1. The petitioner, amending his writ petition, has made the following prayers:

"In the premises, it is, therefore, prayed that the Honble Court may be pleased to pass an appropriate writ, order or direction including one in the nature of:

I. By issuance of writ of certiorari the impugned order dated 09.02.2004 bearing No. 168-GAD of 2004 along with communication letter dated 19.03.2004 may either be quashed or the respondents be directed not to apply the said Government order against the petitioner;

II. By issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing the Government order vide No. 1356-LD(Estt) of 2016 dated 31.03.2016 issued by respondent No. 1 along with letters dated 10.05.2016 and 11.08.2016 issued by respondent No. 2;

III. By issuance of writ of Mandamus commanding the respondents to declare the petitioner to have attained Quasi Permanent in the Government service of the Law Department from July, 1998 and to provide him all service benefits including pay, seniority, promotion, increments etc to which petitioner will be entitled under rules;

IV. Any other order or direction which this Honble Court deem just and proper in the circumstances of the case though not prayed for in the instant petition be also passed in favour of the petitioner."

2. The petitioner was appointed as Junior Assistant in terms of Government order No. 56 UC/LW(Estt) of 1995 dated 28.06.1995 purely on ad hoc basis with effect from 01.07.1995 pending selection and till further orders. By a subsequent order issued under endorsement No. UC/LD(Estt)P/SAZ/95 dated 17.01.1996, it was ordered that that the words "ad hoc basis in line 3rd of order dated 28.06.1995 be read as "temporary basis pending selection".

3. While the petitioner continued to hold the aforesaid post, in the year 2001 the State Government issued order No. 1285-GAD of 2001 dated 06.11.2001 where under it was ordered that all ad hoc appointments made till the issuance of the said order shall be considered for regularization after completion of seven years of continuous service without reference of the posts held by them to the Service Selection Board, subject to certain conditions mentioned in the said Government order.

4. However, by reason of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Suraj Prakash Gupta v. State of J&K, directing the State Government to ensure that basic recruitment rules were followed and not flouted by granting relaxation of rules governing direct recruitment etc., read with the decisions of different Writ Benches and Division Benches of this Court [in SWP No. 1699/1991, decided on 10.10.2002; LPA Ashok Kumar v. State of J&K, decided on 28.05.2002; SWP No. 116/2001, Daleep Singh v. State of J&K decided on 15.11.2001 and some other judgments] the Government issued order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004, superseding the earlier Government order No. 1285-GAD of 2001 dated 06.11.2001, and ordering, inter alia, that all ad hoc appointments made after 28.07.1989 and continued till the date of issue of the said order dated 09.02.2004 and also those adhocees, who were appointed by the General Administration Department or with approval from the General Administration Department and continued till August 2002 or thereafter, shall be converted into contractual appointments with effect from 1st February, 2004, and these contractual appointments shall subsist till 31st December, 2004 or till selections against these posts were made by the concerned selection agencies, whichever was earlier. It was further ordered that these contractual appointees shall be required to execute an agreement in accordance with the format appended to the Jammu and Kashmir Contractual Appointment Rules with the concerned Drawing and Disbursing Officer upto 25.02.2004 and that if any adhocee/contractual appointee failed to execute the agreement, he shall cease to be in the employment of the Government. The posts held by the adhocees were required to be referred by the concerned Administrative Departments to the competent selection agencies by or before 29.02.2004, if such posts had not already been referred to the selection agencies, for selection in accordance with the rules.

5. When the aforesaid Government order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004 was about to be implemented and the Law Department issued communication No. LD(A)92/127 dated 19.03.2004 to some authorities for immediate necessary action in respect of the officials working in their respective offices on ad hoc basis, numerous writ petitions came to be filed by such ad hocees in both wings of the High Court at Srinagar and Jammu seeking quashing of the said order and further praying that the Government be directed to regularize their services in terms of the superseded Government order No. 1285-GAD of 2001 dated 06.11.2001. The petitioner also filed the present un-amended petition with identical prayers.

