N.N. Mithal, J.This F.A.F.O. is directed against the order of the court below granting probate to the widow of the deceased testator. The Respondent No. 1 had applied for grant of probate of the will of her late husband u/s 276 of Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) which was contested by the Appellant before the court below. Parties are admittedly Indian Christians and Sri. P.I. Thakur Dass is said to have died on 2-12-62. He had executed a will on 18th July, 1957 which was propounded to be the last will executed by him. In her application the widow claimed to be one of the beneficiaries under the will and the opposite parties were the sons and daughters of the deceased. The court below, on the evidence before it came to the Conclusion that the will in question had been duly executed by late Sri. P.I. Thakur Dass in a proper state of mind and after fully understanding the same in the presence of the attesting witness. The court, therefore, granted probate of the will dated 18th July, 1957. Aggrieved by this order, the Appellant has come up in appeal.

2. At the very outset Sri. A.K. Banerji appearing for the Appellant has contended that no probate could be granted in the present case as nobody had been appointed as an executor under the will and only Letters of Administration could have been granted to her in view of Section 234 of the Act.

3. It may be recalled that there was a fire in the record room of the District Judge, Allahabad and it has been reported that the entire record of this case had been burnt at that time. This Court therefore, directed reconstruction of the material parts of the record and this has since been done and the parties have filed their paper books containing the necessary pleadings, documents and copies of statements, etc. The Respondents in their paper book have filed the copy of the petition for the grant of probate in para. 5 whereof the Petitioner has claimed herself to be only a beneficiary under the will. In the main petition also there is no allegation anywhere that she had been appointed an executor under the will. On this basis it is sought to be argued that no probate could be granted to Respondent No. 1. He has referred to Sections 222 and 276(1)(e) of the Succession Act in this connection. Section 276 provides for the manner in which an application for grant of probate or for letters of administration should be made. Sub-clause (e) of Sub-section (1) thereof provides that a petition for grant of probate must state therein that he/or she was an executor appointed under the will. This provision is mandatory and in the absence of such an averment the petition was liable to be rejected. Section 222 of the Act also provides that probate of the will can be granted only to an executor of the will. Thus Sections 222 and 276(1)(e) read together lay down that probate can be granted only to an executor named in the will and the fact that the applicant was such an executor must be stated in the application.

4. It appears that such a defect was never pointed out earlier nor any such issue was raised in the court below. In this Court a certified copy of the will has been filed by the Respondent before me which shows that the applicant has been appointed as an executrix therein. The actual words used in Paragraph of the will are; "till such time as my wife Sushila is alive as my survivor even if my son Ajit attains majority, she is the sole owner and chief executrix of every thing mentioned above...... without the consent of my son Ajit."

5. From a perusal of above paragraph of the will it does appear that the (SIC)estator had expressly appointed the applicant as an executor of his will. Apart from this along with the application for grant of probate an affidavit of valuation was filed in which it was stated that the applicant was an executor under the will. It is urged by the Appellant that these words appear to have been copied out from the form which is prescribed under the Court-fees Act and and such it cannot be said that the word executor had, in fact, been used by the applicant in the original application. As the original record has been destroyed in a fire I have no means of ascertaining whether a printed form of affidavit had been used by the applicant. No such objection had been taken in the trial court where it was possible to examine this aspect. Now I do not consider that it would be proper for me to hold otherwise. I would, therefore, treat that such an alteration was consciously made in the affidavit. Since this affidavit forms part of the main petition it must be held that there was substantial compliance of the legal requirements of Section 276(1)(e) of the Act.

6. It was next ursed that the original will had not been placed on record and the document filed in the case was not admissible in evidence. No probate, therefore, could be granted in respect of that will. The basis of this argument is a stray mention in the statement of the applicant herself that two wills were executed simultaneously and only one of them which is Ex. 1 on record was handed over to her by her late husband. The words true copy had been noted by her husband at the time of handing over Ex. 1 to her and the endorsement was also initialled by him. On this basis it was urged that Ex. 1 was merely a copy of the original will and unless loss of the original will was proved no secondary evidence of the same would be admissible. However, this does not appear to be correct. The applicant does not claim to have been present when the will was executed. She only stated that two wills were executed. The first copy was given to their son Aiit and the carbon impression was handed over to her. At the time of handing over the deceased had mentioned the words true copy on it and put his initials also. The attesting witnesses have, however, stated that both the wills containing identical matter had been executed simultaneously by the testator and were duly attested by them. If the will was prepared in this manner and both of them were duly signed by the testator and also attested by witnesses of the same then both of them would be originals and either of them could be vised as primary evidence. The mere fact that on one of such original wills the words true copy have been subsequently ap pended bv the testator (after the same had been executed in accordance with law) would not turn it into a mere copy of the original. It will still remain to be the original will in view of Section 62 of the Evidence Act.

