Arijit Banerjee, J.

1. In this writ petition the petitioners challenge the orders passed by the Learned Addl. District Judge, Burdwan, in 24 Land Acquisition Cases (Annexure P 29 to the writ petition). The undisputed facts of the case are briefly as follows.

2. In June, 2004 the Burdwan Development Authority (in short BDA) issued a notice inviting Expression of Interest for selection of a suitable private partner for development of a Satellite Township at Burdwan. As per the terms of the said notice, the private partner was to pay the actual cost of acquisition of the land on which such township was proposed to be set up.

3. Bengal Shrachi Housing Development Ltd. being the proforma respondent (in short Bengal Shrachi) submitted a proposal to BDA in response to the notice inviting Expression of Interest. By a letter dated 8 November, 2004 BDA communicated its approval of Bengal Shrachis proposal.

4. In November, 2004 and January, 2005 there were newspaper publications regarding proposed development of the Satellite Township by BDA with the help of Bengal Shrachi.

5. By a letter dated 11 May, 2005 BDA requested the Land Acquisition Collector to initiate proceedings for acquiring land for setting up of the proposed township. In May, 2005 notification was issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. This was challenged by an Association of land owners of Burdwan by filing WP No. 16280(W) of 2005 in this Court in August, 2005. The said writ petition was, however, dismissed by a judgment and order dated 23 February, 2007. By a letter dated 14 October, 2005 BDA requested Bengal Shrachi to deposit a sum of Rs. 11,17,99,824 being 50 per cent of the probable cost of acquisition of about 248.32 acres of land in Burdwan.

6. In November and December, 2005 the said sum was deposited by Bengal Shrachi with the BDA.

7. In December, 2005 and January, 2006 notification was issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

8. On 8 March, 2006 a memorandum of agreement was entered into between BDA and Bengal Shrachi. Clause 5 of the said agreement provides that the company shall pay the actual cost of acquisition of the land together with all applicable incidentals, as may be determined by the Land Acquisition Collector, Burdwan, in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1984, (hereinafter referred to as the LA Act) to the BDA. Further, the company would also bear additional costs in connection with the acquisition like subsequent payment to the land losers in pursuance of Court orders etc. if any, on actual basis.

9. On 25 July, 2006 Bengal Shrachi deposited Rs. 1,91,75,810/- with BDA for paying the cost of acquisition in four LA Cases.

10. On 26 February, 2007 BDA handed over possession of 248.32 acres of land covering the area of the Burdwan Satellite Township Project to Bengal Shrachi.

11. By a letter dated 9 October, 2007 BDA requested Bengal Shrachi to consider payments of 10 per cent bonus on total value of land to three land losers.

12. On 5 September, 2008 BDA handed over possession of balance 6.420 acres of land to the writ petitioner company (hereinafter referred to as Shrachi).

13. At this juncture it may be noted that Bengal Shrachi along with a Mauritius based company called Xander Investment Holding VI Limited formed the writ petitioner company, i.e., Shrachi, as a Special Purpose Vehicle for developing the township. Bengal Shrachi and Xander Investment each hold 50 per cent shareholding in Shrachi. On 20 October, 2006 Bengal Shrachi entered into a development rights assignment agreement with Shrachi whereby and where under Bengal Shrachi assigned and transferred all its rights, entitlements and interest in the development of the said project to Shrachi. The respondent authorities had full knowledge of the said agreement dated 20 October, 2006. On 10 January, 2007 Bengal Shrachi wrote a letter to the Additional District Magistrate (Dev), Burdwan & Executive Officer, BDA putting on record the execution of the said assignment agreement and also putting on record that a meeting was held on 29 December, 2006 at the Chamber of the Learned Government Pleader of Burdwan which was attended by the Executive Officer of BDA and the Vice Chairman of Burdwan Municipality wherein it was decided that a tripartite agreement would be entered into between Bengal Shrachi, Shrachi and BDA whereby BDA will, inter alia, confirm the assignment agreement and Bengal Shrachi will indemnify BDA for any loss or damage that BDA may suffer for any acts or deeds of Shrachi in execution of the project.

