1. This criminal revision under Section 397, 401 of Cr.P.C. has been filed against the order dated 4.2.2020 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Joura, District Morena in Sessions Trial No.82/2019 by which the charges under Sections 306, 498-A of IPC have been framed.

2. The applicant No.1 Smt. Rambai is the mother-in-law whereas the applicant No.2 Smt. Poonam is the younger sister-in-law (Devrani), applicant No.3 Ummed Singh is younger brother-in-law (Devar), applicant No.4 Subedar Singh is father-in-law, applicant No.5 Shishupal @ Banti is husband and applicant No.6 Manorama is Nanad.

3. According to the prosecution case, the deceased Mamta was married to the applicant No.5 Shishupal @ Banti in the year 2005. The deceased was having two children, aged about 10 years and another 5 to 6 years. It is alleged that on 11.4.2018, the deceased Smt. Mamta Sikarwar set herself on fire by pouring kerosene oil on her. She was shifted to CHC Joura and her dying declaration was also recorded. In dying declaration, she stated that she had a fight with her mother-in- law (applicant No.1) and younger sister-in-law (applicant No.2). She further stated that because of her quarrel with applicant No.1, applicant No.2 and applicant No.3, she had set herself on fire and only her husband (applicant No.5) had tried to save her. In pre-MLC, smell of kerosene oil from body was detected and she was referred to Higher Centre Forum for treatment. When the deceased was being taken to Delhi she expired on her way and, accordingly, her dead body was taken to District Hospital, Morena from where a marg intimation was sent to the concerning police station. The applicant No.5 was accompanying the deceased on her way to Delhi. The police registered marg and the postmortem of the deceased was got done. The statements of the witnesses were recorded. A container of green colour was seized on the disclosure made by applicant No.5 and the police after completing the investigation filed the charge sheet for offence under Sections 306, 498-A of IPC.

4. The Trial Court by impugned order dated 4.2.2020 framed charges under Sections 306, 498-A of IPC.

5. Challenging the impugned order passed by the Court below, it is submitted by the counsel for the applicants that the marriage was performed about 15 years back. From the dying declaration it is clear that the deceased had committed suicide on the domestic issues and if a person is of a higher sensitive in nature, then the offence under Section 306 of IPC would not be made out.

6. To buttress his contentions, the counsel for the applicants has relied upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 1 SCC 707, Gangula Mohan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in (2010) 1 SCC 750, State of Kerala and others vs. S. Unnikrishnan Nair and others reported in (2015) 9 SCC 639 and this Court in the case of Kalyan Singh vs. State of M.P. reported in 2019 (2) MPLJ (Cri.) 115.

7. Per contra, the counsel for the State as well as the complainant submitted that it is incorrect to say that the deceased committed suicide on the domestic issues. There are specific allegation of harassment. Even the applicants were not providing food to the deceased. Since the deceased was being harassed in her matrimonial house, therefore, a Panchayat was convened and as per the decision of the Panchayat, the deceased was sent to Ahmadabad where applicant No.5 was working. She stayed with applicant No.5 for 5 to 6 months. Thereafter, applicant No.5 ran away after leaving the deceased all alone without leaving any money for her. The deceased informed about her plight and, accordingly, an amount of Rs.2,000/- was deposited in her account by her brother and, accordingly, she somehow managed to come back to Bhind by bus. Thereafter a Panchayat was convened and the applicant No.5 insisted that he would not come to take her but she should be sent to her matrimonial house. Thereafter, the deceased again went to her matrimonial house. However, it is alleged that the applicants started harassing the deceased for bringing the household goods from her parental home and they were pressurizing her to work without providing any food to her. They also used to beat her. It was also alleged that the deceased used to tell the entire story to her siblings but in order to save the pride of the family, she also insisted not to lodge the FIR. About four months prior to the incident, again a Panchayat was convened and the atrocities of the applicants were pointed out. About 10 days prior to the date of incident, the deceased had informed her brother Bablu that she is fed up in her matrimonial house and her in-laws are not providing food to her and they are compelling her to work day and night. Accordingly, Bablu had assured that he would come as early as possible to take her back. On 11.4.2018, her brother Bablu was on his work and at about 12:30, his wife informed that the deceased has set herself on fire. Thereafter, he contacted the applicant No.5 who informed that the injured is inside the hospital and the doctors are not permitting him to go inside the room. Thereafter, the family members of the deceased were informed that the deceased is being shifted to Gwalior and therefore, they came to Gwalior but could not meet them. Later on, they came to know that in-laws of the deceased had taken the dead body of the deceased to Morena hospital. It is submitted that on account of demand of money as well as household articles, the applicants were continuously harassing the deceased and were also not providing food and was compelling her to work in the house day and night, therefore, the deceased committed suicide. Thus it is clear that it is a clear case warranting framing of charge under Section 306 of IPC.

