MUKHERJEA, J.

1. This appeal is directed against a judgment of Mr. Justice Harish Chandra of the Allahabad High court, by which the learned Judge rejected an application of the appellant, to appear and argue a case as an Advocate, before an Appellate Bench of the new High Court, that has been constituted by the amalgamation of the old High Court of Allahabad with the Chief Court of Oudh. The facts that are material for our present purpose lie within a short compass. Sir Iqbal Ahmed, the appellant before us, was a practising Advocate whose name was in the roll of Advocates of the High Court of Judicature in Allahabad as it existed prior to July, 1948. He was appointed a Puisne Judge of that Court in or about 1933 and held the office of the Chief Justice of that Court for a number of years prior to his retirement in the year 1946. At the time of his appointment as a Puisne Judge of the Allahabad High Court, the appellant had given an undertaking that after his retirement he would not practise in that Court or in Courts subordinate thereto. After retirement from the Bench, Sir Iqbal got himself enrolled as an Advocate of the Chief Court of Oudh, and his name was removed from the roll of Advocates of the Allahabad High Court. By an order, known as the United provinces High Courts (Amalgamation) Order passed by the Governor-General of India in exercise of his powers under Section 229 of the Government of India Act and dated the 19th of July, 1948, the High Court in Allahabad and the Chief Court in Oudh were amalgamated and constituted as one High Court with effect from 26th July, 1948. Article 8 of the Amalgamation Order, which is material for our present purpose, provided as follows :-

"8. (1) The new High Court shall have the like powers to approve, admit, enroll, remove and suspend advocates and attorneys, and to make rules with respect to advocates and attorneys, in the whole of the United Provinces as are, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, exercisable by either of the existing High Courts."(2). The right of audience in the new High Court shall be regulated in accordance with the like principles as, immediately before the appointed day, are in force with respect to the right of audience in the High Court in Allahabad".

Provided that, subject to any rule made of direction given by the new High Court in the exercise of the powers conferred by this Article, any person who, immediately before the appointed day, is an Advocate entitled to practise or an attorney entitled to act in either of the existing High Courts, shall be recognised as an advocate or an attorney entitled to practise or to act, as the case may be, in the new High Court."

2. On the 4th November, 1948, an amended Order was passed by the governor-General under Section 229, clause (2), of the government of India Act, by which the order of amalgamation mentioned above was supplemented by addition of a further proviso to paragraph 2 of Article 8 set out above. The proviso reads as follows :

"Provided further that notwithstanding the amalgamation of the existing High Courts all undertakings given by persons who held office as Judges of either of the existing High Courts or of the hew High Court not to practise as advocates within the jurisdiction of either of the existing High Courts shall be deemed to continue in force, and the Chief Justice shall issue directions prohibiting from practice as advocates such persons to such extent as may be appropriate having regard to the terms of their undertakings, and for this purpose the said undertakings shall be construed as applicable to the new High Court."

3.In exercise of the powers conferred by this amended order the Chief Justice of the new High Court issued a direction in the following terms :

