1. This revision under Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. 1958 (for short the Act) challenges the judgment and order of the Additional Controller dt. 16th Jan. 1982 dismissing the petitioners application for eviction of the respondent.

2. Briefly the facts are that on l2th Oct. 1978 the petitioners filed an applition for eviction on the ground mentioned in S. 14 (l) (e) of the Act. They have alleged that the respondent has been their tenant in a portion on ground floor of Property No. 6404/2, Block 7b (popularly known as Block No. 7) Gali No. 4, Ward No. XVI. Dey Nagor. Karol Bagh. New Delhi on a monthly rent of Rupees 400. 00 excluding water and electricity charges since 21st August. 1973 vide a rent note executed by him. that petitioner No. 1 is the owner-landlord while petitioner No. 2 is also the landlady of the premises which were let for residential purposes, that the same are required bona fide by them for occupation as residence for themselves and family members dependent upon them. that they have no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation. It has also been alleged that the family of petitioner No. 1 comprises of himself, his wife (petitioner No. 2) five daughters out of which two are married having children. three sons of marriageable age. that the married daughters visit the petitioners and they have only first floor and mezzanine floor of the said property which is insufficient for their requirements. that petitioner No. 1 is employed as C. P. W. D. Engineer drawing Rs. 1540. 00 per month and his sons are also employed, that the respondent with his family was residing in the premises and had acquired vacant possession of premises No. 131, Main Market. Shanker Road, New Rajinder Nagar. New Delhi where he had removed all his household goods and his family had shifted there in Aug. 1978. that his mother alone is in occupation of the suit premises. They also allege that the father of the petitioner No. 1 had taken the plot on lease from the Delhi Improvement Trust, that he constructed a house and in a family partition the suit property had fallen to the share of petitioner No. 1.

3. The respondent under S. 25-B (4) of the Act made an application for leave to contest but it was dismissed by the Additional Controller. On revision this Court in C. R. NO. 94 of 1979 by judgment dt. 7th August. 1979* granted leave to the respondent to contest the eviction application.

4. The respondent in his written statement dt. 4th September, 1979 has pleaded that the premises were let both for residential and commercial purposes and have been used as such from the commencement of the tenancy, that he was a tenant on the first floorat "reported in (1979) 16 Delhi LT 142. Rs. 330. 00 per month, and later on he became a tenant on the ground floor at Rs. 400. 00 per month, that the tenancy was contracted through a property broker, that the buildings in the area where the suit property is situated are being used both for residential and commercial purpose that (he rent note dt. 21st August. 1973 was a forged document. that a stamp paper for the execution of a rent note with respect to premises on first floor was purchased by him on 21st June. 1973. that. he put his signatures on the blank stamp paper. It has been further pleaded that the petitioners are in possession of first floor and second floor of the suit property. and even if they are not in possession of the second floor, the accommodation on first floor is sufficient for them, that the petitioners are not owners, that petitioner No. 2 alone ,is his landlady that their family members are not dependent upon them. that all five daughters have been married and were living with their husbands. The other pleas raised in the written statement are now not in dispute.

5. In the replication the petitioners have pleaded that the respondent was tenant on first floor for a period of two months from 21st June. 1973 with respect to which no rent note was executed, that the rent note dt. 21st August, 1973 was executed by the respondent and attested by witnesses with respect to the premises on ground floor. It has been denied that the respondent signed the blank stamp paper. It has been pleaded that the premises wore not let through any property broker. All other allegations made by the respondent are denied by the petitioners.

6. The Additional Controller dismissed the eviction application holding that the premises were let both for residential and commercial purposes and hence Sec. 14 (1) (e) of the Act was not applicable and even if applicable the petitioners failed to prove, their bona fide requirement and were in possession of sufficient accommodation. The Additional Controller has held that the family of the petitioners consists of six members i. e. the two petitioners, their two sons and two unmarried daughters, that the entire first floor is with them. that the second floor was lying locked which was let to Shri Garg or his wife who has been allotted Government accommodation but no eviction proceedings were pending against her that the second floor was vacant.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned judgment is not in accordance with law and therefore liable to be quashed under Section 25-B (8) of the Act. He submits that the judgment is based on misreading or ignoring the documentary and oral evidence, that the evidence of the respondent beyond pleadings has been looked into, that respondent did not cross-examine petitioner No. 1 and his witnesses on material points and therefore he is deemed to have accepted the version of the petitioner, that various observations and findings of the Additional Controller are not based on evidence on record and in any case they are perverse, that the Additional Controller based his iudgment on the inspection note of the premises visited by him on 14th January. 1982 contrary to reliable evidence on record. He further submits that the impugned judgment is contrary to all basic principles of law and the approach of the Additional Controller in writing the iudgment has resulted in miscarriage of iustice and prejudice to the petitioners.

