1. The petition is in relation to Survey Nos.28/7, 29/2, 30/1 and 31/1 (Gat Nos. 324 and 330) totally admeasuring 120 R, at village Devale, Tal Panhala.

2. The original owner of the subject property was the landlord, Mr. Dhondopant Krishnaji Kulkarni who passed away on 23/02/1955 leaving behind him his widow Sakhubai. Sakhubai on 06/08/1962 adopted one Sharad, who was a minor of 6 years age at that point of time, whose name came to be recorded as adopted son in the Revenue Records vide Mutation Entry No.976 dated 09/08/1962. Sakhubai passed away on 25/10/1962. Sharad is claimed to have attained majority in the year 1977.

3. It is contended that as the original tenant did not file any application under Section 32G of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (“BT & AL Act’ for short hereinafter), however proceedings were initiated at the behest of Sharad, who approached the Agricultural Land Tribunal (“ALT”), with a request that since no inquiry has been conducted under Section 32G of the BT & AL Act the same be done, on account of which the proceedings bearing No.62-Devale-43 came to be registered under Section 32G of the BT & AL Act, which found that Shripati Dhondi Jadhav the predecessor of the petitioner was cultivating the land in question as a tenant of Dhondopant Krishnaji Kulkarni, the original landlord and an entry in that regard was recorded in the 7/12 extract vide Entry No.1620 dated 30/08/1950. On account of demise of landlord Dhondopant Krishnaji Kulkarni, on 23/02/1955 his widow Sakhubai being the sole legal heir, her name was mutated in the Revenue Records vide Mutation Entry No.2380. Sakhubai by a registered Adoption Deed registered at Sr.No.976 on 01/08/1962 adopted Sharad, who is claimed to have been aged 6 years on the date of adoption. Sakhubai passed away on 25/10/1962 and the name of Sharad Dhondopant Kulkarni was recorded as the landlord vide Mutation Entry No.2747 in the 7/12 extract. So also the original tenant Shripati Dhondi Jadhav passed away and the names of his legal heirs, Mr. Baburao and Mr. Bajirao were recorded in the other rights column as tenants, who continued to cultivate the land. He further held that since Sakhubai was a widow on the tillers day the same got postponed. He further records, vide answering issue No.2 (page 23), that in view of the above, a claim by the tenant under 32G of the BT & AL Act, made earlier was held not to be sustainable by the decision dated 16/11/1969, on account of the landlady being a widow, which was recorded in the Mutation Register vide Entry No.2679 dated 07/09/1961 in the 7/12 extract. He further recorded that the tenant, Shripati Dhondi Jadhav had expressed his willingness to purchase the land in his possession as a tenant, on account of which since Sharad, had not filed any application under Section 31(3) (2) of the BT & AL Act within one year of the demise of Sakhubai, i.e. before 25/10/1963, therefore no resumption could be granted to him and thus held that the tenant was entitled to purchase the land in question.

4. The learned Sub Divisional Officer (“SDO”) in appeal by Sharad by the Judgment dated 03/02/1997 in Tenancy Application No.18 of 1996 allowed the Appeal, on the ground that, on account of the Mutation Entry in the name of Sharad due to the demise of the original landlady Sakhubai on 25/10/1962 the tenant was aware of the demise and the entitlement of Sharad and therefore ought to have filed the application under Section 32G of the BT & AL Act, which having not been done, it could not be said that the tenant has expressed his willingness to purchase the land in terms of Section 32G of the BT & AL Act.

5. This finding by the learned SDO in the Judgment dated 03/02/1997 (page 20) has been upheld by the learned Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (“MRT”) in Revision by the tenant, dismissing the same on 26/11/1997 (page 9), by holding that since the tenant was aware of the demise of Sakhubai and had paid the rent to Sharad, since willingness to purchase was not expressed in term of Section 32G of the MT & AL Act by the tenant the order passed by the learned ALT was not correct in law.

