Sen, J.

1. This Rule has been obtained by the Defendants Nos. 1 to 5against an order passed by the learned Munsif of the Court of Sealdah decidingan issue regarding the valuation of a suit.

2. The facts briefly are these: The Plaintiff instituted asuit against the Defendants, stating that they were mere licensees with respectto a house belonging to the Plaintiff and that the license had been revoked.The Plaintiff claimed possession of the property with respect to which licensehad been issued on the ground that the licensees were refusing to vacate inspite of revocation of the license. He valued his suit at Rs. 100, so far asthe prayer for ejectment was concerned. There was a separate valuation for thePlaintiffs claim for mesne profits. The Defendants objected, stating that thecase was governed by the provisions of Section 7v of the Court-fees Act andthat the valuation should be the value of the subject-matter of the suit asprovided for in that section. The learned Munsif repelled this contention,holding that, in a suit of this description, the Plaintiff could put his ownvaluation on the suit, which, if reasonable, should not be interfered with.Against this decision the Defendants have moved this Court and obtained thisRule. In my opinion, this Rule should be made absolute. The suit is undoubtedlyone for the recovery of possession of a house and it comes under Section 7v itsvaluation should, therefore, be made in one of the ways provided in theaforesaid clause of Section 7 of the Court-fees Act. The Plaintiff is notentitled to put his own valuation in a suit of this description. The learnedMunsif relied upon a decision of a single Judge of this Court: BasiramChristian v. Ganesh Chandra Das Gupta (1920) 24 C.W.N. Clause xvii. Thematerial portion of the decision as reported is in the following terms:

In a suit for ejectment (of a licensee) if the value of thesuit could be the value of the rights which on his plaint the Plaintiff seeksto recover. The Munsif has held that the value of Rs. 100/- is more thansufficient for that right and I am not prepared to hold in revision thatdecision is wrong.

3. With very great respect to the learned Judge who decidedthis case, I am unable to follow the argument. If the report is a correct one,all that the learned Judge is saying is that, if the suit could be valued inthe way that it has been valued, then the valuation is not unreasonable. Thewhole question is whether the suit could be valued in the way in which it hasbeen valued. I am not prepared to rely upon this case, as it is not in anauthorised report. There is a case, viz., Barkatunisa Begum v. Kaniza Fatma I.L.R.(1926) Pat. 631 which seems to take a similar view. The Bombay High Court,however, has taken a different view in the case of Batilal Manilal v. ChandulalChhotalal : A.I.R. (1947) (Bom.) 482 [LQ/BomHC/1946/119] . I am not bound byeither of these decisions, but I prefer to follow the decision of the BombayHigh Court. The suit is clearly one for the recovery of possession of a houseand the subject-matter of the suit is the house. In the Patna case, it seems tohave been held that the subject-matter of a similar suit is something otherthan land and that it was the right of the licensee, which the Plaintiff soughtto set aside. I cannot appreciate this view. After a license has been revokedall that the Plaintiff requires is the recovery of the premises and that, itseems to me, would be the subject-matter of the suit. The Plaintiff in thepresent case seeks for nothing more and I hold that the subject-matter of thesuit is the premises sought to be recovered. In this connection I would referto the provisions of Section 7xi(cc) of the Court-fees Act. There, a specialprovision has been made for the recovery of immovable property by a landlordfrom his tenant, including a tenant holding over after the determination of thetenancy. Now, if this provision had not been there, a suit by a landlord forrecovery of possession of land from a tenant holding over after the tenancy hadbeen determined would have been governed by Clause v of Section 7. Thelegislature thought fit to provide that such a case will not be governed byClause v and it made a provision in Clause xi regarding court-fees payable insuch a case. There is no corresponding provision made by the legislature inrespect of a licensee whose license has been revoked. It seems, therefore, thatthe legislature intended that, in the case of a licensee, the valuation of thesuit should be governed by the provisions of Clause v of Section 7 of theCourt-fees Act.

4. In these circumstances, I hold that the decision of thelearned Munsif is wrong and I set aside the decision on this issue and directthat the learned Munsif should dispose of the case on the basis of thisdecision and in the light of the observations made above.

5. The Rule is made absolute. There will be no order forcosts.

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Satish Chandra Chatterjivs. Shailabashini Debi(08.03.1949 - CALHC)