G.C. Jain, J.

1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated September 13, 1985 passed by the Addl. District Judge.

2. The plaintiff-appellant, Sir Sobha Singh & Sons (P) Ltd. is the owner of the property known as Sujan Park, New Delhi. It comprises of several residential flats, servant quarters and garages. Section 61(1) (a) of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) empowers the respondent, New Delhi Municipal Committee, to impose a tax payable by the owner, on buildings and lands, not exceeding 12 per centum on the annual value. Annual value as defined in Section 3(l)(b) of the Act, in the case of any house or building means the gross annual rent at which such house or building, together with its appurtenances and any furniture that may be let for use or enjoyment therewith, may reasonably be expected to let from year to year, subject to a deduction of 10 per cent for the cost of repairs and for all other expenses necessary to maintain the building in a state to command such gross annual rent and certain other deductions. It is not in controversy that the Committee in exercise of the said powers has imposed house tax on this property.

3. Under Section 63 of the Act the Committee is required to cause an assessment list of all buildings and lands on which any tax is imposed to be prepared. The list, inter alia, is to contain the annual value of the property assessed and the amount of tax assessed thereon by the Committee.

4. For the year 1979-80 the Committee assessed the annual value of the appellants property at Rs. 3,26,258.10 and demanded a sum of Rs. 40,782.20 a house tax. The appellant disputed the legality of the assessment and the demand and filed a suit seeking a decree for permanent injunction restraining the Committee from recovering any amount in excess of Rs. 31,716. The plea raised was that the appellant had recovered only a sum of Rs. 2,81,920 towards rent in the year 1979-80 and after allowing 10% for repairs the annual value came to Rs. 2,53,728 on which only a sum of Rs. 31,704 was payable as house tax. Further plea was that the Committee had unlawfully added the amount realised by the appellant from its tenants towards house tax while determining the annual value and had completely ignored the provisions of the Act and the assessment was without jurisdiction, arbitrary and unlawful.

5. The Committee resisted the suit. According to its plea the annual letting value had been legally assessed on the basis of gross annual rent being fetched for the property in question. It also raised the plea that the suit was barred under Section 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act.

6. The trial proceeded on the following issues:

1. Whether the impugned demand of the defendant is illegal and unwarranted

2. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is barred as per Section 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act;

3. Relief.

7. On issue No. 1 the Trial Court held that the appellant had realised a sum of Rs. 2,81,920 as total rent during the year in question. The rest of the amount received by the appellant was towards house tax which could not be included while assessing the annual value. The assessment made by the Committee on the basis of actual rent plus the house tax was illegal and contrary to the provisions of the law and the demand based on the said assessment was also illegal. On issue No. 2 learned Subordinate Judge held: Since the plaintiff has challenged the basis of assessment and also that assessment arrived at was contrary to the provisions of law, the jurisdiction of this court was not barred. With these findings he decreed the suit.

8. In appeal, learned Addl. District Judge held that the grievance of the plaintiff-appellant was in regard to the mode of assessment of the tax and the principles of the assessment. The jurisdiction of the civil court to try such a suit was barred under Section 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. He consequently accepted the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and dismissed the suit.

9. Aggrieved by the same the plaintiff has filed this second appeal. It was directed to be heard along with RSA 36 of 1985 (R.N. Ghai v. M.C.D.) which had been referred to a larger bench to resolve conflicting judgments. This is how the matter has come before us.

10. The civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting the suit of which its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. (See Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure). A suit of civil nature is a suit the object of which is the enforcement of a civil right or obligation. In the present suit the dispute is about the merit of assessment i.e. whether the assessment made by the Committee is correct and in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is undisputed that this is a suit of civil nature. The only question, therefore, which we have to decide is whether the jurisdiction of the civil court to try this suit is expressly or impliedly barred by Section 86 of the Act.

11. Section 84 (1) & (2) and Section 86 of the Act read as under:

85. (1) An appeal against the assessment or levy of any or against the refusal to refund any tax under this Act shall lie to the Deputy Commissioner or to such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf;

Provided that, when the Deputy Commissioner or such other officer as aforesaid, is, or was then the tax was imposed, a member of the committee, the appeal shall lie to the Commissioner of the division.

(2) If, on the hearing of an appeal under the section, any question as to the liability to, or the principle of assessment of, a tax arises, on which the officer hearing the appeal entertains reasonable doubt, he may, either of his own motion or on the application of any person interested, draw up a statement of the facts of the case and the point on which doubt is entertained, and refer the statement with his own opinion, on the point for the decision of the High Court.

.. .

86. (1) No objection shall be taken to any valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of any person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act.

