1. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.06.2019 passed by the respondent by which monetary benefits of revision of pay with effect from 01.01.2007 and 01.01.2012 have not been granted and other service benefit including, monthly incentive, adjustable advance/ annual performance lined reward/sail performance incentive scheme, canteen expenses, LTC leave, travel concession(LIC)/Liberalized leave travel concession (LLC) leave earned leave(EL) & Half pay leave (HPL) for the period from 28.02.1998 till the petitioner was reinstated.

2. Brief facts as reflected from the records are that the petitioner was appointed as Mason N-3 grade vide order dated 13.10.1986, he was served with charge sheet on 21.02.1997 for giving false information about his caste, qualification and domicile, therefore, an enquiry was conducted and vide order dated 28.02.1998 the petitioner was removed from service. The petitioner has challenged his termination order before the labour Court which was registered as case No. 111/MPRI/98. The learned Labour Court vide order dated 07.02.2001 has reinstated the petitioner without back wages. Against that order, the petitioner as well as respondent have preferred an appeal before the Industrial Court Raipur which was registered Civil Appeal No. 78/MPIR Act/A-11/2001 and the appeal preferred by the petitioner was registered as Appeal No. 69/MPRI Act/A-11/2001. The respondent while challenging the order dated 07.02.2001 passed by Learned Labour Court has directed for payment of subsistence allowance as provided under Section 65(3) of the CG Industrial Relation Act, 1960 vide order dated 15.05.2001 (Annexure P/6) which is mandatory compliance as per the provisions of the Act, 1960. The provisions provides that the employer has to either reinstate the employee or to pay subsistence allowance i.e. last wages drawn by him at the time of termination as per the option of the employer.

3. Learned Industrial Court vide its order date 04.07.2005 has dismissed both the appeals. Against that order, the respondent has preferred the writ petition which was registered as WP No. 3216 of 2006. The coordinate Bench of this Court has dismissed the writ petition on 14.01.2019 filed by the Steel Authority of India Ltd. After dismissal of the writ petition by the Single Bench, the respondent issued order dated 25.06.2019 directing reinstatement of the petitioner but denying the benefits during the intervening period when Labour Court has ordered for reinstatement on 07.02.2001 till he was actually reinstated on 25.06.2019. The petitioner is assailing this order, so far as the benefits for the intervening period have been denied has filed the petition.

4. The respondent has filed return wherein fact with regard to order passed by the Labour Court as well as Industrial Court is not disputed. It has been further submitted that the impugned order has rightly been passed which does not warrant interference by this Court as he was not reinstated in the service, therefore, he is not entitled to get the benefits during intervening period from 07.02.2001 till he was actually reinstated by the respondent.

5. This Court has directed the respondent to submit the relevant policy and circular with regard to grant of LTC, annual performance lined reward/sail performance incentive scheme, canteen expenses, LTC leave, travel concession(LIC)/Liberalized leave travel concession (LLC) leave earned leave(EL) & Half pay leave (HPL). The respondent has submitted these documents.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the respondent without appreciating the fact that the removal order passed by the respondent has been quashed by the Labour Court on 07.02.2001 and he was directed for reinstatement without back wages, the respondent in their option has paid him subsistence allowance and when the order passed by the labour Court as well as Industrial Court are affirmed by this Court then it is presumed that he was never removed from service on 28.02.1998, as such he is entitled to get all the benefits from the date he was reinstated on 07.02.2001 thus he would pray for allowing the writ petition.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the impugned order is legal, justified and in accordance with the rules of the company, as such the impugned order dated 25.06.2019 does not warrant interference by this Court and would pray for dismissal of the writ petition.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

9. The issue is required to be considered in this case whether the petitioner who has been reinstated from service without back wages by the labour Court on 07.02.2001 and thus order attains finality whether he is entitled to get arrears of wages from the date when he was ordered for reinstatement by Labour court or when the employee has actually reinstated.