"The Chief Justice is pleased to direct that ex-Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, before its amalgamation with the Oudh Chief Court, who gave an undertaking not to practise within the jurisdiction of that Court, shall not appear before the Benches of the High Court sitting at Allahabad and in the subordinate Courts in the 37 Districts which were under the jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad before the 26th of July, 1948, and ex-Judges of the Oudh Chief Court who gave an undertaking not to practise within the jurisdiction of that Court, shall not appear before the Benches of the High Court sitting at Lucknow and in the subordinate courts in the 12 Districts which were under the jurisdiction of the Oudh Chief Court before the 26th of July, 1948."The appellant's case, in substance, is that he has been engaged by two persons who were convicted by the Sessions Judge of Budaon of certain offences under the Indian Penal code and had preferred an appeal against the conviction and sentence, to appear and argue the case of the appellants before a Bench of the new High court sitting in Allahabad. As the administrative order of the Chief Justice mentioned above stands in his way, he presented the application, out of which this appeal arises, praying for permission to argue the said criminal case on the footing that he was entitled as a matter of right to practise in the new High Court and all the courts subordinate thereto. In support of his application, a number of contentions were put forward and it was contended inter alia that the provisions made in the amended order of the Governor-General, dated the 4th of November, 1948, as well as the directions given by the Chief Justice of the new High Court in pursuance thereof were illegal and ultra vires and could not, in law, take away the rights which the petitioner could exercise under the provisions of the Bar Councils Act. Another application almost on similar terms was presented by the accused in the criminal case who had briefed Sir Iqbal, praying that the learned Advocate might be permitted to appear and argue the case on their behalf. Both these applications were treated as miscellaneous proceedings in connection with a criminal matter and were heard together by Mr. Justice Harish Chandra of the Allahabad High Court sitting singly. The learned Judge by his judgment, dated 13th of September, 1949, dismissed both these applications and held that Sir Iqbal Ahmad was not entitled to practise before any Bench of the new High Court at Allahabad. The learned Judge, however, give a certificate under Section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, and the appellant has come up to this Court in appeal. An appeal has also been, filed by the applicants in the other petition which is Appeal No. 49 of 1949 but nobody appeared in support of the same when it was called on for hearing.A preliminary point was debated before us as to whether the learned Judge of the High Court was right in treating the application of the appellant as a criminal matter and disposing it of as such. The application was connected no doubt with a criminal case in the sense that it concerned the rights of an Advocate to appear and plead the case of his clients who were parties to a criminal appeal; but the matter in controversy which was presented for consideration of the Court was certainly not a criminal matter in any sense of the expression. In our opinion, the case should have been treated as a civil proceeding. In the view that we have taken, we directed that the appeal before us should be regarded as a civil appeal and the learned counsel before us should be regarded as a civil appeal and the learned counsel appearing for the appellant gave an undertaking that his client would pay the court fees payable in civil appeals under the rules of this court. The judgment appealed from is undoubtedly that of a single Judge but, as this Court had already decided, the judgment or final order of a Judge sitting singly who grants a certificate under Section 205(1) of the Government of India Act, is capable of being challenged directly by way of appeal to this court without taking an appeal in the first instance to a Division Bench of the same High Court : vide Rao Bahadur Kunwar Lall Singh v. Central Provinces and Berar.

4. Coming now to the merits of the appeal, it may be stated at the outset that it is not necessary for our present purpose to express any opinion as to the propriety of an ex-Judge practicing as an Advocate in the Court where he had once exercises the functions of a Judge. We are not called upon to decide the precise nature or extent of the obligation which is involved in an undertaking given by an Advocate at the time of his appointment as a Judge; nor is it material for us to enquire as to whether the new High Court that is sitting in Allahabad can be regarded as a continuation of the old High Court in respect to which the underrating was given by the appellant. Mr. Das appearing on behalf of the appellant has taken his stand firstly upon the provisions of the Bar Councils Act, which according to him give his client the statutory right to practise as an Advocate in the new High Court and in all Courts subordinate thereto. This right, he says cannot be taken away by any order made by the Governor-General under Section 229 of the Government of India Act. The other branch of the learned counsel's contention is that the amended Amalgamation Order passed on the 4th of November, 1948 is ultra vires the authority which is conferred on the Governor-General under Section 229 of the Government of India Act, and the direction given by the Chief Justice of the new High Court in pursuance of this Amended Order is likewise invalid and inoperative in law.So far as the first point is concerned, the learned counsel relies primarily upon Section 14(1) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, which provides that "an Advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise - (a) subject to the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 9 (which are not material for our present purpose) in the High Court of which he is an Advocate." The expression "Advocate" means, according to Section 2(a) an Advocate entered in the Roll of Advocates of a High Court under the provisions of this Act. The various sub-sections of Section 8 lay down the rules for enrolment of Advocates and sub- section (1) definitely states that "no person shall be entitled as of right to practise in any High Court, unless his name is entered in the Roll of the Advocates of the High Court maintained under this Act." Mr. Das's contention, in substances, is that as his client is an enrolled Advocate of the new High Court, he is entitled to practise in that Court as a matter of right under the above provisions of the Bar Councils Act, and this right cannot be taken away by the Amalgamation Order passed by the Governor-General of India under Section 229 of the Government of India Act. In the court below, this contention of the appellant was repelled on the ground that the Indian Bar Councils Act, with the exception of a few sections which are not relevant to the present question, is not applicable to the new High Court that has been established by the Amalgamation Order, without a previous notification by the Provincial Government in the Official Gazette in terms of Section 1(8) of the Bar Councils Act. As there has been no such notification as yet, the appellant is not entitled to invoke the provisions of the Bar Councils Act in his favour.