7. Sri. A.K. Banerji, however, contends that Ex. 1 cannot be accepted in evidence in view of Section 62 of the Evidence Act. According to him before such a document is accepted in evidence it ought to have been prepared by some uniform process and the whole of the document must have been reproduced by the very same process. Since Ex. 1 admittedly had the signatures of the testator as well as the attesting witnesses apart from the endorsement, it cannot be said to have been prepared by uniform process in its entirety. In this connection he has referred to T. Sivasankaram Pillai Vs. Agali Narayana Rao, where a learned single Judge of Madras High Court held:

In order to bring the document within the meaning of Expl. 2 to Section 62, Evidence Act, the whole document with the signature must have been made by one uniform process. As only after the contents of the letter had been typed out B signed the document which was addressed to the Government and then initialled Ext. A. which was kept to the Taluk Board Office, the signature on the document addressed to the Government and the initials in Ext. A could not be said to have been made by one uniform process within the meaning of that Section. The document sent to the Government must be treated as the original as it constituted the communication between the Government and B and that therefore, Ex. A produced bv the Taluk Board Office, was not admissible in evidence. being a copy of the original which was not admissible as being privileged document u/s 124 of the Evidence Act.

8. He has also relied upon Makhan Lal Sen Gupta Vs. The State, in which a Division Bench of Calcutta High court held:

A carbon copy of a search list with certain ink writings on it is not admissible u/s 62. When a mere glance of the document would show that even apart from the ink writings the whole of it could not have been made by one uniform process, it would not satisfy the requirements of Section 62 and other Sections of Evidence Act.

However none of these decisions really throws any light on the question involved here, nor any of them can be an authority for the proposition as contended by Sri. Banerji for the simple reason that the will Ex. 1 is not a copy at all. In fact, the above two wills in identical language were prepared by the process of typing in which the second copy was obtained by a carbon impression. Both these wills having identical language were duly executed by the testator and also attested by the attesting witnesses in accordance with law. In these circumstances, none of them can be said to be a copy of the other within the meaning of Section 62 of the Evidence Act and both of them must be treated as the original wills. Merely because the contents of one of such original wills were obtained through the use of carbon paper, the one prepared on the carbon impression will not become a copy and this alone should not make any difference. Once we find that each of the two wills are separately executed, each one of them must be deemed to be the original will.

9. Under these circumstances, the argument of Sri. Banerji does not appear to be sound and has to be rejected.

10. Besides the above, the Appellant herself has admitted that the will dated 18-7-1957 Ex. 1 bears the signature of her father. She has not seriously questioned the due execution of the will nor does she contend that no will was executed at all. All that is questioned is that this will had been cancelled and another will was executed some times in 1963. but this fact has not been proved on the record. On the evidence, therefore, it is clear that the will in question had been duly executed by the deceased testator while he had a proper disposing mind and the same had been executed in accordance with law. In the circumstances, the argument of the Appellant that the will was not legally admissible in evidence cannot be sustained and is hereby rejected.

11. It was next urged that no application for probate can be allowed if it were only in respect of a part of the property devised under the will. The will, probate of which is sought, must be treated as one single indivisible document and the Petitioner cannot be allowed to pick and choose the properties and claim probate in respect of some and to leave the rest. There is force in the contention, for, if a contrary view is taken, the result may be drastic. No one will then seek probate in respect of the entire property bequeathed under the will but may choose the least valuable or insignificant item of the properties bequeathed under the will and leave the rest. This could not be the purpose of the Act.

