Mahapatra, J.

(1) In this appeal by the two plaintiffs, the correctness of a genealogy, according to which the plaintiffs claimed true to the properties mentioned in the two Schedules A and B given in the plaint and asked for recovery of possession of the same with mesne profits, is in question.

(2) One Siaram Tewarj had three sons Padaratn, Ramchandar and Gangaram. Plaintiffs 1 and 2 belong to the last branch, defendants 1 and 2 to the branch of Padarath and the other defendants, defendants 3 to 20 being to Ram Chandars line. The plaintiffs genealogy as given in the plaint and reproduced in the judgment may be briefly indicated to show the nature of contest between the parries. Padarath Tewari had three sons Ramratan, Nauratan and Ramcharitar. They became separate in status between 1909 and 1911. The survey settlement operations were completed in the said villages by 1912. Ramratan had two sons Rajbhukhan and Roshan. Rajbhukhan died in 1946 and Roshan had died in 1928-29 and defendant No. 1, Manbirta was his widow. Nauratan had a son Lawat who died in 1916. Nauratan died in 1920. Ramcharitar died issueless in 1954. Defendant No. 2, Prema was the widow of Lawat. Plaintiffs asserted that after there was separation in status between Ramratan, Nauratan and Ramcharitar the latter two reunited and sometime after the re-union there was a partition by metes and bounds of the properties Belonging to the three branches, and in that partition schedule A of the properties was allotted to Ramratan, and schedule B properties jointly to Nauratan and Ramcharitar. On the death of Nauratan in 1920, his son having predeceased him, Ramcharitar alone succeeded by survivorship to the whole or the B schedule properties. When Ramratan died in 1921-22, his two sons Rajbhukhan and Roshan came in possession of Schedule A as surviving coparceners. On Roshans death, Rajbhukhan became the sole surviving coparcener and Roshans widow Manbirta, defendant No. 1, was entitled to maintenance. Defendant No. 2, Prema, widow of the predeceased son of Nauratan, was similarly entitled, when Ramcharitar succeeded to B schedule as the sole surviving coparcener. On the death of Rajbhukhan in 1946, Ramcharitar succeeded to his estate Schedule A in 1946-4/. Thus he became legal owner to both Schedules A and B propertied But he could not take possession of Schedule A on the death of Rajbhukhan as he was then in Patna under treatment and became afflicted by paralysis. Defendant No. 1, Roshans widow cams in possession of that. When Kamcharitar himself died in 1954, defendant No. 2, widow of predeceased son of Nauratan (deceased brother of Ramcharitar) took possession of B schedule properties. Plain" tiffs claimed that as Ramcharitar was the legal owner or both A and B as stated above, on his death, his nearest feversioners were to succeed to his estate and plaintiff No. 1 and the father of the plaintiff No. 2 were the only two such persons. Defendants 1 and 2 were entitled to maintenance only and had no legal right to any of the properties. Other defendants including defendants 3 and 4 are remote reversioner and could not be entitled to the suit properties in preference to the plaintiffs. To indicate the relative nearness of the plaintiffs to the common ancestor Siaram Tewari, plaintiffs stated that Siarams third son Gangaram had two sons Imrit and Jeobodh. One of Imrits son was Ramkawal and his son was Sheoji, plaintiff No. 1. Jeobodh had a son Sital whose son was Ramraj and Ramraj who had three sons including plaintiff No. 2, Bachan, was surviving at the time of the death of Ramcharitar. Thus in the branch of Gangaram Tewari, plaintiff No. 1 and Ramraj, father of plaintiff No. 2, were the only two surviving members and they were in fifth degree to the common ancestor Siaram. I have said that defendants 3 to 20 belong to Ramchandars branch and admittedly all of them, except defendants 3 and 4, are lower in degree to defendants 3 and 4, and those two defendants, according to the plaintiffs were in the sixth degree to Siaram in 1954 when Ramcharitar died. They pointed out that Siarams son Ramchandar had one son Agam whose two sons were Nidha and Bakhori. Nidhas son Shamsundar had three sons of whom Sheopukar and Jeopukar, defendants 3 and 4, were two. Bakhoris son was Ramsundar who had three sons Rajeshwar, Sablaik and Nandram (defendant No. 5). Rajeshwars sons are defendants 6 and 7 and Nandrams son is defendants No. 16. Of the other defendants, defendants B to 10 are we sons of defendant No. 3, defendants 11 to 14 are sons of defendant No. 4, defendant No. 15 is son of defendant No. 11, defendant No. 16 is son of defendant No. 5, defendant No. 17 is son of defendant No. 16, defendants 18 and 19 are sons of defendant No. / and defendant No. 20 is son of defendant No. 18, thus the sole basis of the plaintiffs claim to schedules A and B properties was that Ramcharitar had succeeded to those properties and on ins death plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiff No. 2 succeeded to the same as nearest reversioners. They claimed possession from defendants 1 and 2 through the suit. Those two ladies have, however, died during the pendency of this appeal in this Court and applications from the plaintiffs side as well as from the side of the contesting defendants have been made for their substitution in the place of those two ladies. Assuming that the ladies had succeeded to or later became the absolute owners of the suit properties, they having died without any son or daughter, succession from them will devolve upon those of the present parties who may be found as nearest reversionary heirs to their husbands.