6. Those petitions in bunches came up for consideration before different Writ Court Benches of this Court. At Jammu one of the learned Writ Court Benches decided a bunch of writ petitions on 05.04.2004 reported as Thomas Masih v. State of J&K, 2004 (2) JKJ 197 (HC). Subsequent thereto, the petitioners present writ petition was disposed of on 20.05.2004 as being squarely covered and to be governed by the decision in the above case Thomas Masih v. State of J&K. Some other writ petitions also were disposed of pursuant to the said decision of the Court.

7. However, the writ petitioner, feeling aggrieved of the aforesaid order dated 20.05.2004, filed LPA No. 85/2004. Similarly, LPAs were filed by other writ petitioners against the aforesaid judgment in Thomas Masih v. State of J&K and the matters were finally referred to the Full Bench.

8. It appears that before the Full Bench, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner made a statement that the case of the petitioner was not connected with the judgment rendered in Thomas Masih v. State of J&K. Consequently, the petitioners LPA was segregated from the bunch of appeals and was directed to be heard separately before the Division Bench. This is borne out by the order later passed by the Division Bench on 30.05.2016, remanding the writ petition back to the Writ Court. The above Division Bench order dated 30.05.2016, insofar as relevant, is quoted hereunder:

"2. The decision rendered in the batch of petitions was challenged in the L.P. Appeals and the same were referred to Full Bench and while hearing the batch of cases by the Full Bench, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant made a statement that the case of the appellant is not connected in the judgment rendered in SWP No. 390/2004 dated 05.04.2004 and the matter in issue is entirely different. Consequently this appeal was segregated from the batch of appeals and was directed to be heard separately before the Division Bench.

3. Today when the appeal was taken up for hearing the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the issue involved in the writ petition against which LPA was filed, was entirely different and the judgment passed by the learned Singh Judge in the batch of petitions is not applicable to this case.

4. Mr. M.I. Dar, learned Additional Advocate General has fairly conceded the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the issue involved in the writ petition was entirely different and the judgment passed in the batch of petitions would not be applicable to the case of the appellant.

5. In such circumstances, the order of the Writ Court dated 20.05.2004 is set aside and the writ petition is restored to the Writ Court for fresh consideration on merits." (Underlining supplied)

9. It may be mentioned here that in the meantime, the State Legislature enacted the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Special Provisions) Act, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as Special Provisions Act, 2010), providing for regularization of ad hoc, contractual and consolidated employees in the State, subject to certain terms and conditions mentioned therein.

10. Prior to the passing of the above order by the Division Bench, the Government issued order No. 1356-LD(Estt) of 2016 dated 31.03.2016 according sanction to the regularization of the petitioner as Junior Assistant and relaxation in upper age bar in favour of the petitioner under the provisions of the Special Provisions Act, 2010. However, this fact appears not to have been brought to the notice of the Division Bench on 30.05.2016 when the LPA was last listed before it.

11. Be that as it may, the petitioner before this Court sought permission to amend his writ petition to challenge the aforesaid Government order No. 1356- LD(Estt) of 2016 dated 31.03.2016 and take necessary grounds in his writ petition. He was allowed to do so. He accordingly, filed the amended writ petition with the prayers first above mentioned.

12. To be precise, the pith and marrow of the petitioners case is that since his ad hoc appointment made by the initial Government order No. 56 UC/LW(Estt) of 1995 dated 28.06.1995 was converted into temporary appointment by the subsequent order issued under endorsement No. UC/LD(Estt)P/SAZ/95 dated 17.01.1996, in terms of the Rule 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Temporary Service Rules) 1961, he has to be deemed and treated to have become quasi permanent after rendering three years service on the post. In that context the petitioner has challenged the Government order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004, the communication No. LD(A)92/127 dated 19.03.2004 as well as the Government order No. 1356-LD(Estt) of 2016 dated 31.03.2016, regularizing the services of the petitioner, as bad in law, violative of principles of natural justice and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

13. The respondents in their reply have contested the claim of the petitioner.

14. Having heard the learned counsel and considered the matter, I am of the view that the writ petition of the petitioner is wholly covered by the decision rendered in Thomas Masih v. State of J&K (supra). This is borne out by paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the judgment which are quoted hereunder:

"2. By virtue of the aforesaid order, it was also provided that, as a matter of policy, the contractual appointments be made in accordance with Rules to be notified separately. Simultaneous with the issue of the aforesaid order, Government issued Notification SRO 255 dated 5th August, 2003 promulgating the Jammu and Kashmir Contractual Appointment Rules, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as the Contractual Appointment Rules, 2003. These Rules were made applicable to the posts notified vide Government order No. 1018-GAD of 2003 dated 5th August, 2003 and to such other posts as may be notified from time to time in the General Administration Department by Government order. These Rules, inter alia, provide that the appointee under the Rules shall be paid a consolidated monthly salary equivalent to the minimum of the pay scale of the post to which he may be appointed and that he shall not be entitled to any other allowances or monetary benefits, whatsoever. Subsequent to the promulgation of aforesaid Rules, The Government, in supersession of earlier Government order No. 1285-GAD of 2001 dated 06.11.2001, issued order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 9th February, 2004 read with the two Government orders both bearing one and the same No. and date, i.e., 237-GAD of 2004 dated 20.2.2004, under the caption `policy relating to ad-hoc appointments. By virtue of the aforesaid Government Order, it has been, inter alia, ordered that all ad hoc appointments made after 28.07.1989 and continued in service till the date of issue of the aforesaid order and also those adhocees, who were appointed by the General Administration Department or with approval from the General Administration Department and continued in service till August 2002 or thereafter, shall be converted into contractual appointments with effect from Ist February, 2004, and these contractual appointments shall subsist till 31st December, 2004 or till selections against these posts are made by the concerned selection agencies, whichever be earlier. It has been further ordered that these contractual appointees shall be required to execute an agreement in accordance with the format appended to the Jammu and Kashmir Contractual Appointment Rules with the concerned Drawing and Disbursing Officer upto 25th February, 2004 and that if any adhocee / contractual appointee failed to execute the agreement, he shall cease to be in the employment of the Government. The posts held by the adhocees were required to be referred by the concerned Administrative Departments to the competent selection agencies by or before 29th February, 2004, if such posts had not already been referred to the selection agencies, for selection in accordance with the rules.

3. Numerous petitions have been filed before this Court by adhocees, challenging the Government order converting their ad-hoc appointments into contractual appointments and the direction contained therein that such contractual appointees shall be paid a consolidated salary equal to the minimum of the scale attached to the posts held by them with effect from Ist February, 2004. They have sought for quashment of Government order dated 9th February, 2004 together with the corrigendum dated 20th February, 2004 and prayed for a direction to the concerned authorities to regularize their services on their respective posts. Few of these writ petitions, as delineated above, are the subject matter of decision herein.

4. The petitioners herein have been appointed on ad hoc basis either to different non-gazetted or class IV posts. They have given particulars of their respective orders of appointment, the authorities who issued these orders and the allied statement of facts. The fact that some of the adhocees are continuing since the dates just around 28th July, 1989 and some have been appointed thereafter or even after August 2002 is rather clearly admitted in the impugned order itself. Therefore, I need not narrate these facts in this judgment to indicate that the petitioners had, in fact, been appointed on ad hoc basis and are continuing eversince their respective dates of appointment. However, there are certain aspects pleaded in these petitions, which may have to be referred to and dealt with at appropriate place in this judgment. When these petitions came up for hearing on admission, the learned Advocate General appeared and opted not to file any counter-affidavit. He submitted that out-come of these petitions hinged only on certain settled legal propositions; therefore, he opted to argue the cases without filing any counter-affidavit. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners did not object to that course. By this common judgment, therefore, I propose to dispose of finally all the above-mentioned petitions."

It is clearly borne out by the above paragraphs from the judgment that therein the ad hocees had challenged the very same Government order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 9.02.2004 converting their ad hoc appointments into contractual appointments and sought for quashing of the same together with the corrigendum dated 20.02.2004 and prayed for a direction to the concerned authorities to regularize their services on their respective posts. The petitioner had made substantially similar prayer in his writ petition, which are quoted hereunder:

"In the premises, it is, therefore, prayed:

That by issuance of a writ of certiorari the impugned order dated 09.02.04, bearing No. 168-GAD of 2004, alongwith communication letter dated 19.03.2004, may either be quashed or the respondents be directed not to apply the said government order against the petitioner by issuance of a writ of mandamus.