8. Heard the learned counsel for the applicants.

9. Before considering the question as to whether the entire allegations are indicative of commission of an offence of abetment of suicide or not, this Court would like to consider the law governing fields.

10. Section 306 of I.P.C. reads as under :-

“306. Abetment of suicide. —If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

“Abetment” is defined under Section 107 of I.P.C. which reads as under :-

“107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a thing, who—

First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

Explanation 1.—A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing.

Illustration

A, a public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to A that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets by instigation the apprehension of C.

Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2009) 16 SCC 605, while dealing with the term “instigation”, held as under :-

“16................instigation is to goad, urge forward,provoke, incite or encourage to do ‘an act’. To satisfy the requirement of ‘instigation’, though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes ‘instigation’ must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an ‘instigation’ may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.

17. Thus, to constitute ‘instigation’, a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage the doing of an act by the other by ‘goading’ or ‘urging forward’. The dictionary meaning of the word ‘goad’ is ‘a thing that stimulates someone into action; provoke to action or reaction’ ... to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts ”

The Supreme Court in the case of Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal reported in (2012) 9 SCC 734 held as under :-

“17. The offence of abetment by instigation depends upon the intention of the person who abets and not upon the act which is done by the person who has abetted. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid as provided under Section 107 IPC. However, the words uttered in a fit of anger or omission without any intention cannot be termed as instigation. (Vide: State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh ((1991) 3 SCC 1) , Surender v. State of Haryana ((2006) 12 SCC 375, Kishori Lal v. State of M.P.( (2007) 10 SCC 797) and Sonti Rama Krishna v. Sonti Shanti Sree ((2009) 1 SCC 554)

18. In fact, from the above discussion it is apparent that instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of a particular case. No straitjacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether in a particular case there has been instigation which forced the person to commit suicide. In a particular case, there may not be direct evidence in regard to instigation which may have direct nexus to suicide. Therefore, in such a case, an inference has to be drawn from the circumstances and it is to be determined whether circumstances had been such which in fact had created the situation that a person felt totally frustrated and committed suicide. More so, while dealing with an application for quashing of the proceedings, a court cannot form a firm opinion, rather a tentative view that would evoke the presumption referred to under Section 228 CrPC.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar vs. State of M.P. reported in (2002) 5 SCC 371 has held as under :-

“6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing if he firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.”

Further, in para 12 of the judgment, it is held as under: “The word “instigate” denotes incitement or urging to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea, therefore, is the necessary concomitant of instigation.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Gangula Mohan Reddy vs. State of A.P. reported in (2010) I SCC 750 needs mentioned here. In which Hon'ble Apex Court has held that:

“abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing – Without a positive act on part of accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained – In order to convict a person under section 306 IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit offence – It also requires an active act or direct act which leads deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push deceased into such a position that he commits suicide – Also, reiterated, if it appears to Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to society to which victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstances individual in a given society to commit suicide, conscience of Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that accused charged of abetting suicide should be found guilty– Herein, deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord circumstances of case, none of the ingredients of offence under Section 306 made out – Hence, appellant's conviction, held unsustainable”.

In the case of State of W.B. vs. Orilal Jaiswal, reported in 1994 (1) SCC 73 , the Supreme Court has held as under:-

“This Court has cautioned that the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it appears to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that that accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.”

The Supreme Court in the case of M. Mohan vs. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police reported in AIR 2011 SC 1238 has held as under :-

“Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the Legislature is clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306, IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Kishori Lal vs. State of M.P. reported in (2007) 10 SCC 797 has held in para 6 as under:-

“6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in IPC. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word “instigate” literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. “Abetted” in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.”

In the case of Amalendu Pal @ Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal reported in (2010) 1 SCC 707, the Supreme Court has held as under:-

“12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the Court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without their being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.

13. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.

14. The expression ‘abetment’ has been defined under Section 107 IPC which we have already extracted above. A person is said to abet the commission of suicide when a person instigates any person to do that thing as stated in clause firstly or to do anything as stated in clauses secondly or thirdly of Section 107 IPC. Section 109 IPC provides that if the act abetted is committed pursuant to and in consequence of abetment then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. Learned counsel for the respondent State, however, clearly stated before us that it would be a case where clause ‘thirdly’ of Section 107 IPC only would be attracted. According to him, a case of abetment of suicide is made out as provided for under Section 107 IPC.

