Ayling, J.

The facts of the case are set forth in paragraph No. 12 of the District Munsifs Judgment as follows:

The plaintiff who has filed these two suits now for recovery of possession of the plaint properties filed two suits in the Satur District Munsifs Court. Exhibits B and A are his plaints in previous suits, Nos. 97 and 96 of 1909 on the file of the Satur District Munsifs Court. The previous suits were filed by the present plaintiff in his capacity as reversioner to the estate of one Sennava Reddiar, the husband of, Ovammal and for declaration that the alienations made by the widow Ovammal were not valid and binding on him as reversioner. Pending the disposal of the suits, Ovammal died. The plaintiff simply withdrew the two suits on her death, without obtaining permission to bring fresh suits. There is no allegation in the present plaints that any permission was obtained and, in fact, in the course of the arguments, the plaintiffs pleader admitted that no permission had been obtained. Exhibit I in both the suits, which are orders in those two suits, also show that no permission was applied for or granted. It is, therefore, clear that these two suits have been instituted without any permission. The present suits are for recovery of possession of the same properties covered by the same alienations on the same ground that the alienations are not binding on the reversioner, the plaintiff. Excepting the fact that the present suits are for recovery of possession, while the former suits were only for a declaration that the alienations were not binding on the estate, there is no other difference between the allegations in the two suits. The question is whether the present suits are barred under O. 23, R. 1, sub-clause (3), old Sect. 373, Civil Procedure Code.

As far as this Court is concerned the question is concluded by authority. Vide Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nayar (I.L.R., 21 Mad., 35) and Machana Uajhala Dikshatulu v. Gorugantulu Yaggamma ([1910] M. W. N., 182). The facts of the latter case are precisely similar to those of the present case: and the learned Judges accepted without discussion the principles laid down in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nayar (I.L.R., 21 Mad., 35) and held that the second suit would not lie.

The Judgment in Achuta Menon v. Achutan Nayar (I.L.R., 21 Mad., 35) contains a full discussion of the true meaning of Sect. 373 of the old Code of Civil Procedure and the facts as it seems to me, were somewhat more favourable to the plaintiff than in the case before us. The substitution of the words subject-matter for the word matter in O. 23, R. 1 (3) of the new Code of Civil Procedure certainly does not improve the case from the appellants point of view.

I would dismiss the second appeals with costs.

Tyabji, J.

In the face of the decisions cited by my learned brother, I agree that there is no room for any further discussion of the law.

Appeal dismissed.