Anil Dev Singh, J.

1. This order will dispose of Civil Writ Petition Nos. 4777/93 and 3277/2000. Civil Writ Petition No. 4777/93, which is prior in time, was filed by the petitioner, Shanti Sports Club, a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 through its President, Sh.Satish Khosla and petitioner Sh.Sunil Nagar, Member and Secretary thereof inter alias for quashing the acquisition proceedings in respect of land bearing khasra nos. 35, 369/36, 37, 38, 367/21 and 365/33 located in village Masudpur, Mehrauli, New Delhi and for restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession and the functioning of the petitioner society in respect of the sports club created on the aforesaid land. The writ petition also seeks direction to the respondents requiring them to consider the release of the land in question from acquisition. The prayer clause of the writ petition reads as follows:-

(a) require the respondent authorities to consider on an urgent basis any exercise of their powers including powers u/s 48 of the Land Acquisition Act to release the land in question from acquisition;

(b) Issue appropriate writ, order or direction including a writ int he nature of mandamus, certiorari quashing the acquisition proceedings in respect of the land bearing khasra nos.35, 369/36, 37, 38, 367/21 and 365/33 situated in village Masudpur, Mehrauli, New Delhi;

(c) Issue appropriate writ, order or direction including a writ in the nature of prohibition restraining the respondents from interfering with the possession and the functioning of the petitioner society in respect of the sports complex in question situated on the aforesaid land.

(d) award costs in favor of the petitioner and against the respondents;

2. The land mentioned in the prayer clause of the writ petition was notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short the) on 23rd January 1965. Thereafter on 26th December, 1968, a declaration under Section 6 of thepertaining to the land in question was made. In the year 1976, notices under Sections 9 and 10 were issued. The acquisition proceedings culminated in an Award passed by the Collector, Land Acquisition on 22nd December, 1980.

3. On 4th December, 1980, a few days before the passing of the award, one Sh.Amrit Lal Khanna claiming to have purchased 26 bighas of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 35, 369/36 and 37 in village Masudpur, Mehrauli Tehsil, Along with three others, namely, Sh.Srivastava, Naresh Kumar and Gopal Kishan, from Sh.Parameshwar Lal through a sale deed dated January 31, 1969 questioned the acquisition proceedings by a writ petition, being Civil Writ No.1753/80. In the above said writ petition, on December 9, 1980 an order was passed restraining the respondents from dispossessing the petitioner. While that writ petition was pending, three civil suits bearing nos. 3318/91, 1544/33 and 2867/95 were filed on various dates. The dates of the filing of the suits and the cause titles thereof are as follows:-

Suit No. 3318/91 - files on 29th October, 1991. Shanti India ( P ) Ltd. (through Satish Khosla)

.....plaintiff

versus

Delhi Development Authority.

.....Defendant

Suit No.1544/93 - filed on 13th July, 1993.

Atma Ram Amrit Lal Khanna Satish Khosla

.....plaintiffs

versus

Municipal Corporation of Delhi. Delhi Development Authority

.....Defendants

Suit No.2867/95 - filed on 11th December, 1995.

Satish Khosla Amrit Lal Khanna

.....plaintiffs

versus

Delhi Development Authority

.....Defendant

4. The basis on which the suits were filed, the nature of reliefs sought therein and the interim orders prayed for in the applications accompanying the plaints need to be noticed.

5. Suit No.3318/91;

In the plaint it was claimed that the plaintiff, Shanti India (Pvt) Ltd, a company registered under the Companies, Act, 1956 purchased land measuring 38 bighas, 13 bids was comprised in Khasra Nos.369/36, 35, 37, 38, 367/21 and 355/33 situated in village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi. It is also claimed that the plaintiff floated Shanti Sports Club of India which formed a cricket academy with a view to providing cricketing facilities for its members. It is asserted that the defendant, Delhi Development Authority on 28th October, 1991 started digging a road which runs from Andheria Modh to the Airport with a view to raise a wall for blocking the entire road, for rendering the suit property inaccessible. In this suit the plaintiff has raised the following principal prayer:-

(a) Grant a decree for permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant restraining the defendant, its servants, agents, officers and representatives from digging and/or raising a wall or a gate on the road leading to the suit property commonly known as Shanti Garden, Village Masudpur, Tehsil Merauli, New Delhi and/or in any manner interfering in the ingress and egress of the plaintiff through the said road;

Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed an application seeking ad interim ex parte injunction for restraining the defendants from digging and/or raising a wall or blocking the road leading to the suit property.

6. Suit No.1544/93:

In this suit, it is stated that the three plaintiffs, namely, Atma Ram, Amrit Lal Khanna and Satish Khosla, are owners and in possession of immovable property measuring about 38 bighas, 13 bids was comprised in khasra no.369/36, 35, 37, 38, 367/21 and 355/33 situated in village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi. It is further averred that a sports club in the name of Shanti Sports Club of India was formed by the plaintiff No.3, Shri Satish khosla, which runs a cricket academy with a view to provide cricketing facilities to its members. It is alleged that the officers of the defendants have demolished certain structures in village Kishangarh on June 29, 1993 and have even threatened to demolish the suit property. In this suit the plaintiffs primarily have sought the following relief:-

"To grant a decree for permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants restraining the defendants, their servants, agents, officers and their representatives from dispossessing, interfering in the possession of the plaintiffs and their demolishing or sealing any part of the existing structure at khasra nos.369/36, 35, 37, 38, 367/21 and 355/33 village Masoodupur, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi, more particularly shown as Red in the plan annexed hereto".

Along with the suit, the plaintiffs have filed an application for an ex-parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiffs from the land in question and from interfering with their possession and from demolishing and or selling any part of the existing structure erected in the suit land.

7. Suit No.2867/95:

In this suit, it is asserted that the plaintiffs namely, Satish Khosla and Amrit Lal Khanna, are bhoomidars of immovable property known as Shanti Garden and khasra no. 25, 369/, situated in village Masudupur, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi measuring 26 bighas 6 biswas. It is further alleged that suit property is surrounded by a boundary wall which has an iron gate on its north corner. It is further asserted that plaintiff no.1 Satish Khosla floated the Shanti Sports Club of India which runs a cricket academy with a view to extend cricketing facilities to its members. It is further alleged that the officers of the defendant threatened to demolish the boundary wall and the gate of the club and to take forcible possession of an area of about 250 square yards of the said property on the dispensary. As per prayer clause of the suit, the relief claimed is as follows:-

"(a) Grant a decree for permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant restraining the defendant, its servants, agents, officers and representatives from digging and/or raising a wall or a gate on the road leading to the suit property commonly known as Shanti Garden Village Masudpur, Tehsil Merauli, New Delhi and/or in any manner interfering in the ingress and egress of the plaintiff through the said road;"

Along with the suit, the plaintiffs moved an application for grant of ex parte ad interim injunction as per below:-

"(i) Restrain the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land,

(ii) Restrain the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff, and

(iii) Restrain the defendant from demolishing the boundary wall and the gate of the club.

8. In the suits at Serial nos. 1, 2 and 3, the plaintiffs were granted interim reliefs on October 29,1991, July 15, 1993 and 12th October, 1995, respectively. The orders granting interim reliefs read as follows:-

October 29, 1991 :

Suti No. 3318/1991 and I.A.11281/91

"Summons in the suit and notice of the application be issued to the defendant for 12th November, 1991. Till then the defendant authority may raise wall or construct a gate on the road moving from the right of the main gate of Shanti Garden but in such a way that free access to Shanti Garden premises is not blocked."