15. In view of the aforesaid situation and position, we have examined the provision of clause thirdly which provides that a person would be held to have abetted the doing of a thing when he intentionally does or omits to do anything in order to aid the commission of that thing. The Act further gives an idea as to who would be intentionally aiding by any act of doing of that thing when in Explanation 2 it is provided as follows:

“Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”

16. Therefore, the issue that arises for our consideration is whether any of the aforesaid clauses namely firstly alongwith explanation 1 or more particularly thirdly with Explanation 2 to Section 107 is attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case so as to bring the present case within the purview of Section 306 IPC.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapur vs. Ramesh Chander reported in (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under :

35.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of this Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ((2009) 16 SCC 605 to contend that the offence under Section 306 read with Section 107 IPC is completely made out against the accused. It is not the stage for us to consider or evaluate or marshal the records for the purposes of determining whether the offence under these provisions has been committed or not. It is a tentative view that the Court forms on the basis of record and documents annexed therewith. No doubt that the word “instigate” used in Section 107 IPC has been explained by this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh ((2001) 9 SCC 618) to say that where the accused had, by his acts or omissions or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an instigation may have to be inferred. In other words, instigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of the case. All cases may not be of direct evidence in regard to instigation having a direct nexus to the suicide. There could be cases where the circumstances created by the accused are such that a person feels totally frustrated and finds it difficult to continue existence.

Therefore, it is clear that a person can be said to have instigated another person, when he actively suggests or stimulates him by means of language, direct or indirect. Instigate means to goad or urge forward or to provoke, incite, urge or encourage to do an act.

11. If the statement of Bablu is considered, then it is clear that although the marriage of the deceased was performed about 15 years back but for the first five years, she kept properly and thereafter the atrocities of the applicants started. Since the applicant No.5 was working at Ahmadabad, therefore it was decided that the deceased will also be sent to Ahmadabad. At Ahmadabad, the applicant No.5 came back to her house after leaving the deceased all alone without any money and ultimately an amount of Rs.2,000/- was deposited in the account of the deceased and thereafter she came back to Bhind by bus. Again a Panchayat was convened and the applicant No.5 insisted that he would not come to take the deceased back and her siblings may send her to her matrimonial house and, accordingly, the deceased went to her matrimonial house. It is alleged that again the applicants started harassing the deceased by making demand of household articles and they were compelling to work day and night without providing food. Further, in the dying declaration also, the deceased had specifically alleged that she had set herself on fire on account of fight with applicants No.1, 2 and 3. Although in the cause title, the address of applicant No.6 Manorama has been shown to be Dholpur (Rajasthan) but Dholpur is adjoining district of Morena and they are situated at a very close distance, therefore, frequent visit of applicant No.6 to her parental home cannot be ruled out. Further, it is well established principle of law that roving and detailed enquiry is not permissible at the stage of framing of charge and if the allegations prima facie make out even a strong suspicion to the effect that the accused might have committed an offence, then the Court is under obligation to frame charge.

12. The Supreme Court in the case of Soma Chakravarty vs. State (Th. CBI) reported in 2007 AIR SCW 3683 has held as under:-

“20. It may be mentioned that the settled legal position, as mentioned in the above decisions, is that if on the basis of material on record the Court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial.”

The Supreme Court in the case of P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Anr. reported in 2010 CRI. L.J. 1427 has held as under:-

“10. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the Court, after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. In other words, the sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced before the Court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge against him.”

The Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar vs. Ramesh Singh reported in AIR 1977 SC 2018 has held as under:-

“.....Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. …. ”

This Court has thus held that whereas strong suspicion may not take the place of the proof at the trial stage, yet it may be sufficient for the satisfaction of the Trial Judge in order to frame a charge against the accused.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in AIR 1979 SC 366 has held as under:-

“(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out.

(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Niranjan Singh vs. K.S. Punjabi vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya reported in AIR 1990 SC 1869 has held as under:-

“Can he marshal the evidence found on the record of the case and in the documents placed before him as he would do on the conclusion of the evidence adduced by the prosecution after the charge is framed It is obvious that since he is at the stage of deciding whether or not there exists sufficient grounds for framing the charge, his enquiry must necessarily be limited to deciding if the facts emerging from the record and documents constitute the offence with which the accused is charged. At that stage he may sift the evidence for that limited purpose but he is not required to marshal the evidence with a view to separating the grain from the chaff. All that he is called upon to consider is whether there is sufficient ground to frame the charge and for this limited purpose he must weigh the material on record as well as the documents relied on by the prosecution. In the State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (AIR 1977 SC 2018 ) this Court observed that at the initial stage of the framing of a charge if there is a strong suspicion-evidence which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. If the evidence which the prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged by cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (AIR 1979 SC 366 ) this Court after considering the scope of Section 227 observed that the words ‘no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not merely a post office to frame charge at the behest of the prosecution but he has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine that a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. In assessing this fact it is not necessary for the court to enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into weighing and balancing of evidence and probabilities but he may evaluate the material to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value establish the ingredients constituting the said offence.”