10. The record of the case would show that the Labour Court vide its order dated 07.02.2001 has ordered for reinstatement and the respondent has challenged the said order before the Industrial Court by filing an appeal under Section 65 of the Chhattisgarh Industrial Relation Act, 1960 wherein the employer has to comply with the provisions of Section 65(3) of the Act i.e. either the employer has to pay full wages last drawn by him inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule. If the employee has not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such employee has been filed to that effect in such Court. Section 65(3) of the CGIR Act reads as under:-

Section 65(3) Where in any case a Labour Court, by its order directs reinstatement of any employee and the employer prefers an appeal before the Industrial Court against such order, or any proceedings against the order of the Industrial Court in the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be employer shall be liable to pay such employee during the period of pendency of such appeal in the Industrial Court or such proceedings in High Court or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the employee had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such employee had been filed to that effect in such Court.

Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Industrial Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court as the case may be, that such employee had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be.

11. Section 65(3) of the CGIR Act, is pari-materia to provision of Section 17(B) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Section 17(B) of I.D.Act has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dena Bank vs Kiritikumar T. Patel reported in 1999 (2) SCC 106 wheren the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"7. It would be convenient at this stage to set out the provisions contained in Section 17-B of the Act which reads as under:

Section 17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceeding is higher courts. - Where in any case a Labour court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of pendency of such proceeding in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not bee employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such workman had been filed to that effect in such Court:

Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court that such workman had ben employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during any period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this section for such period or part, as the case may be."

The objects and reasons for enacting the said provisions were as follows:

"When Labour Courts pass award of reinstatement, these are often contested by an employer in the Supreme Court of High Courts. It was felt that the delay in the implementation of the award cause hardship to the workman concerned. It was, therefore, proposed to provide the payment of the wages last drawn by the workman concerned, under certain conditions, from the date of the award till the case is fianlly decided in the Supreme Court High courts."

It would thus appear that the object underlying the enacting of the provisions contained in Section 17-B is to give relief to the workman in whose favour an award of reinstatement has been passed by the Labour Court and the said award is under challenge in the High Court of this Court. The said relief has been given with a view to relieve the hardship that would be caused to a workman on account of delay in implementation of the award as a result of the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or this Court. The question for consideration is: what is the extent to which such relief has been granted to a workman under this provision The objects and reason do not indicate an answer to this question and its answer has to be found in the provisions of the enactment. Since the expression "full wages last drawn" in Section 17-B has been construed by the various High Court in the decisions referred to above we would briefly refer to the same:

21. As indicated earlier Section 17-B has been enacted by Parliament with a view to give relief to a workman who has been ordered to be reinstated under the award of a Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal during the pendency of proceedings in which the said award is under challenge before the High Court or the Supreme Court. The object underlying the provision is to relieve a certain extent the hardship that is caused to the workman due to delay in the implementation to the workman is in the nature of subsistence allowance which would not be refundable or recoverable from the workman even if the award is set aside by the High Court or this Court. Since the payment is of such a character Parliament thought it proper to limit it to the extent of the wages which were drawn by the workman when he was in service and when his services were terminated and therefore used the words "full wages last drawn". To read these words to mean wages which would have been drawn by the workman if he had continued in service if the order terminating his services had not passed since it has been by the award of the Labour of Industrial Tribunal, would result in so enlarging the benefit as to comprehend the relief that has been granted under the award that is under challenge. Since the amount is not refundable or recoverable in the even of the award being set aside it would result in the employer being required to give effect to the award during the pendency of the proceeding challenging the award before the High Court or the supreme Court without his being able to recover the said amount in the event of the awarded being set aside. We are unable to constitute the provisions contained in Section 17-B, to cast such a burden on the employer. In our opinion, therefore, the words "full wages last drawn" must be given their plain and material meaning and they cannot be given the extended meaning as given by the Karnataka High Court Visveswarya Iroon & Steel Ltd. [supra] or the Bombay High Court in Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. [supra]."

