(1.) This revision petition by the tenant is directed against the judgement dt. 14-3-1986 passed by the learned Appellate Authority Chandigarh, under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, I949 as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh (for short ' the'), whereby an order of ejectment dt. 15-1-1985 passed against the petitioner by the learned Rent Controller, Chandigarh, has been affirmed and her appeal has been dismissed.

(2.) Bishamber Dass Kohli (since deceased) was the owner of house No. 588, Sector 16-D, Chandigarh, which is without dispute a residential building. He is represented in this revision petition through his sons P.N. Kohli and Prem Kumar Kohli, respondents 1 and 2 respectively. He let out this house to Smt. Satya Bhalla petitioner for purposes of residence vide rent note dt. 1-11-1974 at a monthly rent of Rs. 550/-. An ejectment application was filed under S.13 of the by the landlord for ejectment of the petitioner on three grounds, namely, that she had neither paid nor tendered rent since February, 1983, although she was liable to pay the same every month in advance; that the landlord required the premises for his own use and occupation and for the use and occupation of his son P.N. Kohli who wanted to shift to Chandigarh; and that the husband of the petitioner, Shri Gopi Chand, who is an Advocate, has established his office in the 'house and is using a part of the same as office-cum-library for his profession as a Lawyer. Therefore, the tenant-petitioner is guilty of change of user of the building without the written consent of the landlord in that the character of the building has been changed from that of residential to a scheduled building.

(3.) The petitioner opposed the application. She filed her written statement. She refuted the allegation of non-payment of rent as also the ground for personal necessity of the landlord qua the premises in dispute either for himself or for his son. She further averred that the landlord knew from the very beginning that her husband is an Advocate. Her husband has been using one room in the house as Library-cum-office. The major portion of the house is being used for residential purposes. Therefore, there is no change of user. She maintained that the house in dispute is not a scheduled building and she does not claim any protection on that basis. She admitted that the demised building is a residential one. She stated that she had taken the house on rent for the residence of herself and her family members and her husband has his office in one room. The arrears of rent and interest along with the costs were tendered on the first date of hearing.

(4.) On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues :- 1. Whether the respondent has changed the user of the premises in dispute OPA. 2. Whether the petitioner is estopped from taking up the grounds of change of user as alleged in para No. I of the written statement OPR 3. Whether the petitioner requires the premises for his own use and occupation OPA 4. Whether the tender made by the respondent is insufficient and invalid OPA. 5. Relief.

(5.) After receiving evidence of the parties, the learned Rent Controller decided issue No. 1 in favour of the landlord and issue No. 2 against the petitioner. It was held that the building, which was residential in character had been changed to a scheduled building and that the landlord was not estopped from taking up the ground of change of user. Issue No. 1 was, however, decided against the landlord. It was held that neither he needed the house in dispute for his own residence nor for the residence of his son. The tender of rent made on the first date of hearing was held to be valid. As such issue No. 4 was decided against the landlord. As a result of the finding on issue No. 1, the learned Rent Controller vide his order dt. 15-1-1985 directed ejectment of the petitioner. Her appeal before the learned Appellate Authority failed and was dismissed vide its judgement under revision. The findings on all the issues returned by the learned Rent Controller were affirmed.

(6.) I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. The fate of this revision petition depends on the import of the definition of "scheduled building" contained in Cl. (h) of S.2 of the. It is, however, necessary to take into consideration the other provisions of the and the history of the legislation for deciding this revision petition. The object of the is "an act to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises situated within the limits of urban areas, and the eviction of the tenants therefrom." Clause's (a), (d), and (h) of S.2 define the words "building", "non-residential building", "residential building" and "scheduled building" thus -

"(a) "building" means any building or part of a building let for any purpose whether being actually used for that purpose or not, including any land, godowns, outhouses or furniture let therewith, but does not include a room in a hotel, or boarding house; (d) 'non-residential building' means (i) a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade; (ii) a building let under a single tenancy for use for the purpose of business or trade and also for the purpose of residence. Explanation : For the purposes of this clause, residence in a building only for the purpose of guarding it, shall not be claimed to convert a 'non-residential building" to a 'residential building'. (g) 'residential building' means any building which is not a non-residential building; (h) 'scheduled building' means a residential building which is being used by a person engaged in one or more of the professions specified in Schedule I to this Act, partly for his business and partly for his residence."

(7.) Schedule I to the to which reference is made in Cl. (h) ibid enumerates the following persons :-

"1. Lawyers. 2. Architects. 3. Dentists. 4. Engineers. 5. Veterinary Surgeons. 6. Medical practitioners, including practitioners of indigenous systems of medicine."

