Chatterji, J.This is an application by the second party in a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal P. C, against an order declaring the first party to be in possession of the disputed land. The dispute relates to 2 bighas 3 kathas 10 dhurs of land comprised in plots Nos. 897, 898, 899 in khata No. 424 and plots Nos. 878, 879 and 894 in khata No. 425, situated in Darbhanga town. On 23rd October 1940, an apprehension of a breach of I the peace between the two parties regarding possession of the disputed land was reported by a constable at the Town Police Station. On this report the Assistant Sub-Inspector made an inquiry, after which he submitted a report, dated 1st November 1940, endorsed by the Sub-Inspector asking for issue of notice u/s 144, Criminal P.C., against the first party. On 18th November 1940 Satyadeo Prasad of the first party filed in the Court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Darbhanga, a petition of protest, praying for issue of notice on the second party not to disturb his possession over the disputed land. On 19th November 1940 the Magistrate passed the following order:

From police report it appears that there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace. It is not understoode why the Sub-Inspector waited unusually long; for the second party and so the protest-petition seems to have some weight. Let Mr. S.K. Sher enquire into the matter and report by 3rd December 1940; in the meantime I prohibit both the parties from going upon the land.

2. Mr. Sher, Deputy Magistrate, held an inquiry and submitted his report on 10th December 1940 in which he said:

At present there is absolutely no apprehension of breach of the peace as the only crop on the disputed plot is rahar which will be fit for cutting after a few months. Hence I would recommend that the present dispute ought to be decided u/s 145, Criminal P.C., and not u/s 144, Criminal P.C.

3. Upon this report the Sub-divisional Officer passed the following order on 16th December 1940:

Bead report of Mr. Sher and the petition of the second party. Whenever there is any cultivation there would be trouble. As recommended by Mr. Sher draw up proceeding u/s 145, Criminal P.C., calling upon the parties to file written statements by 10th January 1941. A copy of the proceedings should be served upon the land.

4. A proceeding was accordingly drawn up on 18th December 1940. At the same time, the disputed land was attached. Written statements were filed by both parties in due course. The case of the first party may be stated as follows.

5. The disputed land appertains to mouza Haveli Darbhanga and Kheraj Julkar Banhar, tauzi No. 3331. This property belonged, as to 8 annas, to Chowdhury Barsati Singh and his three brothers, and, as to the remaining 8 annas, to two widows, Mt. Balkumari and Mt. Manrup Kumari, of another branch, of the same family. Subsequently, in course of devolution, the entire property came to be possessed in equal shares by Jamuna Prasad Singh and Lalita Prasad Singh, who were cousins. Jamuna Prasad gifted his 8 annas share to his daughters, Mt. Sampat Kumari and Mt. Bijaya Kumari. The first party took settlement of the disputed land from these ladies with regard to their 8 annas share, by a registered patta dated 5th December 1939 and registered kabuliyat dated 10th July 1940. Thereafter, the first party took settlement of the remaining 8 annas share from the other cosharer, Lalita Prasad Singh, by a registered patta dated 26th June 1940 and kabuliyat dated 10th July 1940. By virtue of these settlements the first party claims to be in possession of the disputed land.

6. The case of the second party may be stated as follows: The disputed land lies in Mahalla Jankinagar Minmahalla Kasbe-Darbhanga, perganna Haveli Darbhanga, otherwise known as Haveli Darbhanga, tauzi No. 3331. In this tauzi Barsati Singh and his three brothers, mentioned above, had 8 annas share. In execution of a mortgage decree obtained by one Ramgulam Sahu against Barsati Singh and his brothers, a 6 annas 13 gandas odd share out of their 8 annas was purchased on 17th November 1911, by Mahanth Bansi Das of Paehhari, predecessor of Mahanth Jagdish Das of the second party. Dakhal dehani was taken by Mahanth Bansi Das on 19th November 1912. Subsequently, the remaining 1 anna 6 gandas odd, out of the 8 annas share of Barsati Singh and his brothers, was purchased by the said Ramgulam Sahu in execution of another mortgage decree held by him, and he took delivery of possession. Thereafter, by a registered kebala dated 22nd December 1916 he sold this 1 anna 6 gandas odd interest to Mahanth Bansi Dass successor Mahanth Rajeswar Das. Thus, Mahanth Rajeswar Das became the owner of an 8 annas interest in the tauzi. The disputed land appertains to this 8 annas interest, and Mahanth Rajeswar Das came into possession of the land by virtue of the purchases. After his death, the disputed land came into possession of Mahanth Jagdish Das, the present Mahanth of Pahhari and he has all along been in possession of it. The first party examined 10 witnesses and also produced some documents; while the second party examined 8 witnesses and produced numerous documents. The learned Magistrate after considering the evidence came to the following conclusion:

From all these circumstances and evidence on record I am convinced that the first party is in actual possession of the lands.

As regards the second party he said:

From all the circumstances and oral evidence adduced by the second party it appears that they are not actually in possession of the disputed land.

7. The first point argued by Mr. Mohammad Yunus, on behalf of the petitioners, is that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceeding u/s 146 inasmuch as tho materials before him did not disclose an apprehension of a breach of the peace at the time. He lays much stress on the following passage in Mr. Shers report:

At present there is absolutely no apprehension of a breach of the peace as the only crop on the disputed plot is rahar which will be fit for cutting after a few months.

8. It is said that this shows that there was no apprehension of breach of the peace at the time the proceeding was drawn up and, therefore, the proceeding was without jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on W. Stewart and Others Vs. Hubert Hughes, in which it was held that:

In order to give jurisdiction to a Magistrate to exercise the quasi civil powers conferred upon him by Section 145, Criminal P.C., he must rely for the initiation of the proceedings upon such materials as would disclose existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. The dispute should be such that it is likely to cause a breach of the peace at the time when the proceedings are drawn. The Section is inapplicable when there is an apprehension of a breach of the peace at any future time.

9. In that case the dispute between the parties was with regard to quarrying boulders for ballast purposes, which could not, obviously, be done during the monsoon. The police report in that case, upon which the Magistrate relied, stated:

The work on the disputed lands by the first party has been stopped on account of monsoon since about a month ago and so no breach of the peace is apprehended at present but there is apprehension of breach of the peace over the disputed land after the present monsoon.

10. This police report, in the opinion of the learned Judges, did not show that there was any likelihood of a breach of the peace at the time when the proceedings were drawn up, but it showed that there was a possibility of collision between the parties at a future time, namely, about two months from that date. Their Lordships, therefore, held that the police report was not sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Magistrate to draw up the proceedings. Prom the police report it was clear that there was at the time no likelihood of any breach of the peace, and no such likelihood had existed for about a month previous to the submission of the report. All that was disclosed in that report was that there was a likelihood at some future date of a breach of the peace. Certainly, under those circumstances, it could not be said that the conditions requisite for the initiation of the proceeding u/s 145 were satisfied. What that Section requires is that "a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists." This was explained by Suhrawardy J., who delivered the leading judgment in the above case, as follows:

What I understand by use of the words dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists is that the dispute must exist and it should be of such a character as likely to cause a breach of the peace unless proceedings are taken u/s 145, Criminal P.C. In other words, proceedings ought to be taken under that Section in order to avert a breach of the peace, which would otherwise take place due to the existence of a dispute between the parties.

11. Now, let us apply this test to the present case. The constable at first reported an apprehension of a breach of the peace. The Assistant Sub-Inspector then held an inquiry and before him both parties claimed to be in possession of the land. In his report he asked for action u/s 144, Criminal P.C., against the first party.