The Supreme Court in the case of Shoraj Singh Ahlawat and others Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in AIR 2013 SC 52 has held as under :

11. A plain reading of the above would show that the Court trying the case can direct discharge only for reasons to be recorded by it and only if it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. Section 240 of the Code provides for framing of a charge if, upon consideration of the police report and the documents sent therewith and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which can be adequately punished by him. The ambit of Section 239 CrPC and the approach to be adopted by the Court while exercising the powers vested in it under the said provision fell for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath Mishra and Ors. v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. (2008) 2 SCC 561 . That too was a case in which a complaint under Sections 498- A and 406 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C. was filed against the husband and parents-in-law of the complainant-wife. The Magistrate had in that case discharged the accused under Section 239 of the Cr.P.C, holding that the charge was groundless. The complainant questioned that order before the Revisional Court which directed the trial Court to frame charges against the accused persons. The High Court having affirmed that order, the matter was brought up to this Court. This Court partly allowed the appeal qua the parents-in-law while dismissing the same qua the husband. This Court explained the legal position and the approach to be adopted by the Court at the stage of framing of charges or directing discharge in the following words:

“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. Support for the above view was drawn by this Court from earlier decisions rendered in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy 1997 Cri.LJ 1125, State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors. 1996 Cri.LJ 2448 and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni 2000 Cri.LJ 3504. In Som Nath’s case (supra) the legal position was summed up as under:

“if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. So also in Mohanlal’s case (supra) this Court referred to several previous decisions and held that the judicial opinion regarding the approach to be adopted for framing of charge is that such charges should be framed if the Court prima facie finds that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence as if to determine whether the material produced was sufficient to convict the accused. The following passage from the decision in Mohanlal’s case (supra) is in this regard apposite:

“8. The crystallized judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.”

14. In State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Pandhi(2005) 1 SCC 568, this Court was considering whether the trial Court can at the time of framing of charges consider material filed by the accused. The question was answered in the negative by this Court in the following words:

“18. We are unable to accept the aforesaid contention. The reliance on Articles 14 and 21 is misplaced...Further, at the stage of framing of charge roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. If the contention of the accused is accepted, there would be a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge. That would defeat the object of the Code. It is well-settled that at the stage of framing of charge the defence of the accused cannot be put forth. The acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel for the accused would mean permitting the accused to adduce his defence at the stage of framing of charge and for examination thereof at that stage which is against the criminal jurisprudence. By way of illustration, it may be noted that the plea of alibi taken by the accused may have to be examined at the stage of framing of charge if the contention of the accused is accepted despite the well settled proposition that it is for the accused to lead evidence at the trial to sustain such a plea. The accused would be entitled to produce materials and documents in proof of such a plea at the stage of framing of the charge, in case we accept the contention put forth on behalf of the accused. That has never been the intention of the law well settled for over one hundred years now. It is in this light that the provision about hearing the submissions of the accused as postulated by Section 227 is to be understood. It only means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more. The expression 'hearing the submissions of the accused' cannot mean opportunity to file material to be granted to the accused and thereby changing the settled law. At the state of framing of charge hearing the submissions of the accused has to be confined to the material produced by the police...

xx xx xx xx

23. As a result of aforesaid discussion, in our view, clearly the law is that at the time of framing charge or taking cognizance the accused has no right to produce any material...”

(emphasis supplied)

15. Even in Smt. Rumi Dhar v. State of West Bengal & Anr. (2009) 6 SCC 364, reliance whereupon was placed by counsel for the appellants the tests to be applied at the stage of discharge of the accused person unde Section 239 of the Cr.P.C., were found to be no different. Far from readily encouraging discharge, the Court held that even a strong suspicion in regard to the commission of the offence would be sufficient to justify framing of charges. The Court observed:

“...While considering an application for discharge filed in terms of Section 239 of the Code it was for the learned Judge to go into the details of the allegations made against each of the accused persons so as to form an opinion as to whether any case at all has been made out or not as a strong suspicion in regard thereto shall subserve the requirements of law...

16. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another (1979) 3 SCC 4, where this Court was examining a similar question in the context of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The legal position was summed up as under:

“10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, the following principles emerge :

(1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out:

(2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.

(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused.

(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Judge cannot act merely as a Post Office or a mouth- piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.”

13. Thus this Court is of the considered opinion that there is a sufficient material available on record against the applicants so as to framed charges for offence under Sections 306 and 498-A of IPC. Accordingly, order dated 4.2.2020 passed by First Additional Sessions Judge, Joura, District Morena in S.T. No.82/2019 is hereby affirmed.

14. The revision fails and is hereby dismissed.