(3) As I said before, the real contest to the plaintiffs case was from, defendants 3 and 4 who filed a written statement setting up another genealogy by which they were shown to be the nearer reversioners than plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiff No. 2. According to them, Siaram had three sons Ramchandar (or Ramcharan) Gangaram and Bhawani Shankar. Bhawani had two sons Manbodh and Jeobodh. Manbodhs son was Imrit whose son was Ramkawai who was father of Seoji, plaintiff No. 1. Jeobodh had a son Ganaur by name. One of the two sons of the latter was Sital. Sitals son was Ramraj and plaintiff No. 2, Bachan, is his son. Thus plaintiff No. 1 is related in the sixth degree to the common ancestor Siaram Tewari and so also was the father of plaintiff No. 2. About their own position in the genealogy they said that Siarams son Ramcharan had sons including Bakhori, Nidha and Agam. Nidhas son was Shamsundar and his sons were defendants 3 and 4, Sheopukar and Jeopukar. They were thus in the fifth degree from Siaram, and, therefore, nearer reversioners than the plaintiffs. About the position of defendant No. 5, they showed that Bakhori had a son Ramsundar whose son was Nandram, defendant No. 5. He was similarly in the fifth degree to Siaram. About defendants 1 and 2, they showed them in the branch of Gangaram whose two sons were Liladhar and Padarath. Padaraths sons were Ramratan, Nauratan and Ramcharitar. Ramratans two sons were Rajbhukhan and Roshan. Nauratans son was Lawat. Defendants 1 and 2 were respectively the widows of Roshan and Lawat. These two defendants denied any re-union between Nauratan and Ramcharitar. They claimed that all the three brothers (sons of Padarath) Ramratan, Nauratan and Ramcharitar were separate from each other and Lawat succeeded to Nauratan. On Lawats death defendant No. 2 came m possession of his properties. Similarly on Rajbhukhans death, defendant No. 1 came in possession of his properties and her possession was for over 12 years before the suit. About the properties belonging to Ramcharitar, they stated that he gifted them to Rajbhukhan and Prema, defendant No. 2, and that is why the whole of the suit properties came in possession of defendants 1 and 2.

(4) The written statement of defendants 5 and 16 set up a third genealogy which was different from that of me genealogy given by defendants 3 and 4 as well as from what the plaintiffs stated. According to them, plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiff No. 2 were of the seventh degree from Siaram Tewari. So also defendants 3 and 4 but defendant No. 5 was in the sixth degree. The reunion between Nauratan and Ramcharitar was admitted by them. The version of the two widows, defendants 1 and 2 in their written statement was on the same line as defendants 3 and 4. They attacked the plaintiffs genealogy and set up their own which were the same as made by the contesting defendants 3 and 4. The formal written statement on behalf of defendants 8 to 14 was only in adoption of that of defendants 3 and 4.