6. Mr Railkar, learned counsel for the petitioner tenant submits, that the finding of the SDO as well as that of the MRT are unsustainable, on the law applicable to the facts in the case and therefore in spite of being concurrent nature it requires interference at the hands of this Court.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner heavily relies upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in Vasant Ganpat Padave (D) by LRs & Ors v Anant Mahadev Sawant (D) Through LRs & Ors in which the question as to whether the successor in interest of a widow is also required to send an intimation to the tenant of cessation of interest of the widow to enable the tenant to exercise his right has been answered in the affirmative by holding that such an intimation was necessary to be sent to the tenant by the successor in interest of the widow, so as to enable the tenant to exercise the right of purchase. He also relies upon Vitthal Mahatru Gavade Patil, Deceased by his heirs v Ramabai Shankar Sunthankar Deceased through heirs (Civil Writ Petition No. 804 of 1997 decided by the learned Single Judge on 13.06.2024) which follows Vasant Ganpat Padave (Supra). He further contends that there is nothing on record that to show, that Sharad, successor in interest of the widow Sakhubai, had at any point of time given any intimation, to the original tenant regarding cessation of the interest of the widow (Sakhubai) on account of which the tenant, became enabled to exercise his right of purchase. He therefore, contended that in view of this, the proceedings commenced by the ALT even at the behest of Sharad under Section 32G of the BT & AL Act were legally competent and the finding by the ALT holding that the willingness on the part of the tenant to purchase the land under Section 32G of the BT & Al Act was a correct finding. He further contended that the finding by the learned SDO and the MRT, were based on presumption that on account of the Mutation Entry in favour of Sharad and the fact that the rent was being paid by the tenant to Sharad, indicated that the tenant had no willingness to purchase, was clearly untenable as the willingness to purchase, by the tenant was always manifest, and more so in view of the finding rendered by the ALT while answering issue No. 2, which has not been considered by both the authorities below in view of which the same stands vitiated.

8. He further submits, that the finding that Sharad who was the successor in interest of the widow, during his life time had never given an intimation of cessation of his interest, to the tenant has never been questioned by the respondent at any point of time, nor anything has been placed on record by Sharad, which would indicate, that the requirement in that regard, having not been complied, even presuming otherwise for the sake of argument that there was no willingness on the part to the tenant, on account of the notice as stated above by Sharad, the entitlement to file an application under Section 32G of the BT & AL Act did not commence, which is also a mandate of Section 32F (1) (a) of the BT & AL Act. He therefore submits that the orders of the learned SDO and that of the learned MRT are required to be set aside and that of ALT is restored.

9. Mr. Girish Paryani, the learned counsel for the respondent while supporting the impugned orders submits that since the petitioner -tenant had not exercised his right after the demise of Sakhubai, nor after being aware of Sharad having acquired right to the property on his attaining majority, the impugned orders are justified. It is further contended that after Sharad attained majority the rent was paid to him and therefore the petitioners were aware that Sharad had become the owner of the property on account of which the application under Section 32G of the BT & AL Act had to be filed within reasonable time which having not been done the same was not maintainable.

10. The very purpose of Section 32G of the BT & AL Act, is for the Agricultural Lands Tribunal (ALT) to determine the purchase price of the land in question so that the tenant has a document of title in respect thereof, the title having already stood transferred in the tenant on the tillers’ day of 01/05/1957 on account of the tenant cultivating the land in view of Section 32 of the BT & AL Act.

11. In the instant case, there is no dispute that Shripat Dhondi Jadhav was the tenant of the lands in question, as this position is not disputed and is also reflected from the mutation entry No.1620 dated 30/08/1950, which position has continued thereafter also. Thus the position that on the tillers day, Shripat Dhondi Jadhav was the tenant of the lands in question is an undisputed one. From a reading of the Mutation Entry No.2679, dated 07/09/1961, it can be discerned that the original tenant had indicated his willingness to purchase the lands in question, however, since Sakhubai was a widow on that date, the tillers day stood postponed, as is recorded therein. This would indicate that an intent to purchase the lands in question by the original tenant was there, at that time itself. That the present petitioners are the legal heirs of the original tenant Shripat Dhondi Jadhav is also not disputed. It is also not in dispute that Sakhubai passed away on 25/10/1962, before which she had adopted Sharad on 09/08/1962, who is claimed to have attained majority in the year 1977.

12. In view of this it was incumbent upon Sharad, the successor-in-interest of Sakhubai, to have given the tenant a notice of the cessation of interest of the widow, to enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase, which is absent in the arena. The position in this regard is covered by what has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Vasant Ganpat Padave (Supra) in which it has been held as under:

“17. It can thus be seen that the scheme of the 1948 Act, and in particular, the 1956 Amendment, which introduced Tillers' Day, is that an absentee landlord's rights in the land must give way to a cultivating tenant. Statutorily, on Tillers' Day, the landlord is divested of title and the tenant is vested with title to agricultural land which he cultivates by dint of his own effort. It is only in three cases that such purchase becomes ineffective — if the tenant fails to appear within the time prescribed after notice is given to him, or appears and declines purchase, or if the tenant fails to pay the entire purchase price. The widow, the minor and the person subject to a disability are placed on the same pedestal, and throughout their widowhood, minority or period of disability are deemed to cultivate the land personally through their tenants — Explanation I to Section 2(6) makes this clear. As we have seen from the case law extracted above, in the vast majority of cases, the landlord is divested of his title on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. It is only in exceptional cases where the landlord is a widow, minor or a person subjected to disability that this right of the tenant is postponed. What is important to note is that it is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant that the tenant becomes the owner statutorily on a fixed date i.e. 1st April, 1957. Even otherwise, on postponed dates that are mentioned under Section 32, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on such postponed date under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 32 when an application for possession made by the landlord under Section 29 is finally rejected — a date that is to the knowledge of both landlord and tenant. Also, under the circumstances prescribed under Section 32(1-A), again the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on a date on which a final order is passed by the Tribunal in the circumstances mentioned in the said sub-section. Again, under sub-section (1-B), in the circumstances mentioned in the aforesaid sub-section, land gets restored to the tenant upon which deemed purchase takes place. Statutorily, therefore, in all cases covered by Section 32, the landlord is divested of his title either on Tillers' Day or on a postponed date which is to the knowledge of the tenant, as the aforesaid date is on and from a final order of a Tribunal or a Tahsildar, as the case may be.

55. The questions referred to us are now answered as follows:

55.1. The object of the Amendment Act of 1969 is relevant and applicable in deciding the scope of the right to purchase by a tenant of a landlord who was a widow or suffering from mental or physical disability on Tillers' Day.

55.2. The successor-in-interest of a widow is obliged to send an intimation to the tenant of cessation of interest of the widow to enable the tenant to exercise his right of purchase.

55.3. The decision in Appa Narsappa [Appa Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443] stands overruled. The decision in Sudam Ganpat [Sudam Ganpat Kutwal v. Shevantabai Tukaram Gulumkar, (2006) 7 SCC 200] stands distinguished as stated in para 47 of the judgment. The decision in Tukaram Maruti [Tukaram Maruti Chavan v. Maruti Narayan Chavan, (2008) 9 SCC 358] , to the extent that it follows the law laid down in Appa Narsappa [Appa Narsappa Magdum v. Akubai Ganapati Nimbalkar, (1999) 4 SCC 443] , stands overruled.”

13. In the instant case, there is nothing on record to indicate that any notice was given to the tenant upon the demise of the landlady Sakhubai, or for that matter even Sharad after attaining majority had issued any notice, to the tenant. Therefore period of one year which enabled the tenant to exercise his right to purchase did not start, as it is only after expiry of such period of one year that the right of tenant to purchase land under Section 32G of the BT & AL Act would get extinguished. This having not been done the right to purchase would continue, since it is undisputed, that the father of the petitioner was admittedly a tenant on the tillers’ day.

14. In the instant matter in fact there is a request by Sharad, himself after he attained majority, to initiate proceedings under Section 32G of the BT & AL Act, as is recorded by the ALT in his order dated 21/11/1995 (pg.21), on account of which the proceedings were commenced and the order was passed.

15. Though it is contended that the petitioner tenant had given rent to the landlord Sharad, that however, is not a position as is reflected from the evidence on record, and even had it been so, that does not absolve the landlord, from giving a notice of cessation of disability, as is held in Vasant Ganpat Padave (Supra), which admittedly is absent. That apart when Sharad, himself, is instrumental in initiating the proceedings under Section 32G of BT & AL Act, that would be of no consequence, whatsoever.

16. The position, therefore stands squarely covered by Vasant Ganpat Padave (Supra). The impugned orders, are based upon presumptions that on account of the mutation of the name of Sharad in the revenue records, it has to be presumed that the tenant had knowledge of his acquiring right and the disability had ceased to exist. There is no scope of any presumption of knowledge of cessation of disability, when the language of the Statute is clear that the time of one year, would commence, only when a notice in that regard is given. It is also to be noted that the provisions of the BT & AL Act, are beneficial in nature and the deemed transfer of title as provided therein, cannot be thwarted on the basis of any presumption. Moreover such a presumption would not be attracted on account of Sharad himself, having requested the ALT to determine the purchase price, as it was not done earlier, which position is not controverted and has also not been taken into consideration by the Authorities below, on account of which though the impugned orders render a concurrent finding, in my considered view, since they are far away from the factuality and the law, they need interference.

17. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 03/02/1997 passed by the learned SDO in appeal and the one dated 26/11/1997 passed by the learned MRT in revision, are hereby quashed and set aside and the order dated 21/11/1995 by the ALT is restored.

18. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.