(8.) It is to be noted that before the coming into force of the Punjab Act No. 29 of 1956, sub-cl. (i) of Cl. (a) of Sub-Sec. (3) of S.13 of the provided that in the case of a residential or scheduled building the landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession if he required it for his own use; he was not occupying another residential or scheduled building, as the case may be, in the urban area concerned and he had not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of the in the said urban area. Similarly, sub-cl. (ii) thereof provided that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession in case of a non-residential building or rented land if he required it for his own use; he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other building or rented land as the case may be and he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the in the urban area concerned. Section 2 of Punjab Act No. 29 of 1956 omitted the words "or a scheduled" and the words "as the case may be" from Cl. (a). The words "nonresidential building or" from sub-para (a), the words "building or" and the words "as the case may be" in sub-para (b), and the words "a building or" in sub-para (c) of Cl. (ii) of S.13(3)(a) were also omitted. The object of carrying out this amendment as given in the statement of objects and reasons published in the Punjab Government Gazette Extraordinary dated 28-8-1956 was as under :-

"Under the Ajmer-Marwara Rent Control Act, 1947, tenants of urban property cannot be ejected except from residential buildings and that too for bona fide personal use. This Act applies to Delhi City also where tenants of commercial or industrial premises cannot be ejected on the grounds of personal use. 1n the Punjab, however, such tenants can be ejected on various grounds including that of personal use. This entails a great hardship on such tenants. The provision allowing eviction on the ground of personal use has been misused by certain landlords and there have been many complaints and representations on behalf of the tenants to amend the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, an the lines of the Delhi-Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1947. It is, therefore, considered necessary that the tenants of non-residential property in the Punjab should at least be placed at par tenants of such property in Delhi and other urban areas covered by the Delhi-Ajmer Act."

(9.) The effect of the amendment thus carried out is that in the case of a scheduled building or a non-residential building the landlord cannot get the same vacated on the ground of requirement for his own use. There is no dispute that if a residential building is let out to a person engaged in one or more of the professions specified in Schedule I ibid partly for his profession and partly for his residence it is a scheduled building. The law is also well settled within this jurisdiction that it a person after taking a residential building on rent for purposes of residence uses a part of the same for one or more of such professions on his being engaged in them, he charges the character of the residential building into a scheduled building and this would render him liable to ejectment from the building on the application of the landlord to the Rent Controller on the ground of change of user. The position in this regard has been lucidly explained in the following observations of a Full Bench of this Court in Des Raj v. Sham Lal, AIR 1980 Punj and Har 229 :-

"For instance, in a case where the demised building is described as 'residential building or house' the same has to be used for residential purposes alone, even when in the rent deed it is not further postulated that the demised building has to be used exclusively for residential purposes otherwise even if a small portion is put to use for business purposes by the lessee mentioned in the Schedule, such as lawyers, architects, dentists, engineers, veterinary surgeons, and medical practitioners, including practitioners of indigenous systems of medicine, without the express permission in writing of the landlord, the said demised building might be taken out from the category of residential building' and turned into a 'scheduled building', the consequences of which are extramely grave for the landlord in that while the possession of the 'residential building' can be secured back by the landlord if he establishes a bona fide need or personal occupation, he cannot succeed in getting back the possession of a 'scheduled building' even on the ground of bona fide personal necessity and the building is lost to the landlord for all practical purposes.'"

(10.) The object of the, the amendment effected therein through the Punjab Act No. 29 of 1956, and the different provisions of the to which reference has been made above thus make it clear that a 'residential building' becomes a 'scheduled building' if it is let out to a person engaged in one of the professions mentioned in Schedule I to the partly for the purpose of his residence and partly for carrying on the profession. The object is that the persons engaged in the professions mentioned in Schedule I are not dislocated from the scheduled building where they reside And carry on their respective professions. In their case a landlord cannot ask than the building be vacated as he or his family members require it bona fide for their own residence. A 'scheduled building' has, thus, been defined as distinct from a 'residential building' to give added protection to the tenants engaged in such professions where a residential building is let out to such a professional for the purpose described in S.2(h) of the and is used as such.