(5) On these pleadings the parties went to trial and evidence was adduced on those lines. The main controversy centered round the genealogy and whether there was any reunion between the two separate brothers Nauratan and Ramcharitar. Another point of difference was also stressed and it was whether Rajbhukhan died within 12 years or more before the suit so that defendant No. 1 could nave prescribed her title by adverse possession. Similarly, the time of the death of Lawat was controverted; whether he predeceased his father or died after him was in dispute. The evidence of the parties was mostly oral. The few documents relied upon by the plaintiffs are of little assistance. The trial Court, on consideration of both kind of evidence, dismissed the plaintiffs suit on accepting as correct the genealogy given by defendants 1 to 4. It held against the plaintiffs that there was no re-union between the two brothers Nauratan and Ramcharitar, but it accepted the plaintiffs version that Lawat had predeceased his father Nauratan and that Rajbhukhan had died within 12 years before the suit, and that Ramcharitar did not give away his properties to Rajbhukhan and Prema, defendant No. 2. But. by holding that defendants 3 and 4 were the nearest reversioners in preference to the plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiff No. 2, the suit was found to have no cause of action. About possession of defendant No. 2 in respect of one-third of the suit properties belonging to Nauratan, the Court below found that her possession having been since 1920 had matured to a perfect title in her favour. To challenge the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiffs have come in appeal.

(6) It is of first importance in this case to determine which of the two sets, plaintiff No. 1 and father of plaintiff No. 2 or defendants 3 and 4 is nearer to ma common ancestor Siaram. No written genealogy was produced by any party although one of the witnesses on the defendants side, D. W. 8, said that he had seen such a genealogy, and another witness U.W. 9 deposed that he had heard from a deceased person Ramnandan Tewari of the same village Nawadih that he had sent in writing the genealogy of the family with plaintiff No. 1 and others, when a title suit was to be filed by defendants 3 and 4 and the plaintiffs against the finding in a case under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, against them relating to the suit properties. How tar the existence of a written genealogy can be interred or accepted from this evidence will be a different matter, but none of the parties could support the genealogy given by them with reference to any written genealogy proved in the trial. The correctness or otherwise of the respective genealogies -- there were three such -- depended mostly upon the oral evidence of the witnesses examined in court. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellants endeavoured to demonstrate, with reference to the evidence, the falsity of the two genealogies set up by defendants 3 and 4 and defendants 5 and 16, but in my view there will be little gain to him by this method. Assuming that their genealogies were not successfully substantiated, the plaintiffs cannot prosper on that deficiency. To be able to claim back the properties from persons who were admittedly in possession of the date of the suit, the plaintiffs nave to establish their title to the same, and that title depended upon the plaintiffs claim that they were nearer than defendants 3 and 4 as reversioners of Ramcharitar, which properties belonged to or were in possession of Ramcharitar at the time of his death in 1954 will be a different question and I shall deal with that later. When if the plaintiffs case that the- whole of the suit properties belonged to him is taken, the suit can only succeed in that respect on the plaintiffs proof that they are nearer to Siaram or Ramcharitar than defendants 3 and 4. It will be useful to examine the evidence on the plaintiffs side first on this question.