8. Section 14 (1) (e) of the Act is as under:

"14 (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant; Provided that the. Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only. namely: (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him. if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose, benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation : Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, "premises let for residential purposes," include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes. "

9. As regards ownership of the suit property, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the plot of land was leased to the father of petitioner No. 1 by the Delhi Improvement Trust and he constructed a residential house, that in a family partition the said property was allotted to petitioner No. 1. Ex. A. W. 1/10 dt. 15th March. 1954 is the lease -deed with respect to the plot of land executed between the Delhi Improvement Trust and Shri Ranjit Singh (A. W. 3) father of petitioner No. 1. The area of the plot according to lease deed is 83 sq. yards. Ex. A. W. 1/18 is the registered partition deed dt. 21st August, 1965 executed between the petitioner No. 1, his father and other family members by which the property was allotted to the petitioner No. 1. The ownership of petitioner No. 1 is thus proved. Learned counsel for the respondent also has not seriously contested this point.

10. The petitioner No. 1 has appeared as A. W. 1. His family according to his statement consists of himself, his wife (petitioner No. 2). three sons of marriageable age. two married daughters and three unmarried daughters. The married daughters have three children and are settled in Delhi. It is admitted that eldest son of the petitioners died in December, 1982 during the pendency of this revision petition, and he was employed as Assistant Engineer in U. P. The other two sons are aged 24 and 22 years who are of marriageable age. that unmarried daughters are studying in M. A. Initially there were three unmarried daughters but it is admitted that one of them has since been married. Petitioner No. 1 has deposed that he has no drawing or dining room and !iis monthly salary is Rs. 1600. 00 that his sons and daughters are dependent upon him for residence.

11. According to the petitioners the existing accommodation fit for residential purposes consists of only first floor as shown in the plan Ex. A. W. 1/1. although they are in possession of the mezzanine floor also. The area of the plot is 83 sq. yards. It is a two and a half storeyed building. The first floor consists of verandah, measuring 13. 6" x 4. 6", one room 13. 6" 7. 0" second room 136". x 10-0". and third room ll-0"x 8. 0" besides kitchen. It is obvious on a reference to the plan that there is only one entrance for all the rooms on first floor, and it cannot be used by two couples as the rooms have no independent entrance. The mezzanine floor has two rooms and their height is only 6. The mezzanine floor is being used as stores only. Otherwise also the accommodation of mezzanine floor is not habitable. The Delhi Municipal Corporation (Building) Bye-laws 1959 prescribe requirements regarding minimum size of a habitable room and it is provided therein that no habitable room shall have a floor area of less than 100 sq. ft. The mezzanine floor thus cannot be said to be a habitable place specially when the height of the rooms is 6 feet only. The Additional Controller has also observed that the mezzanine floor is not habitable. In Bulaki Ram v. Suraj Bhan, 1982 Rajdhani LR 93: (AIR 1982 Delhi 117) it has been observed that mezzanine floor even though big in size cannot be looked upon as a living room.

12. Petitioner No. 1 as A. W. 1 has deposed that Smt. Hari Ram Garg has been a tenant on the second floor. Her name is Kela Devi. The second floor as per said plan consists of two rooms, tin shed, kitchen, bath and W. C. He has deposed that the plan is correct according to site. No other plan has been filed by the respondent. The Additional Controllter has observed that the plan is not correct. But it is not disclosed by the respondent in what manner the plan is wrong. The Additional Controller has thus wrongly held the plan to be wrong. Petitioner No. 1 while in the witness box was not cross-examined, that the petitioners were in possession of the second floor. The Additional Controller inspected the premises and has wrongly observed that the second floor was with the petitioners. There is neither any plea nor evidence that tenant of the second floor ever surrendered the tenancy or possession to the petitioners. The plea of the respondent in his written statement is that the first floor and the second floor are in possession of the petitioners. He has further pleaded that even if the second floor is not in their possession, the accommodation on the first floor is sufficient for them. The respondent changed his defence. In the written statement he has pleaded that the second floor was in the occupation of the petitioner but as a witness he has deposed that there was tenant on second floor who vacated the same subsequently. The case of the petitioners has always been that they have not been in possession of the second floor which has been in possession of the tenant. The Additional Controller has observed that Smt. Garg has been allotted Government accommodation and is residing there and that no eviction proceedings were initiated by the petitioners against her. These observations are based on the statement of the respondent, but there was no such plea in the written statement. This part of the defence was never put forward to petitioner NO. 1 during his cross-exa- mination. In M/s. Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath v. Hartfrod Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1958 Punj 440 it has been observed as under (para 14):

