P.K. JAIN. J.

1. The petitioner Shri S.K. Puri was inducted as a tenant in respect of two bed rooms Along with one bath room, a kitchen and an adjoining toilet with some open space in the rear portion of property No. E-2/14. Model Town, Delhi by late Shri R.N. Chawla. The tenancy was for residential purposes. Shri R.N. Chawla died on 2nd August. 1989. In April 1993 the respondent Smt. Sarla Chawla filed a petition under Section 14-D read with Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short the) for eviction of the petitioner stating therein that on the death of her husband, she had become the owner-landlady of the premises in question, that the premises were required by her for occupation as a residence for herself and for the members of her family consisting of her son, daughter-in-law and her two grand children, and that neither she nor her son had any reasonable suitable accommodation in Delhi. It was further pleaded that she was about 71 years of age and required constant care and company of her son, daughter-in-law and grand children. It was also pleaded that her married daughter is living in East of Kailash and frequently visits her with her husband and two children and sometimes they stay with her for spending their week-ends and on festive occasions. It was explained that the accommodation in her possession was grossly insufficient for her residence and to meet the requirements of the members of her family, the need of whom is growing day by day with the growing up of her grand children.

2. On the service of the request notice, the petitioner filed an application for leave to defend before the learned Additional Rent Controller. It was stated by him that the petition under Section 14-D read with Section 25-B of thewas not maintainable inasmuch as Smt. Sarla Chawla was already in occupation of an independent, sufficient and reasonably suitable accommodation in that property and the eviction petition for additional accommodation was not maintainable under Section 14-D of the. It was further pleaded that Shri R.N. Chawla was the landlord and on his death, his three legal heirs, namely, Smt. Sarla Chawla (the widow), Rajiv Chawla (the son) and Smt. Kalyani Ktehra (the daughter) became joint owners/landlords of the property and as such the provisions of Section 14-D were not attracted and Smt. Sarla Chawla alone could not file the petition under the said provision. It was also stated that Smt. Sarla Chawla was receiving the rent after the death of her husband for herself and on behalf of other legal representatives of her deceased husband as it was convenient for all the legal heirs that the rent be received by one of them and as such Smt. Sarla Chawla was not the sole, exclusive and absolute owner of the property and as such could not apply under Section 14-D of the. It was further pleaded that the petition was bad for non-joinder of legal heirs of deceased R.N. Chawla, that the petitioner had not disclosed the entire accommodation in her possession in the petition since she was also in possession of one room and one covered shed on the first floor of the property and that the petitioner had not filed any authenticated site plan.

3. In her counter-affidavit Smt. Sarla Chawla controverter all the pleas raised by the petitioner and explained that after the death of her husband, Shri S.K. Puri had attorney to her and had been paying the rent to her. She filed certain counter-foils of the rent receipts in support of the said plea. She also explained that even otherwise her late husband Shri R.N. Chawla had executed a Will dated 24th April, 1978, duly registered whereby he had bequeathed the entire property in question in her favor and as such on the death of Shri R.N. Chawla, she had become the sole owner of this property. She further explained that the accommodation on the first floor was in possession of another tenant Shri Samuel Filix since the year 1976. She also explained that she required the ground floor premises on account of her old age and also so as to have compact accommodation on the ground floor which would be self contained and sufficient for her needs.

4. The learned Additional Rent Controller, after hearing the Counsel for the parties and on a perusal of the record, dismissed the application of the petitioner for leave to defend and consequently passed an order of eviction dated 7th October, 1994 which is being assailed by way of this revision petition under Section 25-B{8) of the.

5. Mr. Chandhiok, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the provisions of Section 14-D together with Sections 14-A, 14-B and 14-E have carved out a special category of landlords and the ordinary procedure has been departed from, and that in order to avail the benefit of the special category, the respondent must prove that the case strictly falls within the four corners of the special provisions of Section 14-D. It has been stressed that Shri. R.N. Chawla was the owner/landlord who has let out the premises in question to the petitioner and on his death, he has been succeeded by his widow, the respondent herein, his son and a daughter. It is argued that in these circumstances, the provisions of Section 14-D cannot be invoked nor the present petition was maintainable without impleading the remaining two legal heirs i.e. the son and the daughter of late Shri R.N. Chawla. The learned Counsel has placed reliance upon a Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court rendered in Nanala Girdharilal and Anr. v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala and Ors., 1973 AIR Gujarat 131.

6. On the other hand, Mr. Adarsh Dial, the learned Counsel for the respondent, has argued that on the death of Shri R.N. Chawla, the petitioner had attorney to the respondent and thus the respondent became the landlady qua the petitioner, and even otherwise late Shri R.N. Chawla had executed a registered Will whereby the entire property was bequeathed upon the respondent and as such she became the sole owner/land lady of the premises. It has been pointed out that the present case is fully covered by three judgments of the Supreme Court rendered in Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, , Kanta Goelv. B.P. Pathak and Ors., and Pal Singh v. Shri

Sunder Singh (dead) by LRs and Ors., . Reliance has also been placed by the learned Counsel upon a Full Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Harbans Singh v. Smt. Margrat G. Bhingardive, 1990(1) RCR 680 and a judgment of this Court rendered in Fibre Bond (Sales) Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Chand Rani, 1993(1) RCR 492.

