Meredith, J.This is a miscellaneous second appeal by the judgment-debtor. The decree under execution is a compromise decree for future maintenance under the terms of which the decree-holder was to get 25 maunds of rice every year from 1351 during POUS. For the first year, however, it was provided that the decree-holder would get seven maunds of rice on 20th June 1943, and the remaining 18 maunds in POUS. 1351. The judgment-debtor failed to give the seven maunds of rice by 20th June, and the decree-holder thereupon filed the present application for execution and realisation of the cash value of seven maunds of rice.

2. The judgment-debtor made an objection u/s 47, Civil P.C., and raised only one point, namely, that execution was premature as the decree-holder should have waited until POUS. This objection was rejected by the learned Munsif. In appeal this again was the only point taken before the learned Subordinate Judge, and he also rejected it. In second appeal, this point has not been pressed. Obviously it could not be pressed, since there was a clear default by the 20th June according to the terms of the decree and upon that default the decree-holder was entitled to execute her decree for the amount in default.

3. It has been attempted, however, to raise a new point in second appeal for the first time. The point is that execution is not maintainable, as upon the terms of the decree a fresh suit would be necessary and an application for execution would not lie. It has, however, been well settled for long that a decree for future maintenance is executable upon each default. I need only refer to the Full Bench case in Ashutosh Bannerjee v. Lukhimoni Debya 19 Cal. 139 , wherein it was laid down that future maintenance awarded by a decree when falling due can be recovered in execution of that decree without further suit. Their Lordships in that case quoted certain observations of Westropp C.J., who had said:

It is not desirable that there should be several suits in respect of the maintenance of one widow. The system of seeking or granting relief piecemeal, subjects both plaintiff and defendant to much unnecessary expense and trouble, and is only advantageous to the legal profession; such a course ought to be discontinued so far as may legitimately be done by the civil Court,-

observations the force of which must appeal to every fair-minded person.

4. It is argued, however, that in the decree before us there is no specific provision that the property can be sold in execution in the event of default. All that the decree says is that the maintenance will be a first charge upon certain specified properties. A decree in these terms, it is contended, can only be enforced, by a fresh suit to enforce the charge. As far as I can ascertain from the reported decision, the decree under consideration in 19 Cal. 189 was in the same terms as the present decree, and merely provided that the judgment-debtor do pay so much upon such and such successive dates and created a charge upon certain property for the purpose.

5. Reliance is, however, placed on the following rulings: Aubhpyessury Dabee v. Gouri Sunkur Panday 22 Cal. 859 , Matangini Dassee v. Ghooneymoni Dassee 22 Cal. 903 , Hem Ban v. Bihari Gir 28 All. 58 and Rameshar Upadhya v. Subhkaran Upadhya 10 I.C. 481. 22 Cal. 859 and also 28 All. 58 were based upon the prohibition contained in Section 99, T.P. Act, long repealed and now replaced by Order 34, Rule 14, Civil P.C. There has been a very significant change in the wording of this prohibition, a change which makes all the difference in a case like the present. Section 99 was in the following terms:

Where a mortgagee in execution of a decree for the satisfaction of any claim, whether arising under the decree (sic, mortgage) or not, attaches the mortgaged property, he shall not be entitled to bring such property to sale otherwise than by instituting a suit u/s 67.

6. In Order 84, Rule 14 the words "or not" were omitted, and it runs:

Where a mortgagee has obtained a decree for the payment of money in satisfaction of a claim arising under the mortgage, he shall not be entitled to bring the mortgaged property to sale otherwise than by instituting a suit for sale in enforcement of the mortgage, and he may institute such a suit notwithstanding anything contained in Order 2, Rule 2.

7. Thus, while Section 99 applied to claims arising either under the mortgage or not, the prohibition under Order 34, Rule 14 applies only to claims arising under the mortgage. No doubt, u/s 100, T.P. Act, all the provisions of the Act which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to a charge created either by act of the parties or operation of law; but in the present case the claim does not arise under any mortgage or charge. It arises under the decree itself, and the charge was provided by the decree itself only as an additional safeguard for the lady in securing its enforcement. It would be grossly anomalous and unfair to hold that the provision put into the decree as an additional safeguard for the lady would prevent her from executing her decree at all as she should otherwise have done. In the view I take, Order 84, Rule 14 leads to no such result.

8. As for 10 I.C. 481 and 28 All. 58 these were special cases of decrees in peculiar terms. 28 All. 58 the parties arrived at a compromise, which was embodied in a document setting out that certain properties should be charged for maintenance. A suit was brought to enforce the terms of that document, and it was quite rightly held by Knox J. that such a suit was maintainable. There it was, a question not of enforcing any decree but of enforcing the document executed by the parties as a result of their compromise. In 10 I.C. 481 the point was that there was nothing in the decree to indicate that the parties agreed that if the money were not paid in time the property should be sold. In the present decree for future maintenance, as in the decree in 19 Cal. 1391 the intention of the decree, whatever its wording, was sufficiently clear, namely, that it was intended that in the event of default the decree-holder could enforce the decree by execution. The decree-holder is not now seeking specifically to enforce the charge, but seeking in general terms to execute the decree. I can see no reason why she should not do so, and were I forced to hold otherwise I should have done so with the greatest reluctance, having regard to the observations in 19 cal. 1391 which I have quoted and which I respectfully endorse.

9. Finally, having regard to the fact that this point has been taken for the first time in second appeal and it is a mixed question of law and fact since it is based on the interpretation of the decree the terms of which in that regard have not been considered by the Courts below, I should in any case have felt bound to hold that the point at such a belated stage could not be taken.

10. The appeal is dismissed with costs.