S.P. SINGH, J.

(1.) Both these civil revisions are directed against the same order passed under Section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947--hereinafter referred to as the Act. They have, therefore, been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

(2.) The suit was a suit for eviction of the defendant from a house situate within Muzaffarpur town on the ground of default in payment of rent for over two months and also on the ground of personal necessity. A decree for arrears of rent for the period 1-3-1967 to 30-11-1969 as also for damages from 1-12-1969 to 31-1-1970 was claimed. The rent it was asserted in the plaint, was Rs. 190/- per month as fixed by the House Controller.

(3.) The case of the defendant was that the plaintiffs in collusion with the employees of Muzaffarpur Municipality got the annual municipal valuation of the premises enhanced from Rs. 220/- to Rs. 1900/- and on the basis of this enhanced municipal valuation got the fair rent determined by the House Controller at the increased rate. His case further was that the rent of the holding was Rs. 65/- per month only and he had been paying rent at this rate to the plaintiffs all along and that the plaintiffs never paid the municipal taxes of the holding in the occupation of the defendant and, therefore, the defendant had to pay the municipal taxes from 1965 onwards. Thus he claimed that no rent was due from him to the plaintiffs who also did not require the house for their personal use either.

(4.) On an application of the plaintiffs under Section 11-A of the Act, which was contested by the defendant, the court below has held (1) that the defendant should deposit rent at the rate of Rs. 190/- per month. (2) that he is liable to pay even arrears of rent which is barred by time at that rate as fixed by the Controller and (3) that he should deposit arrears of rent at the said rate from 17-4-1965 after deducting the amount of municipal taxes to the tune of Rs. 2843.20 paid by him; and has directed the defendant to deposit by 17-11-1970 all arrears of rent at the said rate of Rs. 190/- per month up to August, 1970, the rent for September. October and November, 1970 by 15th of December. 1970 and thereafter the rent for December. 1970 and following months by 15th of the succeeding month.

(5.) Civil Revision No. 1460 of 1970 has been filed on behalf of the defendant. The other Civil Revision No. 1545 of 1970 has been filed by the plaintiffs. Mr. B. C Ghose, learned counsel appearing for the defendant, has contended (1) that the court below has acted illegally in exercise of jurisdiction in directing the defendant to deposit arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 190/- per month when the rate at which the rent was last paid was only Rs. 65/- per month, and (2) that the court below has acted illegally in exercise of jurisdiction in directing the defendant to deposit rent from 17-4-1965 to 28-2-1967 which was not claimed in the suit and stood time barred. Mr. P.N. Singh, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, has urged that the court below has acted illegally in exercise of jurisdiction in allowing the defendant to adjust the amount of municipal taxes paid by him towards arrears of rent.

(6.) I propose to deal first with the contention of learned counsel for the plaintiffs raised in Civil Revision No. 1545 of 1970. In support of his contention that the court below ought not to have allowed deduction of municipal taxes. Mr. Singh has placed reliance on a Bench decision of this Court in Sagarmal Agarwalla v. Smt. Annapurna Neogi, 1963 BLJR 334 = (AIR 1964 Pat 298 [LQ/PatHC/1962/123] ). He has submitted that the court below was required to fix the arrears of rent at the rate last paid or at the rate of fair rent fixed by the Controller and since in the instant case the Controller had determined the fair rent of the premises in question at Rs. 190/- per month, the court below should have directed the defendant to deposit the arrears of rent at that rate. It could not allow adjustment of municipal taxes from the arrears of rent as the municipal taxes were being paid by the defendant on account of contract or agreement arrived at between him and the plaintiffs. The defendant, therefore, was liable to pay the municipal taxes to the plaintiffs over and above fair rent fixed by the Controller. It has been held in Sagarmal Agarwallas case, 1963 BLJR 334 = (AIR 1964 Pat 298 [LQ/PatHC/1962/123] ) that the tenant is liable to pay municipal taxes over and above the fair rent determined by the House Controller, but the claim in the suit from which the matter came up before this Court related to a period prior to 1955. The decision, therefore, was given with reference to the law as it was before 1955. By amending Act of 1955 (Bihar Act 16 of 1955) whole of Section 8 of the Act was redrafted and Section 8-A was inserted. Section 8 (1) (b) of the Act, inter alia, lays down that the landlord shall not be entitled to recover from the tenant in addition to the amount of rent any municipal rates, taxes or cases in respect of such building except in accordance with the provisions of Section 8-A. Section 8-A (2) provides that if the landlord defaults in payment of municipal tax and it is paid by the tenant, the latter shall be entitled to recover the same from the landlord by adjustment towards the rent payable by him as if the amount paid by him were a debt due to him by the landlord. In view of the change in the law, the tenant is now entitled to adjustment of the municipal tax paid by him and the court below cannot be said to have committed any error in ordering for such an adjustment. Thus, there is no merit in Civil Revision No. 1545 of 1970 and it must fail.