(7) With reference to the genealogy stated in the plaint, learned Counsel for the appellants pointed out that plaintiff No. 1s grandfather was Imrit. That was also the position in the genealogy given by defendants 1 to 4. It Imrit could be proved to be the grandson of Siaram, the common ancestor, then plaintiff No. 1 would be in the fifth degree of the common ancestor. It was pointed out the witnesses, P. Ws. 5, 7, 8, 10 and plaintiff No. 1 as P.W. 12 stated in their deposition from which Imrit was found to be the grandson of Siaram Tewari. Although there was discrepancy in the two rival genealogies, about the sons of Siaram, learned Counsel contended that it was immaterial for the purpose of the present suit, if plaintiff No. 1s grandfather Imrit could also be shown as the grandson of the common ancestor. They would falsify the defendants genealogy showing Imrit to be great grandson of Siaram. Similarly, he pointed out that P. Ws. 3, 5, 7, 8 and 10, also stated that Padarath was the son of Siaram Tewari. If that evidence was accepted and learned counsel stressed that it should be so, this Padarath shown as grandson of the common ancestor in the defendants genealogy should be discarded. Similarly, he pointed out that Nidha and Bakhori were stated to be the sons of Agam as shown in the plaintiffs genealogy in the depositions of P.Ws. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 12. The defendants genealogy showed them to be brothers of Agam and in that way defendants 3 and 4 were raised one degree higher. The depositions of the abovementioned plaintiffs witnesses do not establish the mutual relationship of the parties to confirm to the plaintiffs genealogy. It will be useful to deal with their evidence separately but before that two positions in law should be kept in view. There can be direct evidence about the relationship by blood. A witness may depose that he Knows a particularly relationship between some persons and his evidence may be from this knowledge; but if the witness has no direct knowledge he can give evidence about the statements relating to the existence of any relationship by blood between two or more persons, heard by him from persons who made such statements provided those persons had special means, of knowledge about such relationship and such statement were made before the question in dispute was raised. Evidence about such statements only becomes relevant if persons making such statements are dead or cannot be found or have become incapable of giving evidence or their attendance cannot be procured without any unreasonable delay and expense, it is only in those limited cases that a witness having no direct knowledge about the relationship by blood can give evidence of statements known by him from other persons about such relationship. This is what is cleanly stated in Section 32(5) of the Evidence Act. A witness can also give his opinion in evidence as to the relationship or one person to another that is in controversy before a Court, provided that opinion is expressed by his conduct, and if he as a member of that family or otherwise has special means of knowledge of that relationship. That is according to the provisions under Section 50 of the Evidence Act. Subject to the limitations as stated above, the statement or the opinion deposed to by a witness on the question or relationship at one person to another will be relevant, it is in this light that the depositions of the plaintiffs witnesses will have to be looked into, because none of them had any direct knowledge about the relationship between the parties with reference to the common ancestor. Useful reference in this connection can be made to the cases of Sitaji v. Bijendra Narain Choudhury, AIR 1954 SC 601 [LQ/SC/1954/75] and Dolgobinda Pancha v. Nihal Charan Misra, AIR 1959 SC 914 [LQ/SC/1959/77] .

(8) (His Lordship examined the evidence of the plaintiffs witness, in the light of the law stated above and proceeded.) Thus the oral evidence on the plaintiffs side does not prove the genealogy stated in the plaint.

(9) I shall next examine the documents on which the plaintiffs sought reliance. Ext. B-1 is a letter purported to have been written on the 23rd Pus 1295 by one Sewak Lal to the landlord Syed Ali Hussain for orders to permit Padarath Tewari, Bakhori Tewari and Jeobodh Tewari to plant trees in an area of about 15 katnas. me order was endorsed on that letter and was marked as Ext. A-1. thus the document was more than 70 years old. This letter was filed by and on behalf of defendants 5 and 16 out used by the plaintiffs in their support. The alias names of Agam and Jeobodh were stated in that letter and also the names of fathers of Padarath Bakhori and Jeobodh as mentioned therein conformed to the genealogy of the plaintiffs. On the basis of the alias names and parentage mentioned above, plaintiffs wanted to falsify the defendants genealogy. The trial Court found this document to be highly suspicious and brought into existence by and at the instance of the plaintiffs who were also responsible for its production in Court though under the guise of defendants 5 and 16. The appearance of the paper, the ink, confirmed the that courts suspicion, one of the reasons that weighed with it was that if the insignificant paper could be preserved in we landlords office for 70 years, the jamabandi and other papers of the landlords office of that period could have been brought before the court by the plaintiffs to show how the tenants belonging to Siarams family were being described with reference to their fathers () name. The trial court also did not believe that the paper was produced from proper custody. It is hardly expected that an employee or the landlord would take minute precaution in stating me alias names in a casual letter of this nature. Apart from these features of Exts. B-1 and A-1, they are wholly inadmissible in evidence as the writer of the letter was not shown to have any special moans of knowledge about the relationship to prove which the letter was sought to be brought in existence. Section 90 of the Evidence ACT no doubt raises some presumption about the authorship of a writing if a document is 30 years old and it produced from proper custody but that is only a manner of proof, whether the statements made in that document would be relevant will depend upon the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in Clause (5) of Section 32. If it does not become relevant, Section 90 will not be called for. In that view Ext. B-1 is irrelevant and inadmissible. Learned Counsel for the appellants, when pointed out this, conceded against the admissibility. Plaintiffs have thus failed to prove their genealogy to the effect that plaintiff No. 1 and the father of plaintiff No. 2 are in the fifth degree of Siaram, the common ancestor.