7. In Kanta Goals (supra) case, after reproducing the definition of the terms landlord and tenant as contained in the, their Lordships of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe as under:

"Read in the context of the Rent Control law, the simple sense of the situation is that there should be a building which is let. There must be a land-lord who collects rent and a tenant who pays it to the one whom he recognizes as landlord. The complications of estoppel or even the concepts of the Transfer of Property Act need not necessarily or inflexibly be imported into the proceedings under the rent control law, tried by special Tribunals under a special statute. In this case, rent was being paid to the late Dass who let out to the appellant, on the death of the former, the rent was being paid to the 1st respondent who signed the receipts in his name and added that it was on behalf of the estate of the deceased Dass. At a later stage the rent was being paid to and the receipts issued by the 1st respondent in his own name. Not that the little change made in the later receipts makes much of a difference, but the fact remains that the tenant in this case had been paying the rent to the 1st respondent. Therefore, the latter fell within the definition of landlord, for the purposes of the."

8. Similarly in Sri Ram Pasricha (supra) it was pointed out by their Lordhsips that the relation between the parties being that of landlord and tenant, only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The tenant cannot deny that the landlord had title to the premises at the commencement of the tenancy. Under the general law, in a suit between landlord and tenant the question of title to the leased property is irrelevant. It is, therefore, inconceivable to throw out the suit on account of non-impleading of other co-owners as such. Both the aforesaid judgments were affirmed by their Lordships in Pal Singhs case.

9. Turning to the case in hand, it is the admitted case of the parties that Shri R.N. Chawla was the owner/land lord of the premises and he had let out the premises in question to the petitioner. It is also an admitted fact that after the death of Shri R.N. Chawla, the petitioner-tenant had been pay in grant to Smt. Sarla Chawla, the respondent herein, which fact is fully borne out by the copies of the various counter-foils of the rent receipts placed on the record. It is correct that in October 1992 the counterfoil recites that the rent was being recovered in respect of the property of Shri R.N. Chawla, but in all the subsequent receipts it is categorically mentioned that the rent was being paid on account of the property of Smt. Sarla Chawla. Thus the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties came into existence by attornment. Even other wise late Shri R.N. Chawla had executed a registered will during his life time bequeathing this property in favor of the present respondent. This Will had been executed and got registered long before his death by the testator. By virtue of this Will also the respondent became the sole owner/land lady of the premises in question.

10. Even otherwise as per the law laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, it is clear that one co-owner can sue for eviction under special categories of the landlords as contained in Sections 14-A, 14-B, 14-C and 14-D of the. In Sri Ram Pasricha (supra), Their Lordships had categorically held that a co-owner is as much a owner of the entire property as any sole owner of a property is, and he can seek eviction of his tenant without impleading the other co-owners. The Full Bench judgment of the Gujarat High Court relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner was noticed and explained in this case by their Lordships.

11. From a bare reading of Section 14-D of the Act, it is evident that a landlady is required to show that she is a widow, that the premises were let out either by her or by her deceased husband, and that the tenanted premises are required by her for her own residence. In the case in hand, it is not disputed that the respondent is a widow. It is also an admitted fact that the premises in question were let out to the petitioner by her late husband Shri R.N. Chawla. As stated above, the petitioner had attorney to the respondent and as such she became the landlady qua the petitioner and as such has the locus to apply for eviction under Section 14-D of the.

12. Then the learned Counsel for the petitioner has argued that the need of the respondent in respect on the tenanted premises is not a bonafide one and as such the Additional Rent Controller ought to have granted leave to defend. It is further argued that the respondent is in occupation of a room and a shed on the first floor which fact has been concealed by the respondent and as such there was sufficient material for granting leave to defend to the petitioner. The learned Counsel has also placed on record a copy of the letter dated 8th November, 1994 purported to have written by A.G. Promoters to the respondents regarding some alleged collaboration agreement which was being negotiated between them. Thus it is contended that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Precision Steel, and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, 1982 S.C. 1158, leave to defend ought to have been granted to the petitioner.

13. It may be stated that the scope for the grant of leave to defend in cases covered by the special categories created by Sections 14- A to 14-D of the is quite limited. In S. Surijt Singh Kalra v. Union of India and Ors., . Their Lordships observed as under:--

"Likewise if the applications are under Sections 14-C to 14-D, the summons should state accordingly. That would indicate the scope of the defense of the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub-Section (5), of Section 25-B. Under Sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the application of the landlord depending upon whether it is under Section 14-A, 14-B, 14-C or 14-D or under Section 14(1)(e). The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defense under Section 14(1)(e) as against an application under Section 14-B. There cannot be any defense unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against our jurisprudence."