July 15, 1993:

I.A.6320/93 in Suit No.1544/93.

".....Meanwhile, the defendant, their servants, agents and officers are hereby restrained from demolishing, or sealing any part of the existing structure at property bearing khasra nos.369/36, 35, 37, 38, 367/21 and 355/53, village Masoodpur, Mehrauli, New Delhi, as shown red in the plan annexed with the plaint. Compliance of Order 39 Rule 3 CPC be made within three days."

October 12, 1995:

I.A.No.12470/95 in Suit No.2867/95.

".....There shall be injunction restraining the defendant, its servants, agents, officers and representatives of the plaintiffs in the portion shown in red or demolishing the gate at Mark X or the boundary wall existing at Khasra nos.35, 369/36 and 37, village Masoodpur, Tehsil Mehrauli, New Delhi as shown in blue in the plan annexed to the plaint until further orders. Compliance of Order 39 (3) CPC be made within three days."

9. On 12th October, 1993, apart from filing the C.W.P.No.1753/80 and the aforesaid suits, the present petitioners moved one of the instant writ petitions, being CWP No.4777/93. In the writ petition it is claimed that Amrit Lal Khanna along with the others was the owner of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 35, 369/36, 37, 38, 367/21 and 365/33 situated in village Masudpur, Mehrauli. It is further claimed in an additional affidavit, filed on November 3, 1993, that Amrit Lal Khanna constituted and appointed Shri Satish Khosla as his attorney by means of a power of attorney dated June, 12, 1990, with regard to one half share in khasra nos. 35, 369/36, 37 admeasuring 26 bighas 6 bids was situated in village Masudpur, Mehrauli. Thereafter, vide letter dated July 1, 1990 Satish Khosla wrote to Shanti Sports Club agreeing to hand over possession of the land bearing khasra nos. 35, 369/36, 37, 38, 367/21 and 365/33 located in village Masudpur, Mehrauli, to the latter for purposes of sports-cum-recreational centre subject to certain conditions. As is apparent from the letter, one of the conditions was that the club shall pay 50% of its net income to Shri Satish Khosla w.e.f. April 1, 1994. It may be mentioned that the offer was made by Satish Khosla as power of attorney holder of Amrit Lal Khanna. In response, Shanti Sports Club on July 10, 1990 accepted the offer of Satish Khosla. As already noticed, Shanti Sports Club through Satish Khosla and its Secretary have filed the writ petition inter alias requiring the respondents to consider denotification of the land in question or in the alternative to quash the acquisition proceedings. It is pertinent to mention that in the writ petition no interim relief was granted.

10. The present petitioners did not remain content with the filing of the aforesaid instant writ petition (CWP No. 4777/93.) They also moved an application, being C.M. No. 8269/93, in C. W.1753/80 for intervention. C.W.No.1753/80 was referred to the Full Bench and it was directed that C.W.P.No.4777/93 be listed after the decision of the Full Bench. On 14th December, 1995, the Full Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as Roshanara Begum vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1996 Delhi 206, upheld the acquisition proceedings and rejected the challenges thereto.

11. It may be pointed out that in the intervention application, being C.M.8269/93 filed by the present petitioners it was urged among other grounds that the land in question had been developed into a sports complex with modern amenities and it would be a national waste to allow such a construction to be demolished. It was found by the Full Bench that the construction had been raised after issuance of the notification under Section 4 of theand the constructions were raised with complete knowledge of the fact that the land is liable to be acquired for public purpose. It was also observed that the sports complex built by the petitioners was not in consonance with the public purpose for which the land had been earmarked in the scheme of the Government. The court was of the opinion that the petitioners cannot legally get the notification quashed on any valid grounds. However, liberty was granted to the petitioners to make a representation to the authorities for getting the land released and it was left to the authorities to examine whether in view of the modern sports complex having been brought into existence on the land in question, could it serve the public purpose of acquiring the land for that particular scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended in respect of the land in question. At this stage it will be appropriate to quote the observations of the Full Bench in this regard:-

".....Thus, we do not think that the petitioner/applicant can legally get the notification quashed on any valid grounds in the present matter. However, the petitioner/applicant is at liberty to make any representation to the authorities for getting the land released and it is for the authorities to examine whether in view of the modern sports complex having been brought into existence in the land in question could it serve the public purpose of acquiring this land for that particular scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended in respect of the land in question. However, the acquisition proceedings are not liable to be quashed on any such plea."

12. The various land owners, not being satisfied with the decision of the Full Bench carried the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court on November 1, 1996 dismissed the appeals vide judgment Murari and others v. Union of India and others, : (1997)1SCC15 . While upholding the order of the Full Bench, the Supreme Court noticed that a large extent of the land had been acquired and observed that it would not be proper to exclude from planned development of Delhi small portions of land over which structures had been raised. It also noted the concession of the learned counsel appearing for the State that the Govt. will consider each of the structures and take a decision in that respect. At this stage it will be apposite to extract the observations of the Supreme Court:-

"In the present case also a large extent of land measuring thousands of acres had been acquired and, Therefore, it would not be proper to leave out some small portions here and there over which some structures are said to be constructed out of the planned development of Delhi. We may, however, add here that during the course of the arguments Shri Goswami, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-State made a statement that the Government will consider each of the structures and take a decision in that respect. We, Therefore leave this issue to the discretion of the respondent."

13. On October 3, 1997, after about eleven months of the decision of the Supreme Court, Shanti Sports Club through Satish Khosla addressed a representation to the Minister for Urban Development, Govt. of India, for release of the land. Again, on June 3, 1999 the aforesaid club preferred a fresh representation to the them Minister for Urban Development, Government of India, for release of the land from acquisition, change of the land use from rural use to recreational use and for regularisation and approval of the club. It is claimed that on 3rd June, 1999 a meeting was held in the office of Shri Ram Jethmalani, the then Minister of Urban Development where the President of the Shanti Sports Club and the Vice Chairman of DDA and other senior officials of the DDA were present, and a policy decision was taken for denotification of the land in question and for regularisation of the same in favor of Shanti Sports Club. The President of the Shanti Sports Club was allegedly asked to hold discussions with the officials of the DDA for hammering out the terms of regularisation by mutual negotiations. On 8th June, 1999 the Private Secretary to the then Minister for Urban Development sought a report from the Commissioner of Planning, DDA, in respect of the land in question in order to enable the Minister to take a decision in the matter. On the same day, viz., June 8, 1999 the petitioners are stated to have written a letter to the Minister for Urban Development suggesting terms for regularisation and denotification of the land. It is claimed by the petitioners that on June 8, 1999 itself the then Minister again took a decision to regularise the club and directed finalisation of the terms for the same. On 9th June, 1999, the petitioners allegedly submitted a fresh representation to the Vice Chairman, DDA for denotification and regularisation of the land on the terms specified therien. On 24th May, 2000 in C.W.4777/93, the counsel for the Government of India made a statement in court to the effect that a decision had been taken by the concerned Minister with regard to the representation of the petitioner seeking release of the land in question from acquisition. He further stated that the concerned Minister did not accede to the request of the petitioners to denotify the land in question. In view of the statement of the learned counsel for the respondents we directed the respondents to communicate the decision of the Government to the petitioners. Pursuant to the said direction, the Under Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation, Govt. of India, vide his letter dated June 9, 2000 communicated the decision of the Government to the petitioners. The said communication reads as follows:

"No. J-13039/1/95-DDIB, Vol-II Government of India, Ministry of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation, (Delhi Division)

Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi. Dated 9th June, 2000

To

Shri Satish Khosla, President, Shanti Sports Club, Shanti Sports Complex, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi-110070.

