Fazl Ali, J.The only question which arises in this appeal is one of limitation and it arises upon the following facts.

2. In 1932 the appellants brought a title suit against the respondents which was dismissed on 4th August 1933 with costs. Thereupon they appealed to the District Judge but their appeal also was dismissed with costs on 22nd December 1934. The appellants then prefer, red a second appeal to the High Court which was dismissed with costs on 19th September 1935 as talbana was not filed within the time prescribed. The appellants thereupon filed a miscellaneous judicial case for the restoration of the second appeal and this case was dismissed with costs on 16th January 1936. Thereafter, on nth January 1939, the respondents executed their decree for costs which included the costs allowed to them in the trial Court, in the first and the second appeals and in the miscellaneous judicial case.

3. A question then arose as to whether the period of limitation for the execution of the decree for the costs of the suit and the appeals would run from 19th September 1935, the date when the second appeal was dismissed for default or from 16th January 1936, when the miscellaneous judicial case was dismissed. The first Court came to the conclusion that the appellants application for execution was barred except in so far as it related to the costs allowed in the miscellaneous judicial case decided on 16th January 1936.

4. The District Judge however held on appeal that the application was not time barred. In reversing the decision of the Court of first instance the learned District Judge relied on Firm Debhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das AIR 1937 in which Courtney-Terrell C.J., and James J., have held (1) that the words "where there has been an appeal" in Clause (2) of Article 182, Limitation Act, do not mean, in their strict grammatical construction that the appeal must be against the decree in the suit; but they include an appeal against an order made on an application for rehearing under Order 41, Rule 21, Civil P.C. (1908) and (2) that all cases in which the Court re-considers its own judgment are cases of review within the meaning of Clause (3) of Article 182 and therefore an order made on an application for restoration under Order 41, Rule 21, Civil P.C., is an order passed on review within Clause (3).

5. Now, if we had been of the view that the present case is fully covered by Firm Debhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das AIR 1937 we would have referred this appeal to a larger Bench, because both my learned brother and I are agreed that some of the propositions laid down by the learned Judges in that case require further examination. But as I shall presently show the present appeal can be decided on a point which was neither raised nor decided in that case.

6. As both the parties to this appeal have proceeded on the assumption that the application for restoring the second appeal is to be treated as an application for review, the present case must be held to be governed by Article 182, Clause (8), Limitation Act. Article 182, Clause (3) provides that where there has been a review of judgment the period of limitation begins to run from the date of the decision passed on the review.

7. This provision has been construed in a number of cases wherein it has been held that it does not apply where the application for review has not been granted but rejected, that is to say, in such cases limitation is not enlarged under this clause : see Kurupam Zamindar v. Sada siva (87) 10 Mad. 66. Rai Brijraj v. Nauraan alal AIR 1917. Venugopal Mudali v. C. Venkatasubbiah Chetty AIR 1916 1202 and Fakir Chand Mondal and Another Vs. Daiba Charan Parui and Another, . With this view I entirely agree. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the words "where there has been a review of judgment" mean "where there has been an application for review of judgment." In my opinion however there is no justification whatever for inserting the word "application" into this provision.

8. The learned advocate for the respondent contended that as there is similarity in the language of Clauses (2) and (3), the word review must be construed to mean an application for review. But the answer to this contention is this: the words "where there has been an appeal" must mean where there has been an appeal by the person who is aggrieved by the judgment appealed from, because only such a parson is allowed to prefer an appeal.

9. On the other hand, the words "when there has been a review of judgment" must mean a review by some one who can review the judgment, that is to say, by the Court which pronounced the judgment to be reviewed. If that is the meaning to be attached to the words, it is plain that the article will have no application where an application for review has been rejected, because in that case there has not been a review of judgment. The learned advocate for the respondents also contended that the words "review of judgment" may be construed to mean proceedings for review of judgment. Such a construction however has never been placed upon these words and I do not see any justification for doing so.

10. In my opinion, therefore, the time of limitation in the present case began to run from 19th September 1935 in regard to the costs which were awarded in the trial Court as well as in the first and second appeals and so far as the execution in respect of these costs is concerned, it must be held to be time-barred. As to the costs awarded in the miscellaneous judicial case, it was conceded by the learned Counsel for the appellant that these costs are still recoverable and therefore no decision on that point is necessary. In these circumstances.

11. I would allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned District Judge and restore the judgment of the subordinate Judge. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the parties should bear their own costs here and in the Court of the District Judge.

Rowland J.

12. I agree. With regard to the observations in Firm Dedhraj Lachminarayan v. Bhagwan Das AIR 1937 Pat. 337 implying that the Privy Council decision in AIR 1932 165 (Privy Council) had had the effect of reversing the current of authority in this Court and in particular overruling Rai Brijraj Vs. Nauratan Lal, . I would like to point out that the law as understood and applied in this Court, even before the date of the Privy Council judgment (which was delivered on 2lst April 1932), was in the same sense as that declared by their Lordships. The latest pronouncement of this Court before the date of that Privy Council judgment was made on 15th July 1931 in Kameshwar Singh Bahadur v. Beni Madho Singh AIR 1931 Pat. 422. Kulwant Sahay J., with whom Khwaja Mohamad Noor J. agreed, held that the reference to an appeal in Article 182(2), Limitation Act, is not limited to an appeal which was a competent appeal; that the article applies whenever an appeal has been preferred; and that presentation of a memorandum of appeal is preferring an appeal. There is therefore no question of the current of authority in this Court being reversed in consequence of what the Judicial Committee decided in Nagendra Nath v. Suresh Chandra AIR 1932.