By a letter dated 1 March, 2007 addressed to Bengal Shrachi, BDA recorded its no objection to the implementation of the said project through Shrachi.

14. Under cover of a letter dated 2 July, 2009 BDA forwarded to Bengal Shrachi minutes of a meeting of BDA wherein it was recorded that in some land acquisition cases the compensation awarded by the Collector had been enhanced by the Reference District Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and that BDA was taking steps for filing of Appeal in those cases.

15. A lease deed dated 27 August, 2010 was executed by BDA in favour of Shrachi in respect of 254.74 acres of land owner in Burdwan town on which the proposed Satellite Township was to be set up. Bengal Shrachi was a confirming party to the said lease-deed.

16. Between July, 2010 and June, 2012 several letters were written by BDA to Shrachi providing details of land acquisition cases in which orders of higher valuation of compensation had been passed by the Reference District Court under Section 18 of the LA Act without notice or giving a hearing to Shrachi.

17. In the above factual background Shrachi has filed the instant application challenging the orders of higher valuation of compensation passed by the Reference District Court under Section 18 of the LA Act primarily on the ground that Shrachi is a person interested and the Reference Court should have given an opportunity of hearing to Shrachi before enhancing the quantum of compensation.

18. At the outset Learned Counsel for the respondent nos. 5-19 and 24-28 submitted that out of 57 reference cases initiated under Section 18 of LA Act 37 cases have been carried to this Court by way of appeal from the orders passed by the Reference Court. Such appeals are pending, hence the present writ petition should not be entertained.

In response, Mr. Pal, Learned Senior Counsel pointed out that this writ petition should be treated as being confined to the reference cases which are not before this Court in appeal. He submitted that out of 20 remaining reference cases, the land losers in 16 of the cases are not parties to the writ petition. The remaining four land losers are respondent nos. 6, 16, 17 and 25 in this writ petition. Hence, the writ petition should be treated as being confined to those four cases only.

19. I find Mr. Pals submission to be reasonable. Hence, this writ petition is treated as confined to challenging the orders enhancing compensation in the reference cases initiated by the respondent nos. 6, 16, 17 and 25.

20. Learned Counsel for the said respondents then challenged the maintainability of the writ petition on two difference grounds. Firstly, he contended that there is an efficacious alternative remedy available to Shrachi by way of appeal under Section 54 of the LA Act. Hence, the writ petition is not maintainable.

I am unable to accept this contention. Firstly, existence of an alternative remedy does not affect the maintainability of a writ petition. It is a rule of practise that the High Court generally does not entertain a writ petition if another efficacious remedy is available to the aggrieved party. The jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition in spite of existence of an alternative remedy is in no way abrogated or abridged. Similarly, there is no absolute legal injunction on an aggrieved party from invoking the writ jurisdiction notwithstanding that he could have recourse to an alternative remedy. To put it differently, existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to the maintainability of a writ petition. It is the Courts discretion as to whether or not an application under Article 226 of the Constitution shall be entertained in the facts of a given case in spite of the availability of an efficacious alternative remedy. There are certain well-recognised situations where notwithstanding the availability of an alternative remedy, a writ petition may be entertained. One such situation is when the impugned order is challenged on the ground of breach of the principles of natural justice, as in the present case.

21. Further, by the order dated 4 May, 2015 passed by Dr. Sambuddha Chakraborty, J. at the time of admission of the writ petition, the point of maintainability of the writ petition in spite of availability of an alternative remedy has been decided in favour of Shrachi. Although towards the end of the said order the Learned Judge recorded that the question of maintainability of the petition has been kept open by a learned Single Judge of this Court by an order dated 16 July, 2012 to be decided after giving the respondents an opportunity of being heard, the same must be understood as the question of maintainability of the petition as far as locus standi of Shrachi is concerned.