Sub: De-notification of Shanti Sports Club land comprising 50 bighas 12 bids was in respect of lands bearing Khasra No. 367/21(1-10), 32 (8-05), 355/33 (3-07), 35(5-19), 368/36(11-14), 37(8-13) 38 min (7-0) and 354/33(4-04).

Sir,

I am directed to refer to your presentation dated 3.6.99 submitted to this Ministry & representation dated 8.6.99 enclosed as Annexure to the Writ Petition on the above mentioned subject and to say that the matter has been examined in consultation with DDA. The development on the land has taken place after the acquisition of land was completed and award was declared. The land has been acquired for the Vasant Kunj Residential Project which has been help up due to prolonged litigation. Apart from these the Honble High Court in CWP No.1753/80 filed by Shri Amrit Lal Khanna and subsequently the Honble Supreme Court have upheld the acquisition proceedings in favor of the Government.

2. Therefore, it has been decided that you request to denotify the above land cannot be acceded as the land is required for public purpose. This is for your information.

3. This issues with the approval of the competent authority.

Yours faithfully, Sd/- (R.C.NAYAK) Under Secretary (DDVA)"

Shanti Sports Club and Shri Satish Khosla, President thereof, being aggrieved of the decision of the Government have filed writ petition No. 3277/2000. This is how both the writ petitions are before us.

14. Shri Sanghi and Dr. Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners pointed out that representations were filed by the petitioners before the authorities for release of the land from acquisition, for its regularisation in favor of the petitioners and change of use thereof from rural use to recreational use. Our attention was drawn to the representation dated October 3, 1997 which was addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India; the Lt.Governor; Secretary, Land and Building Department, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and Vice Chairman DDA in which it was inter alias requested that powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act be exercised for denotification of the land in question. It was also pointed out that pursuant to the representation, the Private Secretary to the Minister of Urban Development, Government of India, on January 8, 1999 addressed a letter to the Commissioner (Planning), DDA, seeking the latters views as to whether it would be appropriate to accord sanction to the sports club, in view of the fact that there are no sport clubs in the Vasant Kunj area, which has a large population. The Directors was asked to send his report by january 25, 1999. The learned senior counsel also claimed that on June 3, 1999 a fresh representation was presented before the Minister for Urban Development when the Vice Chairman, DDA, and other senior officials were present. According to them, Shri Jethmalani, the then Minister for Urban Development, took the decision to denotify the land and to regularise the same in favor of the club. As per learned counsel, the President of the Club was directed to discuss the terms for regularisation with the DDA. They also referred tot a note of the Chairman, D.D.A., dated June 3, 1999 and submitted that it was recorded to give effect tot he decision of the Minister. The learned senior counsel also referred to a further representation of the petitioners dated June 8, 1999 suggesting the terms for regularisation of the land in favor of the club and to a note recorded by the then Minister for Urban Development, Government of India, thereon on the same day, viz., June 8, 1999.

15. Learned senior counsel contended that Shri Jeghmalani, the them minister had taken a final decision to denotify the land in question and regularise the same in favor of the petitioner club. According to them, only the terms on the basis of which the formal notifications withdrawing from acquisition and releasing the land in favor of the petitioners were required to be settled. They argued that contrary to the decision arrived at by the then Minister for Urban Development on June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999, his successor declined to denotify the land by reviewing and reversing the same though no power of review vested with him. The upshot of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is as follows:-

1. The then Minister for Urban Development had taken a decision to denotify the land and regularise the same in favor of the petitioners.

2. That once a decision to denotify and regularise the land was taken by Shri Jethmalani, the then Minister for Urban Development, there was no power to review the same by his successor.

16. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners. it seems to us that the same proceed on mere surmises and assumptions. the assumption of the petitioners that Sh. Ram Jethmalani had taken a decision to denotify the land is without any foundation. Similarly the assumption that he had decided to regularise the land in favor of the petitioner club also does not appear to be correct. It needs to be noted that while the assertions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that a meeting of the petitioners took place with the then Minister for Urban Development on June 3, 1999 and a note was recorded by the Vice Chairman, DDA on the same day are well founded, the further claim that he (the Minister for Urban Development) took a decision to denotify and regularise the land in favor of the petitioners is not justified. The note of the Vice Chairman, DDA dated June, 3, 1999 (page 272) does not reflect that a final decision was taken by the Minister. The note of the Vice Chairman, DDA reads as follows:-

"Attended the meeting. The decision is to generating some alternatives to regularise this institutions possession in such a way as to satisfy the principle of enquiry from the public point of view also. Please put it in the file.

P.K. Ghosh 3.6.99"

A regarding of the aforesaid notes does not suggest that a decision was reached by the Minister to denotify the land. It seems to us that the note indicates that the department was required to explore the possibilities to regularise possession of the petitioners over the land but this does not mean that a final decision was reached in this regard. In case any decision to denotify the land and to regularise the same in favor of the petitioner club was taken by the then Minister he would have recorded a written order to that effect. On the contrary Minister on the representation of the petitioner club dated June 3, 1999 recorded the following note on June 7, 1999:-

"Discussed. Put up after ten days."

Even the note recorded by Shri Jethmalani on the representation of the petitioner dated June 8, 1999 does not show that he had reached a final conclusion to denotify the land and regularise the same in favor of the petitioner club. The note recorded by him on June 8, 1999 at the foot of the representation of the petitioner-club of the same date reads as follows:-

"Extensive construction has taken place. This must be with full co-operation of the public servants concerned.

In accordance with the settled policy, no demolition can or will be ordered. At the last meeting, I indicated that suitable terms of regularisation be settled by negotiations. I would leave this now to my successor."

Sd/- Ram Jethmalani."

17. The aforesaid note and the note recorded by the Vice Chairman on June 3, 1999 at best reflect the musings of the Minister. he was still pondering over the possibility of a negotiated settlement and possible terms of regularisation. On June 7, 1999 he had directed the representation dated June 3, 1999 to be put up after ten days, i.e., on June 13, 1999. But the petitioners without waiting for ten days presented a fresh representation to Shri Jethmalani on June 8, 1999. It needs to be noted that on 8th June, 1999, Shri Ram jethmalani relinquished charge of the office of the Minister for Urban Development and assumed charge of the office of Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs. On the same day, Sh. Jag Mohan relinquished charge of the office of Minister for Communication and assumed charge of the office of the Minister for Urban Development. This being so how it can be attributed to the erstwhile Minister to have taken a decision to denotify the land from acquisition and to regularise the same in favor of the petitioners on the day he laid down his office as Minister for Urban Development. it is apparent from the note recorded by Shri Ram Jethmalani on the application of the petitioners dated June 8, 1999 that the matter was left to his successor. We fail to appreciate the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the then Minister had taken a final decision to regularise and denotify the land in favor of the petitioners. Assuming for the sake of argument that on June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999 a decision to denotify and regularise the land was taken by the then Minister for Urban Development, it seems to us that such a decision will be of no consequence and will have no existence in the eye of law. This is so because the terms for denotification and regularisation were not settled. Settlement, if any, was left for the future. In the event of the parties failing to reach a settlement there would be no occasion to withdraw from acquisition of the land and to regularise the same in favor of the petitioners. We also fail to appreciate as to how it can be argued that though the terms for regularisation were still to be settled, the decision to regularise the land in favor of the first petitioner was taken by Sh. Ram Jethmalani. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners, Therefore, is fallacious and is hereby rejected. Besides, the withdrawal from acquisition of any land of which possession has not been taken is governed by section 48 of the. Undoubtedly, section 48 vests power in the Government to withdraw from acquisition except in the case provided for in section 36 thereof. But withdrawal form acquisition must necessarily be by a notification under sub-section (1) of section 48 of thepublished in the official gazette.