(10) About defendants 3 and 4, plaintiffs family table showed them to be in the sixth degree in descenoancy from Siaram. Learned counsel argued that it the plaintiffs tailed to prove that, then on the case of the defendants showing defendants 3 and 4 to be in the fifth degree, the plaintiffs should be entitled to the suit properties along with them. This reasoning is apparently attractive but devoid of substance. The defendants genealogy puts the plaintiff No. 1 and the father of plaintiff No. 2 in the sixth degree of Siaram. When the plaintiffs failed to prove their own genealogy, they will have to establish the incorrectness of the defendants genealogy in respect of the plaintiffs before they can seek advantage on the other part of the defendants genealogy about defendants a and 4. The trial court, on a careful analysis of the evidence, accepts the genealogy given by defendants 1 to 4, that is, the plaintiff No. 1 and the father of plaintiff No. 2 were taken to be in the sixth degree, whereas defendants 3 and 4 in the fifth degree of the common ancestor Siaram. Learned Counsel endeavoured to counteract the defendants documents on which the trial court relied in this respect. Ext. A is an extract from the entries in the survey khasra record of village Kataria during survey season 1874/75. There Sitai Tewari was shown as son of Ganaur Tewari (Goar Tewari), Bhakhori Tewari shown as son of Rambaran Tewari at once and Ramacharan or Ramjiwan. Tewari at another place. The writings are in Urdu and the trial court on an inspection of the same took the view that the writing read as Rambaran Tewari was Ramcharan Tewari. Now the fathers names of these two persons Sital and Bakhori, as shown in this document are in conformity with what was stated in the family table given by the contesting defendants. Plaintiffs proved some other entries in the khasra marked as Ext. 4 and 4 (a) to show that the name of Bakhoris father was stated as Rambaran. Such was not the name of his father according to either plaintiffs or defendants 1 to 4, and the trial court look that the writer of those entries might have written baran instead of charan as the Kaithi cha could by mistake be read as Kaithi ba. About the entry showing the name of Ramcharan in Ext. A, the trial court found that the word Ramcharan appeared to have been changed into Ramjiwan. The urdu words cha and ray were changed into jim, ye and wao. This over-writing was obvious. The ink used in this over-writing was different from that used in the rest of the writing. The certified copy of these entries which was marked as Ext. A atter the original was produced in Court was obtained in April 1959 and the fathers name of Bakhori was clearly shown in that as Ramcharan. The trial court, therefore, thought that the over-writing showing the fathers name as Ramjiwan in the original was fraudulently made by somebody after the gram of the certified copy and no support could be taken by the plaintiffs from such over-writing or interpolation. Learned Counsels further criticism against this document was that it was not admissible for the reason that it was not proved to be a statement about the relationship between Sital and Ganaur or Bokhari and Ramcharan made by a person who had any special means of knowledge to know those relationships being a member of that family or otherwise. The mention of fathers name, according to mm, was merely a description of the cultivator in whose name the entries were made but was not proof of the relationship. He overlooked the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. By which an entry in any public or other official register stating a fact in issue or relevant fact and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties becomes a relevant fact and is provable in the prescribed manner. There was no comment upon the manner of proof in this case. There is no doubt that these are the entries in a public and official register and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duties because this Khasra register was maintained under Act 6 of 1869 and the columns provided in the register were to be filled up in the discharge of official duties of the public servant concerned. Till those entries are proved to be false, they will be good evidence of what is stated thereunder. In that view, a major support is obtained from this ancient and reliable document for the family trees stated by defendants 1 to 4 in regard to the comparative remoteness of the plaintiffs 1rom the common ancestor as compared with the defendants 3 and 4. Bakhori, according to the plaintiffs, was son of Again, that is, greatgrandson of Siaram but, according to defendants 1 to 4, he was grandson of Siaram and brother of Niana and Agam. That Ext. A is admissible under Section 35 of the evidence Act can also be easily supported from what was held in the case of Soshi Bhoosnun Bose v. Girish Chunder, ILR 20 Cal 940 [LQ/CalHC/1893/16] , William Graham v. Phanindra Nath, MR 1916 Cal 617 andt Shyam Pratap Singh v. Collector of Etawah, AIR 1946 PC 103 [LQ/PC/1946/11] .