And the respondents be directed to regularise the services of the petitioner in light of the government order dated 06.11.2001, ie., the regularization policy of the government bearing No. 1285 GAD of 2001, and other policies in vogue for regularisation of services of ad hoc employees as the Honble Court may deem applicable in case of the petitioner in the interests of justice.

Any other writ, order or direction which this Honble Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents in the interests of justice and equity."

Obviously, therefore, insofar as the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in his preamended writ petition were concerned, the same were substantially same as had been the subject matter in Thomas Masih v. State of J&K (supra).

15. Now, in the amended writ petition, the petitioner, apart from challenging his own regularization order dated 31.03.2016, has added the prayer to command the respondents to declare him to have attained quasi permanency in Government service from July, 1998 and to provide him all service benefits. This claim of the petitioner is founded by him on the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961. This specific plea was also taken by the petitioners in Thomas Masih v. State of J&K (supra) and the learned Writ Court thoroughly considered the issue therein and rendered its findings and decision thereon in the judgment. Paras 9 to 16 thereof, which are relevant in this connection, are quoted hereunder:

"9. It was next, alternatively, argued that the petitioners, who have put in more than three years of continuous service, have acquired a right to be declared quasi-permanent. In this connection, the learned counsel have referred to Rule 3(1) of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961. To buttress this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners have cited and relied upon the judgment of one of the learned Single Judges of this Court in Mohd. Yousuf Pukhta v. State of J&K, 1989 SLJ 62. This is one of the vital issues involved in these petitions and is also linked to the first argument advanced by the learned counsel.

10. The Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Temporary Service Rules) were promulgated vide Notification No. 416-F dated 15th November, 1961. The relevant provisions, which are contained in Rules 1, 2 and 3 of the aforesaid Rules, are extracted below:

1. (1) These rules may be called the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1961.

(2) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3), these rules shall apply to all persons who hold a civil post under the Government and who are under the rule making control of the Government but who do not hold a lien on any post under the Government or any other State Government or the Central Government.

(3) Nothing in these rules shall apply to.-

(a) personnel of Jammu and Kashmir Militia;

(b) Government servants engaged on contract;

(c) Government servants not in whole time employment;

(d) Government servants paid out of contingencies;

(e) Persons employed in work charged establishments;

(f) Such other categories of employees as may be specified by the Government;

(g) Temporary Government servants who have earned pension in respect of their previous military or civil service.

Provided that the ex-servicemen who are re-employed after their retirement from army at the age of 45 years or earlier shall not be debarred from the benefits of these rules if they otherwise fulfil the requirements of these rules.

2. In these rules unless the context otherwise requires

(a) Government service means temporary service under the Government;

(b) quasi-permanent service means temporary service commencing from the date on which a declaration issued under rule 3 takes effect and consisting of periods of duty and leave (other than extraordinary leave without allowances) after that date;

(c) Deleted;

(d) temporary service means service against a temporary post and officiating service in a permanent post under the Government.

3.(1) A Government servant shall be eligible for being declared as quasi-permanent if he has been in continuous Government service for more than 3 years in a Department which is not as a whole temporary:-

(a) employees may be declared quasi-permanent against permanent posts or such temporary posts which have been in existence for 3 years or more; and

(b) against such temporary posts transferred from plan to non-plan establishment which have been in existence for three years or more on non-plan establishment;

(c) No person may be declared quasi-permanent against a plan post.

11. From a bare perusal of the aforesaid Rules, among other things, it emerges that:

(i) in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, except the categories specified in sub-rule (3), the Temporary Service Rules apply to all such persons who hold a civil post;

(ii) in terms of clause (f) of sub-rule (3), the Government has power to bring out of the purview of these rules such other categories of employees as may be specified;

(iii) the Rules do not prescribe for temporary appointments;

(iv) in terms of Rule 3(1), if a person has been in continuous Government service for more than 3 years, he shall be eligible for being declared as quasi-permanent.