18. The Supreme Court in Murari vs. Union of India and others (supra) while relying on its earlier decisions in Chandrabansi Singh vs. State of Bihar 1994 4 SCC 316, State of Maharashtra vs. Uma Shankar Raja Bhau : (1996)1SCC299 and U.P. Jal Nigam vs. Kalra Properties (Pvt) Ltd : [1996]1SCR683 held that even if it be assumed that there was an order for release of certain land form acquisition, the same cannot be given effect to in absence of a notification published in the official gazette withdrawing from acquisition of land. In Larsen & Toubro ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others, : [1998]2SCR339 , the Supreme Court while reiterating the aforesaid principle observed as follows:-

"Principles of law are, Therefore, well settled. A notification in the Official Gazette is required to be issued if the State Government decides to withdraw from the acquisition under Section 48 of theof any land of which possession has not been taken.

In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court it is futile to argue that a final and binding decision was taken by the Minister on 3rd June, 1999 and 8th June, 1999 to withdraw from acquisition and to regularise the land in favor of the petitioners.

19. We may now look to the issue from another angle. it is not in dispute that in the Master Plan, which is statutory in nature and has the force of law, the land use of the area in question is recorded as "rural use". Therefore, the use of the land by the petitioner club for recreational purposes is unauthorised. In case the land is to be regularised in favor of the petitioner club, first the land use is to be changed from rural use to recreational use. This would call for an amendment of the Master plan in accordance with section 11-A of the Delhi Development Act, 1957 (for short the DD Act). Under sub-sections (1) of section 11-a of the DD Act, the DDA and under sub-section (2) thereof the Central Government can make modifications in the Master Plan or the Zonal Development Plan. But the DDA can make only such modifications which do not effect important alterations in the character of the plan and which do not relate to the extent of land-users or the standards of populations density. According to sub-section (3) of section 11-A, before making any modification to the plan a notice in the prescribed form is to be published for inviting objections and suggestions with respect tot the proposed modification. After receipt of objections and suggestions the same are required to be considered by the DDA or the Central Government, as the case may be. As per sub-section (4) of section 11-A, every modification made under the provisions of this section is required to be published in such a manner as the DDA and the Central Government may specify and the modifications will then come into operation either on the date of the publication or on such other date as the DDA or the Central Government may fix. In case the DDA makes any modifications to the plan under sub-section 91), it is required under sub-section (5) to report to the Central Government the full particulars of such modifications with in thirty days of the date of which such modifications come into operation. According to sub-section (6), if any question arises regarding modifications proposed to be made by the Delhi Development Authority or the modifications which bring about important changes in the character of the plan, or to the extent of land use or the standards of population density, it shall be referred to the Central Government whose decision thereon shall be final. It is not disputed that so far there is no proposal for change of land use of the land in question from rural use to recreational use. Unless the land sue is changed and the master plan is amended accordingly, it is beyond our comprehension how the Minister could take a decision to regularise the land in favor of the first petitioner. It appears that the petitioners were conscious of the fact that regularisation of the land in favor of the petitioner club was not possible unless the Central Govt. issued notification under section 48 of thewithdrawing from acquisition and changed the land use from rural use to recreational use under section 11-A of the Delhi Development Act. This is apparent form the prayer clauses contained in the representation of the first petitioner dated June 3, 1999. The prayer clause read as follows:-

(a) de-notify the land comprising 50 bighas 12 bids was in Village Masudpur, Vasant Kunj, New Delhi of Shanti Sports Club.

(b) change the land use to recreation, and

(c) regularise and approve the project of Shanti Sports Club as it is."

20. The question of regularisation of the land in favor of the petitioner club can arise only after its prayers (a) and (b) are granted. As a matter of fact the aforesaid nothings only relate to the issue of regularisation of h eland and do not even refer to tits denotification. The nothings of June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999 do not reflect that the then Minister considered or applied his mind to the questions relating to withdrawal from acquisition of the land and change of land use at all. Since the questions of withdrawal from acquisition and change of land use are still at large, no decision could have been taken with regard to the regularisation of the land in favor of the petitioner club. Otherwise, it would amount to putting the cart before the horse. It appears that it was the understanding of the petitioners that on June 3, 1999 and on June 8, 1999 the Minister did not take any final and binding decision to denotify and regularise the land in favor of the club. If this was not the understanding, the petitioner club would have stated affirmatively in its representations dated June 9, 1999 that a firm decision spelling certainty to denotify and regularise the land in favor of the petitioner club was taken on June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999. On the contrary, the prayer in the representation dated June 9, 1999 again is for denotification and regularisation of the land in favor of the petitioner club. At this stage, it will be convenient to set out the representation of the petitioners dated June 9, 1999 addressed to the Vice-Chairman, DDA, to the extent it is relevant:-

xx xx xx

"Apropos to the meeting held with your goodself, Officials of Delhi Development Authority and the Honble Minister for Urban Development. As desired by the Honble Minister, I am submitting the following proposal for your consideration.

That as you know the recent policy decisions of the Government of India are for increasing participation of private developers in not only the housing activity but also sports activities, Therefore, our prayer is for de-notification and regularization of the sports Club. The Shanti Sports Club on its part would do the following:

xx xx xx"

21. Thus, it is apparent that the representation does not speak of any final order passed or decision taken by the then Minister for Urban Development. The nothing were not understood by the petitioner club to be in the nature of a final determination. They at best can serve as incorporating proposals. The matter still being at that stage, the petitioner club in its representation dated June 9, 1999 sets out proposals for consideration of the appropriate authority. The submission that the Minister had taken a final and binding decision to denotify and to regularise the land on June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999 is obviously an after thought. That apart, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner club that the then Minister, Shri Ram Jethmalani, took a final and binding decision to denotify the land and to regularise the same proceeded on the basis of the misreading of the aforesaid nothings. We, Therefore, have no hesitation in rejecting the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner club. While doing so we hold that the then Minster for Urban Development did not take a decision to denotify the land or regularise the same in favor of the petitioner club. We also hold that assuming that a decision was taken by the aforesaid Minister to denotify and to regularise the land in favor of the petitioner club, the same is non-est and unenforceable being illegal. In such a situation there would be no question of implementing the same.

