Fazl Ali, J.This is an appeal from a decree passed by the Subordinate Judge of Gay a in a suit brought by the plaintiff to recover a sum of Rs. 26,795-11-8 from defendants Nos. 1 to 3. Defendants Nos.1 and 2 are full brothers and defendant No. 3 is the son of defendant No. 1. These three defendants were admittedly members of a joint family of which defendant No. 1 was the manager or karta till 1932 (1339 F.). The case of the plaintiff is that defendant No. 1 as karta of the family borrowed (1) Rs. 4,869 on December 5, 1929, (2) Rs. 7,200 on March 22, 1931, (3) Rs. 10,034-7-0 on September 27, 1931, and executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff for the particular sum borrowed on each occasion. The trial Court decreed the suit against all three defendants holding that the hand-notes were genuine and that defendant No. 1 h#d borrowed the sums mentioned in them for family necessity. This appeal has been preferred by defendants Nos. 2 and 3 (defendant No. 1 not appealing) and the only questions which are raised by them are; (1) that the plaintiffs action being based upon promissory notes, no decree should have been passed against defendants Nos. 2 and 3 who had not signed them, and (2) that the finding of the trial Court as to the existence of legal necessity for the loans taken by defendant No. 1 was not correct. In arguing the first" point the learned Advocate for the appellant greatly relied on Sadasukh Jankidas v. Sir Kishan Prasad 46 IA 33 : 50 Ind. Cas. 216 : AIR 1918 PC 146 : 46 C 663 : 29 CLJ 340 : 17 ALJ 405 : 25 MLT 258 : 36 MLJ 429 : 21 Bom. LR 605 : 1 UPLR 37 : (1919) MWN 310 : 23 CWN 837 : 10 LW 143 : 12 Bur. LT 160 (PC). In that case a question arose whether a person whose name did not appear on certain hundis (which are negotiable instruments) could be. made liable under them on the ground that the person who had drawn the hundis was his agent. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee answered the question in the negative and observed as follows:

It is not sufficient that the principals name should be in some way disclosed: it must be disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name is the real name of the person liable upon the bills. Their Lordships attention was directed to Sections 26, 27 and 28, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the terms of these sections were contrasted with the corresponding provisions of the English Statute. It is unnecessary in this connection to decide whether their effect is identical. It is sufficient to say that these sections contain nothing inconsistent with the principles already enunciated, and nothing to support the contention, which is contrary to all established rules, that in an action on a bill of. exchange or promissory note against a person whose name properly appears as party to the instrument, it is open either by way of claim or defence to show that the signatory was in reality acting for an undisclosed principal.

2. In view of these observations it has been held in a number of recent cases that the karta of a joint Hindu family cannot by executing a promissory note in his own name bind the other members of the family, no other names appearing on the document as those of persons to be charged: see Sreelal Manglulal Vs. Lister Antiseptic Dressing Co. Ltd., , Hari Mohan Ghose Vs. Sourendra Nath Mitter and Others, , Kutti Ammu v. Purushotam Doss 21 MLJ 526 : 8 Ind. Cas. 851 : (1911) 1 MWN 45 : 9 MLT 120 Jibach Mahto Vs. B. Shib Shanker Chaudhry, and Birkeswar Raut Vs. Ram Lochan Pandey and Another, . The Allahabad High Court has, however, taken a different view in Krishnanand Nath Khare Vs. Raja Ram Singh, and held that there is no inherent reason why the managing member of a joint Hindu family cannot in that capacity execute in his sole name a promissory note which should be binding on the family as a whole and the property owned by it The learned Judges who decided that case have explained the decision of the Privy Council by pointing out that the position of the head of the joint Hindu family is not the same as that of an ordinary business agent and that a joint Hindu family, being a legal person according to Hindu Law lawfully represented by and acting through the managing member r head thereof, is included ordinarily in term a person. A similar view had been expressed by two eminent Judges of the Madras High Court in Krishna Ayyar v. Krishnasami Ayyar 23 M 597 and both these decisions have been followed by the Lahore High Court in Bhaguran Singh & Co. v. Bakshi Ram AIR 1933 Lah. 494 : 149 Ind. Cas. 556 : 6 RL 705 and by a Single Judge of this Court in Tikan Chand Chaudhury Vs. Sudarsan Trigunait and Others, . It may also be stated that before the decision of the Judicial Committee in Sadasukh Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad 46 IA 33 : 50 Ind. Cas. 216 : AIR 1918 PC 146 : 46 C 663 : 29 CLJ 340 : 17 ALJ 405 : 25 MLT 258 : 36 MLJ 429 : 21 Bom. LR 605 : 1 UPLR (PC) 37 : (1919) MWN 310 : 23 CW N 837 : 10 LW 143 : 12 Bur. LT 160 the High Court of Calcutta had also held in several cases that the karta of a joint Hindu family could bind the other members of the family by signing a promissory note for family purposes: see Nagendra Chandra Dey v. Amar Chandra Kundu 7 CWN 725 and Baisnab Chandra De v. Ramdhon Dhor 11 CW N 139.