(7.) Coming now to Civil Revision No. 1460 of 1970 I find that there is no merit in the first contention of Mr. Ghose that the court below has erred in directing deposit of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 190/- per month when the rate at which the rent was last paid was only Rs. 65/- per month. In Mahabir Ram v. Shiva Shanker Prasad, AIR 1968 Pat 415 [LQ/PatHC/1968/18] (FB). Tarkeshwar Nath, J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench, laid down the procedure which the Court has to adopt on an application under Section 11-A of the Act as follows :

"(a) In case the defendant denies the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and himself, the court has to examine the materials then available and come to a conclusion whether the said denial or a dispute as to the title of the plaintiff was bona fide or a mere pretence; and in case there is no prima facie merit in the said denial, the defendant can be called upon to make the deposit if other conditions are fulfilled.

(b) The court has to determine as to what was the rate of rent last paid and as to what amount of rent was in arrear, if any The order passed in this connection is subject to variation, inasmuch as, the House Controller may determine during the pendency of the suit that the fair rent of the house is somewhat different. The orders passed at the stage of the said application under Section 11-A are subject to the final decision on the very same questions in the suit."

It is obvious from the passage quoted above that Section 11-A has been interpreted to mean that though ordinarily direction is to be given to a tenant to make deposit at the rate of rent last paid, it is subject to variation in cases where fair rent of the house is determined by the Controller at a rate somewhat different from the rate at which it was last paid. No doubt, in the passage quoted above, reference has been made only to variation during the pendency of the suit, but on principle no distinction can be made between the variation during the pendency of the suit and at a time prior to the institution of the suit. According to the scheme of the Act, once a fair rent is fixed by the Controller, it binds both the parties, i.e., the landlord and tenant and rent is to be paid accordingly. The fair rent as fixed by the Controller has to prevail over the rent fixed by agreement. The view that where fair rent has been determined, the order on the tenant to deposit month by month rent as also the arrears of rent must be at that rate also finds support from a Bench decision of the Court in Nayan Chandra Das v. Smt. Bani Bose Civil Revn. No. 686 of 1969--judgment dated 23-12-1969 (Pat.) wherein it has been observed that it is not mandatory for the court to make an order for deposit of rent, but if the court decides to make an order on the tenant to deposit month by month rent as also the arrears of rent, if any it must be fair rent, if any, determined by the House Controller under the provisions of the Act. In my Opinion, therefore, the court below cannot be said to have committed any error of jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the view taken by it is in accordance with the decisions of this Court. This contention of Mr. Ghose cannot, therefore, be accepted.

