Das, J.

(1) These two applications in revision arise out of an order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Monghyr, dated the 6th of January, 1951, in two miscellaneous cases, namely. Miscellaneous Case No. 41 and Miscellaneous Case No. 42 of 1950, before the learned Subordinate Judge.

(2) The relevant facts are the following: The petitioner before us is the Maharajadhiraj of Darbhanga. The petitioner was the proprietor of a village called Rasulpur Makdum in the district of Monghyr. There is an adjoining diara village called Pundarak in the district of Patna, of which the State of Bihar, opposite party No. 3 before us, is the proprietor. The opposite parties classed together as the first party were lessees of Diara Pundarak, and the opposite parties classed together as the 3rd party were tenants of the Khas Mahal in respect of the lands in question. In 1928 there was a dispute about 125 bighas of land as to whether they lay in the petitioners village Rasulpur or in village Pundarak. The dispute resulted in a proceeding under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure. That proceeding terminated against the present petitioner. Soon after there was another dispute regarding a block of 675 bighas of land. There was a proceeding under Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, which was decided against the petitioner. In 1934 the petitioner brought a suit for about 800 bighas of land, being Title Suit No. 24 of 1934 in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Monghyr. The suit was primarily one for a declaration of title and recovery of possession: there was also a claim for mesne profits, the nature and details whereof have given rise to some controversy. I shall later deal with that aspect of the matter. The present opposite parties were defendants in the suit, the lessees and tenants being defendants 2nd and 3rd parties and the defendant 1st party was the then Secretary of State for India in Council through the Collector of Monghyr. The suit, it appears, was contested by the Secretary of State alone. On the 28th of May, 1940, there was a compromise and the suit was decreed on compromise against the Secretary of State for India and ex parte against the other defendants. Paragraph 3 of the compromise petition stated:

"If any part of the land in dispute is ascertained by the surveyor to be within the Raj boundary Government will pay to the Maharajadhiraj whatever they have realised as profits of this particular land for the past 10 years and up to relinquishment of possession by Government in favour of the Maharajadhiraj."

The Government, however, did not relinquish possession in pursuance of the compromise petition. The result was that the present petitioner executed the decree and got possession delivered by a pleader commissioner on the 20th of April 1943. Thereafter, the present petitioner filed an application claiming mesne profits from the 28th May, 1930 to the 20th of April 1943, and one Mr. Maheshwar Prasad was appointed pleader commissioner for the ascertainment of mesne profits claimed by the petitioner. He submitted his report on the 21st of May, 1946, and in his report awarded mesne profits to the extent of Rs. 6,365/- and odd annas against the Secretary of State and Rs. 1,19,742/- and odd annas against defendants 2nd and 3rd parties, that is, 1st and 2nd opposite parties before us. The defendants did not appear to challenge the findings of the pleader commissioner, and on the 14th of February, 1947, the learned Subordinate Judge accepted the report of the pleader commissioner and passed a final order for mesne profits. Then on the 29th of May, 1950, more than three years after, some of the present opposite parties filed an application for setting aside the ex parte preliminary and final decrees under the provisions of Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure. On the 2nd of September, 1950, they also filed two applications, purporting to be applications under Sections 151 and 152, Code of Civil Procedure, for what they called an amendment of the decrees; in effect they said that the decree for mesne profits was illegal, incorrect and without jurisdiction and should be set aside. The learned Subordinate Judge dealt together by one judgment the application under Order IX, Rule 13, and the applications under Sections 151 and 152, Code of Civil Procedure. By his order dated the 6th January, 1951, he dismissed the application under Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, holding that the opposite parties before us had full knowledge of the suit and also of the proceeding for the ascertainment of mesne profits. He further found that the application under Order IX, Rule 13, Code of Civil Procedure, was barred by time. He then proceeded to deal with the applications under Sections 151 and 152, Code of Civil Procedure, and held that the decree for mesne profits passed by his predecessor in office was erroneous and inequitable. On that finding he came to the conclusion that it was open to him to correct the mistake of his predecessor in the interest of justice, and purporting to act in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court, he vacated the decree for mesne profits.

(3) It is against this order of the learned Subordinate Judge that the two applications in revision are directed. Mr. B. C. De, appearing for the petitioner, has urged two substantial points: firstly, he has contended that the learned Subordinate Judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction in vacating the decree for mesne profits inasmuch as neither Section 151 nor Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure, gave the learned Subordinate Judge a jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the decision of his predecessor and set aside a decree passed by a court of competent jurisdiction except in accordance with law; secondly, he contended that the learned Subordinate Judge was wrong even on merits, in thinking that the decree for mesne profits was erroneous or inequitable.