(2) No refund of any tax shall be claimable by any person otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules thereunder.

12. It will be seen that Section 84(1) provides for an appeal against the assessment or levy to the Deputy Commissioner or to such other officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf. Section 84(2) enact that the officer hearing the appeal may refer the matter to the High Court if he entertains a reasonable doubt as to the liability to, or the principle of assessment of the tax, Section 86 enacts that no objection may be taken to any valuation or assessment in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in the Act. From these provisions it is clear to us that the remedy against assessment or levy of house tax is only by way of an appeal under Section 84 of the Act. The authority to decide objection to any valuation or assessment is vested in the Deputy Commissioner or any such officer as may be empowered by the State Government in this behalf. The said officer has the exclusive power to decide such objections. No other authority of court is competent to decide an objection to valuation or assessment. Section 86 of the Act clearly says so. This Section clearly bars the jurisdiction of civil court to entertain a suit in which objection is taken to any valuation or assessment made by the Committee. This stands concluded by the decisions of the Supreme Court.

13. In Firm Seth Radha Krishan v. Administrator Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, AIR 1963 SC 1547 [LQ/SC/1963/57] , Sections 84 and 86 of the Act came up for consideration. The dispute in that case was whether the plaintiff was liable to pay terminal tax on Sambhar Salt at the rate of 3 pies per maund under item 68 which was applicable in respect of salt common or at the rate of As. 10 per maund under item 69 which related to salt of all kinds other than common salt. The High Court held that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Before the Supreme Court it was contended that since the impugned levy was not made under the Act but in derogation of the provisions thereof the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear the suit. Repelling this contention Subha Rao J. (as he then was) observed;

The only dispute was as regards the rate of tax payable in respect of the salt brought by the appellant into the limits of the Municipal Committee. The rate depended upon the character of the salt. The ascertainment of the said fact is necessary step for fixing the rate and it is not possible to say that in ascertaining the said fact the authorities concerned travelled outside the provisions of the Act.

14. In Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corporation, AIR 1977 SC 955 [LQ/SC/1977/127] the plaintiffs had imported certain goods within the limits of the then Jabalpur Municipal Committee between April 1, 1943 and March 31, 1946 and had paid to Committee a sum of Rs. 16528 and odd as octroi duty. This duty was assessed by the Committee on an amount which was 40% less than the retail price of the goods which were brought within the municipal limits. In 1946-47 the Municipal Committee decided to reopen and revise the assessment by assessing octroi duty on an amount which was only 6% less than the retail price of the goods. The Committee further decided to levy double the duty by way of penalty for the aforesaid period on the ground that the plaintiff had intentionally evaded the payment of the duty payable on the goods. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against the decision of the Municipal Committee to the Sub Divisional Officer who modified the decision of the Committee by permitting it to charge the octroi duty on an amount which was less by 12% than the retail price of the goods. The Sub Divisional Officer upheld the decision of double duty by way of penalty. The revision petition was dismissed by the Board of Revenue. The plaintiff paid the amount under protest and filed a civil suit for recovery of the said amount with interest. The Committee, inter alia, raised the plea that the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit was barred by Section 84(3) of the C.P. and Berar Municipalities Act The said provisions were absolutely in pari materia with the provisions under Section 86 of the Act. On behalf of the plaintiff it had been contended that the assessment once made was final subject to the remedies which the Act provided to the aggrieved party and the reopening of assessment was wholly without jurisdiction and therefore the suit was competent. Rejecting this contention the Supreme Court held:

These provisions show in the first place that the defendants undoubtedly possess the right and the power to assess and recover octroi duty and double duty on goods which are brought within the municipal limits for sale, consumption or use therein. The circumstance that the defendants might have acted in excess of or irregularly in the exercise of that power cannot support the conclusion that the assessment or recovery of the tax is without jurisdiction. Applying the test in Kamla Mills, if the appropriate authority while exercising its jurisdiction and powers under the relevant provisions of the Act, holds erroneously that an assessment already made can be corrected or that an assessee is liable to pay double duty when Rule 14(b), in fact, does not justify such an imposition, it cannot be said that the decision of the authority is without jurisdiction. Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are, as held in Dhulabhai (AIR 1969 SC 78 [LQ/SC/1968/102] ) for the decision of the authorities set up by the Act and a civil suit cannot lie if the orders of those authorities are given finality.