22. On the point of locus standi, Mr. Pal submitted that in deciding the issue of maintainability of the writ petition in spite of availability of an alternative remedy, by necessary implication the Court decided the issue of locus standi in favour of Shrachi since unless Shrachi is a person interested in compensation as defined in Section 3(b) of the LA Act, it would not be entitled to maintain either an appeal or a writ petition. Mr. Pal submitted that since no appeal has been filed by the respondents from the order dated 4 May, 2015, the issue of locus standi of Shrachi to maintain the present writ petition has attained finality. A person has locus standi to challenge an order of higher valuation passed by a reference Court under Section 18 of the LA Act if he is a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the LA Act. Section 3(b) provides that the expression person interested includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the LA Act and a person shall be deemed to be interested in land if he is interested in an easement affecting the land. Under the memorandum of agreement entered into by and between Bengal Shrachi and BDA for development of the satellite township at Burdwan, Bengal Shrachi had an obligation to pay the actual cost of acquisition of land as may be determined by the Land Acquisition Collector and also the additional cost in connection with acquisition like subsequent payment to the land losers in pursuance of Court orders. Such obligation is now that of Shrachi in view of the arrangement between the parties whereby Shrachi has stepped into the shoes of Bengal Shrachi. The recital of the said memorandum of agreement also establishes that the scheme of acquisition was that the States/BDAs obligation to arrange/pay the compensation is to be discharged by Bengal Shrachi. In accordance with the terms of the memorandum of agreement, initially Bengal Shrachi and subsequently Shrachi have already paid to BDA the compensation awarded by the Collector. Implication of the said scheme of acquisition is also evidenced by the fact that BDA is now demanding the enhanced/higher valuation of compensation awarded by the Reference Court from Shrachi. As such, Shrachi has an interest in the compensation and hence is a person interested as defined by Section 3(b) of the LA Act.

23. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Pal relied on three judgments of the Honble Apex Court. In Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd v. Frangis Victor Coutinho (Dead) by Lrs., (1980) 3 SCC 223 , [LQ/SC/1980/152] at paras 8 and 14 of the judgment the Honble Apex Court observed as follows:-

"8. It seems to us that the definition of a person interested given in Section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested either in the title to the land or in the quantum of compensation. In the instant case, it is not disputed that the lands were actually acquired for the purpose of the company and once the land vested in the Government, after acquisition, it stood transferred the company under the agreement entered into between the company and the Government. Thus, it cannot be said that the company had no claim or title to the land at all. Secondly, since under the agreement the company had to pay the compensation, it was most certainly interested in seeing that a proper quantum of compensation was fixed so that the company may not have to pay a very heavy amount of money. For this purpose, the company could undoubtedly appear and adduce evidence on the question of the quantum of compensation.

14. Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of person interested must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him. Similarly if such a person is not heard by the Collector or a court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before a court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, local authority or a person or whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him, seriously prejudice his rights. Moreover, in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by section 18(1) of the. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that it had no locus to file an appeal before the Bench."

24. In Neelagangabai v. State of Karnataka, (1990) 3 SCC 617 , [LQ/SC/1990/304] the Honble Apex Court held that since the land was acquired for the purpose of the respondent corporation and the burden of payment of the compensation was on the corporation, it was mandatory for the reference Court to cause a notice to be served on the respondent corporation before proceeding to determine the compensation claim. Since no such notice was served on the respondent corporation and it was deprived of an opportunity of placing its case before the Court, the judgment rendered in the reference case was illegal and not binding on the corporation.

25. In Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. v. Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition) Neyvely, (1995) 1 SCC 221 , [LQ/SC/1994/994] at paragraphs 12 to 14 of the judgment the Honble Apex Court observed as follows:-