(11) Learned Counsel for the appellants referred us to some cases to contend that the recitals in Ext. A could not come into evidence unless the proof of the requisites stated in Section 32 of the Evidence Act were fulfilled. In the case of Soney Lall Jha v. Darbdeo Narain Singh, AIR 1935 Pat 167 (FB) the decision was about recitals of boundary in a private document. In the case of Subbian Mudaliar v. Gopala Mudaliar, AIR 1936 Mad 808 [LQ/MadHC/1935/276] it was about a statement in a plaint in a former suit. In the case of Mathura Prasad Singh v. Bhulan Singh, 14 Ind cas 339 (Orissa), it was about a pedigree which had been previously filed during the settlement operation. None of these cases has any relevancy to the consideration of admissibility of an entry in a public official register made in accordance with the statutory provisions. Consideration of Section 35 of the Evidence Act was not in any of those cases.

(12) Defendants also filed several rent receipts and proved them as Ext. B series. (His Lordship after considering them, proceeded.)

12-A. Defendants oral evidence on their genealogy came from D. Ws. 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18. (His Lordship reviewed their evidence and proceeded.)

In a case of the present nature very little reliance could be placed on the oral testimony of the witnesses, particularly when it did not conform to the rules of relevancy or the manner of proof as statutorily laid down, out strongest support can be drawn from unimpeachable documentary evidence and in the present case that is available to the contesting defendants 3 and 4 from the entries in Ext. A. In that view the finding of the trial court about the correctness of the family tree given by defendants 3 and 4 can very well be supported.

(13) It then does not become very necessary to consumer the other aspects of the plaintiffs case about re-union between Nauratan and Ramchariter after separation between the three brothers Ramratan, Nauratan and Ramcharitar or the period of possession of the different items of property by Prema, widow of Lawat and Manbrita, widow of Roshan, original defendants 2 and 1, respectively, because It the plaintiffs are not the nearest reversioners to Ramcharitar or Rambhukhan, there is no cause of action for the present suit. On the question of re-union, the finding or the trial Court was against the plaintiffs. The oral evidence of P.Ws. 2, 4, 7 and 12 on that point appears to be thoroughly unreliable. (After examining their evidence His Lordship continued:)