(8.) The other contention of Mr. Ghose that the Court below erred in directing for deposit of arrears of rent for the period 17-4-1965 to 28-2-1967 which was not claimed in the suit and thus not subject-matter thereof and stood time barred requires serious consideration, specially in view of conflicting decisions of learned Single Judges of the Court. It is manifest that the arrears of rent for the aforesaid period could not have been realised by the plaintiffs by instituting a separate suit. If such a separate suit were to be instituted, the defendant could successfully plead therein that the claim was barred by limitation as well as by Order 2. Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 11-A itself no doubt does not say that arrears of rent which is barred by limitation cannot be ordered to be deposited, but it has been contended by Mr. Ghose that that section has to be read together with other sections of the Act. According to him, when Section 11 (1) (d) of the Act provides that a tenant can be evicted only for default in payment of rent lawfully payable, the rent, arrears, current or future, which may be ordered to be deposited under Section 11-A must also be lawfully payable. He has submitted that the decision in Mahabir Rams case AIR 1968 Pat 415 [LQ/PatHC/1968/18] (FB) does support his contention for it is apparent from this decision that Section 11-A has not to be read independently of other provisions of the Act, but together with them. On the other hand. Mr. P. N. Singh has contended that Section 11-A does not put any limitation on the power of the court to order for deposit by the tenant even such arrears of rent which is barred by limitation or any other law at the time of the making of the application under that section or at the time of the institution of the suit itself. There are three decisions of Untwalia. J. (now Honble the Chief Justice) sitting singly which, according to Mr. Singh, support his aforesaid contention. In Rishab Sunder Das v. Dr. Raghubar Dayal, 1960 BLJR 607 it has been held that the underlined principle of Section 11-A is that a tenant defendant against whom a suit for ejectment has been filed, cannot be allowed to remain in possession of the demised property without payment of rent and the arrears too, if any during the continuance of the suit. There is nothing in the decision to show that the arrear in respect of which the order was passed by Untwalia, J. in this case was either barred by limitation or any other law. No doubt, his Lordship has referred to this decision in another decision to which I shall refer hereafter and which does support the contention of Mr. Singh. In my opinion, there is nothing in Rishab Sunder Dass case 1960 BLJR 607 which supports the contention of Mr. Singh.

(9.) In Bholanath Tewary v. Kuer Rup Narain Singh Trust, 1967 BLJR 397, Untwalia. J. has held that court is not concerned with the law of limitation while making an order under Section 11-A of the Act and that remedy to claim arrears of rent though barred under law of limitation the right of the landlord to get his dues is not extinguished and if a tenant wants to contest the suit for ejectment, law as laid down in Section 11-A obliges him to pay all dues on account of arrears of rent as well as current and future rent. In support of his view that even such rent which has become time barred can be ordered to be deposited on an application under Section 11-A of the Act, he has referred to three decisions of Madras High Court in Adyapadi Vasudeva Udpa v. Krishna Udpa, AIR 1921 Mad 418 [LQ/MadHC/1920/323] , Gurpur Vamana Pai v. Venkatu (Venkatesh) Naika, AIR 1936 Mad 116 [LQ/MadHC/1935/323] and Janab Vellathi v. Kadervel Thayammal. AIR 1958 Mad 232 [LQ/MadHC/1957/188] . All these decisions of the Madras High Court were decisions under Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the Managing Committee v. Tripurary Charan Palit 1972 Pat LJR 529 = (AIR 1973 Pat 60 [LQ/PatHC/1972/95] ). Untwalia. J. again relying on his two decisions referred to above has held that the maintainability of an application under Section 11-A of the Act is not dependent upon the making of a claim for arrears of rent in the suit. His Lordship has further held that the filing of an application under Section 11-A of the Act is not hit by the provisions of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 2. C. P. C. and that an application under that section cannot be held to be not maintainable in regard to a period beyond three years of the date of the filing of the application.

(10.) Mr. B. C. Ghose has placed reliance on an unreported decision of Mahapatra. J. in Sheo Chand Roy Choudhury v. Naba Kumar Singh Dudhoria, (Civil Revn. No. 53 of 1968--judgment dated 10-1-1969) (Pat.). This civil revision also was directed against an order under Section 11-A of the Act. Mahpatra. J. has held in this case that where a landlord claims a decree for arrears of rent in a suit for eviction, no order under Section 11-A of the Act can be passed in his favour for deposit of rent of a period prior to the institution of the suit exceeding the amount in respect of which a decree is claimed. He has observed --

"It seems to me that there will be e frustration in the sense of justice if a plaintiff claims a certain amount by way of arrears of rent in the suit itself, and at the same time he will recover from the tenant a larger sum for a period other than claimed in the plaint from the tenant, taking advantage of the provisions under Section 11-A of the Act."