"it is a well established rule of evidence that a party should put to each of his opponents witnesses so much of his case as concerns that particular witness. If no such questions are put. the Courts presume that the witness account has been accepted. If it is intended to suggest that a witness was not speaking the truth upon a particular point, his attention must first be directed to the fact by cross-examination so that he may have an opportunity of giving an explanation. "

13. I do not appreciate how the Additional Controller held that the second floor was lying vacant and at the same time held that Kela Devi was tenant on the second floor who has shifted to the Government allotted accommodation. The question is whether the tenancy of the second floor was ever surrendered or possession delivered to the petitioner. There is neither any plea nor evidence to that effect. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that he made application before the Additional Controller for further cross-examination of the petitioner No. 1 and also for amendment of the written statement to plead vacation of the second floor by the tenant and its availability for residence to the petitioners. These applications were filed in October. 1980 and May. 1981. The contents of these applications were denied by the petitioners. These applications were dismissed by the Additional Controller. The purpose of these applications is that the second floor has become available to the petitioner for residence. These facts are denied by the petitioners. But assuming that the second floor has also been made available to the petitioners. I am of the opinion, that the accommodation on first floor and the second floor together is insufficient for the petitioners and their family. I am. therefore of the opinion that the petitioners have in their possession only the first floor premises.

14. The next question is that accommodation is required by the petitioners. There is no dispute that the petitioners family now consists of themselves, their two sons and two unmarried daughters besides three married daughters having children. The two petitioners require one bedroom, two sons and two daughters also require four bedrooms. The two sons are of marriageable age and the unmarried daughters are students of college. Both daughters who study in college require separate rooms. The petitioners also require a guest room for married daughters as and when they visit them. The petitioners also require dining room and drawing room. They have got first floor in their occupation which can be used only by one couple. Even if it is assumed as suggested by the respondent, that second floor is in possession of the petitioners or they can obtain possession by claiming eviction of the tenant on second floor as that tenant has been allotted Government accommodation. the premises with the petitioners consisting of first floor and the second floor would not be sufficient for their needs. The requirement of a drawing room and a dining room cannot be said to be unreasonable. Petitioner No. 1 is an Engineer and his sons and daughters are also educated. In Jagan Nath v. Tribeni Devi. 1970 Ren CR 767 (Delhi), it has been held that additional accommodation required by the family for drawing and dining room which the family was not accustomed to previously is reasonable and bona fide.

15. The sons and daughters of the petitioners are dependent upon them for residence. They are not in a position to establish a separate residence. In Govind Dass v. Kuldip Singh, AIR 1971 Delhi 151 it has been held by the Division Bench that the meaning of the word dependent as used is S. 14 (1) (e) of the Act is not restricted to persons financially dependent but is comprehensive enough to include persons who are dependent on landlord for residential accommodation. In Krishan Kumar v. Vimla Sehgal, 1976 Ben CR 249 it has been observed that the landlord cannot be asked to put up with limited accommodation in his possession and huddle his son and daughter together. It has also been observed that if the landlord- requires one separate room for each member of his family including himself and his wife. his requirement cannot be said to be unreasonable. In Bulaki Ram (AIR 1982 Delhi 117) (supra) it has-also been observed that married daughters requirement who may be visiting the parents also needs consideration while determining the requirement. Similar observations were also made by this court in S. B. Khanna v. Trilok Nath, 1980 Rajdhani LR 187. The requirement of the petitioners is thus of eight rooms.

16. The next question is: Whether there is relationship of landlord and tenant between petitioner No. 1 and the respondent It is admitted that petitioner No. 2 is his landlady. The entire evidence on record has been read with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. The respondent has only examined himself. His statement does not inspire any confidence. To say the least he has no regard for truth. There is admittedly documentary evidence to the effect that the first floor was let by the petitioner No. 1 to him on 21st June. 1973. for residential purposes but while appearing as a witness, the respondent has deposed that the first floor premises were let to him for residential-cum-commercial purposes. In this connection reference may be made to the counterfoil of the rent receipt dated 21-6-1973 and writing on its back Ex. A. W. 1/14 and Ex. A. W. 1/15. The counterfoil and the writing on its back bear initials of the respondent which are admitted by him. Ex. A. W. 1/15 the writing on the back of the counterfoil dated 21st Juno, 1973 reads as under : "premises with fittings taken on rent for residence on first floor from owner Shri S. K. Gupta at Rs. 330. 00 per month excluding water and electricity charges". This writing proves that petitioner No. 1 was the owner-landlord of the respondent. While appearing as A. W. 1 respondent has deposed as follows:

"initially I took on rent the first floor of the suit premises on 21st June. 1973 at monthly rent of Rs. 330. 00. The said portion was taken on rent for residential-cum-commercial purposes".