"12. It is true that Section 50(2) of thegives to the local authority or the company right to adduce evidence before the Collector or in the reference under Section 18 as it was specifically stated that in any proceedings held before the Collector or the Court, the local authority or the company may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. However, it has no right to seek reference. Based thereon, the contention is that the limited right of addiction of evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation does not carry with it the right to participate in the proceedings or right to be heard or to file an appeal under Section 54. We cannot limit the operation of Section 3(b) in conjunction with sub-section (2) of Section 50 of thewithin a narrow compass. The right given under sub-section (2) of Section 50 is in addition to and not in substitution of or in derogation to all the incidental, logical and consequential rights flowing from the concept of fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice. The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this Court starting from Himalayan Tiles case is that the beneficiary, i.e., local authority or company, a cooperative society registered under the relevant State law, or statutory authority is a person interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and is an aggrieved person. It flows from it that the beneficiary has the right to be heard by the Collector or the Court. If the compensation is enhanced it is entitled to canvass its correctness by filing an appeal or defend the award of the Collector. If it is not made a party, it is entitled to seek leave of the court and file the appeal against the enhanced award and decree of the Civil Court under Section 26 or of the judgment and decree under Section 54 or is entitled to file writ petition under Article 226 and assail its legality or correctness. When the award made under Section 11 of the Collector is vitiated by fraud, collusion or corruption, the beneficiary is entitled to challenge it in the writ petition apart from the settled law that the conduct of the Collector or Civil Judge is amenable to disciplinary enquiry and appropriate action. These are very valuable and salutary rights. Moreover in the language of Order 1, Rule 10 CPC, in the absence of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher compensation, no complete and effectual determination of binding just and proper compensation to the acquired land would be made. So it is concomitantly a proper party if not a necessary party to the proceedings under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC. The denial of the right to a person interested is in negation of fair and just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution.

13. The reasons are not far to seek. It is notorious that though the stakes involved are heavy, the Government plead or the instructing officer do not generally adduce, much less proper and relevant, evidence to rebut the claims for higher compensation. Even the cross-examination will be formal, halting and ineffective. Generally, if not invariably the governmental agencies involved in the process take their own time and many a time in collusion, file the appeals after abnormal or inordinate delay. They remain insensitive even if the States involved run into several crores of public money. The courts insist upon proper explanation of every days delay. In this attitudinal Situation it would be difficult to meet strict standards to fill the unbridgeable gaps of the delay in filing the appeals and generally entails dismissal of the appeals at the threshold without adverting to the merits of the hike in the compensation. On other hand if the notice is issued to the local authority etc. it/they would participate in the award proceedings under Sections 11 and 18, adduce necessary and relevant evidence and be heard before the Collector and the court before determining compensation. For instance that without considering the evidence in the proper perspective, the court determined the compensation.

14. If there is no right of hearing or appeal given to the beneficiary and if the State does not file the appeal or if filed with delay and it was dismissed, is it not the beneficiary who undoubtedly bears the burden of the compensation, who would be the affected person Is it not interested to see that the appellate court would reassess the evidence and fix the proper and just compensation as per law For instance the reference court determined market value at Rs. 1,00,000 while the prevailing market value of the land is only Rs. 10,000. Who is to bear the burden Suppose State appeal was dismissed due to refusal to condone the delay, is it not an unjust and illegal award Many an instance can be multiplied. But suffice it to state that when the beneficiary for whose benefit the land is acquired is served with the notice and brought on record at the stage of enquiry by the Collector and reference court under Section 18 or in an appeal under Section 54, it/they would be interested to defend the award under Section 11 or Section 26 or would file an appeal independently under Section 54 etc. against the enhanced compensation. As a necessary or proper party affected by the determination of higher compensation, the beneficiary must have a right to challenge the correctness of the award made by the reference court under Section 18 or in appeal under Section 54 etc. Considered from this perspective we are of the considered view that the appellant-Company is an interested person within the meaning of Section 3(b) of theand is also a proper party, if not a necessary party under Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC. The High Court had committed manifest error of law in holding that the appellant is not a person interested. The orders of the High Court are accordingly set aside."

26. Mr. Pal submitted that the aforesaid judgements clearly establish that Shrachi is a person interested and was entitled to be heard by the Reference Court before the compensation was enhanced. Principles of equity, justice and good conscience also warranted the same. Since Shrachi was not heard, there was a clear breach of the principles of natural justice. Hence, the orders of the Reference Court impugned in the present proceeding should be set aside and the four reference cases should be remanded back to the Reference Court for being decided afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to Shrachi.