(v) sub-rule 3(1)(a) confers a discretion on the competent authority to declare an employee as quasi-permanent against a permanent or a temporary post.

12. Though a relevant question arises whether an adhocee holds a civil post, yet, at first, I deem it appropriate to deal with the argument of the learned counsel that Rule 3(1) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 has created a vested right in those of the adhocees who have been in continuous ad hoc appointment for more than three years for being declared as quasi-permanent employees.

13. The Temporary Service Rules, 1961 do not prescribe for temporary appointments. Temporary appointments are provided under and governed by Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal, 1956. Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1956 was amended vide Notification No. 291 dated 28th July, 1989. Prior to its amendment, it read as under:

14. Temporary appointments. (1) Where it is necessary in the public interest owing to an emergency which has arisen and could not have been foreseen, to fill immediately a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of a service, class or category and the making of an appointment to such vacancy in accordance with these rules would involve undue delay, excessive expenditure or administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may appoint a person otherwise than in accordance with these rules temporarily until a person is appointed in accordance with these rules but such temporary appointment shall in no case exceed three months on each occasion.

(2) Every appointment made under sub-rule (1) together with all the particulars relating to the persons so appointed, namely, the date of appointment, the duration of the vacancy and the period or periods, if any, for which the same person had previously held a post borne on the cadre of the same service, class or category, the nature of the emergency or inconvenience and the reasons for the appointment shall be reported without delay to the Minister-in-charge, if the order is passed by a lower authority.

(3) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service or a candidate qualified and considered fit to hold the post under these rules.

(4) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall not be regarded as a probationer in such service, class or category, or be entitled by reason only of such appointment to any preferential claim to future appointment to such service, class or category.

The amended Rule 14 of the Classification Control and Appeal Rules reads as under:

14. Temporary appointments. (1) Where it is necessary in the public interest owing to an emergency which has arisen and could not have been foreseen, to fill immediately a vacancy in a post borne on the cadre of service, class or category and the making of an appointment to such vacancy in accordance with these rules would involve undue delay, excessive expenditure or administrative inconvenience, the appointing authority may appoint a person otherwise than in accordance with these rules temporarily with the prior approval of the Chief Minister in Coordination until a person is appointed in accordance with these rules but such temporary appointment shall in no case exceed three months on each occasion and not more than nine months in all.

(2) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall be replaced as soon as possible by a member of the service or a candidate qualified and considered fit to hold the post under these rules.

(3) A person appointed under sub-rule (1) shall not be regarded as a probationer in such service, class or category, or be entitled by reason only of such appointment to any preferential claim to future appointment to such service, class or category. (Underlining supplied)

14. As is seen, the pre-amended Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1956 envisaged continuation of an adhocee until a person was appointed in accordance with the Rules. Cases could be conceived that an adhocee was continued for more than three years. A protection of deemed eligibility for being declared as quasi-permanent, subject to the conditions as mentioned in Rule 3A, was carved out in respect of such adhocees in terms of Rule 3(1) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961. However, whereas the pre-amended Rule 14 did not prescribe any limitation on the total period an adhocee could continue, the amended Rule 14 expressly bars continuation of an ad-hoc appointment beyond the period of nine months. There is no other provision on the subject either in the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules or the Temporary Service Rules, 1961. Therefore, Rule 3(1) of the Temporary service Rules, 1961 has to be read together with Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules. Reading the two provisions together, since the continuation of ad hoc appointment beyond nine months has been expressly barred, as a necessary implication, the deemed eligibility that was envisaged by Rule 3(1) of Temporary Service Rules, 1961 becomes redundant. In other words, Rule 3(1) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 has no application to persons appointed on ad-hoc basis. Continuation of a person beyond nine months, dehors the express provision of Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, will not alter the aforesaid legal implication. Consequently, no authority can exercise the discretion of declaration as quasi-permanent conferred under Rule 3 (1)(a) of Temporary Service Rules, 1961 on such authority vis-vis a person appointed on ad hoc basis under the amended Rule 14 of Classification, Control and Appeal Rules, 1956.