A little further their Lordships categorically held as under:--

"Needless to state, therefore, if an application is filed under Section 14-B or 14-C or 14-D, the tenants right to contest the application is narrowed down and is restricted to the parameters of the respective Sections. He cannot widen the scope of his defense by relying upon Section 14(1)(e).

14. Similarly in a recent judgment rendered in V. Rajeshwari v. Bombay Tyres International Limited. Civil Appeal No. 3006 of 1990 decided on 18th January. 1994, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with a prayer under Section 14-D of the Act, clearly held that the tenant had practically no defense whatsoever and all that had to be proved under the said Section are that the landlady is a widow and that the premises are required by her for her own residence. The judgment in Precision Steel & Engineering Works (supra) being relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner relates to a case filed under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, the scope of which is quite different as pointed out by their Lordships in Surjit Singh Kalras case (supra).

15. It is not disputed that the respondent is residing Along with her son, her daughter-in-law and two grand children. It is also evident that respondent has a married daughter who is residing Along with her husband and children in East of Kailash, New Delhi and her said daughter Along with family members frequently visits the respondent and they do stay with the respondent some times for spending their week-ends and on festive occasions. It may be clarified that the respondent is admittedly a lady of about 70 years of age and she requires the constant care & company and presence of her son, daughter-in-law and the grand children. The premises in dispute are required by the respondent on the ground that the premises in her occupation are not sufficient and suitable for her residence and the residence of her said family members. It may be mentioned that the need of the premises for the son, daughter-in-law and their children is actually the need of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances discussed above. After the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anand Swaroop Vohra v. Bhir San Bahri and Anr., , an

application for eviction under Section 14-D is maintainable even where the landlord/landlady had some accommodation available but the same is insufficient for his or her need.

16. As regards the contention regarding the alleged concealment, the same does not appear to be sustainable in view of the site plan placed on the record. The first floor consists of only one room set and the same is in occupation of a tenant since the year 1986. There is no such accommodation on the first floor which might be available to the respondent landlady to satisfy her need in any manner.

17. It may be stated that the scope of the powers of this Court in revision proceedings is limited and restricted. In Helper Girdharibhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri and Ors., 1987 S.C. 1782 the scope for exercising the revisional power by the High Court has been laid down as such. "In exercising revisional power under Section 29(2) the High Court must ensure that the principles of law have been correctly borne in mind by the lower Court. Secondly, the facts have been properly appreciated and a decision arrived attacking all material and relevant facts in mind. In order to warrant interference, the decision must be such a decision which no reasonable man could have arrived at. Lastly, such a decision does not lead to a miscarriage of justice. But, in the guise of revision substitution of one view where two views are possible and the Court of Small Causes has taken a particular view, is not permissible. If a possible view has been taken the High Court would be exceeding its jurisdiction if it substrates its own view in place of that of the Courts below because it considers it to be a better view. The fact that the High Court would have taken a different view is wholly irrelevant." Even in Fibre Bond (Sales) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) it was clarified by a Single Bench of this Court that under revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the Act, this Court cannot act as an appellate Court to scrutinise the findings of facts, which are supported by reasons, which have not been shown on the face of the record to be erroneous or vitiated by any infirmity or perversity,

18. In the present case the impugned order is well reasoned and well considered on facts and in law, and the same is free from any infirmity or illegality. It not require any interference in revision.

19. Before parting I may deal with another contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the respondent does not require the premises for herself but is negotiating for a collaboration agreement with a builder either to transfer the property or to construct multistoreyed flats. This plea has been taken after the filing of the present revision petition. Even otherwise the provisions of sub-Section 2 of Section 19 are adequate deterrent for the landlady against her not putting the premises to personal use which is the ground in the petition under Section 14-D, as in the event of her failure to occupy the premises within two months of getting vacant possession, or having occupied. If at any time within three years, from the date of obtaining possession, she re-lets to any other person then it would be open to the petitioner-tenant to apply to the Controller for restoration of possession and the Controller on being satisfied as alleged, can order for restoration of possession or payment of such compensation to the evicted tenant as deemed fit. In the face of these provisions the mere allegation being sought to be raised after the filing of the present revision by filing a copy of the alleged letter, genuineness and correctness of which is denied by the learned Counsel for the respondent, cannot stand in the way of the respondent from getting an eviction order under Section 14-D of the.

As a result, the revision petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee is assessed at Rs. 2000/-.

The petitioner was granted two months time to vacate the premises when the impugned order was passed and that time is expiring today. In equity, I grant further period of two months to the petitioner from today to handover the vacant possession of the premises to the respondent.