3. Now the view expressed in these cases has this advantage that it enables the Court to grant the same relief in a suit based on a promissory note as in suit for debt and therefore makes it unnecessary for it to decide whether the suit belongs to one category or the other. The distinction between these two classes of suits is too well recognized to be overlooked, but so far as this country is concerned, the line of distinction becomes highly artificial in many cases, firstly because except in a few mercantile towns a promissory note is not popularly regarded as a negotiable instrument: and, secondly, because the distinction depends largely on the view one takes of the pleadings, and the pleading in the mofussil Courts are generally defective and badly drafted. Besides, so far as the Hindu Law goes, it does not recognize any distinction between the liability of the joint family when the debt is contracted by its karta under a promissory note and its liability when the debt is contracted otherwise. Under that law all that is necessary to make every member of the family liable is that the debt should have been contracted for legal necessity oftfor tho, benefit of the family. Where, therefore, the benefit is proved, the Court will not be justified in refusing to grant the appropriate relief to the creditor, unless it is compelled to do so by something to be found in the Negotiable Instruments Act or the principles underlying it.

4. Under the law of negotiable instruments, as has been explained by the Judicial Committee in Sadasukh Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad 46 IA 33 : 50 Ind. Cas. 216 : AIR 1918 PC 146 : 46 C 663 : 29 CLJ 340 : 17 ALJ 405 : 25 MLT 258 : 36 MLJ 429 : 21 Bom. LR 605 : 1 UPLR (PC) 37 : (1919) MWN 310 : 23 CW N 837 : 10 LW 143 : 12 Bur. LT 160 it seems necessary that the name of the person to be charged should be disclosed in the document in such a way that the responsibility is made plain and can be instantly recognized as the document passes from hand to hand. Now, the joint Hindu family is an institution peculiar to this country and the law gives its karta the power to contract loans for the benefit of the family according to his own discretion and without any express authority from the other members of the family, Therefore, when the karta borrows money for the family purpose he is not acting as an agent for an undisclosed principal or principals but may well be regarded as the principal. At any rate when he acts as a karta, he acts in a capacity which is so well-known that there can be no misapprehension as to the identity of the person or persons whom he purports to bind by his act. On the whole, therefore, I am inclined to think that the rule laid down in Sadasukh Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Prasad 46 IA 33 : 50 Ind. Cas. 216 : AIR 1918 PC 146 : 46 C 663 : 29 CLJ 340 : 17 ALJ 405 : 25 MLT 258 : 36 MLJ 429 : 21 Bom. LR 605 : 1 UPLR (PC) 37 : (1919) MWN 310 : 23 CW N 837 : 10 LW 143 : 12 Bur. LT 160 is not applicable to a Hindu family and I am to some extent fortified in my view by the later pronouncement of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1934 4 (Privy Council) . In that case a suit had been brought on the basis of two promissory notes executed by the manager of a joint Hindu family against the surviving members of that family after the death of the manager who had executed the promissory notes. The Judicial Committee in dealing with the case observed: (1) that it would be within the authority of the karta of the joint family to borrow money in his own name if it be necessary for the proper conduct of the joint family business that money should be borrowed from time of time on promissory notes, and (2) the fact of the promissory note being signed by the karta is equally consistent with the borrowing by him for his own individual purpose or borrowing for the purpose of the joint family business.