5. In our opinion, it is not necessary for purposes of the present case to decide whether the view taken by the High Court on this point is correct or not; for even conceding that the Bar Councils Act does apply to the new High Court, the real difficulty that lies in the way of the appellant is that the Bar Councils Act standing by itself does not create any right in him to practise in the new High Court. In order to acquire this statutory right of practicing in a High Court under Section 14(1) of the Indian Bar Councils Act, it is absolutely necessary that the name of the Advocate should be enrolled in the Roli of Advocates prepared by that court under Section 8(2) of the Bar Councils Act. The appellant's name was originally in the Roll of Advocates prepared by the old Allahabad High Court. After retirement from the Bench, he caused his name to be removed from this list and got himself enrolled as an Advocate of the Chief Court of Oudh. It is admitted that after the Amalgamation Order of July, 1948, was passed, no new Roll of Advocates has been prepared by the new High Court under the provisions of the Bar Councils Act. The appellant, therefore, cannot lay any claim to a statutory right under Section 14 of the Bar Councils Act. Whatever rights he has acquired under the proviso to Article 8 (2) of the Amalgamation Order which confers on the Advocates practicing in either of the High Courts before the appointed day the right of practising in the new High Court. Although an argument was advanced before the court below that the proviso to Article 8(2) of the Amalgamation Order was illegal by reason of its contravening the provisions of the Bar Councils Act, Mr. Das abandoned that line of attack and he expressly relied upon this proviso as giving his client the position of an enrolled Advocate of the new High Court under the Bar Councils Act. Once it is conceded that the rights claimed by the appellant are founded on the proviso to Article 8 (2) of the Amalgamation Order, the question of the appellant's rights under the Bar Councils Act, being taken away by any order of Governor-General Cannot possibly arise. The first point raised by Mr. Das, therefore, has got no substance.The material point that requires consideration is the other contention raised by Mr. Das, which turns upon the effect to be given to the amended order made by the Governor-General on the 4th of November 1948. If the provision of this amended order is to be read as a further proviso to Article 8(2) of the original order, obviously the appellant cannot succeed. Mr. Das's contention is that the amended order is illegal and ultra vires the authority of the Governor-General under Section 229 of the Government of India Act and hence ineffectual in law to take away the rights created by the original order.

6. Section 229 of the Government of India Act, as it stands adapted under the Indian Provisional Constitution (Amendment) Order, 1948, is in the following terms :

"(1) The Governor-General, if the Chamber or Chambers of the Legislature of any Province present an address in that behalf to the Governor of the Province for submission to the Governor-General, may by order constitute a High Court for that Province or any part thereof or reconstitute in like manner any existing High Court for that Province or for any party thereof, or, where-there are two High Courts in that Province amalgamate those Courts.

(2) Where any Court is reconstituted, or two Courts are amalgamated, as aforesaid, the order shall provide for the continuance in their respective offices of the existing judges, officers and servants of the Court or Courts, and for the carrying on before the reconstituted Court or the new Court of all pending matters, and may contain such other provisions as may appear to the Governor-General to be necessary by reason of the reconstitution or amalgamation."