12. The Respondent has in their option has complied with provisions of Section 65(3) of the Act, 1960 which is payment of subsistence allowance to an employee when order of reinstatement is challenged by the employer before the Higher Court, therefore, the employer cannot say that since they have complied with the Section 65(3) of the Act by paying subsistence allowance, the order of Labour Court reinstating the workman on 07.02.2001 will be effective when the employee is actually reinstated by them on 25.06.2019. The respondent without understanding the effect of the reinstatement has passed the impugned order on 25.06.2019. The word “reinstatement” is subject matter of interpretation by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in various judgments. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs Kranti Junior Adhyapak & Ors reported in 2013 (10) SCC 324 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held under:-

"21. The word “reinstatement” has not been defined in the Act and the Rules. As per Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol.II, 3rd Edition, the word “reinstate” means to reinstall or re-establish (a person or thing in a place, station, condition, etc.); to restore to its proper or original state; to reinstate afresh and the word “reinstatement” means the action of reinstating; re-establishment. As per Law Lexicon, 2nd Edition, the word “reinstate” means to reinstall; to re- establish; to place again in a former state, condition or office; to restore to a state or position from which the object or person had been removed and the word “reinstatement” means establishing in former condition, position or authority (as) reinstatement of a deposed prince. As per Merriam Webster Dictionary, the word “reinstate” means to place again (as in possession or in a former position), to restore to a previous effective state. As per Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, “reinstatement” means “To reinstall, to re-establish, to place again in a former state, condition, or office To restore to a state or position from which the object or person had been removed.’

22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer employee relationship, the latter’s source of income gets dried up. Not only the concerned employee, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. Denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the concerned employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments.

23. A somewhat similar issue was considered by a three Judge Bench in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. (supra) in the context of termination of services of 56 employees by way of retrenchment due to alleged non-availability of the raw material necessary for utilization of full installed capacity by the petitioner. The dispute raised by the employees resulted in award of reinstatement with full back wages. This Court examined the issue at length and held:

9. “It is no more open to debate that in the field of industrial jurisprudence a declaration can be given that the termination of service is bad and the workman continues to be in service. The spectre of common law doctrine that contract of personal service cannot be specifically enforced or the doctrine of mitigation of damages does not haunt in this branch of law. The relief of reinstatement with continuity of service can be granted where termination of service is found to be invalid. It would mean that the employer has taken away illegally the right to work of the workman contrary to the relevant law or in breach of contract and simultaneously deprived the workman of his earnings. If thus the employer is found to be in the wrong as a result of which the workman is directed to be reinstated, the employer could not shirk his responsibility of paying the wages which the workman has been deprived of by the illegal or invalid action of the employer. Speaking realistically, where termination of service is questioned as invalid or illegal and the workman has to go through the gamut of litigation, his capacity to sustain himself throughout the protracted litigation is itself such an awesome factor that he may not survive to see the day when relief is granted. More so in our system where the law’s proverbial delay has become stupefying. If after such a protracted time and energy consuming litigation during which period the workman just sustains himself, ultimately he is to be told that though he will be reinstated, he will be denied the back wages which would be due to him, the workman would be subjected to a sort of penalty for no fault of his and it is wholly undeserved. Ordinarily, therefore, a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. That is the normal rule. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated as in this case viz. to resist the workmen’s demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. In such circumstances reinstatement being the normal rule, it should be followed with full back wages. Articles 41 and 43 of the Constitution would assist us in reaching a just conclusion in this respect. By a suitable legislation, to wit, the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the State has endeavoured to secure work to the workmen. In breach of the statutory obligation the services were terminated and the termination is found to be invalid; the workmen though willing to do the assigned work and earn their livelihood, were kept away therefrom. On top of it they were forced to litigation up to the Apex Court now they are being told that something less than full back wages should be awarded to them. If the services were not terminated the workmen ordinarily would have continued to work and would have earned their wages. When it was held that the termination of services was neither proper nor justified, it would not only show that the workmen were always willing to serve but if they rendered service they would legitimately be entitled to the wages for the same. If the workmen were always ready to work but they were kept away therefrom on account of an invalid act of the employer, there is no justification for not awarding them full back wages which were very legitimately due to them.

In the very nature of things there cannot be a strait-jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that something is to be done according to the Rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour. It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular.

After enunciating the above-noted principles, this Court took cognizance of the appellant’s plea that the company is suffering loss and, therefore, the workmen should make some sacrifice and modified the award of full back wages by directing that the workmen shall be entitled to 75 % of the back wages.