22. Mr. Kirit Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General, Ms. Gita Luthra and Ms. Gita Mittal, appearing for the respondents submitted that under Article 166 of the Constitution, a decision of the Government has to be expressed in the form and manner prescribed therein. It was further submitted that the decision to denotify the land and to regularise the same in favor of the petitioner cannot be spelt out from the note recorded by the Vic- Chairman, DDA on June 3, 1999 and the note recorded by the then Minister for Urban Development dated June 8, 1999. Not only because such a decision in fact was not taken but also because no communication was made to the petitioner of any decision in accordance with Article 166 of the Constitution. It is not necessary to examine the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents regarding the form and manner in which the order of the Government is to be expressed since we find that the Minister in fact had not taken any final and binding decision on June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999 for withdrawing from acquisition and for regularising the land in favor of the first petitioner. It is also not necessary to go into the authorities cited by the parties regarding the manner and form in which the order of the Government is to be expressed.

23. The second limb of the argument of the learned senior counsel for he petitioners that the impugned decision contained in the aforesaid letter dated June 9, 2000 is invalid as the Government did not have the power to review the decision dated, June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999 of Sh. Ram Jethmalani to withdraw from acquisition and to regularise the land in favor of the first petitioner. This submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners is misconceived. As already noted, Sh. Ram Jethmalani did not order denotification of the land and change of it use from rural use to recreational use, and without taking a decision in this regard no regularisation thereof in favor of the petitioners was/is either possible or permissible. Since no such decision was taken by Shri Jethmalani, the petitioners cannot complain that the decision of his successor conveyed to them through letter of the Under Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development, Government of India, dated June 9, 2000 declining to denotify the land was passed by reviewing the earlier decision. This position will prevail even if the aforesaid nothings recorded on June 3, 1999 and June 8, 1999 are construed as the decision of Shri Jethmalani to denotify the land and to regularise the same in favor of the petitioner club as the same has no existence in the eyes of law and will not come in the way of the Government passing a fresh order. Therefore, it is not necessary to determine the aforesaid question posed on behalf of the petitioners.

24. On August 9, 2001, Ms. Shoba, learned counsel for the petitioners mentioned the matter and submitted that on August 1, 2001 a learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP No. 923/97, Pershadi and others v. Union of India and others, has held that where the Minister had taken a decision to denotify the land, his successor was not competent to reverse the same. The aforesaid decision brought to our notice does not help the petitions. In that case as matter of fact it was found by the learned Single Judge that on April 13, 1999 Shri Jethmalani had taken a decision to denotify the land of village Kotlamahigram. He had also taken a decision that the Ministry will issue the denotification order through an extraordinary gazette by April 16, 1999. In the instant case, however, we have found as a matter of fact that Shri Jethmalani had not taken a decision to denotify the land at all. Therefore, the petitioners cannot draw a parallel between the instant case and Pershadis case. We may clarify that our observation with regard to Pershadis case should not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of that case.

25. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that as per the approved lay out plan of Vasant Kunj, only 11 bighas 14 bids was is required for development. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the impugned order was under a misapprehension that the entire land under acquisition was needed for the housing project. They stated that the petitioners were willing to give up their claim over 11 bighas and 14 biswas. In so far as the rest of the land is concerned, they argued that the same ought to be denotified as it is not required for the housing project. This argument is also devoid of any merit. Respondent no.5 in his counter affidavit dated August 5, 2000 has clearly stated that the land is required for development schemes of the DDA. It is pointed out that because of the illegal construction made by the petitions during the operation of the restraint orders the housing scheme of the DDA has been held up resulting in loss to the public. The affidavit also alludes to the fact that the land for peripheral road in Sector D-7 and land meant for primary school and dispensary has been encroached upon by the petitions. According to the affidavit, the permitted land use in the area is as follows:-

(1) Partly residential.

(2) Partly for rural use.

26. The affidavit goes on to state that the Technical Committee of the DDA has mooted a proposal for change of land use from rural use to residential use, keeping in view the need of lakhs of applicants who are on the waiting list for allotment of flats. The recommendation of the Technical Committee is stated to have been accepted by the DDA and a resolution has been passed recommending change of user of 23.08 hectares of land behind D-6, Vasant Kunj from rural to residential use. In view of the categorical stand of the DDA that the land is needed for housing project, the argument of the petitioners that only 11 bighas and 14 bids was was required for residential use fails. It has been noticed by the Supreme Court in Murari vs. Union of India (supra) that there is inflow of more than one lakh people every year to the city. It is also noted that Delhi is an ever expanding cosmopolitan, commercial and industrial city where millions of multifarious, national and international activities take place. The Supreme Court also noticed that the city is confronted with serious housing problems. As a sequitur, it was found that planned development of Delhi is a continuous and unending process. Therefore, we cannot find fault with the decision of the Government declining to release the land from acquisition.

27. It was then urged by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the impugned decision communicated to the petitioners vide letter dated June 9, 2000 took into account matters which it ought not to have taken into consideration. It was also submitted that in the impugned decision matters which ought to have been taken into account have not been considered. It was further submitted that the decision suffers from arbitrariness and no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it. The impugned decision was also criticised on the ground that there was no proper application of mind by the concerned authority and the decision was taken mechanically. It was also submitted that the decision is based on reasons which are totally irrelevant and dehors the consideration for which the Full Bench of this Court and the Supreme Court allowed the petitions to represent to the Minister for Urban Development for denotification of the land and for regularisation of the same in favor of the petitions. We have examine the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioners. We do not think that the order suffers from any of the aforesaid-vices.

28. The petitioners are, inter alia, attacking the decision on the basis of what is known as Wednesbury principle as adumbrated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, 1947 (2) All E.R. 680, which authority was cited on behalf of the petitions. A reading of the aforesaid letter dated June 9, 2000 shows that the attack is not justified. There is nothing arbitrary or unreasonable about he decision. It is based on valid reasons and considerations. The reasons as culled out from the letter are as follows:-

(1) The land is required for public purpose, viz., Vasant Kunj Residential Project.

(2) The development on the land took place after the acquisition of the land was completed and award was published.

(3) Vasant Kunj residential project has been held up due to prolonged litigation.

We do not find these reasons to be irrelevant and dehors the consideration for which the Full Bench of this Court and the Supreme Court permitted the petitions to make a representation to the Minister for Urban Development for denotification of the land and for its regularisation in their favor. The Minister was wholly justified in basing his decision on the aforesaid reason for rejecting the representation of the petitioners. We may now examine each one of the aforesaid reasons which led to the impugned decision.

Re. First Reason:

We have already noticed that the land is required for providing shelter to applicants whose number runs into lakhs. It was contended on behalf to he petitioners that authorities have not examined the question whether the housing project is liable to be modified or amended in view of the coming into existence of the sports club and this being so, the impugned decision is not in consonance with the following observations of the Full Bench in the case of Roshanara Begum v. Union of India (supra):-

"...However, the petitioner/applicant is at liberty to make any representation to the authorities for getting the land released and it is for the authorities to examine whether in view of the modern sports complex having been brought into existence in the land in question could it serve the public purpose of acquiring this land for that particular scheme or the scheme is liable to be modified or amended in respect of the land in question..."

We have given serious consideration to the aforesaid submission. The much needed housing project, which is required for large number of applicants, is one of the considerations for the impugned decision. The decision making authority had given primacy and preference to the housing project over the sports club. Such a consideration is implicit in the decision itself. It was not necessary to state the obvious. It is well settled that right to shelter is a fundamental right [see New Reviera Coop. Housing Society and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer and others, : (1996)1SCC731 ]. In view of this position, preference given to the housing project over the sports club cannot be frowned upon as the State is fulfilling the basic human need of shelter.