7. The wording of the old section has remained unchanged except that the powers, which under the original section were conferred upon His Majesty, are now exercisable by the Governor-General and as a consequence of that, the word "order" has been substituted for the expression "Letters Patent" which occurred in the original section. The contention of Mr. Das in substance is that once the Governor- General has made an order of amalgamation as contemplated by Section 229 (1) of the Government of India Act, and purported to incorporate therein the other matter that are enumerated in sub-section (2), the powers exercisable by him under this section are exhausted; and there is no power left in him under which he can vary, supplement or repeal a provision which has already been made in the Amalgamation Order. The grounds put forward by the learned counsel in support of his contention are of a two-fold character. In the first place, he says, that the section contemplates the making of an order which is in the nature of a "Letters Patent" and in fact the expression "Letters Patent" was used in the section previously. A Letters Patent, it is said, once issued, cannot be amended, supplemented or revoked without any express power being given to that effect, and this is indicated by the express provisions of the Indian High Courts Act of 1861 and the subsequent Parliamentary legislation on the subject. In the second place, it is argued that the language of Section 229 of the Government of India Act, shows clearly that the section contemplates only one self-contained order which has to be made by the Governor-General, if and when the condition specified in this section is fulfilled. There is no scope for making of a second order under the section under any circumstance. Furthermore, as the power conferred by the section is not an unconditional one, there is no occasion for application of the rule of interpretation contained in Section 32 (1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889.It appears to us that neither the use of the words "Letters Patent" in Section 229 of the Government of India Act, as it stood before adaptation, nor the fact that the order which the section contemplates may be similar in character to a Letters Patent, is at all material for the purpose of a proper interpretation of the Act. The expression "Letters Patent" has a technical meaning in English law. It means "letters" or writings addressed by the Sovereign of England "to all to whom these presents shall come, " reciting the grant of some dignity, office, monopoly, franchise or privilege to the patentee. They are so called because they are open with the seal affixed and ready to be shown for confirmation of the authority for the thing given (1). None but the Sovereign of England can issue Letters Patent and the reason why this expression has been dropped in the Section 229 of the Government of India Act, is that the powers under this section are now vested in the Governor-General of India. So far as the present case is concerned, nothing turns upon the fact as to whether the instrument, by which a High Court is established, is described as a "Letters Patent" or as an "order" simply. Whether any power of revocation or modification exists depends not upon the description of the instrument but upon the nature and extent of the powers conferred by the Act of Parliament, in exercise of which the instrument is executed. The Indian High Courts Act, 1861. Empowered her majesty to erect and establish by Letters patent, three High Courts in the three Presidencies, subject to the terms and conditions set out in the Act. There were elaborate provisions in the Act relating to the constitution of the High Courts, the different jurisdictions which the Courts could exercise and the laws they were to apply. Section 17 of the Act, expressly authorised Her Majesty, within a period of tree years from the date of the establishment of a High Court, to revoke the whole or part of the Letters Patent or to issue supplementary or additional Charters as Her Majesty might think proper. Thus Parliament, when it delegated to the Crown, the authority to establish High Courts by Letters Patent, laid down in minute details the limits within which such powers were to be exercised. Section 17 of the Indian High Courts Act, undoubtedly indicates that after the period of three years specified in the section, the power of revoking the Charter or issuing supplementary Charters could not be exercised by Her Majesty unless, of course, fresh authority was given by the Parliament for that purpose; but from this it cannot be argued that any instrument, by which a High Court is constituted, is by its nature incapable of being revoked or modified after it is issued. This limits of the power in each case would have to be ascertained from the language of the Act, which creates the power. By section 113 of the Government of India Act 1915, His Majesty was empowered to establish additional High Courts in such areas as his Majesty considered desirable. The discretion given by this section was almost unfettered and no detailed conditions or limitations were laid down as are found in the Indian High Courts Act. In the Government of India Act, 1935, the relevant provision is contained in Section 229, and it is necessary to examine the language of this section for the purpose of determining whether it was within the competence of the Governor- General to make the amended Amalgamation Order on the 4th of November, 1948.The section is divided into two parts which are embodied in two sub- sections. The main provision is in sub-section (1), which lays down that the condition precedent to the vesting of the power in the Governor-General is the presentation of an address by the Chamber or Chambers of the Legislature of any province to the Governor of that province for submission to the Governor-General in relation to constitution or reconstitution of a High Court or amalgamation of two High Courts situated in the province. On this condition being fulfilled, the Governor-General acquires the power to make an order for the purposes mentioned in the clause under this section. Sub- section (2) lays down what the order should contain if it is one for reconstitution of a High Court or amalgamation of two High Courts in a province. No specific directions are given in cases where the order is merely for the constitution of a High Court. The directions specified in sub-section (2) come under three heads and of these the first two are clearly mandatory while the third optional.