12. Although u/s 211 of the Succession Act, the entire property of the testator vests in the executor or administrator appointed under the will and in law, he is the legal representative of the deceased person for all purposes and he is entitled to administer the properties in any manner that he desires but once he decides to obtain probate of the will, he must do so in respect of the entire property devised under the will. Obtaining of probate may become necessary in order to establish any right in the property of the, deceased or to establish executors own right as an executor or as a legatee under Sections 212 and 213 of the Act. We should also consider Section 19-I of the Court-fees Act (as amended in U.P.) which reads as follows:

19-I. No order entitling the Petitioner to the grant of probate or letters of administration shall be made upon an application for such grant until the Petitioner has filed in the Court, in the form set forth in the third Schedule, a valuation, according to the market rates current on the date of the application of ah assets and liabilities of the deceased in India at the time of the latters death, and the Court is satisfied that the fee mentioned in Article 11 of the First Schedule has been paid on such valuation,

Explanation:- If at the time of his death, the deceased was a member of a joint Hindu family governed by Mitakshara Law, such portion of the assets and liabilities of the family as would have been allotted to the deceased in a partition made immediately before his death, shall be deemed to be the assets and liabilities of the deceased within the nietyning of this Sub-section.

(2) The grant of probate or letters of administration shall not be delayed by reason of any motion made by the Collector u/s 19-H, Sub-section (4).

13. Article 11 of Schedule I provides that when the total value of the assets increases, the court-fee payable also increases. In Schedule III form of valuation provided for mentioning moveable and Immovable property of the deceased refers to all the properties which the testator possessed of and the market value thereof will form the basis of the valuation of the probate. These provisions in the Court-fees Act, therefore, make it necessary for the grant of probate giving of full details of the properties with their market value as on the date of the application and to pay the court-fee thereon in accordance with Article 11 of Schedule I.

14. The learned Counsel for the Respondents, however, urges that it is only the Immovable property which really belonged to the testator at the time of his death. In the will the mention about the fixed deposit was incorrect and the money lying therein belonged not to the testator but to the Petitioner herself. In view of this, he urged that it would be improper to require her to pay any court-fee or to mention this property in the schedule of the deceaseds property. This is, however, not correct. The probate of the will has to be granted in respect of the entire property of the deceased which the deceased was possessed of at the time of his death. All the assets have to be included in the schedule required to be filed u/s 19I of the Court-fees Act. The mere fact that the Petitioner lays claim to one of the items of the property mentioned in the will, will not entitle the Petitioner to exclude such property from the schedule. It is well established that the jurisdiction of the Probate Court is limited only to the consideration of the validity of the will and it cannot concern itself with the disputed questions of title to the property which must be decided by a regular civil court.

15. In a very well discussed case reported in Vrandavanla Goverdhanlal Pitti and Another Vs. Kamala Bai Goverdhanlal and Others, , a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court expressed itself thus:

There is no section in the Succession Act dealing specifically with grants in respect of a portion of the estate of a particular item of property, it is, therefore, clear that where a probate of a will is applied for, it must be of the entire estate which, under the will, vests in the executor, unless of course the court grants it subject to an exception.

The general rule is that a probate should be granted in respect of the entire estate of the deceased because u/s 211 the entire estate of the deceased vests in the executor appointed by the will. It is only in special circumstances that a probate in respect of a portion of the property can be justified.

16. In the instant case in the application for grant of probate schedule showed only residential house at Stanley Road, Allahabad but makes no mention of the fixed deposit amount of Rs. 40,000/- which was claimed as her own by the Petitioner. This cannot be done and the argument of Sri. Banerji to this extent is correct that the application for probate was defective inasmuch as it was not for the entire property left by the deceased. Shri S.N. Verma, learned Counsel for the Respondent, however, made a statement that his client be permitted to correct the application and to pay the additional court-fee. This cannot be done by this Court now as the probate has already been issued to the Respondent. The court below, however, is directed to entertain the application of the Petitioner Respondent for amendment of the schedule after she first surrenders probate already granted to her and to grant her an opportunity of paying the additional court-fee. After this has been done, the probate may be granted afresh to her. The question whether the deposit of Rs. 40,000/- belonged to the deceased or not will remain open and may be got decided on the regular side in the civil court by any of the parties.

17. In view of the above the appeal fails on all substantial grounds but has to be allowed only on a technical ground, as above, and I order accordingly. The matter will now go down to the lower court with a direction that it shall readmit the application at its original number and after the Petitioner has surendered the original probate granted to her before it the Respondent No. 1 may apply for amendment of the petition and to pay requisite court-fee thereon. After this has been done, the court may grant a fresh probate to the Petitioner without permitting the parties to adduce any further evidence either oral or documentary on any other points in the light of my decision on the points raised before me in this appeal.

18. In the circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their own costs in this Court.