Re.Second Reason:

It cannot be disputed that the first petitioner raised the construction over the land after the issuance of the notification under section 4 of the A t, the publication of the declaration under section 6 thereof, and the publication of the award of the Collector. In addition, the land is said to have been sold to Sh. Amrit Lal Khanna and others through a sale deed dated 31st January, 1969, subsequent to the issuance of the notification and the declaration under section 4 and 6 of therespectively in violation of the provisions of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. The construction, Therefore, is unauthorised and has been raised at the peril of the petitioners. In this view we are supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Muraris case (supra), where it was observed as follows:-

"...So far as the structures and construction made on the land are concerned there is no material to show that they were made before the issuance of notification under section 4 of the. It is also not clear whether such constructions were raised with or without necessary sanction/approval of the competent authority. No grievance, Therefore, can legitimately be raised in that behalf as the same would be regarded as unauthorised and made at the risk of the land owners..."

Despite the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court the learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that under the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, there is no embargo on the purchaser to buy the land after the same has been notified under the Land Acquisition Act. They also submitted that the Delhi Lands (Restriction on Transfer) Act does not prescribe any penalty or punishment for the purchaser who buys the land after the issuance of the declaration under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It was also contended by them that the petitioner could not only buy the land after the publication of declaration under section 6 of the Act, but they could even built upon it. We cannot subscribe to the aforesaid view. Such a view is not only opposed to policy behind the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act But is also not in conformity with the provisions thereof. In section 4 of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act there is an explicit restriction on the seller to sell the land. This being so, surely it cannot be argued that there is no corresponding restriction on the purchaser to buy the same. Contention raised by the petitions tends to defeat the purpose and object of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972.

29. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur, and others v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda and others, : AIR1970SC802 ; The Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and others, : (1971)3SCC821 ; and B.O.I. Finance Ltd. v. Custodian and others, (1997) S.C.C. 488, in support of their contention that purchase of land after the issuance of notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act does not suffer from any illegality. The decisions in the aforesaid cases do not help the petitioners. In Gunwant Kaurs case (supra) the Supreme Court considered the question whether a person who had purchased the land after the issuance of the notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was barred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to his land. In that case there was no dispute with regard to the question whether or not there was any restriction on the purchaser to buy the land after the publication of the declaration under section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. In fact, the provisions of the Delhi Lands (Restriction on Transfer) Act did not apply to the land which was the subject-matter of the decision of the Supreme Court. As regards the Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabads case (supra) the same has not relevance to the issue in question. In so far as the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B.O.T. Finance Ltds (supra) is concerned, that was not a matter relating to purchase of land after the issuance of notification under section 4 and declaration under section 6(1) of the. The question which fell for the consideration of the Supreme Court was whether or not the notification issued under section 16 of the Securities Contract s (Regulation) Act, 1956 prohibited entering into a forward transaction. The Supreme Court held that the notification permitted sale of securities by spot delivery and it was only the future sale of resale of the securities at a latter date which the notification did not permit. In that case it was contended by the appellants that the contracts which were entered into by and between the banks and the third parties could not be invalidated because of the banks non-compliance of the directions issued by the Reserve Bank. The Supreme Court seems to have been impressed by the fact that it will be wholly unjust and inequitable to hold that the transactions entered into by the banks with the customers, which transactions were otherwise not invalid, could be regarded as void because the banks did not follows the directions or instructions issued by the Reserve Bank of India. The banks could be liable for levy of penalty or other consequences flowing from section 46 of that Act, but that would not result in invalidation of the agreements by and between the banks and the third parties. The decision is wholly inapplicable to the case in hand. In this case we are confronted with a provision which places a bar on the seller to sell the land after declaration has been issued under section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. Unlike the directions issued by the Reserve Bank of India which may only be known to the banks, in the instant case the question is of a statutory provision of which the parties can not plead ignorance. In fact it is not even the case of the petitions that they were not aware of the existence of the Delhi Lands (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972.

30. On the other hand, in addition to the decision in Muraris case (supra) there are other decisions of the Supreme Court as well which run counter to the aforesaid submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners. We may now refer to these decisions.

31. In Gyan Chand and Gopala and others, : [1995]1SCR412 , the Supreme Court held that any encumbrances created by the owner of the land after the notification under section 4(1) is published does not bind the Government. The agreement of sale, if any, would be frustrated. Again in Yadu Nandan Garg v. State of Rajasthan and others, : AIR1996SC520 , it was held that the purchase of the land after issuance of a notification under section 4(1) of thewas not lawful and did not clothe the purchaser with any colour of title as against the State. It was also observed that by operation of section 16 of theall encumbrances stand extinguished and the purchaser gets no title to the acquired land. In this view of the matter, the court found the sale to e void under section 23 of the. This view was followed by the Supreme Court in The Secretary, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur v. Daulat Mal Jain etc : (1997)1SCC35 . Again in Jaipur Development Authority v. Mahavir Housing Coop. Society, Jaipur and others : (1996)11SCC229 , it was held that the purchaser who buys the land after issuance of a notification under section 4 of thecannot have a higher right than the original owner himself hand he cannot set up any little to property on the basis of sale deeds. He is only entitled to compensation obviously by getting into the shoes of the original land owner.

32. While we are dealing with the second reason on which the impugned decision is grounded, we may note the further submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners in their attempt to demolish the same and to seek our intervention on equitable grounds. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners have developed the sports complex at a huge cost. According to him the sports complex has all the modern facilities for the sports person and in case the same is demolished it will not be in the national interest.

33. The Full Bench in Roshanara Begum vs. Union of India and others, : AIR 1996 Delhi 206, while upholding acquisition took note of the construction raised by the petitioners. The Full Bench found that the construction was raised obviously with complete knowledge of the fact that this land was liable to be acquired for public purpose. Even the Supreme Court in Murari vs. Union of India (supra) has observed that where large tracts of land measuring thousands of acres have been acquired, it would not be proper to leave out some areas here and there over which some structures are said to have been constructed. While making these observations, the Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision in State of Uttar Pradesh vs Pista Devi, : [1986]3SCR743 , in which it was held that when large chunks of land are acquired for planned development of the urban area, it would not be proper to leave small portion of the land, out of the development scheme, over which some structures have been constructed. The Supreme Court in Muraris case (supra), however, left the question of release of land from question to the discretion of the Appropriate Authority in view of the statement of the counsel for the Government that it will consider each of the structures and take a decision in respect thereof. In consonance with the statement of the learned counsel appearing for the Government in that case, the representation of the petitioners was considered but their request to denotify the land was not accepted. Since the impugned order is, inter alia, based on the consideration that the land is needed for Vasant Kunj Housing Project no interference is called for by this Court. Taking cue from the aforesaid decisions it also appears to us that the petitions cannot claim any equity on the ground of having raised the constructions on the land in question. The construction was raised at their own risk and peril. In case the argument of the petitioners is accepted it would amount to encouraging unauthorised construction and conferring legitimacy to brazen illegalities.