8. The language of the section seems to contemplate only one order that has to be made by the Governor-General after an address has been presented by the Chamber or Chambers of the Legislature of a province in the manner laid down in the section. As the power can be exercised by the Governor-General only when such address is presented, it is certainly not within the competence of the Governor-General, after an order is made, to issue a different order of constitution, reconstitution or amalgamation of High Courts at his own will and pleasure without there being a further address on that behalf from the Legislative Chambers. The subsidiary matters that are enumerated in sub-section (2) are intended certainly to form part of the main order which is to be made under sub-section (1), but from that it does not follow that the entirety of these directions must be contained in the same sheet of paper or that they must be issued all at the same time. Suppose that the order given by the Governor-General omits to give a direction regarding the continuance of the existing Judges in case of reconstitution of a Court. This is a mandatory provision, the absence of which will make the order incomplete. To supply this omission and make the order complete and perfect, a supplementary order can certainly be made by the Governor-General and the supplementary order would be reckoned in such a case as an integral part of the original order. Then again there may be a lacuna or ambiguity in the case of a purely discretionary direction relating to a matter which the Governor-General considers necessary by reason of reconstruction or amalgamation. We think that in such circumstances it would be quite open to the Governor-General to make a subsequent order, not for the purpose of revoking or repealing the earlier order but for removing the doubt and ambiguity that might be in the original order or supply any incidental omission in the same. In our opinion, this is exactly what has happened in the present case. There being an amalgamation of the Allahabad High Court with the Chief Court of Oudh, the rights of Advocates of either of the two Courts to practise in the new High Court were certainly a matter upon which it was necessary to make definite provision. There was a provision made in respect to this matter in the proviso to Article 8(2) of the Amalgamation Order. There was apparently an omission or lacuna in the provisions so made, for nothing was said about the few ex-Judge Advocates of either Court who had given an undertaking at the time of their appointment not to practise in that Court of any Courts subordinate thereto after retirement. It seems to us that the provision introduced by the amended order of 4th November, 1948, was not in any way inconsistent with or repugnant to that of the proviso to Article 8 (2) of the original order. The original order contemplates cases of a general description which are not complicated by reason of undertakings given by Advocates who acted as Judges in either of the two Courts. These are special cases which would not ordinarily come under the general rule and would require to be considered and dealt with separately. The Governor-General need not have made any provision with regard to the Advocate's rights at all; it was purely discretionary with him to do so; but if any provision is made and that is found to be incomplete or ambiguous in any way, it would obviously be within his powers to make the order clear and perfect. The order of the 4th of November 1948, was thus a supplementary order which removed the lacuna and supplied the omission in the original order. In our opinion, the Governor- General was quite within his rights in issuing an order of this description which could not but be regarded as a part of the original order. This being our view, it is unnecessary for us to consider for the purposes of this case, whether the powers conferred by Section 229 of Government of India Act, could be exercised as and when occasion arises, under Section 32(1) of the Interpretation Act, 1889, or whether any power of revocation is given to the Governor-General under Section 19(5) of the Indian Independence Act.

9. The result is that in our opinion this appeal fails and is dismissed.