27. Learned Counsel for the respondent nos. 5-19 and 24-28, in support of his submission that Shrachi lacks locus standi, relied on three decisions of the Honble Apex Court. He cited the decision in the case of Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Jind v. Municipal Committee, Jind, AIR 1988 SC 2139 [LQ/SC/1988/186] . In that case, the Improvement Trust Jind acquired an area of land for development of a housing and commercial complex. Its successor, the Municipal Committee took possession of the land and sold some portion of the land to the appellants. The agreement contained a clause that if compensation was enhanced, the appellants would be liable to pay the same to the Municipal Committee. On a reference under Section 18 of the LA Act, the compensation was, in fact, enhanced. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal, one of the appellants applied for being impleaded as a party and for an opportunity of hearing to contest the claim for enhanced compensation. The application was rejected on the ground that the applicant was not an interested person within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the LA Act. Upon the matter being carried to the Supreme Court it was held that the land in dispute was not acquired for the purpose of the appellants but for the Municipal Committee for the purpose of developing its scheme. After the declaration of Award, the Municipal Committee took possession of the land and thereafter transferred a portion of the same to the appellants under an agreement. In those circumstances the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Himalayan Tiles (supra) did not apply as the appellants were not interested persons and they had no right to question the Award.

28. Learned Counsel then relied on Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 1164 [LQ/SC/1986/66] . In that case, the Honble Apex Court held that the scheme of the LA Act and in particular Section 50(2) and Section 25 lead to the inevitable conclusion that apart from fraud, corruption or collusion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector under Section 11 may not be questioned in any proceeding either by the Government or by the Company or by the Local Authority at whose instance the acquisition is made. The Honble Apex Court further held that what may not be done under the provisions of the may not be permitted to be done by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 which is not meant to avoid or circumvent the processes of law and the provisions of the statute.

29. The last decision relied upon by learned Counsel is in the case of Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan (Dead) By LRs v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 469 [LQ/SC/2015/951] . In the facts of that case, the Honble Court held that the land in question was acquired by the State Government in favour of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (in short KIADB) which was the beneficiary. After the land was transferred in favour of the Board, it transferred by way of lease the acquired land in favour of a company. The Honble Apex Court held that on a careful reading of the relevant provisions of the LA Act, KIAD Act and the KIADB Regulations it is clear that the company was neither the beneficiary nor an interested person in the land as on the date of acquisition of the land either in terms of Section 2(11) of the KIAD Act or under Section 3(b) of the LA Act.

30. Learned Counsel for the respondent nos. 21-24 submitted that only the requiring authority has locus standi to challenge the Collectors award. In this connection learned Counsel relied on a decision in the case of UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Gyan Devi (dead) by LRs, AIR 1995 SC 724 [LQ/SC/1994/998] . While interpreting Section 50(2) of the LA Act, The Honble Apex Court by majority observed in paragraph 25 of the reported judgement as follows:

"25. To sum up, our conclusions are:

1. Section 50(2) of the L.A. Act confers on a local authority for whom land is being acquired a right to appear in the acquisition proceedings before the Collector and the reference court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation.

2. The said right carries with it the right to be given adequate notice by the Collector as well as the reference court before whom acquisition proceedings are pending of the date on which the matter of determination of compensation will be taken up.

3. The proviso to Section 50(2) only precludes a local authority from seeking a reference but it does not deprive the local authority which feels aggrieved by the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector or by the reference court to invoke the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution as well as the remedies available under the L.A. Act.

4. In the event of denial of the right conferred by Section 50(2) on account of failure of the Collector to serve notice of the acquisition proceedings the local authority can invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

5. Even when notice has been served on the local authority the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution would be available to the local authority on grounds on which judicial review is permissible under Article 226.

6. The local authority is a proper party in the proceedings before the reference court and is entitled to be impleaded as a party in those proceedings wherein it can defend the determination of the amount of compensation by the Collector and oppose enhancement of the said amount and also adduce evidence in that regard.

7. In the event of enhancement of the amount of compensation by the reference court if the Government does not file an appeal the local authority can file an appeal against the award in the High Court after obtaining leave of the court.