Attention of Mahapatra, J., was drawn to the decision in Bholanath Tewarys case, 1967 BLJR 397 and he distinguished it on the ground that in that case there was no claim for arrears of rent in the suit itself. In this connection he has observed --

"There may be cases in which a part of arrears of rent accruing during the pendency of the suit for eviction may be barred by time when the application under Section 11-A of the Act is filed and cannot be recovered through a decree of a court. In those circumstances, the court will not consider the question of limitation for purposes of a direction to be given under Section 11-A, if it is satisfied that there has been arrears of rent due to the plaintiff. The decision referred to above, will cover such a case as well as a case where there is no claim for arrears of rent in the suit itself".

In my view, his Lordship may be right in observing that on an application under Section 11-A of the Act, no question of limitation will arise in respect of arrears of rent which has accrued due during the pendency of the suit. His Lordship may also be right in observing that there would be a frustration in the sense of justice if a plaintiff is allowed to get as arrears of rent accrued due prior to the institution of the suit higher than the amount claimed as arrears of rent in the suit itself. But. I am definitely of the opinion, with all respects to his Lordship that he is not right in observing that with reference to Section 11-A of the Act while question of limitation would arise in respect of rent accrued due prior to the institution of the suit, question of limitation would not arise if no claim for arrears of rent is made in the suit itself. Such a view of law will also lead to frustration in the sense of justice for, while a person who has claimed a decree for arrears of rent and paid court-fee thereon would not get an order in his favour under Section 11-A of the Act for an amount of rent higher than what is claimed by him, if he does not make any claim and does not pay court-fee he would get as arrear even such rent which has become barred by time. If there is no question of limitation in respect of arrears of rent to be ordered to be deposited under Section 11-A of the Act, no part of the arrears of rent can be held to be barred by limitation for the purposes of an order under that section even in cases where a decree for rent is claimed.

(11.) Section 11-A reads as follows:--

"If in a suit for recovery of possession of any building the tenant contests the suit as regards claim for ejectment, the landlord may make an application at any stage of the suit for order on the tenant to deposit month by month rent at a rate at which it was last paid and also the arrears of rent, if any; and the Court, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, may make an order for deposit of rent at such rate as may be determined month by month and the arrears of rent, if any and on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent within fifteen days of the date of the order or the rent at such rate for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month, the Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck out and the tenant to be placed in the same position as if he had not defended the claim to ejectment. The landlord may also apply for permission to withdraw the deposited rent without prejudice to his right to claim decree for ejectment and the Court may permit him to do so. The Court may further order recovery of cost of suit and such other compensation as may be determined by it from the tenant."