24. Another three Judge Bench considered the same issue in Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New Delhi (supra) and observed:

“Plain common sense dictates that the removal of an order terminating the services of workmen must ordinarily lead to the reinstatement of the services of the workmen. It is as if the order has never been, and so it must ordinarily lead to back wages too. But there may be exceptional circumstances which make it impossible or wholly inequitable vis-à-vis the employer and workmen to direct reinstatement with full back wages. For instance, the industry might have closed down or might be in severe financial doldrums; the workmen concerned might have secured better or other employment elsewhere and so on. In such situations, there is a vestige of discretion left in the court to make appropriate consequential orders. The court may deny the relief of reinstatement where reinstatement is impossible because the industry has closed down. The court may deny the relief of award of full back wages where that would place an impossible burden on the employer. In such and other exceptional cases the court may mould the relief, but, ordinarily the relief to be awarded must be reinstatement with full back wages. That relief must be awarded where no special impediment in the way of awarding the relief is clearly shown. True, occasional hardship may be caused to an employer but we must remember that, more often than not, comparatively far greater hardship is certain to be caused to the workmen if the relief is denied than to the employer if the relief is granted."

13. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India Thr. vs Dragendra Singh Jadon reported in 2022 (8) SCC 378 has considered the issues in paragraph 18 to 19 which are as under:-

"18. In our considered view, the learned Single Bench of the High Court rightly granted relief to the Respondent. By the impugned judgment and order, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the Appeal of the Appellants and directed that the Respondent would have to be treated in service from the date of removal till the date of actual reinstatement in service and would accordingly be entitled to seniority and the right to be considered for promotion, but would not be entitled to back wages.

19. We find no infirmity with the concurrent findings of the Single Bench and the Division Bench of the High Court. There is a difference between reappointment and reinstatement. Reinstatement means to return a person or thing to its previous position or status. An order of reinstatement puts a person back to the same position."

14. The position of law which emerges from the aforesaid decisions may be summarized as follows: The effect of reinstatement is to restore an employee to his former capacity, status and emoluments, as if his services had never been terminated and the employee gets the benefit of continuity of service. The general rule in industrial adjudication is that on reinstatement, the employee is to be duly compensated for the loss of earning during the period of his enforced idleness or unemployment. In the absence of cogent reasons to the contrary such compensation should normally be equal to the full wages or remuneration which the employee would have received had he continued in service but for the order of termination of his service.

15. Thus, the confirmation of reinstatement order passed by the learned Labour Court on 07.02.2001 by the Industrial Court as well as this Court makes it clear that employee will be reinstated on 07.02.2001 as such impugned order Annexure P/1 treating the period from 28.02.1998 till actual date of joining “Dies Non” and denial of gratuity for this period is illegal and deserves to be quashed. The respondent is directed to calculate the gratuity of the petitioner for this period on the salary which petitioner is entitled to get in the intervening period from 07.02.2001 to the date when he was actually reinstated by the respondent within three months adjusting the amount of gratuity, if any paid to him.

16. The respondent has also denied wage revision benefits of 01.01.2007 and 01.01.2012 granting notionally to the petitioner is illegal and deserves to be quashed. Accordingly, it is quashed. The petitioner will be restored to his original position as on 07.02.2001 till he was actually reinstated. The respondent is directed to pay the salary for the period from 07.02.2001 till he was actual reinstated after adjusting the amount which was paid to the petitioner in compliance of Section 65(3) of the CGIR Act within three months. The respondent has also denied promotional benefits, payment of monthly incentive, adjustable advance/ annual performance lined reward/sail performance incentive scheme, canteen expenses, LTC leave, travel concession (LIC)/ Liberalized leave travel concession (LLC) leave earned leave(EL) & Half pay leave (HPL) for the period from 28.02.1998 till the petitioner was reinstated is also quashed. The respondent is directed to re-examine the case of the petitioner for grant of above stated benefits including promotional benefits as per the policy/rules of the Company within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order treating the petitioner to be in service on 07.02.2001.

17. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition is allowed.