(14) There is another important aspect which is also decisive in this case. The plaint was filed on the 16th of November 1956 and before that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, had come into force. Admittedly, the original defendants 1 and 2, the two ladies, were in possession of the suit properties from 1946 and 1954 when Rajbhukhan and Ramcharitar died respectively, or at least from 1954. According to the provisions under Section 14 of the Act, any property possessed by a "female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act (17th June 1956) shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Under the explanation given under that Section, property includes property acquired by a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance or in any other manner whatsoever. Defendants 1 and 2 were undoubtedly entitled to maintenance out of the property belonging to Ramratans and Nauratans branches. Their possession, therefore, can well be presumed before 1956 to be at least in lieu of maintenance, and in that view, on the new Act coming into force on the 17th June 1956, they became absolute owners of those properties, and on the date the suit was instituted plaintiffs had no cause of action against them. The same view also becomes irresistible even if the property is held to have been acquired by those two ladies not in lieu of maintenance but "in any other manner whatsoever." The word whatsoever indicates the wide amplitude. For the benefits of Section 14, two things are necessary; the property should have been acquired by we female Hindu and she should be in possession, it is well established that the word possessed in section 14 is to be taken in its wide import and includes constructive possession or possession in, law; see G. Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Veeravva, AIR 1959 SC 577 [LQ/SC/1958/173] and Munnalal v. Rajkumar, AIR 1962 SC 1493 [LQ/SC/1962/86] .

(15) In this case there is no difficulty in regard to the possession of the two ladies, in tact they were in possession before the Act came into force. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the ladies did not acquire the properties lawfully and, therefore, their possession on the date of the commencement of the Act will not give them the benefit of absolute ownership. How can it be said that they came in possession of the properties in an unlawful manner The properties belong to the family of which they were members with a right of maintenance out of those properties. On the death of the last surviving coparcener in the respective families their right to maintenance out of those properties also remained intact and no one else ever attempted to take possession of those properties and to offer to maintain the two ladies, the very tact that the ladies remained in possession right from the date of death of the last surviving coparcener in the respective families till the date of the suit indicates unmistakably the lawful manner in which they came and continued in possession. The properties cannot be said to have been acquired in any unlawful manner so as to deprive the ladies of the benefit of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. After stating the different manners of acquisition in the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 14, the Legislature thought it wise to include also other acquisitions in any manner whatsoever, for example, if a person, puts a female Hindu in possession of some properties belonging to him without executing a deed of transfer as envisaged under the Transfer of Property Act, the acquisition, in that case, of the property by the female Hindu will not be unlawful and will be covered by the Explanation given to Sub-section (1). Similar will be the position in case where a female Hindu acquires property by exchange, although exchange has not been included in the explanation. There cannot be any doubt that the Legislature intended to confer the benefit of absolute ownership on the female Hindus over the properties acquired by them in any manner either before or after the Act came into force. Even if the female Hindu comes in possession as a trespasser in any property and continues to be so for a period of 12 years, she prescribes her title inasmuch as a suit by a rightful owner for her eviction will be barred by the laws of limitation, in such property also a female Hindu shall have absolute ownership. In that view of the matter, possession of the two ladies over the suit property on the date of the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 resulted in their absolute ownership over the property, and that would bar the plaintiffs claim completely on the date the suit was instituted.

(16) The trial Court found and I see no reason to vacate that, that there was no re-union between Nairatam and Ramcharitar and one-third of the suit properties belonging to Nauratan came and continued in possession of the original defendant No. 2, Prema, from 1920 on Nauratan s death. If she did not hold the possession of the same in lieu of maintenance, her possession was adverse to him or those who were the rightful owners, and after 12 years of such possession she prescribed her absolute true to that share of property and the present suit could not be maintained against her for eviction, it her possession was in lieu of maintenance, she also became absolute owner under the Hindu Succession Act. In either view the plaintiffs could have no cause of action in the present suit against her.

(17) Learned Counsel urged that now that the two ladies are dead, the question of succession shall have to be determined as between the parties. The Court no doubt may take into account the subsequent incidents like me death of defendants 1 and 2 but whether they have died intestate or not we do not know. In that view, the question of succession to them has to be left open. For the reasons stated above, I have to uphold the decree of the Court below though on some different reasons and accordingly this appeal is dismissed with costs to Respondents 3(a) to 3(d) and 4.