This is only one glaring example of the respondent to show that he has no regard for truth. Ex. A. W. 1/16 is the counterfoil of the receipt dated 21st July, 1973 for first floor in respect of rent for one month from 21st July. 1973 to 20th August. 1973. Ex. A. W. 1/17 is the writing on the back of this receipt by which vacant possession of first floor was delivered by the respondent to S. K. Gupta owner-petitioner No. 1. Thus it can be held on the basis of these two counterfoils and the admitted writing on the back of these counterfoils that petitioner No. 1 was the landlord of the respondent with respect to first floor. The question however is whether petitioner is the landlord with respect to premises on the ground floor. Another question which is crucial for decision is: What was the purpose of letting The two questions i. e. relationship of landlord and tenant and the purpose of letting can be dealt with together as the documentary evidence is common.

17. The case of the respondent is that the premises were let for residential and commercial purposes and has been used as such from the commencement of the tenancy. It is in evidence that the respondent was only liaison officer for various firms UP to June, 1975 and he started his business at Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi from 1st July. 1975. He has not produced any documentary or oral evidence except his own statement in support of his case. He, as a witness, has deposed that the premises on ground floor were let to him for residential and commercial purposes. Petitioner No. 1 who has appeared as A. W. 1 has deposed that initially the first floor was let for residence and from 21st August. 1973 the ground floor was let for residential purposes alone and at the time of letting ground floor the respondent had executed the rent note in his presence and it was attested by the witnesses, that the respondent has been using the premises for residential purpose, that the lease in respect of the plot over which the suit house was built is for residential purposes alone. Clauses 4 (a) and 4 (c) of the lease deed dated 15th March. 1954 Ex. A. W. 1/10 provide that the lessee shall erect a residential house on the plot and further the lessee shall not use the said land and the building for any other purpose than the purpose of residential house Petitioner No. 1 hs further deposed that the rent note was got typed by the respondent. It was read out and explained to him in the presence of the attesting witnesses and then it was signed by him. The question is: Whether the respondent had put his signatures on the blank stamp paper or after it had been typed. Admittedly the stamp paper was purchased by the respondent on 21st June, 1973 and he had put his initials under the endorsement of the stamp vendor. The front portion of the stamp paper which contains the terms of the rent note admittedly bears his initials as well as full signatures besides signatures of the attesting witnesses. A. W. 4 Nitya Nand has deposed that previously he was residing in the house adjoining the suit house, that he had good relations with the respondent, that he was called by the respondent, that the respondent read the rent note himself and signed the rent note Ex. A. W. 1/11 in his presence. He has further deposed that he signed the rent note as an attesting witness that the respondent had put his full signatures on the front portion of the rent note on the stamp paper. Thereafter the petitioner looked initials on the back of the stamp paper and pointted out the difference between the full signatures and his initials, whereupon the respondent also put his initials on the front portion of the stamp paper. He has also deposed that the respondent paid the rent and obtained the receipt and possession. from the petitioner, that the premises were let to him for residence and the respondent has always used the premises for residence and that no business or office was ever carried on by him in the premises This witness has further deposed that the respondent has been carrying on his business at Asaf Ali Road, that he has been using the premises for residence since the date of execution of the rent not till January. 1979.

18. The Additional Controller has observed that witness A. W. 4 is not a reliable witness. The witness was not examined by the Controller who has written the impugned order. He has been disbelieved and held to be biased against the respondent on the ground that the witness claimed to have visited the office of the respondent at Asaf Ali Road and he could not give his date of visit and the municipal number of the office, name and style under which the 1984 Delhi/13 VI G 17 respondent was carrying on business and he is a friend of the petitioner appearing as a witness without being summoned. The statement of A. W. 4 does not lead to any inference that he was not a truthful witness.

