1. The appellants herein feeling aggrieved by the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 4-2-1993 have preferred these appeals by special leave. The brief facts which need to be noticed for the disposal of these appeals are as under

2. On receipt of a requisition from the Director of Land Records for filling vacancies in the post of Patwaris, an advertisement was issued on 7-5-1987, inviting applications from eligible candidates for the existing 485 vacancies. Pursuant to this advertisement, over a lakh of candidates applied for the post of Patwari. It appears that thereafter the Subordinate Service Selection Board (hereinafter called the Board) was dissolved on 22-6-1987, and was reconstituted on 25-6- 1987. Thereupon, a fresh advertisement was issued for filling in the said 485 vacancies on 22-7-1987. On the requisition of the Director, the total number of vacancies were enlarged to 1000 or thereabout. As a very large number of candidates had applied, the Board constituted various committees for interviewing the candidates at different stations. On receipt of the recommendations from these committees, the Board selected 2318 candidates. However, the Government reduced the number to 1313 candidates. On their successful completion of the training they would eventually be appointed Patwaris under the provisions of the Haryana Revenue Patwaris (Group C) Service Rules, 1981 (hereinafter called the Rules)

3. Six of the unsuccessful candidates (respondents 3 to 9 herein) challenged the selection made by the Board on various grounds by way of writ petitions in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. A Division Bench of that High Court passed an interim order on 6-3-1991. As 574 candidates out of the selected candidates had already been sent for training and it was apprehended that further candidates may be sent for training, the High Court by an interim order permitted the State Government to go ahead with the process of training of 574 selected candidates, but restricted the appointments to 485 candidates including reserved category. The earlier interim order was modified accordingly. Later, the High Court heard the writ petitions and disposed them of by the judgment impugned herein dated 4-2-1993. It appears that in the course of the hearing of the writ petitions the statement of Shri M. S. Madan, the Secretary of the Board, was recorded as a court witness on 12-1-1993 which has been reproduced in extenso in the judgment of the High Court. We, therefore, do not feel called upon to reproduce the same herein. The High Court after considering the material laid before it quashed the impugned selection mainly on three grounds, namely, (1) that out of the total candidates selected, a large majority belonged to District Sirsa, including Darba Kalan Assembly Constituency, represented by Shri Om Prakash Chautala, son of the then Chief Minister, Ch. Devi Lal; (2) the selection process was reduced to a mere farce or mockery as hardly a minute or two could be devoted to each candidate at the interview having regard to the time spent and the number of candidates interviewed on a single day by the Committee appointed by the Board; and (3) the percentage of marks allotted for interview being as high as 85 per cent, it left room for arbitrary pick and choose

4. Mr Sudhir Walia, the learned counsel appearing in C. A. Nos. 3859- 62 of 1993 very ably presented the case on behalf of the appellants and pointed out that the decision rendered by the High Court directly affected the appellants who were admittedly not parties to the writ petitions filed in the High Court and, therefore, grave injustice was done to the appellants as their point of view was not available to the High Court. We, therefore, permitted him to place the case on behalf of the appellants in expenso so that we may be able to appreciate the point of view of the appellants and come to our own decision on the merits or otherwise of the appeals. Having heard learned counsel at length and having perused the relevant rules, we are, for reasons which we shall immediately state, unable to interfere with the judgment and order rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court

5. The learned counsel contended that the High Court was in error in drawing certain inferences on the premise that Shri Om Prakash Chautala represented the Sirsa District including Darba Kalan Assembly Constituency and that his father was at the relevant point of time the Chief Minister of Haryana. He submitted that there is no finding of fact that either of them had played any role in the matter of selection of candidates and, therefore, merely because a large number of candidates selected belonged to this Constituency the High Court was not justified in drawing the inference that the selection was politically motivated. He also submitted that Shri Devi Lal was not"the Chief Minister at the material time. We think, there is a considerable force in this submission but since we propose to uphold the order of the High Court on the other two grounds, we need not examine the same in detail but we do feel that the High Court has drawn unwarranted inferences in this behalf

