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Smt. Meenakshi Gupta And 3 Others v. State Of U.p. And Another

Smt. Meenakshi Gupta And 3 Others v. State Of U.p. And Another

(High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad)

APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 11169 of 2022 | 12-07-2022

Rajeev Misra, J.

1. Heard Anil Kumar Pathak, learned counsel for applicants, learned A.G.A. for State and Chandra Pratap Singh, learned counsel representing opposite party 2.

2. Perused the record.

3. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed challenging charge sheet No. 158 of 2011 dated 19.12.2011 submitted in Case Crime No. 330 of 2011, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 B IPC P.S. Kotwali, District Kanpur Nagar, Cognizance Taking Order dated 18.01.2012 passed by Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar upon aforesaid charge sheet, as well as entire proceedings of consequential Case No. 30 of 2012 (State Vs. Smt. Meenakshi and others) now pending in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate IIIrd, Kanpur Nagar.

4. Record shows that first informant opposite party 2 Suresh Kumar lodged an F.I.R. dated 31.12.2011, which was registered as Case Crime No. 330 of 2011, under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 B IPC P.S. Kotwali, District Kanpur Nagar. In the aforesaid F.I.R. five persons namely Smt. Meenakshi Gupta, Ghanshyam Das Gupta, Smt. Kiran Gupta, Pradeep Kumar Gupta and Shankar Gupta have been nominated as named accused.

5. After registration of aforementioned F.I.R. Investigating Officer proceeded with statutory investigation of concerned Case Crime Number in terms of Chapter XII Cr. P. C. During the course of investigation, Investigating Officer examined first informant and other witnesses under Section 161 Cr. P. C. Witnesses so examined have supported the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. On the basis of above and other material collected by Investigating Officer during course of investigation, he came to the conclusion that complicity of named accused is established in the crime in question. Accordingly, Investigating Officer submitted the charge sheet dated 19.12.20211, whereby applicants have been charge sheeted under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 B IPC.

6. Upon submission of aforesaid charge-sheet, cognizance was taken upon same by Court concerned, vide Cognizance Taking Order dated 18.1.2012. As a consequence of above, criminal case No. 30 of 2012 (State Vs. Smt. Meenakshi and others) came to be registered in the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate IIIrd, Kanpur Nagar.

7. Feeling aggrieved by above, applicants, who are charge sheeted accused, have now approached this Court by means of present application under Section 482 Cr. P. C.

8. Learned counsel for applicants contends that dispute between the parties is a purely private dispute. During pendency of above mentioned criminal case before Court below, parties have amicably settled their dispute. On the basis of settlement so arrived at between parties, a joint compromise deed was filed before Court below. A certified copy of the same has been brought on record as Annexure 7 to the affidavit filed in support of present application.

9. On the aforesaid premise, it is urged that once parties have entered into a compromise, no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging proceedings of above mentioned criminal case. Interest of justice shall better be served in case, entire proceedings of above mentioned criminal case are quashed by this Court itself in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P. C, instead of relegating the parties to Court below.

10. Mr. Chandra Pratap Singh, learned counsel for informant opposite party 2 does not oppose the present application. He has invited the attention of Court to the compromise deed dated 27.01.2012 jointly filed by the parties, wherein the factum of compromise entered into between the parties has been admitted. He further contends that once first informant/opposite party 2 has compromised with accused applicants, then in that eventuality he cannot have any grievance in case proceedings of above mentioned criminal case are quashed by this Court.

11. Learned A.G.A. does not oppose this application. He contends that dispute between parties is basically a private dispute. Parties have already compromised which has also been acted upon and verified by Court below. As such, no ground exists to continue the prosecution of applicant.

12. It is also contended by learned A.G.A. that once first informant/opposite party-2 has himself compromised with accused applicant, then in that eventuality, he cannot have any objection, in case entire proceedings of above mentioned criminal case are quashed by this Court.

13. This Court is not unmindful of the following judgements of Apex Court:

1. B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC 675 [LQ/SC/2003/383] .

2. Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[2008)9 SCC 677] [LQ/SC/1997/1447] .

3. Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others ( 2008) 16 SCC 1 [LQ/SC/2008/2084] .

4. Shiji @ Pappu and Others VS. Radhika and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 705.

5. Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 [LQ/SC/2012/838 ;] ">(2012) 10 SCC 303 [LQ/SC/2012/838 ;] [LQ/SC/2012/838 ;] .

6. K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226 [LQ/SC/2013/228] .

7. Dimpey Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory through Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2013) 11 SCC 497 [LQ/SC/2012/1090] .

8. Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab ( 2014) 6 SCC 466 [LQ/SC/2014/327] .

9. Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and another (2014) 9 SCC 653 [LQ/SC/2014/734] .

10. C.B.I. Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389 [LQ/SC/2015/1102] .

11. C.B.I. Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 350 [LQ/SC/2017/296] .

12. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641 [LQ/SC/2017/1450] .

13. Anita Maria Dias and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2018) 3 SCC 290 [LQ/SC/2018/76] .

14. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar and Another Vs. Union of India and others, (2018) 10 SCC, 443 [LQ/SC/2000/1297] (Constitution Bench).

15. State of M.P. VS. Dhruv Gurjar and Another, (2019) 5 SCC 570 [LQ/SC/2019/345] .

16. State of M.P. V/s Laxmi Narayan & Ors., (2019) 5 SCC 688 [LQ/SC/2019/430 ;] ">(2019) 5 SCC 688 [LQ/SC/2019/430 ;] [LQ/SC/2019/430 ;] .

17. Rampal Vs. State of Haryana, AIR online 2019 SC 1716.

18. Arun Singh and Others VS. State of U.P. and Another (2020) 3 SCC 736 [LQ/SC/2020/208 ;] ">(2020) 3 SCC 736 [LQ/SC/2020/208 ;] [LQ/SC/2020/208 ;] .

19. Criminal Appeal No. 1489 of 2012 (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.), 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834.

14. wherein the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be made between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non compoundable offences. However, Apex Court in State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra) that no compromise can be made in respect of offences against society as they are not private in nature. Similarly in Ram Pal Vs. State of Haryana (Supra) it has been held that no compromise can be made in cases relating to rape and sexual assault. Reference may also be made to the decision given by this Court in Shaifullah and others Vs. State of U.P. And another [2013 (83) ACC 278] in which the law expounded by the Apex court in some of the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.

15. Recently Apex court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur (Supra) has laid down the following guideline with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings as well compromise in criminal proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10, which read as under:

"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions.

16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."

16. Recently in Ramgopal and another (supra), Court has again reiterated the guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-

"18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.

19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences 'compoundable' within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations."

17. Considering the facts and circumstances of case, submissions made by counsel for parties and the material on record, this court is of considered opinion that dispute between parties is a purely private dispute and not a crime against society. Moreover, during pendency of present application, parties have already compromised their dispute. Compromise so entered into by parties have been acted upon and verified by Court below. As such, no difference exists between parties. Consequently, no useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of above mentioned case. In view of compromise entered into by the parties, chances of conviction of accused applicant is remote and bleak. As such continuation of proceedings would itself cause injustice to parties. The trial would only entail loss of judicial time in a futile pursuit particularly when torrents of litigation drown the courts with an unimaginable flood of dockets.

18. In view of above, aforementioned applications succeed and are liable to be allowed. Consequently, entire proceedings of Case Crime No. 330 of 2011,, as well as entire proceedings of consequential Case No. 30 of 2012 (State Vs. Smt. Meenakshi and others), arising out of aforementioned case crime number 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 B IPC P.S. Kotwali, District Kanpur Nagar,, now pending in Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate IIIrd, Kanpur Nagar, are, hereby, quashed.

19. Aforesaid applications are, accordingly, allowed.

20. Cost made easy.

Advocate List
  • Anil Kumar Pathak

  • G.A.,Chandra Pratap Singh

Bench
  • Hon'ble Justice Rajeev Misra
Eq Citations
  • LQ
  • LQ/AllHC/2022/14796
Head Note

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashing of criminal proceedings — Dispute between parties is a purely private dispute and not a crime against society — During pendency of present application, parties have already compromised their dispute — Compromise so entered into by parties have been acted upon and verified by Court below — No difference exists between parties — No useful purpose shall be served by prolonging the proceedings of above mentioned case — In view of compromise entered into by parties, chances of conviction of accused applicants is remote and bleak — As such continuation of proceedings would itself cause injustice to parties — Trial would only entail loss of judicial time in a futile pursuit particularly when torrents of litigation drown the courts with an unimaginable flood of dockets — Entire proceedings of case crime No. 330 of 2011, as well as entire proceedings of consequential Case No. 30 of 2012 (State Vs. Smt. Meenakshi and others), arising out of aforementioned case crime number 420, 467, 468, 471, 120 B IPC P.S. Kotwali, District Kanpur Nagar, now pending in Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate IIIrd, Kanpur Nagar, quashed .