19. EX. A. W. 1/12 is the counterfoil of the rent receipt issued with respect to the ground floor premises. It is dated 20th August. 1973. But it is in evidence that it was written and signed on 21st August. 1973 when the premises on ground floor were let. This receipt is for Rs. 800. 00 as rent for two months from 21st Aug. , 1973 to 20th Oct. , 1973 at Rs. 400. 00 per month. The back of this counterfoil, it is alleged by the petitioners. bears the initials of the respondent, but he has denied his initials on the counterfoil and the writing on its back. One thing I have noted in this regard that the respondent has never out his initials on any paper on the record at the time of admission and denial of the documents. He out his full signatures under the word admit or deny on all documents. This appears to have been done by the respondent intentionally. NO handwriting expert has been produced by either party. According to petitioner No. 1 as A. W. 1 the rent note was signed and receipt was issued on 21st August. 1973 and that the respondent had put his signatures on the counterfoil and the writing on its back. A bare comparison of the initials of the respondent on this crucial counterfoil Ex. A. W. 1/12 and writing on its back Ex. A. W 1/13 with his admitted initials on the previous two counterfoils and the writings on their back Ex. A. W. 1/14, Ex. A. W. 1/15, Ex. A. W. 1/16 and Ex. A. . W. 1/17 show that all the initials are by one and the same person. These initials also tally with his admitted initials on the front portion of the rent note on the stamp paper as well as under the endorsement of the stamp vendor. These counterfoils and writings on their back are photostat copies of the original counterfoils and writings which were filed by the petitioner in the suit for recovery of rent against the respondent. The suit for rent was decreed by the trial court holding that the respondent had executed the rent note The respondent filed first appeal (R. F. A. No. 93 of 1981) which is pending in this court. The record of the said appeal with trial court record containing the original counterfoils has been made available at the time of hearing. I have examined the initials of the respondent on the admitted counterfoils and writings on their back with the disputed initials on the counterfoil dated 20th August. 1973 and writing on its back. I am of the opinion that the receipt dated 20th August. 1973 Ex. A. W, 1/12 and writing on its back Ex. A. W. 1/13 bear the initials of the respondent and there is no doubt in my mind about this. I am further of the opinion that the respondent intentionally denied his initials on Ex. A. W. 1/12 and Ex. A. W. 1/13 for the reasons known to him.

20. The original receipt dated 20th August. 1973 has not been produced by the respondent. He has also not produced the account books showing payment of rent for the period 21st August. 1973 to 20th October. 1973 at Rs. 400. 00 per month or for any other period. The respondent, in his written statement did not disclose the rate of letting of ground floor to him. The petitioners had alleged that the ground floor was let out with effect from 21st August. 1973 and the respondent has only pleaded that the ground floor was let to him from a date other than the date of commencement of tenancy alleged in the eviction petition. The respondent did not plead the date on which he took the ground floor on rent. This vague plea was made by him. as he was not prepared to admit his initials on the counterfoil and the writing on its back. The writing Ex. A. W. 1/13 on back of the counterfoil Ex. A. W. 1/12 reads as under : "premises on ground floor portion. two rooms, passage, kitchen and common W. C. bath and courtyard with fittings taken on rent for residence as per rent note from owner Shri S. K. Gupta". The writing thus shows that rent note dt. 21st Aug. , 1973 was executed first and thereafter the writing on the counterfoil was made which was initialled by him showing that ground floor was taken on rent from petitioner No. 1. owner for residence. When petitioner No. l was in the witness box no question was put to him with regard to this disputed counterfoil Ex. A. W. 1/12 and the writing on its back Ex. A. W. 1/13. In other words, the respondent accepted the statement of the petitioner No. l that the premises were let to him for residential purposes with effect from 21st August, 1973 (Sec : M/s. Chuni Lal Dwarka Nath (AIR 1958 Punj 440) (supra).

21. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the counterfoil receipt and writing on its back were net put to the respondent in cross-examination. The petitioners have proved the receipt Ex. A. W. 1/12 and writing Ex. A. W. 1/13. No question was put to him in cross-examination on behalf of the respondent. It was not tor the petitioners to ask any question from the respondent regarding this counterfoil receipt or the writing on its back when he appeared as a witness.