(4) In my opinion, the first contention of Mr. B.C. De is correct and must be upheld. There are many decisions which have laid down that the court cannot override the express provisions of law by a resort to inherent powers under Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, nor can the court ignore the specific provisions for dealing with a case by a resort to inherent Jurisdiction either under Section 151 or Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure; see -- Neelaveni v. Narayana Reddi, 43 Mad 94 [LQ/MadHC/1919/247] (F.B.), --Ajodhya Mahton v. Mt. Phul Kuer, 1 Pat. 277, -- Haridas Mukherjee v. Bijay Krishna Das, A.I.R 1930 Cal. 387 [LQ/CalHC/1929/237] and -- Sheikh Yaruddin v. B. Das, A.I.R. 1946 Pat 165 [LQ/PatHC/1944/58] . In the case before us the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is that the opposite parties had full notice and knowledge of the suit which resulted in the preliminary decree as also of the proceeding which resulted in the final decree for mesne profits. If the decree was erroneous, the procedure for getting the decree vacated was by way of an appeal from the decree. If there was any error apparent on the face of the record, the proper procedure was to file an application for review within time. If a fraud was committed which vitiated the decree, it was open to the opposite parties to bring an action on that basis to set aside the decree. If fraud was committed on the court, the position might have been different and in an appropriate case the inherent jurisdiction of the court might be invoked. But there is no finding of fraud in this case; on the contrary, the finding is that the opposite parties knew of the suit and of the application for mesne profits, but they kept quiet and did not choose to contest the application. That being the position, it seems to me surprising that there should be any occasion for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court or for saying that the ends of justice require that a person who was allowed a decree to be passed against him with full knowledge of the suit and proceeding taken against him should be allowed to agitate against the decree by a resort to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. There has been no abuse of the process of the court in this case which would require to be prevented or remedied by a resort to the inherent power of the court. I do not think that Section 151 or Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure, can be used in the way it has been used by the learned Subordinate Judge.

(5) Sir Sultan Ahmad, appearing on behalf of the contesting opposite parties, has very strongly contended before us that the preliminary decree was not in accordance with the judgment, and the court has an inherent jurisdiction to amend the decree to carry out its own meaning. It is contended that Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure, is not confined merely to clerical or arithmetical mistakes, nor to errors arising from accidental slips or omission. He has placed before us the plaint and the judgment passed in Title Suit No. 24 of 1934. He has referred particularly to paragraphs 40, 41 and 45 of the plaint. It appears from those paragraphs that with regard to 115 bighas covered by the proceeding under Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner distinctly claimed that he was dispossessed. With regard to remaining 675 bighas, the petitioner said that he was virtually dispossessed. In paragraph 45 the petitioner averred that the order of the Collector of Patna in the Ballabandi proceeding and of the Subdivisional Officer of Barh in the Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure, proceeding had the effect of dispossessing the plaintiff from the lands in dispute. By relief No. 5 the petitioner asked for mesne profits from the date of the order in the Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, case to the date of the delivery of possession. Relief No. 6 was couched in the following terms:

"That inasmuch as no mesne profits have yet accrued due with regard to the disputed lands other than, those covered by the Section 145, Cr. P. C. proceeding it is not claimed in this suit but an order may be passed in the decree that the plaintiff will be entitled to get mesne profits with regard to these lands from the date, of dispossession up to the date of the recovery of possession."

It is contended on the basis of relief No. 6 that there was no claim for mesne profits with regard to 675 bighas of land. In the judgment by which the suit was decreed ex parte against the contesting opposite parties, the learned Subordinate Judge referred to the evidence which showed that the opposite parties other than the Secretary of State for India had given up possession soon after the institution of the suit. No date of giving up such possession was however mentioned in the judgment. The judgment showed that costs were disallowed against defendants 2nd and 3rd parties; it did not mention anything about mesne profits except stating that the suit was decreed ex parte against defendants 2nd and 3rd parties. In the decree as drawn up all the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff were allowed ex parte against defendants 2nd and 3rd parties. Relief No. 6, though it stated that no mesne profits had yet accrued due with regard to lands other than those covered by the Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code proceeding, asked for an order to be passed in the decree that the plaintiff would be entitled to get mesne profits with regard to those lands as well from the date of dispossession up to the date of recovery of possession. Mr. De has contended, not without some justification, that relief No. 6, properly construed, asked for a decree for future mesne profits with regard to 675 bighas of land as well. The matter did not, however, rest there. In accordance with the directions passed in the preliminary decree an application for ascertainment of mesne profits was made and a commissioner was appointed to ascertain the mesne profits. The finding of the learned Subordinate Judge is that the contesting opposite parties had knowledge of the application; yet they did not appear to contest the application and a final decree for mesne profits was passed against them in accordance with the report of the pleader commissioner. We have examined the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge which resulted in the final decree for mesne profits. That final decree is in accordance with the judgment pronounced by the learned Sub- ordinate Judge on the 14th of February, 194

7. The utmost that can be said in favour of the contention of learned Counsel for the contesting opposite parties is that relief No. 6 was to some extent ambiguous, and the judgment which the learned Subordinate Judge passed in Title Suit No. 24 of 1934 on the 24th May, 1940, was itself not very clear with regard to relief No.

6. But no ambiguity exists with regard to the final decree for mesne profits. That decree is in accordance with the judgment, and clearly gives effect to it. In these circumstances, there is no question of correcting any error, accidental or otherwise, under the inherent power of the court.

(6) For the reasons given above, I am of the opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge was in error and acted in excess of his jurisdiction in setting aside the decrees passed by his predecessor. It was not open to the learned Subordinate Judge to decide the case as though he were the court of appeal. Neither Section 151 nor Section 152, Code of Civil Procedure, gave him the jurisdiction to set aside the decree on a finding that the decree was erroneous and inequitable. If there was any mistake or ambiguity in the preliminary decree, the contesting opposite parties were themselves responsible for it. They knew of the decrees, both preliminary and final, and kept quiet for so long, without taking any steps in accordance with law for the correction of such error or ambiguity.

(7) The result, therefore, is that I allow the applications with costs and set aside the order of the learned Subordinate Judge vacating the decrees passed against the contesting opposite parties. Hearing fee six gold mohurs. Ramaswami, J.

(8) I agree.