15. It be further seen that Rule 3(1) says, a Government servant shall be eligible for being declared as quasi permanent. Government service has been defined to mean temporary service, which in turn has been defined to mean even officiating service in a permanent post. It is not shown by any of the petitioners that he has been rendering officiating service against a permanent post. Even if it were assumed that the petitioners have been officiating against permanent posts and that Rule 3 has still any application to ad hoc appointees, it is axiomatic from a reading of Rule 3(1) that it lays down only the eligibility criterion of such an employee for being considered to be declared as quasi-permanent. If an ad-hoc employee fulfilled the eligibility criterion as laid down in Rule 3(1), that fact by itself would not create a right, muchless a vested right, in him to be declared as quasi-permanent. Such an employee had to fulfill other conditions and the competent authority had to be satisfied that the employee at the time of entry into such service possessed the minimum service age, qualification, required standard of character and antecedents etc. The competent authority had also to issue a declaration regarding his suitability, work and conduct during the past period of temporary service. In any case, Rule 3(1) does not envisage creation of any right in such an employee to be declared as quasi-permanent. The relevant provision, i.e., sub-rule 3(1)(a) confers only a discretion on the competent authority to declare an employee eligible under sub-rule 3(1) of the Rules as quasi-permanent. It is only if it were shown that the competent authority had, in fact, exercised this discretion in favour of similarly circumstanced person or persons, as the petitioners, that the petitioners could make a grievance of denial of equal treatment or seek an equal treatment. That is not the case; the petitioners herein have not brought anything on record to show that any of the ad-hoc appointees engaged after 28th July, 1989, the date when Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeal Rules was amended, has been declared as quasi-permanent under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961.

16. Coming again to the first argument of learned counsel for the petitioners as to their position being similar to the adhocees governed by Government order dated 11th September, 1989, the adhocees appointed prior to 28th July, 1989 were governed by the pre-amended Rule 14 which, in its relevant texture, was entirely different from the amended provision of Rule 14. Therefore, it cannot be said that the two sets of adhocees one governed by the pre-amended provision and the other governed by the amended provision constitute one class. Where the appointments are governed by two different sets of Rules, with two different relevant textures, the appointees would not constitute one single class. The two stand on two different footings and, therefore, constitute two different classes. Judgment in Mohd. Yousuf Pukhta v State of J&K (supra), cited and relied upon by the learned counsel, is not attracted herein. Firstly because that judgment related to an adhocee governed by the pre-amended Rule 14; secondly that judgment is a judgment per incurium because the Honble Judge had failed to take note of the settled position of law, as enunciated by the Apex Court holding the field; thirdly, the provisions of Temporary Service Rules, 1961 were not directly involved therein nor referred to in the judgment and fourthly the petitioner in that petition was a Peon working in the Department where 25% of the posts of Junior Assistants were reserved for in-service candidates. The petitioner therein was otherwise eligible and entitled to be promoted to the post of Junior Assistant as an in-service candidate. Therefore, the judgment does not help the petitioners herein. Similarly, the judgment in Raj Nath v State of J&K, 1993 KLJ 410 is not applicable because that case basically pertained to daily rated workers and, in any case, there was a direction contained in that judgment to the Government to frame a policy which was put in place by the State Government by virtue of SRO 64 of 1994. Consequently, I am of the view that the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 have no application to the case of the petitioners. In that view of the matter, the argument advanced by the learned counsel that the petitioners have acquired a right to be declared as quasi-permanent under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 is misconceived and untenable. Since I have come to the conclusion that the Temporary Service Rules, 1961 are not attracted to these cases, I need not go to the point whether the petitioners can be said to be holding civil posts."