8. In an appeal by the person having an interest in land seeking enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded by the reference court the local authority, the should be impleaded as a party and is entitled to be served notice of the said appeal. This would apply to an appeal in the High Court as well as in this Court.

9. Since a company for whom land is being acquired has the same right as a local authority under Section 50(2), whatever has been said with regard to a local authority would apply to a company too.

10. The matters which stand finally concluded will, however, not be reopened."

31. Learned Counsel for the said respondents also referred to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Tapan Kumar Saphui v. State of West Bengal, (2015) 5 CHN (Cal) 264 , [LQ/CalHC/2014/954] in support of his submission that this court in its appellate jurisdiction may adjudicate upon the validity of the decree of the Reference Court but such a question cannot be considered in the writ jurisdiction which is a collateral proceeding. However, the said case pertains to Sections 14M, 14T, 54 and 61 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and I fail to appreciate how the said decision advances the case of the said respondents. Further, it is not the decision but the decision making process adopted by the Reference Court that is under challenge in this writ petition.

32. I have given anxious consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the parties. The short question that arises for determination is whether or not Shrachi was entitled to be heard by the Reference Court before that Court enhanced the compensation payable to the land losers. If so, the impugned orders of the Reference Court enhancing the compensation would be bad for breach of the principles of natural justice as admittedly Shrachi was not given notice of the Reference Court proceedings and was not heard.

33. It is true that initially the agreement for development of the project was entered into by and between BDA and Bengal Shrachi. Bengal Shrachi then mooted the proposal of executing the project through a joint venture company in which Bengal Shrachi and Xander Investment would have equal shareholding. BDA agreed with the same and gave its no objection. Accordingly, the writ petitioner company i.e. Shrachi was incorporated and Bengal Shrachi assigned all its interests, rights and entitlements in development of the said project in favour of Shrachi by executing an agreement of assignment dated 20 October, 2006. This agreement was accepted by BDA and BDA accepted Shrachi as the developer of the project. This is amply demonstrated by the fact that the lease deed in respect of the concerned land was executed by BDA in favour of Shrachi. In other words, Shrachi stepped into the shoes of Bengal Shrachi as developer of the project. This position is undisputable since after Shrachi came into the picture BDA raised all demands on Shrachi as would be evident from, inter alia, a letter dated 6 September, 2010 (Annexure P 20 to the writ petition) written by BDA to Shrachi. Shrachi has been making all payments to BDA whether towards the annual lease rent or any other expenditure incurred by BDA in connection with the project. Prior to the assignment agreement being executed between Bengal Shrachi and Shrachi, Bengal Shrachi had paid the first instalment that was due to BDA. After the assignment, it is Shrachi which has been making all necessary payments. As per the understanding and arrangement between the parties, it will be Shrachi which will be bound to pay any enhanced compensation in respect of acquisition of the concerned land. Hence, it would be preposterous to hold that Shrachi is not a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the LA Act. The order of the Reference Court enhancing the compensation directly affects Shrachi as it is Shrachi who would be out of pocket.

34. In Himalayan Tiles and Marble (P) Ltd. (supra), the Honble Apex Court in no uncertain terms held that the words person interested in Section 3(b) of the LA Act must receive a liberal construction and a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation will be a person interested. The principles of equity, justice and good conscience also warrant such an interpretation. Shrachi would definitely be interested in seeing that the amount of compensation is not unduly heavy since ultimately the financial burden will be on Shrachi. Hence, in my opinion, it was imperative on the Reference Court to give an opportunity of hearing to Shrachi before enhancing the compensation. I find strong support for this view of mine in the decision of the Honble Apex Court in Neelagangabais case (supra).

35. Further, a fair and just procedure consistent with the principles of natural justice would also warrant giving an opportunity of hearing to Shrachi before the compensation amount is enhanced. In Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. (supra), the Honble Apex Court reiterated that the beneficiary of the acquisition, be it a company or any other entity is a person interested to determine just and proper compensation for the acquired land and it is, hence, a person interested. The Supreme Court also referred to the language of Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC and observed that in the absence of the beneficiary who ultimately is to bear the higher compensation, no complete and effectual determination of just and proper compensation for the acquired land could be made. In my opinion, Shrachi is not only a proper party but a necessary party to the proceedings before the Reference Court and the denial of a hearing to a person interested like Shrachi is, in the words of the Honble Apex Court, in negation of a fair and just procedure offending Article 14 of the Constitution. The reasons why a party in the position of Shrachi must be held to be a person interested are indicated by the Honble Apex Court at paragraphs 13 and 14 of the judgment in Neyvely Lignite Corporation Ltd. (supra), which have been extracted above.