No doubt, while other provisions of the Act are for the benefit of the tenant, Section 11-A was inserted in the year 1955 for the benefit of the landlord but it has to be read together with the other provisions of the Act and also subject to other laws. It is to be read together with the other provisions of the Act because it is well established rule of interpretation of statutes that various provisions of the same Act are to be given a harmonious construction so that one may not render the other nugatory. It is to be read subject to other laws for where the legislature intended that some of the provisions of the Act should not be read as subject to any other law, it used the expression "Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary" or "Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary". While "Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary" has been used in Section 4, "Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary" has been used in Section 11. Neither of these expressions has been used in Section 11-A. Therefore, in my opinion, under Section 11-A only such arrears of rent accrued due prior to the institution of the suit may be ordered to be deposited which can be legally recovered by the landlord and is not barred by any law. With greatest respect. I am of the opinion that the view that the bar of limitation or of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be invoked for the purposes of Section 11-A is not correct. In this connection reference may be made to Clause (d) of Section 11 (1) of the Act. Under this clause, eviction can be claimed on the ground of the tenant having been in arrears for two months of rent lawfully payable. If a tenant is in arrears of two months rent which is barred by limitation or Order 2. Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thus not lawfully payable, then he cannot be evicted. An order under Section 11-A of the Act is to be passed in a suit for eviction. If eviction itself cannot toe claimed on the ground that tenant is in arrears of rent for it is not lawfully payable, such arrears of rent cannot be ordered to be deposited under Section 11-A of the Act. Sections 11 and 11-A must be read together otherwise the result will be disastrous. Let us take a case where eviction is claimed on the ground that the tenant was in arrears of rent for two months which was barred by time and thus not lawfully payable. The tenant files a written statement that in the circumstances the landlord cannot get a decree for eviction under Section 11 of the Act. Then the landlord files an application under Section 11-A of the Act for deposit of that arrears of rent which was made a ground for eviction by him in the suit though it was barred by time. The court passes an order for deposit of that arrears. The tenant fails to comply with that order with the result that his defence against ejectment is struck out. In such a case the suit of the landlord for eviction shall have to be decreed though, on his own case, he could not get a decree for eviction under Section 11 of the Act. This will be the position in spite of the fact that Section 11 uses the expression "Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary" and the expression is not used in Section 11-A. In my opinion on the language of Sections 11 and 11-A. It is manifest that arrears of rent which accrued due prior to the institution of the suit, but is not lawfully payable cannot be ordered to be deposited under Section 11-A of the Act. The position may be different so far arrears of rent accruing due during the pendency of the suit is concerned. Such arrears even if barred by limitation on the date of making an application under Section 11-A may be ordered to be deposited. In support of this view, I would refer to the debate at the floor of the Bihar Legislative Assembly relating to that section which was inserted by the Amending Act of 1955. Some of the Members of the Assembly vehemently opposed the amendment on the ground that it was against the interest of the tenant and unjust. Replying to those objections, the Minister Incharge stated:-- ..(Verunacular Matter Omitted).. it appears that the intention of the legislature in inserting Section 11-A was to give some relief to the landlord in respect of the rent--arrears or current -- for the period of the pendency of the litigation. It was not intended that Section 11-A should apply to arrears of rent accrued due prior to the institution of the suit, even though it is not lawfully payable. Rather, it can be contended that under Section 11-A no order at all can be passed in respect of rent accrued due prior to the institution of the suit even though claimed in the suit. But since Mr. Ghose has not challenged that part of the order by which the petitioner has been ordered to deposit rent from 1-3-1967 to the date of the institution of the suit. I do not propose to record a definite answer to that question, nor do I propose to record a definite answer to the question whether on the basis of the debate on the floor of the Legislative Assembly it can be held that rent accrued due after the institution of the suit, though not lawfully payable, being barred by law of limitation or some other law, can be ordered to be deposited under Section 11-A as, on the contention of learned counsel for the parties, this question does not arise for decision in this case.

(12.) Decisions on Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act are not of any real help in interpreting Section 11-A of the Act for the obvious reason that there is difference in the language of the two sections. Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act is as follows:

"Where a lease of immovable property has determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent, and the lessor sues to eject the lessee if at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrears, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days, the Court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred."

Really Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act put the lessee on an election. If he pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear together with interest thereon and lessors full costs of the suit or give such security as the Court think sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days he is relieved against the forfeiture and would hold the property leased as if forfeiture had not occurred. It is in these circumstances that the expression "rent in arrear" in the section has been interpreted to mean all rent in arrear irrespective of limitation. There is no question of the tenant being put on any election under Section 11-A of the Act. In this section there is no question of any voluntary payment or tender of the rent in arrear by the tenant to the landlord and on such payment or tender, of the tenant being relieved against the forfeiture. Section 11-A contemplates an order by the Court even against the wishes of the tenant and provides for a penalty in case of disobedience of the courts order without any advantage to him.