16 So far as the Government order 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004 is concerned, which is challenged herein, the said order was challenged in the aforesaid writ petitions as well and the learned Court had returned a finding thereon. Paras 24 and 25 of the judgment in that behalf may be extracted hereunder:

"24. Coming to the impugned order dated 9th February, 2004, it is not shown to have been issued pursuant to Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules. It is based on Cabinet Decision No. 27/2 dated 25th January, 2004 adopting a policy relating to settlement of ad hoc appointments. Even if it is assumed that by virtue of the impugned order, the ad-hoc appointments of the petitioners have been converted into contractual appointments in pursuance of Rule 3 of the Rules and, therefore, does not constitute a policy, even that course was available to the Government since appointments of the petitioners were not governed by any Rules or a valid Government order, their term of appointment under Rule 14 of the Classification, Control and Appeals Rules, 1956 having come to an end long back. In normal course, as per the aforesaid Rules, the adhocees, even for contractual appointment, were required to face the due process of selection as prescribed and described above. The adhocees have not been made liable or asked to underego this process. As a matter of policy, the Government has extended to them the benefit of deemed selection inasmuch as they have been ordered to continue on contractual appointment basis upto 31st December, 2004 and have been directed to enter into agreements in the prescribed form. It may be reiterated that under sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 of the Rules, it is only if a person is selected by the prescribed Selection Committee after undergoing the selection process and appointed that he is required to execute the agreement in question. Further, for purposes of this contractual appointment, the condition of eligibility prescribed under Rule 5 of the Rules has not been enforced. Since these adhocees, who had no right to continue against the respective posts, could not even be appointed on contractual basis dehors the Contractual Appointment Rules, 2003, the Government has taken a policy decision to extend such a benefit to them. The policy has to be read in that context. Therefore, it is imaginable why the order has been issued as a matter of policy lest the contractual appointments of the adhocees, dehors the Contractual Appointment Rules, 2003 as well, should be challenged by eligible candidates desirous of seeking such contractual jobs. In that view of the matter, I am of the view that to that extent the Government has been fair and reasonable enough in extending this benefit to the adhocees. Before proceeding further I deem it relevant to quote hereunder paragraph 12 onwards of the impugned order:

...

...

25. The object of the aforesaid order is clearly indicated in clauses (iv), (v) and (v) of the operative portion thereof, as quoted above, i.e., first, the posts held by the adhocees have been ordered to be referred to the competent selection agencies by 29th February, 2004. This order has been made applicable to all class or category of posts, including the Gazetted posts, non-gazetted posts and Class IV posts. Such a course is totally lawful and according to the constitutional requirements. Selection of candidates to the three categories of posts , namely, Gazetted posts, nongazetted posts and Class IV posts, are made by three different agencies, namely, the State Public Service Commission vis-avis the Gazetted posts, the Service Selection Board for non-gazetted posts and District Level Committees for Class IV posts. Under clause (v) it has been specifically said that the adhocees who may have crossed the upper age limit prescribed for Government service and who may apply before the selection agencies shall also be considered by such selection agencies and their upper age limit shall be deemed to have been relaxed to the extent required for this purpose. In this manner, the Government has taken due care that each such adhocee gets a fair opportunity of competing in the selection process. As regards the Class IV employees, it has been ordered that a separate mechanism for selection of adhocees shall be formulated. According to the learned Advocate General, this scheme has not so far been framed and the reason put forth is the enforcement of Model Code of Conduct. I have gone through the judgments cited and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The latest law on the subject is that the process of recruitment prescribed by statutory rules cannot be bypassed by issuing directions for regularization of the services of the ad hoc employees who had come to the service through back-door entry. Even the leverage extended in extraordinary cases earlier by the Courts by directing the Government to frame a scheme and regularize such employees is not being insisted now. The emphasis of the law, as it exists now, is on entrusting such matters to the concerned selection authority. Reference in this regard may be had to J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan, (1994) 2 SCC 630 [LQ/SC/1993/1054] ; Dr. Surrinder Singh Jamwala v. State of J&K, (1996) 9 SCC 619 [LQ/SC/1996/1094] ;Dr. Meera Massey v. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra, (1998) SCC 88; P. Ravindran v Union Territory of Pondicherry, (1997) 1 SCC 350 [LQ/SC/1996/1618] and Suraj Parkash Gupta v State of J&K, 2000) SCC 561. Therefore, I am of the opinion that various directions and decisions taken by virtue of the impugned order, as referred to above, are in line with the mandate of law."