12. The first party then filed a petition of protest in which it was asserted that they were in possession. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, by his order dated 19th November 1940 prohibited both the parties from going upon the land. Then Mr. Sher in his report recommended proceeding u/s 145, Criminal P.C. It is true that Mr. Sher said. "At present there is absolutely no apprehension of a breach of the peace;" but reading his report along with that of the Assistant Sub-Inspector it is apparent that what he (Mr. Sher) actually meant was that there was no immediate apprehension of breach of the peace such as would justify proceeding u/s 144, Criminal P.C. He, however, recommended a proceeding u/s 145, Criminal P.C. Though the crop was not fit for cutting at the time, both the parties were claiming the right to cut it and a clash was likely to take place between them at the time of cutting or even before, if any party wanted to cut it before it was completely ripe. A dispute undoubtedly existed at the time, and it was of such a character that it was likely to cause a breach of the, peace unless proceedings were taken u/s 145, Criminal P.C. Thus the ease falls within the principle laid down in the above decision W. Stewart and Others Vs. Hubert Hughes, . In Hari Charan De Vs. Sherali Talukdar, , Lort-Williams and S.K. Ghose, JJ. explained the above quoted crucial words of Section 145, Criminal P.C., as follows:

The Section requires that there must be a present dispute, and that there must be a likelihood of a breach of the peace. That is to say, there must be a present fear that it is probable that there will be a breach of the peace owing to the dispute unless proceedings are taken under the section.

13. In the present ease, it cannot be doubted that there was "a present fear" that the dispute that existed was likely to cause a breach of the peace unless proceedings were taken u/s 145, Criminal P. C. In the present case it cannot be said that there were no materials on the record to justify the initiation of the proceeding u/s 145, Criminal P.C. Some materials undoubtedly there were. Whether those materials were sufficient or not was entirely for the consideration of the learned Magistrate. The High Court cannot go into the sufficiency or otherwise of those materials. In Ishri Prasad v. Warasat Hussain AIR 1920 Pat. 745, Jwala Prasad J. said:

We cannot look into the sufficiency or otherwise of the material. If there was no material at all in the police report, the Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to institute a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code. But this is not the case here. The concluding words of the police report may not be sufficient in the minds of others, yet they may be sufficient to satisfy the Magistrate.

He further said:

The Magistrate being responsible for peace and order, his discretion to institute a proceeding u/s 145 should be unfettered provided he has before him material, however slight, for his being satisfied as to the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace.

14. Again in the Special Bench decision of this Court in AIR 1916 Pat. 292 Chamier C.J. observed:

For instance, at one time it was said that the High Court could examine the information that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace, on which the Magistrate initiated the proceeding with a view to testing its reliability or sufficiency, but it is now well settled that the sufficiency of the information is entirely a matter for the Magistrate and that the High Court will not require it to be furnished to him in any particular form.

15. These observations may well be applied to the facts of the present case. There is a further difficulty in the way of the petitioners. The Magistrate drew up the proceeding on 18th December 1940. If the Magistrate acted in excess of his jurisdiction, and the second party felt aggrieved by his order, they could have come up in revision against that order. But they did not do so and chose to wait and take the chance of judgment in their favour. The proceeding continued for about a year, the final order being dated 23rd December 1941, and both parties examined a number of witnesses and produced various documents. Much public time and harassment to the parties would have been saved if objection were promptly taken in this Court against the order initiating the proceeding. The revisional powers of the High Court u/s 439, Criminal P.C., are discretionary and are exercised for the ends of justice. The second party having waited for a year and having allowed the order initiating the proceeding to go unchallenged so long, cannot now be heard to complain of excess of jurisdiction, because the final order has gone against them. In this connection reference may be made to Kulada Kinkar Roy v. Danesh Mir (06) 33 Cal. 33 in which their Lordships said:

But he contends that, as the police report upon which the Magistrate proceeded to draw up the initial order was defective and did not set out sufficient facts to justify an apprehension of the breach of the peace, the whole proceedings were without jurisdiction, and it is the duty of this Court to set aside the final order. We have no hesitation in holding that we ought not to accede to this contention. Here the petitioner, in the language of Coleridge, J. in Marsden v. Wardle (1854) 3 E. & B. 695, chose to wait and take the chance of judgment in his favour, and he cannot now be heard to complain of excess of jurisdiction, and to claim as a matter of right that the proceedings should be quashed.

16. For the aforesaid reasons the first contention raised by Mr. Yurras must be overruled.

17. The next point taken by Mr. Yunus is that the learned Magistrate did not properly consider the documentary evidence produced by the second party. (His Lordship considered the evidence and then concluded.) All the contentions raised by the petitioners fail and I would dismiss the application.

Manohar Lall, J.

I agree.