34. At this stage we would also like to clear the impression of the petitioners that as per policy of the Government a built up areas cannot be demolished after acquisition. The same impression is created by the nothing of Shri Jethmalani dated June 8,1999. It appears to us that in case such a policy existed the same would have been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court in Murari and others v. Union of India and others (supra). As already seen, the Supreme court has categorically held that no grievance can be made by the land owners as the construction raised after the issuance of the notifications was unauthorised and made at the risk of the land owners. In Nirmalendu Dev Nath and others v. Union of India and others, : 75(1998)DLT765 , it was urged that in view of the policy decision of the Government built up area cannot be acquired. The contention raised was rejected in view of the several decisions of this Court. In this regard it was held as follows:-

"Mr. Saini contended the Government in view of its policy decision cannot acquire built up area and, Therefore, the acquisition proceedings must be quashed. The contention of the learned counsel is not well founded. The power to acquire land is to be exercised in the manner laid down by the. The power is statutory power which is required to be exercised in public interest. If the land is needed for a public purpose the mere fact that there is a policy of the Government not to acquire built up area cannot come in the way of acquisition. If it was otherwise, the public authorities will not be able to acquire built up areas to decongest the localities and to provide civic amenities including sanitation, parks, amusement centres, etc. which are essential for healthy living. In M/s. Prem Chand Ramesh Chand v. Delhi Development Authority and another, 66 (1997) DLT482, a Division Bench of this Court relying on Attar Singh v. D.D.A. (C.W.P. No. 3110 of 1991, decided on August 10, 1992) Shri Bhagwan and another v. Union of India and others, 1991 (2) DL 59 , and Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, 1996 I A.D. Delhi 6 ; 6 (1996) DLT 206 [LQ/DelHC/1995/1072] , held as follows:-

"The contentions that there is any policy to regulate unauthorised colonizes or there is a policy decision not to acquire built up area, are concluded against the petitioner by a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Attar Singh v.D.D.A. (CW 3110 of 1991) decided on 10 the August, 1992. In Attar Singhs case also it as alleged that he petitioner had a godown built up area situated in Village Haiderpur on private lad and no action can be taken by the respondent against the petitioner. In that case too, the Bench referred int he judgment to the same Award No. 50/80-81 made on 18th July, 1980. The contention that there was a policy of Government to regularise the unauthorised colonies and also not to acquire built up area was rejected and it was observed that:

"It was further contended that unauthorised colonies on Government land are sought to be regularised. It is possible that a political decision to this effect may be taken with regard to some of the colonies but as far as this land is concerned, there have been valid proceedings for acquisition under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It there was any built up area as on the date when section 4 notification was issued, the claimants would be entitled to receive compensation in accordance with law. As far as the petitioner is concerned, we do not find that the petitioner is entitled to any compensation and in fact it is one Udai Singh who has already received the compensation. Be that as it may, merely because some of the colonies are going to be regularised cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner specially when, in the writ petition, there is no challenge to the acquisition proceedings The proposal of excluding the land from the award which was there is 1968 has apparently been given a go-by and this has resulted in, first Notification under Section 6 being issued on 2nd January, 1969, followed by the award in 1980."

The contention in respect of the policy of leaving out from the acquisition built up area has also been repelled in another Division Bench decision of this Court in Shri Bhagwan and Another v. Union of India and others, 1991 (2) DL 59. This decision has been affirmed by a Full Bench of this Court in Roshanara Begum v. Union of India : 61(1996)DLT206 . We may also notice that the appeal filed against Full Bench decision has been dismissed by the Supreme Court (Se: Murari and others v.Union of India and others, : (1997)1SCC15 )."

35. We adopt the aforesaid reasoning to explode the myths that the land over which construction is raised even after the publication of a notification under section 4 of theand a declaration under section 6 thereof cannot be acquired and the building erected there on cannot be demolished subsequent to the acquisition.

36. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any infirmity i the second reason on which the impugned decision is based.

37. Re. Third Reason:

In so far as the third consideration for turning down the request of the petitioners for denotification of the land is concerned, it cannot be argued with any amount of conviction that the same is farfetched or irrelevant. The residential project cannot brook any delay and delay and prolonged litigation obviously comes in the way of its execution.

38. Before parting with the aforesaid aspect of the reasons we may note that the first two reasons son the basis of which the representations of the petitioners have been rejected were also the basis for upholding the acquisition by the Supreme Court and the High Court. If these were the grounds for upholding the acquisition, we fail to appreciate how these very grounds when considered by the Government to reject the application of the petitioners for denotification of the land and for regularisation of the same in favor of the petitioners can be found fault with. Neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court expressly or by necessary implication put any embargo on the State to consider these facets while deciding the representation of the petitioners.

39. We may also point out that the learned senior counsel for the petitioner urged that the reasons stated in the affidavit of the respondents and the office nothings for rejection of the representation cannot be gone into to support the impugned decision. It is not necessary to examine the plea as we find that the reasons for rejection of the representation are evident from the impugned letter dated June 9, 2000 and we have only considered that letter for examining the reasons for rejection of the representation of the petitioners.

40. It was argued by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that since the club is already serving a public purpose it should not be taken over and ought to have been released from acquisition and regularised in favor of the petitioners. We regret our inability to accept the aforesaid submission as otherwise it will amount to lending legitimacy to unauthorised occupation of land by the petitioners. It seems to us that the impugned order cannot be interfered with on the ground that the land is already being used fora beneficial purpose. This view finds sustenance from the decision of the Supreme Court in Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. etc. v. State of Rajasthan and others, : 1993(66)ELT47(SC) . In that case the acquisition was impugned inter alias on the ground that the land was begin utilised for a public purpose, namely, a polo ground, which purpose was much more beneficial than the one for which the land was begin acquired. The Supreme Court held that the court cannot go into the comparative utility of the public purposes. In this regard, the Supreme Court observed as follows:-

"Mr. Jain then contended that the land subject matter of acquisition includes a polo ground which is used for one of the major sports peculiar to Rajasthan. According to him the polo ground is serving a public purpose which is much more useful and important than the one for which the land is being acquired. We cannot go into the comparative utility of the public purpose. Once we are satisfied that the acquisition is for a public purpose, no fault can be found with the proceedings on the ground that that the land is already being used for some beneficial purpose."

The same reasoning would be applicable in the instant case as well.

41. We also find that the club is not only meant for activities relating to sports but it also has residential blocks and is used for letting purposes as well. This position is admitted by Shri Satish Khosla in his written statement filed in Suit No. 3064/96 titled M/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Limited and others v. Satish Khosla, which was a suit seeking decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant Shri Satish Khosla from letting out garden for functions and parties during the currency of lease agreement entered by and between M/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Limited and Shri Satish Khosla in respect of collage No. 6 at the Shanti Sports Club. The averments made in paras 4, 6 and 11 of the said written statement are revealing. These paras to the extent relevant are set out below:-

"xx xx xx

4. Para 4 is denied. It is pertinent to note that the Cottage in question is situated in the Shanti Sports Club and is one of the 7 Cottages in the said sports Club. Shanti Sports Club, of which the defendant is the Chairman, came into existence in 1989 and the sports facilities of the said Club are being utilised by its members as well as others. The said Club has amongst others a cricket ground, six tennis courts, swimming pool, squash courts, billiards rooms and a host of other facilities for use for its members. The Club has large beautifully manicured lawns appealing to the eye. Since the very inception of the Club, its beautiful lawns are hired for wedding parties, birth-day parties and for other festive occasions. These wedding parties have been held on the lawns of he Club since 1991, and are the very life and soul of the Club apart from its sports activities. In fact, the aforementioned wedding parties and other functions which are held on the lawns are the major source of revenue for the Club. The club has more than 1500 members and about 200-300 frequent the club every day.

