Harries, C.J.This is a defendants appeal from concurrent decrees of the Courts below decreeing the plaintiffs claim for Rs. 1,700 and interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent, per annum from 27th July 1933. On 12th July 1920, one Prasad Sahu, predecessor-in-interest of plaintiffs 2 and 3, obtained a preliminary mortgage decree for Rs. 7379 against Asfandiar Khan, and on 13th June 1921, this decree was made absolute. On 1st August 1924, Prasad Sahu assigned this mortgage decree to defendants 1 to 3 and two other persons for Rs. 5,000. A sum of Rs. 3300 was paid to Prasad Sahu and the remainder, namely Rs. 1700, was left with defendants 1 to 3 to be paid to plaintiff 1 who was a creditor of Prasad Sahu. It was a term of the agreement that this sum was not to be paid to plaintiff 1 until defendants 1 to 3 had realized the decree.

2. Defendants 1 to 2 executed the decree assigned to them in execution case No. 289 of 1932 and on 11th July 1933, the judgment-debtor deposited the decretal amount in Court. On 18th July 1938, this amount was attached by some third party, but on 21st July 1933, the attachment order was withdrawn and the execution case was dismissed on full satifaction to the decree-holder. On 24th July 1933, defendants 1 to 3 withdrew the money which had been so deposited. For some reason or other defendants 1 to 3 refused to pay the sum of Rs. 1,700 to plaintiff 1 as they had agreed in the con-tract of 1st August 1924, and on 22nd July 1936, the plaintiffs brought this suit to recover the sum of Rs. 1,700 together with interest. Both the Courts below decreed the plaintiffs claim; but it has been con-tended by Mr. Nawal Kishore Prasad on behalf of the appellants that the decrees of the Courts below cannot be sustained.

3. The first point taken by the appellants is that this suit was barred by limitation. As I have stated earlier, the sum of Rs. 1700 was not payable by defendants 1 to 3 to plaintiff 1 until the defendants had realized the decree. The decretal amount was deposited by the judgment-debtor in Court on 11th July 1933, but this was attached by a third party. However, on 21st July 1933, the attachment order was withdrawn and the execution case dismissed because the-decree had been fully satisfied. It has been contended that the decree was realized at latest by 21st July 1933, and that time ran from that date. The suit was actually brought on 22nd July 1936, over three years from the date when the decree was realized. If this was a suit to recover a sum of money due, it would have been barred in three years, and it might well be said that the present suit was out of time. The trial Court appears to have thought that the present suit was one for specific performance and that Article 113, Limitation Act applied.

4. It was, however, held that time began to run not from the date when the execution, case was dismissed on the ground of full satisfaction but from the date when the money was actually withdrawn, namely 24th July 1933. Accordingly the learned Munsif held that the suit was. within time. The lower Appellate Court was of opinion that this was a suit to which Article 116,. Limitation Act applied and as that article gave the plaintiffs six years to bring the suit, the suit was well within time. It has been strongly urged that this is a suit for specific performance, but, in my view, it is clearly not so. Specific performance can only be asked for in suits falling within Section 12, Specific Relief Act, and clearly this is not such a suit.

5. It was further argued that this was a suit for indemnity; but in my view it is not such a suit. The contract entered into by defendants 1 to 3 was not to indemnify plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3 against any loss but it was a contract to pay plaintiff 1 a sum of money on the happening of a specific event, namely the realization of the decree. It appears to me that this is a case where compensation is sought for breach of contract. Defendants 1 to 3 promised to pay plaintiff 1 Rs. 1700 when the decree was realized, and this promise they have broken. It is not a suit to recover money lent or money due as a result of some transaction similar to a loan. It is clearly a case where the plaintiffs are suing for compensation for the defendants breach of contract. That being so, Article 116, Limitation Act applies, and that Article gives the plaintiffs six years to bring the suit. The suit, therefore, was well within time, and the defence of limitation was of no avail to the defendants. In my view this case cannot be distinguished from the case in 8 Pat 860.1

6. In this latter case money had been left with a vendee to pay a debt due from the vendor to a third party. The vendee failed to pay, and a Bench of this Court held that his failure gave the vendor a right to sue for compensation for breach of contract, and that Article 116, Limitation Act applied to such a suit. It is impossible to distinguish that Bench case from the case now before the Court, and that being so, it must be held that the present suit is within time.

It was further argued that if this suit was a suit for compensation, then the plaintiffs claim was bound to fail by reason of the fact that plaintiffs 2 and 3 had failed to establish that they had suffered any loss.

7. It was contended that before plaintiffs 2 and 3 could succeed, they would have to show that they had been compelled to pay plaintiff 1 the sum of Rs. 1700 which the defendants had contracted to do. In the first place, this argument entirely overlooks the fact that plaintiff 1, the person who was to receive the money, is a party to the suit. Both the Courts held that he was a privy to this contract, and that being so, he has obviously suffered loss, because he has not received the sum which the defendants contracted to have paid over to him. Further, it appears to me that plaintiffs 2 and 3 have suffered serious loss even if they have not been called upon as yet to pay what is due to plaintiff 1.

8. Their liability to plaintiff 1 is still undischarged, and that being so, they can sue for compensation for breach of contract. This point also has been clearly decided in Ram Rachhya Singh v. Raghunath Prasad AIR (1930) Pat 46 to which I have already referred. In my view, howsoever this case is regarded, the plaintiffs have a cause of action for compensation.

Lastly, the appellants have argued that the Courts below were wrong in granting interest upon this sum of Rs. 1700, and reliance has been placed upon a Bench decision of this Court: J.H. Pattinson v. Bindhya Debi AIR (1988) Pat 1 96, in which it was held, that in the absence of an agreement, express or implied, interest on money wrongfully detained is not recoverable either under the Interest Act or under the proviso to the only Section in that Act. If this was a claim for money wrongfully detained, there can be no doubt that interest could not be recovered; but if the suit is to be regarded as a suit for compensation, then the plaintiffs are entitled to such an amount as would compensate them for the loss which they have suffered by reason of the defendants breach of contract. The defendants, the moment they realized this money, were bound by their contract to pay it to plaintiff 1, and this they failed to do. The Court must, therefore, consider what damage the plaintiffs have suffered.

9. It appears to me that plaintiff 1 has clearly suffered damage in excess of Rs. 1700 and if this is regarded as a claim by plaintiffs 2 and 3 they also suffered loss in excess of Rs. 1700. They have been deprived of the use of this money because of the defendants breach of contract and the latter are bound to compensate the plaintiffs for their loss. It appears to me that the correct measure of damages is the loss sustained by the plaintiffs, and such loss can very properly be estimated as Rs. 1700 plus a reasonable rate of interest thereon. That would be a fair and reasonable manner of ascertaining the amount of compensation due by reason of the breach of contract. Both the Courts below have considered 12 per cent, per annum simple to be reasonable interest upon this money. It may be that the lower Courts were wrong in granting a decree for Rs. 1700 together with interest in terms; but the decree can be justified when it is regarded as a decree which gives the plaintiffs the actual loss which they have suffered.

10. In my view interest at 12 per cent, together with the amount of Rs. 1700 fairly and reasonably represents the loss suffered by the plaintiffs. That being so, they were entitled to recover such a sum by way of damages for breach of contract. The argument that they were not entitled to interest as such is really academic. If they are entitled to the full amount granted by the Court below by way of damages then the decrees of the Courts below must be sustained. The result therefore is that this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Fazl Ali, J.

11. I agree.