22. Durga Prasad. A. W. 5 is a neighbour. He has deposed that the respondent has been using the ground floor premises for residential purposes that neither office nor business was carried on by the respondent in the suit premises. A. W. 6 Pooran Mal. a washerman aged 80 years, who has been visiting the respondent, has deposed that the respondent has always used the premises for residential purposes that the respondent has now shifted to Ncv Rajinder Nagar. that initially the respondent was a tenant on the first floor and after two months he shifted to the around floor. A. W. 5 Durga prasad has stated, that no office was there in the premises and he has been disbelieved by the Additional Controller who visited the suit premises on 14th January. 1982 and found the respondents office i. e. office table. office chairs, typewriter, telephone and goods meant for export being kept there. A. W. 6 Pooran Mal has also been disbelieved on account of inspection of the premises by the Additional Controller. The case of the petitioner is that the respondent with his family had already acquired vacant possession of the premises at New Rajinder Nagar. New Delhi and shifted from the suit premises in August, 1978. It is in evidence that respondent wanted to convert user of the premises from residential to commercial and he also wanted to sublet or part with the possession of the same. The petitioners filed a Civil suit wherein on ex parte injunction was granted restraining him to subject and convert user of the premises. The injunction restraining the respondent from subletting or parting with the possession was maintained but the injunction restraining him from converting to commercial use was vacated. When admittedly the respondent was not residing in the suit premises on the date of inspection i. e. 14th January. 1982 there was no point in visiting the suit premises by him and make his inspection as the basis for holding that the premises were let for use as office by the respondent.

23. The purpose of letting under Sec. 14 (1) (e). of the Act is to be determined as on the date when the premises were let i. e. 21st August. 1973 to the respondent. He was liaison officer UP to 30th June. 1975 and started business from. 1st July. 1975. In this case it is immaterial if the respondent has changed the user without the consent of i the petitioner. There is no plea that he ever used the suit premises for commercial purposes with the consent of the petitioner. If the premises were inspected on 14th January, 1982 and the respondent was found to have an office it would not prove that the letting purpose of the premises was commercial and residential at the time when it was let out in August, 1973. The fact that the respondent and his family shifted from the suit premises in August. 1978 is not denied. It is possible that after the vacation of the injunction by the Civil Court restraining him from converting the user the respondent established office. The Additional Controller, in my opinion, unnecessarily visited the premises.

24. When the respondent was appearing as his witness, the records of sales tax department pertaining to his business was got produced by the petitioner. Photostat copies of the various documents are Ex. R. W. I/a to R. W. 1/x. All these documents admitted by the respondent, prove that he started his business at Asaf Ali Road with effect from 1st July. 1975 and before July. 1975 he was only a liaison officer. In these documents the respondent has not shown, the address of the suit premises as the address of his business either as main office or branch office. The respondent has not placed any document on record showing the address of the suit premises as his business address or that any business or office was ever carried on by him in the suit premises.

25. Ex. R. W. I/a is the application dt. 19th September. 1975 under the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules. 1957 for registration of the respondents firm Aradhana Enterprises, 1/18-B Asaf Ali Road. New Delhi. Ex. R. W. 1/b is the application dt. 18th September. 1975 for registration of his said firm under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act. 1941 as extended to Delhi for dealers having only one place of business. These two applications conclusively prove that the place of business of the respondent is 1/18-B, Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi and that his home address is the address of the suit premises. These applications though dt. September. 1975 do not disclose, that the respondent had his main office or branch office in the suit premises. Affidavit Ex. R. W. 1/c dt. 13th November. 1975 discloses that the respondent is a resident of the suit premises. The respondent submitted his statement dt 21st November. 1975 before the sales tax authorities copy whereof is Ex. R. W. 1/d. He had stated there that he started the said business with effect from 1st July. 1975 at 1/18-B Asaf Ali Road. New Delhi, that his residential address was of the suit premises where he had been residing for the last three years. He has stated. "i hereby declare that before starting M/s. Aradhana Enterprises business I was working as a liasion Officer of different concerns on commission basis. " Ex R. W. 1/e is the certificate of registration under the Central Sales Tax Act showing the address of the respondents firm as that of Asaf Ali Road and not of the suit premises. Similarly the certificate of registration under the local Sales-tax Act. Ex, R. W. l/f shows the address of the respondent firm as that of Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi. Form ST-36 under the Delhi Sales-tax Rules Ex. R. W. 1/h and R. W. 1/j are on behalf of the respon- dent which also show his business at Asaf Ali Road and not at the. suit premises. The other documents are the sales-tax returns filed by the respondent showing that he has been carrying on his business of Aradhana Enterprises at 1/18. B Asaf Ali Road. New Delhi and not at the suit premises. The documentary and oral evidence on record conclusively prove that the suit premises have never been used for business or office purposes by the respondent. On the basis of his documents alone it can be said definitely that he has been carrying on his business of Aradhana Enterprises at 1/18b Asaf Ali Road. New Delhi, that he never had his main or branch office of his business in the suit premises.

26. The rent note and counterfoil receipt Ex. A. W. 1/12 and the writing on its back Ex. A. W. 1/13 were duly ex- ecuted by the respondent. The lease deed between the Delhi Improvement Trust and the father of the pettioner No. 1 recites that the premises cannot be used for any purpose other than residence. The entire evidence leads to irresistble conclusion that the suit premises were let to the respondent only for residential purposes. By these writings specially the rent note and the said countefoils the relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner No. l and the respondent is also established.