36. The decision in Hindu Kanya Maha Vidyalaya, Jind (supra), relied on by Learned Counsel for the respondent nos. 5-19 and 24-28 is distinguishable on facts. In that case the land in question was not acquired for the benefit of the party which sought to challenge the enhanced compensation. In that case, the Municipal Committee after taking possession of the land sold a portion of the land to that party. In that context, the Honble Apex Court held that the ratio laid down in Himalayan Tiles (supra) did not apply and the appellants were not interested persons. The decision of the Honble Apex Court in Santosh Kumars (supra) case, in my considered opinion, has no application to the facts of the present case. Shrachi has not made a reference to the Civil Court for reduction of the compensation amount nor has challenged the compensation amount by way of writ petition in the present proceeding. The sole grievance of Shrachi is that in spite of being a person interested it was not given an opportunity of hearing by the Reference Court prior to enhancing the quantum of compensation. In the case of Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan (supra), upon considering the provisions of the KIAD Act and KIADB Regulations, the Honble Apex Court held that the company was not a beneficiary or an interested person in the land as on the date of the acquisition of the land. In any event, the said decision or for that matter any of the decisions relied on by Learned Counsel for the respondent nos. 5-19 and 24-28 in no way detract from the principles laid down in Himalayan Tiles (supra), Neelagangabai (supra) and Neyvely Lignite Corporation (supra).

37. Learned Counsel for the respondent nos. 21-24 relied on the Honble Apex Courts decision in UP Awas Evam Vikas Parishad (supra). Paragraph 25 of the judgment on which reference was placed has been extracted above. The observations of the Honble Apex Court in the said paragraph, in my opinion, advance the case of the petitioner rather than that of the respondents and support the view that I have taken. The right of a company for whose benefit the land has been acquired and who is to bear the cost of acquisition of the land, to appear before the Collector or the Reference Court for determination of proper amount of compensation has been clearly recognised by the Honble Apex Court in that case.

38. The principles of natural justice are nothing but embodiment of the rules of fair play. One need not be versed in law to say that it would be grossly unfair to pass an order behind the back of a person if such order has adverse consequences for that person. Before an order is passed by a judicial or quasi-judicial or even administrative authority which is likely to have civil consequences for a party, such party must be given an opportunity of hearing. Hence, the courts evolved the principle of audi alteram partem, which in essence means that nobody shall be condemned unheard. One must be provided an opportunity of resisting the passing of an order if the same is likely to affect him adversely. The principles of natural justice have become one of the strongest pillars of the Rule of Law not only in the jurisprudence of our country but indeed all over the world. So much so, that it is now universally accepted that an order passed or an act done in violation of the principles of natural justice is void and non-est in the eye of law. [See AIR 1966 SC 893 [LQ/SC/1965/312] , para 13 and (1989) 1 SCC 628 [LQ/SC/1973/401] , para 7]

39. In view of the aforesaid, the orders of the Reference Court in the reference cases initiated by the respondent nos. 6, 16, 17 and 25 in this writ petition, are set aside. The said reference cases are remanded back to the leaned Additional District Judge, Burdwan for being decided afresh after giving an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner company. Such fresh decision shall be taken by the Reference Court as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of this order being placed before the Reference Court. I make it clear that I have not gone into the merits of the case in the sense that I have not considered whether or not the compensations awarded by the Reference Court in the said 4 cases are just and proper and it will be open to the Reference Court to take a fresh decision in the said matters in accordance with law and the principles of natural justice upon hearing all interested persons including the writ petitioner company.

40. WP No. 9778 (W) of 2012 is accordingly disposed of. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

41. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.