(13.) Mr. P. N. Singh has also relied on the following decisions; Ramrao Raoji Palkar v. Amir Kasam Bhagwan, (1956) 58 Bom LR 284. Sohan Lal Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha, 1957 All LJ 503. Rullia Ram Hakim Rai v. S. Fateh Singh S. Shamsher Singh, AIR 1962 Punj 256 (FB) and Mahipal Singh v. Mam Chand 1963 All LJ 496. In Ramrao Raoji Palkars case (1956) 58 Bom LR 284, Chainani, J. was dealing with Section 12 (3) of the Bombay Rents. Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. That sub-section is similar to Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act According to that section if the tenant deposited the arrears etc. of rent he was relieved against the forfeiture and could not be evicted. Chainani. J. has pointed out--"This sub- section embodies the equitable principle judicially recognised both in England and in India that if the defaulting tenant pays to the landlord the rent in arrears and his full costs of the suit, the landlord should be deemed to have received full compensation and to have been put in the same position as if the rent had been paid to him when it became due". According to Section 11-A of the Bihar Act, the landlord can never be put in that position he would evict the tenant even if the tenant pays the entire arrears. That equitable principle, therefore, cannot be invoked in the present case. In Rullia Ram Hakim Rais case, AIR 1962 Punj 256 (FB) the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court was dealing with the Proviso to Section 13 (2) (i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The Proviso to Section 13 (2) (i) was also similar to Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 13 (2) (i) provided as to when could a tenant be evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent. Mahajan, J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench emphasised that the expression used was "rent due" and not "rent legally due". Section 11 (1) (d) of Bihar Act uses the expression "lawfully payable". In Sohan Lal Kharbandas case, 1957 All LJ 503 and Mahipal Singhs case, 1963 All LJ 496 relevant provision of law under consideration was Section 3 (1) (a) of U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act That section also dealt with as to when a tenant could be evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent. The expression used in that sub-section was merely "arrears of rent" unqualified by an expression like "legally due" or "lawfully payable." It was held in these cases that the tenant could be evicted even for non-payment of rent which had become time barred. None of these decisions is of any real help in interpreting Section 11-A of the Act.

(14.) In my opinion. Section 11-A of the Act has to be read together with and subject to other provisions of the Act and not independent of them. It has also to be read subject to other provisions of law. The expression "arrears of rent" in that section, according to me, means "arrears of rent lawfully payable". It may not include even arrears accrued due during the pendency of the (suit which is barred by limitation or any other law on the date of making an application under Section 11-A of the Act. But as already observed on the contention of learned Counsel for the parties, it is not necessary to decide the question with reference to arrears of rent accrued due during the pendency of the suit. However, so far arrears of rent accrued due prior to the institution of the suit is concerned. I hold that it cannot be ordered to be deposited under Section 11-A of the Act, if it is hot lawfully payable, i.e., barred by law of limitation or some other laws, such as Order 2. Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An interpretation of Section 11-A other than this would lead to many anomalies. No landlord in that case would claim a decree for arrears of rent in the "suit itself and pay court-fee thereon, for he will get the arrears of rent deposited under Section 11-A of the Act at the risk of tenants defence to ejectment being struck out. A suit lying to a superior court, if the arrears of rent would have been claimed therein, will be filed before an inferior court as a mere suit for eviction valuing it at twelve months rent only with the same advantages getting the entire arrears, even barred by time, under Section 11-A. An order under Section 11-A of the Act is interlocutory in nature and ordinarily a relief which could not have been granted in the suit itself cannot be granted on an application under Section 11-A. The view taken by me above is also supported by some decisions of the Calcutta High Court. In T.S.R. Sarma v. Nagendra Bala Devi, (AIR 1952 Cal 879 [LQ/CalHC/1952/240] ) (FB), it has been laid down that Section 14 (41 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act is to be read subiect to Section 14 (1) of that Act. According to Section 14 (1) of that Act, arrears of rent means arrears of rent legally payable. Relying on the Full Bench decision in the aforesaid case, a learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court in Krishna Chandra Bose v. Radharani Ghose, (AIR 1954 Cal 102 [LQ/CalHC/1953/7] ) has held that under Section 14 (4) of the Act, the court cannot make an order for deposit of rent barred by limitation.

(15.) For the aforesaid reasons. In my opinion, the second contention of Mr. Ghose that the court below has acted illegally in exercise of jurisdiction in directing under Section 11-A of the Act the defendant to deposit rent from 17-4-1965 to 28-2-1967 which was not claimed in the suit and stood time barred must succeed. Civil Revision No. 1460 of 1970 is, therefore, allowed in part and the order of the court below directing the defendant to deposit rent from 17-4-1965 to 28-2-1967 is set aside. The defendant-petitioner must however, deposit entire arrears of rent from 1-3-1967 up to March, 1973 at the rate of Rs. 190/- per month after adjusting the amount of municipal tax paid by him within 15 days of this order. He must also go on depositing rent from April. 1973 month by month by the 15th of the following month during the pendency of the suit. In case of default, his defence against ejectment will be struck out. Civil Revision No. 1545 of 1970 is dismissed. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs of this Court.