27. Learned counsel for the respondent refers to a receipt dt. llth October. 1973 Ex. R. W. 1/1 by Mr. P. K, Kedia showing payment of commission by the respondent for setting of the around floor by the petitioners to him. The alleged broker lias not been produced as a witness to prove this receipt. The name of the broker Mr. P. K. Kedia was not suggested to petitioner No. 1 while he was in the witness box. His name was not disclosed in the written statement. No reliance can be placed on the statement of the respondent regarding this receipt also. Moreover, the contents of the receipt, are disputed by the petitioner, and cannot be deemed to have been proved by the statement of the respondent. In Bishwanath Rai v. Sachhidanand Singh, AIR 1971 SC 1949 [LQ/SC/1971/314] it has been held that the correctness of the contents of the letter can only be proved by examining the executant or the writer as a witness. The petitioner No. 1. on the other hand. has specifically denied that any property broker was involved in letting the premises to the respondent. The respondent was already tenant on the first floor. He was known to the petitioner No. 1. It therefore does not appear reasonable that a broker was engaged either by the petitioners or the respondent to let the ground floor.

28. Ex. R. W. 1/2 dt. 10th June. 1976 is a letter from Narayan Samajdar. Calcutta addressed to M/s. Libras Export International at the address of the suit premises. This letter also cannot be deemed to have been proved by the respondent. The writer or executant has not been examined. This is a solitary letter alleged to have been received by the respondent from one of his customers. Receiving of one letter at the suit premises would not show that the premises were let to the respondent for residential-cum-commercial purpose. The Additional Controller on the basis of this letter has held that the letting purpose was residential-cum-commercial. The respondent has withheld the entire correspondence if it was addressed to him at the suit premises. The respondent has been in occupation of the suit premises since August. 1973. The eviction case was filed in October. 1978. If the premises were let or used for business or office purposes he ought to have produced the documentary evidence for the said period of five years in support of his case. Failure of the respondent to place on record any such documentary evidence would lead to a presumption that had he produced it it would not have supported his case.

29. R. W. 1/3 is the assessment order under Sec. 143 (1) of the Income-tax Act. 1961 pertaining to the respondent. This order is dated 16th December, 1974 and it pertains to his income for the year ending 31st March. 1973. Admittedly he was not a tenant in the suit premises up to March. 1973. This assessment order does not show that the respondent ever had any business or office in the suit premises. Besides this he has placed on record the documents marked a, b, c and d purporting to be from the Income-tax Officer relating to assessment year 1976-77 wherein the address of Aradhana Enterprises is shown as that of the suit premises. These documents- are dt. 9th March. 1979. The respondent according to him has been carrying on business under the name and style of Aradhana Enterprises since July. 1975. He has not placed on record the various assessment orders and other records showing the address of the suit premises in his returns or other documents and assessment orders. In any case I am of the view that merely showing address in the income-tax return or the assessment order it does not establish that the business was being carried on in the suit premises or that the premises were let for business purposes.

30. The Additional Controller has observed that the High Court granted leave to the respondent observing that according to the respondent the purpose of letting was residential-curn-commercial. the rent note was forged and the signatures were obtained on blank stamp paper. The observations of the High Court as reproduced in the judgment by the Additionl. Controller prior to the grant of leave has no relevancy for inciding the eviction case after recording evidence. An allegation made in an application for leave to defend, which if proved, may non-suit the landlord, is sufficient for the grant of leave to contest. In Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal. AIR 1982 SC 1518 [LQ/SC/1982/140] . the Supreme Court has held that for grant of leave to contest allegations in the application for leave to defend are to be considered. These allegations by any stretch of imagination cannot amount to proof of those facts and any observation made by the High Court with respect to the contents of an application for leave to defend does not mean a decision of the disputed fact. I. therefore, do not appreciate how the Additional Controller has cited in his judgment paragraph from the judgment of the High Court granting leave to defend and drawing an inference, it appears, in favour of the respondent.

31. The Additional Controller has observed that the petitioners have admitted that the respondent has carried on export business in the suit premises. The petitioners denied this fact and no such alleged admission has been pointed out to me during arguments.

