(1) In the suit out of which this appeal arises the plaintiff Sheopuian Pandey alleged that he is the next reversloner to the estate of Hari-charan Pandey and that two deeds of gift executed by Musammat Barta Kuer, the widow of Hari-charan Pandey, on the 31st May, 1944, and the 1st December, 1948, in favour of Ramsewak Ojha and Nema Pandey, respectively, were illegal and void and not for legal necessity. The plaintiff accordingly prayed for a declaration that these deeds of gift were not binding upon the reversioners. The suit was contested by the widow, Musammat Barta Kuer, and also by the transferees, Nema Pandey and Ramsewak Ojha. The trial Court accepted the case of the plaintiff and granted a decree in his favour. Against the decree of the trial Court the defendants preferred an appeal to the High Court, During the pendency of the appeal in the High Court, namely, on the 17th June, 1956, the Hindu Succession Act (Central Act No. 30 of 1956) came into force. When the appeal came up for hearing, Misra, J., took the view that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act applied to the case, and under the provisions of that section, the widow became full owner of the property in dispute and accordingly the plaintiff has no right to sue as a reversioner and get a declaration prayed for in the plaint, Misra, J., accordingly allowed the appeal and ordered that the suit of the plaintiff should be dismissed.

(2) This appeal is presented on behalf of the plaintiff against the judgment of Misra, J., under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

(3) On behalf of the appellant it was submitted that the view expressed by the learned Single Judge with regard to the interpretation of, Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act is erroneous in view of the subsequent decision of a Full Bench of this High Court in Harak Singh v. Kailash Singh, AIR 1958 Pat 581 , [LQ/PatHC/1958/94] in which it was pointed out by the Full Bench that the expression "any property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act must be broadly interpreted in the context of the language of the sub-section and roust be. taken simply to mean "any property owned by a female Hindu" at the date of the commencement of the Act. But a Hindu Female cannot be deemed to be the owner of the property of which she had made an absolute alienation before the date of the commencement of the Act, and the decision of the Full Bench, therefore, is that Section 14 cannot apply to such property and the limited interest of the widow in such property is not enlarged to an absolute interest. It was further pointed out by the Full Bench in that case that where a female Hindu makes an absolute alienation of property, without legal necessity, by way of sale or gift before the coming into force of the Act, the right of an heir of the last male holder to repudiate the alienation and his claim of possession thereof from the transferee, on the death of the female Hindu, or on the extinction of the womens estate otherwise is not adversely affected and taken away by Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. In our opinion the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant is well founded and must be accepted as correct. In view of the decision of the Full Bench regarding the interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act we hold that the view of law expressed by the learned Single Judge with regard to the effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act is not correct and must be overruled. It is also necessary to point out that the view expressed by the Full Bench of the High Court has been approved by the Supreme Court in a subsequent case G.T.M. Kotturuswami v. S. Veeravva, AIR 1959 SC 577 [LQ/SC/1958/173] . In view of the principle laid down by the decision of the Full Bench of this High Court and also by the decision of the Supreme Court it must be held in the present case that the plaintiff is entitled to maintain the suit for a declaration that the two deeds of gift dated the 3ist May, 1944, and the 1st December, 1948, executed by Musammat Barta Kuer, defendant No. 3. in favour of Ramsewak Ojha and Nema Pandey, respectively, are illegal and not supported by legal necessity and not binding upon the plaintiff as the next reversioner to the estate of Haricharan Pandey.

(4) It was, however, argued on behalf of the respondents that Musamrnat Barta Kuer was still in possession of the properties in spite of the two deeds of gift dated the 31st May, 1944, and the 1st December, 1948, and the alienees were not in possession of the properties. It was submitted that the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act must apply to the case because Musammat Barta Kuer was in possession of the properties on the date the Act came into force. In support of this argument learned Counsel referred to paragraph 7 of the plaint, where it is said that the aforesaid deeds of gift are farzi, collusive, illegal, null and void and ineffective" and that the said deeds were not binding upon the plaintiff or the disputed property as entered in schedules A and B. Learned Counsel also referred to the evidence of P. W. 3 and P. W. 4 at pages 15 and 16 of the paperbook and to the statement of these witnesses that Musammat Barta Kuer was still in possession of the properties alienated by her. It is not possible for us to accept the contention put forward, on behalf of the respondents that Musammat Barta Kuer was still in possession of the properties on the date of the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The reason is that there is a specific assertion in the written statement of the widow, Musammat Barta Kuer, herself that the alienees were in possession of the disputed properties which were the subject-matter of the two deeds of gift. In paragraph 13 of the written statement it is said that defendant No. 3 executed the deeds of gift and put the donees in possession and occupation of the properties. There is also a denial of the allegation of the plaintiff in paragraph 14 of the written statement. Apart from this there is the evidence of D. W. 7, the widow herself, at page 30 of the paperbook to the effect that Ramsewak Ojha and Nema Pan-dey were in possession of the properties covered by the deeds of gift. D. W. 5, Ramsewak Ojha, and D. W. 6, Nema Pandey, have also deposed that they were in possession of the properties covered by the deeds of gift (see pages 26 and 28 of the paperbook). Examining the evidence as a whole, we are of opinion that the case of the defendants is more acceptable and the proper inference is that the widow, Musammat Barta Kuer, was not in possession of the disputed property after the execution of the deeds of gift or at the time when the Hindu Succession Act of 1956 came into force. It is manifest, therefore, that the provisions of Section 14 of that Act cannot be applied to the present case and the suit of the plaintiff cannot be dismissed on this ground.

(5) For these reasons we allow this appeal under the Letters Patent, set aside the judgment and . decree of the learned Single Judge of this High Court dated the i2th May, 19.58, and order that the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated the i6th January, 1951, should be restored. There will be no order as regards costs of the Letters Patent Appeal.