5. The matter, however, need not be pursued any further because I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge that on the pleadings of the parties the present suit should be treated as a suit for recovery of debt. This is clear on reading paras. 3 and 4 of the plaint where after stating the amounts which were borrowed by defendant No. 1 on different occasions it is stated that the three hand-notes were executed in proof of his taking the aforesaid loans". Again in para. 6 of the plaint the defendants are sought to be made liable on the ground that "they were benefited by the loans" and in para. 8 it is clearly stated that the cause of action accrued on the dates on. which the loans were taken and the hand-notes sued upon were executed. It is true that in para. 9 of the plaint the plaintiff asked for a decree "on account of the three hand-notes sued upon," but the plaint must be read as a whole, and if read as a whole, it supports the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the suit was in essence a suit for debt and, therefore, all the members of the family would be liable to re-pay the debt if they were contracted for legitimate family necessity. The next question to be considered is whether the debts were in fact contracted for family necessity. (After discussing the evidence his Lordship came to the conclusion that defendant No. 1 contracted the loans in question not for his own use but for the benefit of the family and that both defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were benefited by the loans, and proceeded.) There is only one other point which remains to be dealt with. In cases where a loan is contracted by the managing member of a joint family a question often arises at the time of the execution of the decree as to the extent of the liability of the other members of the family for the debt. This question has arisen in this particular case also as will appear from the connected miscellaneous appeal before us and it seems therefore to be necessary that the decree of the Court should be prepared in such a way as to make the position clear." In Jwala Prasad Vs. Bhuda Ram, two learned Judges of this Court have quoted with approval the following passage from Mullas Hindu Law as correctly summarizing the law on the subject:

In the case of debts contracted by a manager, in pursuance of his implied authority in the ordinary course of the family business, there is a distinction between the liability of a manager and the liability of his co-parceners. The manager is liable not only to the extent of his share in the joint family property, but, being a party to the contract, he is liable personally, that is to say, his separate property is also liable. But as regards the other coparceners, they are liable only to the extent of their interest in the family property, unless, in the case of adult co-parceners, the contract sued upon, though purporting to have been entered into by the manager alone is, in reality, one to which they are actual contracting parties, or one to which they can be treated as being contracting parties by reason of their conduct, or one which they have subsequently ratified.

6. Now in this particular case, so far as defendants Nos. 1 and 3 are concerned, the position is perfectly simple The former as the executant of the hand-notes is personally liable for the debts contracted under all of them and defendant No. 3 who is a minor is liable for these debts only to the extent of his interest in the joint family property. La to defendant No. 2, I am of opinion he is personally liable for the loan contracted under the hand-note dated September 27, 1931. I have already stated that the mortgage bond (Ex. 3) dated September 19, 1932, which was executed by him as well as by defendant No. I refers in clear terms to the promissory note in question and I may quote the exact words used in the bond which are as follows:

We paid rent with interest on the default of instalment for 1928 to the said ijaradar by taking a loan from BabuSidheshwar Prasad Narain Singh, etc., etc., under a hand-note for Rs. 10,034-7-0.

7. I think that this statement, the correctness of which there is no reason to doubt, brings the case of defendant No. 1 within the exception referred to in the passage quoted above and amounts to a ratification of the loan. Defendant No. 2 is, therefore, personally liable so far as the debt contracted under the hand-note of September 27, 1931 is concerned, but he is liable only to the extent of his share in the joint family property in respect of the debts contracted under the other two hand-notes. I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs and direct that in the decree which is to be prepared in this Court the amount due under the three hand-notes should be calculated separately and it should be made clear that defendant No. 1 is personally liable for the debts due under all the three hand-notes that defendant No. 2 is personally liable only in respect of the debt contracted under the third hand-note and that defendant No. 3 is not personally liable under any of the debts but is liable only to the extent of his interest in the joint family property.

Madan, J.

8. I fully agree.