32. The Additional Controller has held that the ground floor premises at Arya Samaj Road were being used for commercial purposes. I do not appreciate how the user of other premises specially the leasehold premises for residential houses can"determinc the letting purpose of the suit premises. The user of other premises for commercial purpose. if assumed to be correct, would not change the purpose of letting. Moreover under the terms of lease with Delhi Improvement Trust the ground floor or any other portion of the suit property cannot be used for any other purpose. It is therefore immaterial if the ground floor premises at Arya Samaj Road adjoining the suit premises have been used for commercial purposes. In fact there is solitary statement of the respondent to that effect and no such question was put to petitioner No. 1 in cross-examination.

33.The Additional Controller has farther observed that the purchase of the stamp paper by the respondent is not proved. The respondent has admitted that the stamp paper was purchased by him on 21st June, 1973. I do not appreciate how it was necessary for the petitioners to prove the purchase of the stamp paper by the respondent. Admitted facts are not rcquired to be proved. The respondent also admitted that he signed under the endorsemest of the stamp vendor existing on the back of the document Ex. A. W. 1/10. The Additional Controller further observed that the respondent is an educated person and therefore there was no sense in explaining or reading the contents of the rent note. There is nothing wrong in explaining or reading the contents of a document to the executant, a graduate before he puts his signature. During arguments it has been stated by the learned counsel for the respondent that he is a Graduate, According to the respondent the stamp paper was purchased on 21st June 1973 with respect to tenancy of first floor premises and he signed the blank stamp paper. In fact stamp paper was purchased but no rent note for first floor premises was executed. It is not the case of the respondent that rent note with respect to the first floor was executed.

34. The Additional Controller has observed that the respondent was using the premises for both purposes i. e. residence and business with the consent of the petitioner but it is not based on any evidence. There was no plea that the respondent started using premises for business purpose with the consent of the petitioner. The conduct of the petitioner. on the other hand in filing the injunction suit against the respondent restraining him from converting the user of the premises from residence to commercial shows that the petitioner never consented to any such conversion.

35.The learned counsel for the respondent submits that the rent note Ex. A. W. 1/11 dt. 21st August. 1973 is signed by the landlord and tenant, that it is lease deed which requires registration under Section 107 of the T. P. Act and as it is not registered it is not admissible in evidence under Section 49 of the Registration Act. There is force in this submission but purpose of letting is collateral and this fact can be looked into from the document Ex. A. W. 1/11 under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act (See: J. N. Banerjee v. Sohan Lal Bhargava. 1971 Ren CR 895): (AIR 1971 Delhi 243)

36. The accommodation on the ground floor and the first floor is similar. First floor rent was Rs. 330. 00 and the ground floor rent is Rs. 400. 00. On the basis of the increase in rent for the around floor, the Additional Controller has observed that there must have been a change of purpose. I do not appreciate how the increase in rent will show the purpose of letting. The around floor has entrance from two sides but it is not so with respect to first floor. The ground floor can be used by two couples while the first floor cannot be used as such. I am of the opinion that rent note dated 21st August. 1973 was executed, initialled and signed by the respondent after it had been typed and read by him. Similarly counterfoil and writing on its back Ex. A. W. 1/12 and Ex. A. W. 1/13 are initialled by the respondent. The premises on ground floor were thus let for residence only.

37. After giving my careful consideration to the entire record which has been referred to by the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion, that various observations of the Additional Controller are perverse and most of them are not based on evidence and as such I am of the view that the impugned judgment is not in accordance with law and is liable to be set aside. In Jagatjit Industries Ltd. v. Rajiv Gupta. (1980) 18 DLT 434 it has been observed that the revisional jurisdiction under S. 25b (8) of the Act is wider than under S. 115 of the Civil P. C. The High Court under this provision has power to reverse the finding which is perverse, contrary to evidence or based on no evidence. The phrase according to law in S. 25b (8) of the Act refers to the decision as a whole, and is not to be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision which must be according to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. These observations were made by the Supreme Court in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury. AIR 1963 SC 698 [LQ/SC/1961/384] while interpreting S. 35 of the Delhi and Aimer Rent Control Act. 1952, a provision similar to S. 25b (81 of the Act. Similar observations were also made in pooran Chand v. Motilal. AIR 1964 SC 461 and Kewal Singh v. Mst. Lajwanti. AIR 1980 SC 161.

38. The impugned judgment dated 16th January, 1982 of the Additional Controller dismissing the petitioners application for eviction of the respondent is not in accordance with law. The revision petition is therefore accepted setting aside the impugned order. An order of eviction with respect to the suit premises on the gr3und floor of House No. 6404/2. Block 7-B (popularly known as Block No. 7) Gali No. 4, Dev Nagar. Karol Bagh. Ward No. XVI, New Delhi is passed in favour of the petitioners against the respondent with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 500. 00. The eviction order will not be executable for six months.