(11.) In my view, this protection against eviction from a residential house being a scheduled building is not available to a tenant when he/she is not engaged in one of the professions mentioned in Schedule I. Equally, this protection is not available to such a tenant when one of his/her family members is engaged in one of the aforesaid professions and such a member starts using apart of the residential building for his profession. As an illustration, where a tenant is occupying or residential building and his/her son or daughter secures a Degree of Bachelor of Laws/M.B.B.S. and starts the profession of a lawyer/Doctor and uses a part of the residential building under lease with the tenant for the purpose of his/her profession, the attainment of such a qualification by such a family member of the tenant and the event of his being engaged in the profession would not give the residential building let out to the tenant the status of a 'scheduled building'. No protection would be afforded to the tenant on that account as contemplated by, the provisions of the. There can yet be another illustration. Father of a tenant of a residential building is an engineer in government service and on his retirement from service starts living with the tenant as his family member. 'To keep himself occupied and to earn some additional income for the family he starts practising as an engineer. He prepares estimates, designs and drawings by using one of the rooms in the residential building let out to the tenant. This event of the retirement of the father of the tenant and his additional effort of engaging himself in the profession of an engineer to earn some income for the family would also not give any protection to the tenant as envisage in the nor can the residential building in his possession achieve the character of a scheduled building. Illustrations can be multiplied but do not on side it necessary to do so.

(12.) Now I notice the argument of the learned counsel for the landlord-respondent which has prevailed with the authorities below. It has been contended that in Cl. (h) of S.2 of the the words used are "by a person engaged in one or more of the professions' and not by a tenant engaged in one or more of the professions". Therefore, when any person living with the tenant either as a member of his family or as a licensee when engaged in one or more of the professions specified in Schedule I to the uses the residential building partly for his profession, it would amount to changing the character of the residential building to a 'scheduled building'.

(13.) There are two fallacies in this argument which have not been taken note of by the authorities below. Firstly, the governs the relationship of landlord and tenant and confers jurisdiction on the Rent Controller to adjudicate on their rights and liabilities. Therefore, the words a person in Cl. (h) ibid, would mean landlord or tenant. However, in the context of Cl. (h) ibid it would necessarily mean tenant because when the residential building is being used by the tenant engaged in one or more of the professions specified in Schedule I ibid partly for his business and partly for his residence that it would become a scheduled building and the Rent Controller cannot order the tenant to vacate the same when the landlord applies for his ejectment on the ground that he requires it for his own occupation. It has " been held by the Supreme Court in Carew and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1975) 2 SCC 791 [LQ/SC/1975/296] that definitions in an Act are a sort of statutory dictionary to be departed from when the context strongly suggests it. It has been further observed as under :- "To repeat for emphasis, when two interpretations are feasible, that which advances the remedy and suppresses the evil, as the Legislature envisioned, must find favour with the Court. Are there two interpretations possible There are, as I have tried to show and I opt for that which gives the law its claws."

(14.) Secondly, it bears repetition to stress that the object of categorising a scheduled building' as distinct from a 'residential building' was to give added protection to the tenants engaged in certain professions who use the residential buildings let out to them not only for residence but also for the profession. The object is not to arm the landlord with an additional ground to eject the tenant where a member of his family joins one of those professions and uses a part of the building for the same on the ground that the 'residential building' has been converted into a 'scheduled building'. In fact in such a situation the building let out to the tenant continues to be a residential one. Likewise, the tenant is also not entitled to the additional protection envisaged in the case of a scheduled building by the in such a situation. This construction on the language of S.2(h) of the is a reasonable one and fulfils its object. I, therefore, reject the above contention of the learned counsel for the landlord.

(15.) It is educative to note here the following observations from a recent judgement of the final Court in H. Shiva Rao v. Cecilia Pereira, AIR 1987 SC 248 [LQ/SC/1986/448] :- "It has to be borne in mind that Rent Control legislations are beneficial to the tenant and restrictive of the rights of the landlords - these legislations were passed to meet the problem of shortage of accommodation in cities and towns. Whether that is the best way to meet the problem of finding habitats for growing number of people is another issue. Whether or not the problem could not be met by another way is also another question. Courts must find out the literal meaning of the expression in the task of construction. In doing so, if the expressions are ambiguous then the construction that fulfils the object of the legislation must provide the key to the meaning. Courts must not make a mockery of legislation and should take a constructive approach to fulfil the purpose and for that purpose, if necessary, iron out the creases."

(16.) These observations fortify the interpretation placed by me on S.2(h) of the. It is also worth noting that the petitioner has nowhere claimed either in her written statement or during the course of her statement on oath in Court as her own witness that the demised building is a 'scheduled building'. In fact, she maintained that it is a residential building and contested the claim of the landlord for her eviction on the ground that he requires the same for his own use and for the residence of his son. The authorities below after appreciating the evidence have reached at a concurrent finding that this ground for eviction put forward by the landlord is non-existent.

(17.) In view of the above discussion, I allow this revision petition set aside the judgement of the learned Rent Controller and the judgement of the Appellate Authority affirming the same and dismiss the ejectment application of the landlord under S.13 of the. I, however, leave the parties to bear their own cost. Revision allowed.