6. Now so far as the selection process is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellants invited our attention to the affidavit filed on behalf of the Board in the High Court wherein it was stated in reply to the allegation in para 5 of the petition that about 400 candidates were called for interview daily at different places and the interviews commenced from 9.00 a. m. with a lunch break of half an hour, till late hours. It was further stated that sufficient time was devoted in interviewing each and every candidate to adjudge his/her ability and suitability for the said post. Some of the candidates could not even reply to a single question and hence very little time was taken away by such candidates. A copy of this affidavit was made available to us in the course of arguments. Our attention was also drawn to a short counter-affidavit filed by the Secretary of the Board in the present proceedings wherein it is stated in paragraph 4 that 400-600 candidates were interviewed on each day from 9.00 a. m. till late hours. From the said averments made on behalf of the Board in the present proceedings both before the High Court and this Court, it clearly emerges that on one single day as many as 400-600 candidates were interviewed by each committee appointed by the Board. Even if one were to assume that the committee devoted as many as 12 hours i. e. from 9.00 a. m. to 9.00 p. m. on a single day for interviewing candidates it would not be able to devote more than two minutes time per candidate. Assuming for the sake of argument that as some of the candidates were not able to answer even a single question the time taken by them was brief it could not be less than a minute and, therefore, it is difficult to hold that the interviews were meaningful and purposive to enable proper assessment of the knowledge and suitability of each candidate for the post. The High Court was, therefore, right in commenting that the interviews were a mere farce or mockery and it was humanly impossible in effectively interview as many as 400-600 candidates on a single day

7. The learned counsel for the appellants, however, invited our attention to the observations of this Court in Sardara Singh v. State of Punjab. From paragraph 6 of the judgment on which reliance is placed, it would appear that the allegation was that only 15 hours were spent to interview as many as 821 candidates and hence the selection process was a farce. This contention was, however, denied and it was submitted that 35 hours were spent in all at the rate of 7 hours per day and, therefore, the ratio in Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana had no application. It would, thus, appear that the decision turned on the facts of that case. We, therefore, do not see how the observations in paragraph 6 of the judgment have any relevance to the fact-situation obtained herein. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the selection process was reduced to a mere farce as sufficient time could not have been devoted for interviewing each candidate

8. So far as the third ground is concerned, there is no dispute that out of 100 marks, 15 marks were reserved for higher educational qualifications, sports, experience, etc. whereas 85 marks were reserved for the performance of the candidate at the viva voce. The High Court came to the conclusion that the high percentage of marks reserved for the viva voce test left room for arbitrary selection. To counter this contention, the learned counsel for the appellants once again invited our attention to the observations made by this Court in paragraph 7 of Sardara Singh case and submitted that the selection could not be quashed on the ground that high percentage of marks were reserved for interviews. In paragraph 7 of the judgment, this Court observed that under the extant rules the Board had the option of choice in regard to the mode of selection and it had opted in favour of the viva voce method and since the rules were not in challenge before the Court the option of the Board could not be assailed. The observations in paragraph 7 of the judgment cannot be read as laying down a ratio that notwithstanding the high percentage of marks reserved for interview the rule laying down the same is unassailable. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi the Constitution Bench held that allocation of more than 15% of the total marks for the oral interview would be arbitrary and unreasonable and would be liable to be struck down as constitutionally invalid. In Ashok Kumar Yadav case this Court once again reiterated that where the marks allotted for viva voce test are disproportionally excessive, it would tend to arbitrariness. In paragraphs 26 to 28 this Court dealt with the matter extensively and came to the conclusion that allocation of 22.2 per cent marks for the viva voce test was excessive and unreasonably high, tending to leave room for arbitrariness. In the instant case, apart from the fact that the percentage of marks allocated for interview was as high as 85, the fact that as many as 400 to 600 candidates were interviewed on a single day also provides reason to believe that the selection process tended to be arbitrary. In any case there is room for such suspicion to be reasonably entertained. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court in this behalf is unassailable

9. We would like to make it clear that we have limited our consideration to the procedure adopted at the preselection stage and have not thought it necessary to examine the procedure at the postselection stage. Once we hold that the entire selection process was tainted, we are not able to uphold the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that since the appellants had received training and had passed the examination, they should be protected. It must be remembered that out of 1313 candidates selected, 574 were sent for training. Because of the interim order of the Court only 485, including the reserved category, could be appointed. The others were not sent for training because of the pendency of the petitions. Even out of those sent for training others in excess of 485 could not be appointed because of the interim order dated 6-3-1991. To protect 485 and not others would be quite discriminatory, in that, the 485 candidates whose entry is in the same tainted manner as others, would secure appointment while others would not. We think that once the process of selection is found to be tainted, whatever had flowed consequent thereto must also fall along with the process of selection. We, therefore, see no merit in this plea

10. The learned counsel for the appellants lastly submitted that if in response to the fresh advertisement the appellants apply for being selected they may be granted age relaxation in view of these developments. There is some force in this submission. We think it would be advisable for the department concerned to take a positive view in this behalf before the issuance of a fresh advertisement. We would commend a sympathetic view in this behalf so that those who have become age barred can seek appointments. Without waiting for a representation from the appellants it would be advisable for the department to take a decision and include it in the advertisement. The appellants may also move the Government and the Government may consider their request sympathetically. The appeals will stand dismissed with no order as to costs. Stay stands vacated.