xx xx xx

6. Para 6 is denied. The contents of this para are absolutely false to the knowledge of the plaintiffs inasmuch as the plaintiffs all along knew that the garden in between the two Cottages was let out on hire for marriage and other private parties. The defendant denies any verbal assurance was given to the plaintiffs that the garden was to be used for he families residing in two cottages and not for any other purpose. The lawn/garden in question in between the two cottages is of more than 3000 sq. yards in size and it was not hired out to the plaintiff.

xx xx xx

11. The averments made in para 11 are denied. It is submitted that the plaintiffs have filed the present suit only to harass the defendant. It is pertinent to note that in the other Cottages in the Club several Diplomats including Deputy High Commissioner of Pakistan, Ambassador of Kazakastan and other dignitaries are staying for several years without any complaint. It is denied that the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from hiring out the garden for functions and parties during the tenure of the alleged lease agreement. The revenue generated from hiring out the garden for functions and parties is a significant revenue and is necessary for the proper and efficient running of the Club and these functions and parties are the very life and soul of the Club.

xx xx xx"

The aforesaid averments made in the written statement filed by Shri Satish Khosla in the above noted suit clearly reveal that the cottages at the club and its lawns are being used for commercial and rental purposes. In respect of cottage No. 6 alone the club was charging large amounts as per below under various agreements. These details are as follows :-

1. According to the lease agreement by the between the club and M/s.Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. the latter was required to pay a rental of Rs.60,000/- p.m. to the former during the first year of the lease.

2. The rent was liable to be increased by 5% after the first years, 10% over the last rent paid after second year and every year thereafter.

3. Agreement stipulated payment of advance rent in the sum of Rs.4,50,000/- by M/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. to the Club.

4. Under maintenance and service agreement in respect of the said premises M/s. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. were required to pay Rs.40,000/- p.m. to the Club.

5. The maintenance charges of the premises were liable to be increased by 5% over the last charge paid after the first year, and increase of 10% over the last charge paid after the second year and every year thereafter.

6. Under an agreement for security services, for the same cottage, the aforesaid lessee was required to pay Rs.30,000/- p.m. to the club and these charges were liable to be increased by 5% after first year and 10% after the second year and every year thereafter.

7. Under an agreement styled as hire agreement, the lessee was required to pay to the club a sum of Rs.70,000/- p.m. for the use of the fittings and fixtures installed in the cottage.

8. The lessee was also liable to pay to the club hire charges of Rs.7,50,000/- as advance for the fittings and fixtures installed in the cottage.

42. Thus, it is apparent that the petitioners have a commercial stake in he land, It appears to us that the impugned decision cannot be found fault with as it has given primacy to the nee for providing housing to the community over the commercial interests of the petitioners.

43. We also find from the concerned file of the DDA that an earlier request of the petitioner for denotification of the land was also considered on February 4, 1997 by the Vice Chairman, DDA, who was of the opinion that the possession of the land should be taken over as regularisation in favor of the petitioners would amount to accommodating a blatant violations of legal provisions. This shows that even the DDA, the beneficiary of land for whom the land was acquired, is not in favor of denotification o the land, which is being unauthorisedly used by the petitioners not only for sports but also for gaining large sums of money by letting out the cottages and gardens.

44. The learned senior counsel for the petitioners canvassed that the petitioners were not given a hearing by the concerned authority before passing the impugned order and as such principles of natural justice have been violated. It is difficult to accept the submission that in a matter where the petitioners are given an opportunity to make a representation for seeking denotification of the land form acquisition and for regularisation thereof in their favor, an opportunity of hearing is required to be given. The requirement of hearing cannot be imported in a matter of this nature. In S. Kapur Singh v. Union of India, : [1960]2SCR569 , where it was claimed that an opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken against the public servant includes an opportunity of making an oral representation, the Supreme Court held that an opportunity of making an oral representation is not a necessary Postulate of an opportunity of showing cause.

45. The learned counsel for the petitioners also argued that the petitioners have been subjected to discrimination as certain other lands which were subject-matter of acquisition have been denotified under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. We find no force in the contention since the land is still needed for the housing project. Similar argument advanced before the Full Bench in Roshanara Begum v. Land Acquisition Collector (supra) for challenging the acquisition was rejected and it was held that there cannot e any question of discrimination merely because some of the lands were denotified in exercise of the powers under section 48 of the. It seems to us that in case some land is wrongly denotified for showing favor to a party, such action of the State can be challenged. But a party cannot seek denotification of the land on the analogy of a case where State withdraws from acquisition on extraneous grounds as two wrongs cannot make a right. Thus we reject the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

46. One more aspect needs to be highlighted. it appears to us that the aforesaid suits and writ petitions were filed to thwart the process of acquisition. We would like to highlight the contradictions made therein. In Writ Petition NO. 1753/80 the petitioners - Amrit Lal Khanna, Shri Srivastava, Naresh Kumar and Gopal Kishan, stated that they had purchased 26 bighas of land comprised in Khasra Nos. 35, 369/36 and 37 in village Masudpur, Mehrauli Tehsil from Shri Parmeshwar Lal. Contrary to the position taken int he aforesaid writ petition, in Suit No.3318/91 it was claimed by the plaintiff, Shanti India (P) Ltd., that it had purchased land measuring 38 bighas, 13 bids was comprised in Khasra Nos. 369/36, 35, 37, 38, 367/21 and 355/33 situated in village Masudpur, Tehsil Mehrauli. This suit was filed by the plaintiff through Shri Satish Khosla. Again in Suit No. 1544/93 a different stance was taken that three plaintiffs, namely, Atma Ram, Amrit Lal Khanna and Satish Khosla, were the owners in possession of 38 bighas, 13 bids was of land comprised in Khasra No. 369/36, 35, 37, 38, 367/21 and 355/33 situated in village Masudpur. In Suit No. 2867/95 it was stated that plaintiffs, namely, Satish Khosla and Amrit Lal Khanna were bhoomidars of Khasra Nos. 25, 369/36, 37 situated in village Masudpur measuring 26 bighas, 6 biswas. In one of the instant petitions, CWP No. 4777/93, it is averred that Amrit Lal Khanna along with other persons were owners of the land in question. By means of an additional affidavit filed by the petitioners on November 3, 1993 in this petition it is asserted that Amrit Lal Khanna constituted and appointed Shri Satish Khosla as his attorney with regard to half share in Khasra Nos. 35, 369/36, 37 admeasuring 26 bighas, 6 bids was situated in village Masudpur. As is apparent from the above, different stands relating to ownership of the land have ben taken in various litigations. If we go by the present writ petition, Satish Khosla is merely a power of attorney of Amrit Lal Khanna with regard to half share in the instant property. Though he cold deal with half portion of the property, yet vide letter dated July 1, 1990 addressed to Shanti Sports Club, he agreed to hand over possession of the entire land in question comprised in Khasra Nos. 35, 369/36, 37, 38, 367/21 and 365/33 situated in village Masudpur to the former. it appears to us that different stance were taken in different suits and writ petitions to abuse the process of law. This has resulted in delaying the acquisition proceedings affecting the public adversely. At the cost of public interest the petitioners have impeded the housing project which is so very essential for solving the housing project which is so very essential for solving the housing problem. The interim orders passed on the applications filed in the suits obviously had a baneful effect. not only the writ petitions need to be dismissed but even the interim orders need to be vacated.

47. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petitions are dismissed. The interim orders passed on the applications filed in the suits are hereby vacated.