15. Similar view was taken in Munshi Ram & Others v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, AIR 1979 SC 1250 [LQ/SC/1979/175] . The plaintiffs in that case were partners of a firm Bharat Industries, Chheharta. Profession tax under Section 61(l)(b) of the Act was levied on all the partners of the said firm. The appellant filed a suit for seeking a decree for permanent injunction restraining the Committee from realising the tax on the plea that the said tax could be levied only on the firm and not on the partners. The Trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal the Addl. District Judge reversed the judgment and decreed the suit. The decree was affirmed in Second appeal but was reversed on a Letters Patent Appeal. It was held that Section 86 of the Act barred the jurisdiction of the civil court to try the said suit. The case was then taken to the Supreme Court by way of special leave. Affirming the findings of the Letters Patent Bench it was held:

It is well-recognised that where a Revenue Statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all other forums and modes of seeking it are excluded. Construed in the light of this principle, it is clear that Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act bar, by inevitable implication, the jurisdiction of the civil court, where the grievance of the party relates to an assessment or the principle of assessment under this Act.

16. Same view was taken by one of us, Yogeshwar Dayal, J. (as he then was) in S. Khushwant Singh & Another v. New Delhi Municipal Committee 1982 (1) I.L.R. (Delhi Series) 836 and Naubahar Hussain Shah v. Municipal Committee Batata, AIR 1935 Lahore 970.

17. Mr. M.L. Lonial, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that the Committee exceeded its jurisdiction in adding the amount realised towards house tax while determining the annual value. The assessment was contrary to the provisions contained in the Act and without jurisdiction. The civil court was, therefore, competent to try the case. This contention cannot be accepted in the presence of the binding precedents referred above. Admittedly the Committee had jurisdiction to assess the annual value. If in doing so it commits any irregularity or mistake it cannot be said that it acted outside or in abuse of the powers under the Act or the assessment was without jurisdiction. The appellant had a remedy by way of appeal under Section 84 of the Act. The jurisdiction of civil court to try a dispute relating to merits of assessment of annual value was barred under Section 86 of the Act. It may be added that there is no averment in the plaint that the assessment was tainted by fraud or any other fundamental defect.

18. Mr. Lonial referred us to a Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court (Circuit Bench at Delhi) in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Das 1964 PLR (LXVI) 361. This decision supports the contention of Mr. Lonial but, in our view, is no longer good law in the presence of the Supreme Court decisions mentioned above. A Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ramesh Kumar and others v. The Municipal Committee, Gurdaspur and Others, AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 295 has held that the said decision was no more a good law.

19. Reliance was also placed on a Division Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in Amrik Singh Day Singh v. Municipal Committee Jhelum, AIR 1936 Lahore 972. The dispute in that case related to the enforcement of a contract entered into by the Municipality. It was noticed in that judgment that there was no other remedy under the Act.

20. In the admission order reference has been made to three decisions of this CourtVed Parkash v. Municipal Corporation, 1972 RLR (Note) 26; Suresh Chand Jaipuria v. M.C.D. 1975 RLR (Note) 62; and S.K. Construction Private Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 20 (1981) DLT 389. [LQ/DelHC/1981/302]

21. In Ved Parkash v. Municipal Corporation, B.C. Misra J. observed that if the act of corporation is without jurisdiction then civil suit lies to challenge the same but if the complaint is about procedure or on merits, then remedy is provided in the Act. In the present case the complaint is on merits of the assessment of the annual value. The Committee, without any doubt, had jurisdiction to assess the annual value. This judgment, therefore, does not support the contention of the appellant.

22. In Suresh Chand Jaipuria v. M.C.D., Civil Revision No. 479 of 1974 decided on February 21, 1975 S. Ranganathan J. (as he then was) observed: A person who is entitled to an opportunity to file an appeal may not utilize that opportunity to file an appeal but may file a suit if he is so advised; I can see nothing which prevents a party from doing so especially when the challenge to the assessment is that it has not been made according to the Statute. These observations were made in a revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The challenge was to an order of the Addl. District Judge confirming the order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the application of the petitioners for temporary injunction. In an application for grant of temporary injunction only a prima facie view is taken. There is no final finding that the civil court had jurisdiction to try such suits. It has no binding force.

23. In S.K. Construction P. Ltd. v. M.C.D. D.R. Khanna, J. observed: As regards the contention that the suit is not maintainable, and that the proper remedy of the petitioner was to have gone in appeal before the District Judge under Section 169 of the Act, it cannot be said that the contention of the petitioner that when the demand raised is absolutely not sustainable against it under the law, it can file a suit for quashing it, is not worth giving a trial. These observations were also made in a civil revision against an order refusing to grant temporary injunction. As is clear from the observations quoted above, no final view was taken.

24. For the foregoing reasons we are of the considered opinion that the civil court has no jurisdiction to try this claim. Consequently, affirming the finding of the learned Addl. District Judge, we dismiss the appeal with costs.