The judgment so rendered by the learned Writ Court squarely covers the pleas raised by the petitioner in his writ petition.

17. Apart from the above certain new developments have also taken place and intervened in the meantime. As mentioned above, the State Legislature has enacted the Special Provisions Act, 2010 - an Act providing for regularization of the employees appointed on ad hoc, contractual or consolidated basis. In terms of the Application Provision of the Special Provisions Act, 2010, viz., Section 3 thereof, its provisions apply to such posts under the Government as were held by any person having been appointed on ad hoc or contractual basis, including those appointed on consolidated pay. That would undoubtedly include the post held by the petitioner. Further, Section 5 of the Special Provisions Act, 2010 provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force or any judgment or order of any court or tribunal, the ad hoc or contractual or consolidated appointees referred to in Section 3 shall be regularized on fulfillment of the conditions enumerated thereunder. The first proviso thereunder provides that the regularization of the eligible ad hoc or contractual or consolidated appointees under the Special Provisions Act, 2010 shall have effect only from the date of such regularization, irrespective of the fact that such appointees have completed more than seven years of service on the appointed date or thereafter, but before such regularization.

18. In view of the above clear provisions of the Special Provisions Act, 2010, holding the field, the claim of the petitioner would be governed by the provisions of the said Special Provisions Act, 2010 and his prayer seeking regularization under the Government order of 2001 is antithetic to the provisions of the Special Provisions Act, 2010 and, therefore, wholly misconceived. If the petitioner thought that by any standards his case would be governed by the 2001 order and that the provisions of the Special Provisions Act, 2010 had taken away his any right, then he ought to challenge the vires of the provisions of the Special Provisions Act, 2010. In face of the provisions of the Special Provisions Act, 2010, the petitioner cannot claim import of the 2001 order in his favour.

19. There yet another important factor: The judgment in Thomas Masih v State of J&K (supra) was upheld in some LPAs, while some other LPAs were pending. When this fact was brought to the notice of a Division Bench of the Court on 14.09.2004, it made a reference to the Full Bench in the following terms:

"When the hearing of these cases was taken up our attention was drawn to the order dated 19.07.2004 in LPA(SW) No. 104/2004 (Shafiqa Begum v. State and others) and other analogous appeals whereby the appeals arising from the judgment in the case titled Thomas Masih and others v. State of J&K giving rise to some of the appeals before us, were dismissed and the judgment of learned Single Judge was upheld. Though the said order does not cover the points which are sought to be canvassed in these appeals as indicated in course of hearing earlier, we are of the view that it would be in the fitness of things that the appellants cases are heard by a larger Bench."

20. The said appeals under Reference have been disposed of by the Full Bench by order dated 18.05.2016 on the statement of the counsel appearing in those appeals that the appellants services stand regularized pursuant to the Special Provisions Act, 2010; thereby the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in Thomas Masih v State of J&K (supra) has remained intact.

21. The statement made by the two counsels appearing for the parties before the Division Bench that the case of the petitioner was different from that involved in Thomas Masih v State of J&K (supra). In any case, the claim put forward by the petitioner is unsustainable.

22. Looking at the matter on the anvil of the facts and circumstances as they stand, Government order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004 read with any communication issued pursuant thereto are no more operational. After the enactment of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service (Special Provisions) Act, 2010 by the State Legislature, the Government orders on the subject, be it Government order No. 1285-GAD of 2001 dated 06.11.2001 or Government order No. 168-GAD of 2004 dated 09.02.2004, have lost their implication and operation. These orders are immaterial now and nobody can claim any harm by, or be granted any benefit under, either of these orders. The claim of the petitioner that he having acquired the quasi permanent character pursuant to the 1961 Temporary Appointment Rules, in view of the findings recorded in Thomas Masih v State of J&K (supra) is equally grossly misconceived.

23. In light of the above, the petitioner having failed to make out a case to entitle him to the reliefs claimed and prayed for by him, this petition is dismissed together with the connected MP.

24. No order as to costs.