1.Sir Patrick Spens, C.J. The only question which it is necessary to decide in this appeal is whether the proceedings out of which the appeal arises are “in respect of any act done or purporting to be done in the execution of his duty” by the appellant as a servant of the Crown (Section 270 (1) of the Constitution Act).

2. The appellant was a station master at a steamer station on the O.T. Railway. The complaint alleges that on 25th July 1944, the complainant with his wife and certain others proceeded to the station a short time before the steamer was due to leave, that he went to the booking office to purchase tickets, asking his wife and the rest of the party to wait at the jetty along with the luggage, that the booking clerk declined to issue tickets alleging that it was very near the time fixed for the steamer's departure and that when he went to the jetty he found that his wife and the other people had already boarded the steamer with the luggage and accordingly he asked the station master to arrange for the issue of the tickets required. It will be convenient, in view of the argument urged before us, to set out the rest of the complaint in full:

“He (the station master) gave a flat refusal and said that he could not do anything in the matter and when your petitioner repeated his request, he got annoyed and asked your petitioner to get out and then your petitioner wanted to go on the steamer to bring back the ladies and the luggage but the accused No. 1 (station master) resisted your petitioner's going on the steamer and showed unsympathetic attitude and furious temper and went to the length of abusing your petitioner calling bad names such as “Badmas,” “Tum Kahan Jata Hai” “Steamer per jaoge tab mar khaoge.”

“(6) That your petitioner resented this and protested against the uncivil behaviour whereupon accused No. 1 called out a man Khalifa by name and other coolies and ordered them to beat your petitioner and on the order being issued accused No. 2 Khalifa and some coolies began to assault your petitioner and his companions. The accused No. 1 also assaulted your petitioner with slap and gave fists and blows on the body of your petitioner and your petitioner's brother.”

After the appellant had been summoned, the Magistrate expressed the view that sanction under section 270 (1) of the Constitution Act was necessary for the institution of these proceedings. The complainant applied to the Government of Bihar for sanction; he was informed in reply “that he should seek his remedy in the superior courts if his complaint is dismissed.” On production of this order the magistrate discharged the accused, though it is not on record how exactly he interpreted this order.

3. On application to the Sessions Judge for further enquiry he was of the opinion that no sanction was necessary in the case and he accordingly ordered a further enquiry. The station master carried the matter on revision before the High Court. Agarwala, J. dismissed the petition, holding that Section 270 (1) could not be invoked in respect of an offence committed in 1944 because the “relevant date” referred to in that clause must be taken to be the date of Part III of the Act coming into force, viz. 1st April, 1937. This appeal has been filed against this order of the learned Judge and the correctness of his interpretation of the expression “relevant date” in its application to a railway servant has been questioned.

4. It has been contended that a railway servant is not a person “employed about the affairs of Province” but one “employed about the affairs of the Federation” that according to clause (3) of Section 270, “the relevant date”, in the applicant's case must be held to be the date of the establishment of the Federation and that therefore the act complained of is one done before the “relevant date.” By way of answer to this contention it has been suggested that on a proper reading of clause (1) of Section 270 the benefit of that section can be invoked by servants of the Central Government only when proceedings are instituted after the establishment of the Federation in respect of acts done before the date of the establishment of the Federation. It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to decide this question because we are of the opinion that the act complained of in this case cannot be held to be one “done or purporting to be done” in the execution of the appellant's duty as a servant of the Crown.

5. The materials with reference to which the applicability of Section 270 (1) must be considered were indicated in the Judgment of this Court in Hori Ram Singh v. The Crown. It was pointed out by Sulaiman, J. that as the prohibition was against the institution itself, the applicability of the section must be judged at the earlier stage of institution. The learned Judge then proceeded to say “if the prosecution case as disclosed by the complaint or police report, as the case may be, shows that the act purported to be done in execution of duty, the proceedings must be dropped. But if the prosecution case does not involve this, the case cannot be thrown out on the preliminary ground of want of consent.” [Page 179: See also pp. 184 and 185] Applying this test, we are unable to hold that on the allegations in the complaint, which we have above set, out, the acts complained of can be regarded even as one “purporting to be done” by the appellant in execution of his duty.

6. Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to Sections 68 and 113-A of Indian Railways Act and to Chapter IV, rule 2, of the Bengal and Northwestern Railway Traffic Manual and contended that the Station Master believed that he was exercising the powers and duties imposed upon him by these provisions and that he was entitled to the protection afforded by Section 270 (1) even if he erroneously thought that these provisions justified his conduct. We do not propose to discuss the bearing of these provisions on the case. Asobserved by Sulaiman, J. in the judgment already referred to, “the mere fact that accused proposes to raise a defence of the act having purported to be done in execution of duty would not in itself be sufficient to justify the case being thrown out for want of sanction under Section 270 (1). Counsel for the appellant further contended that reading the complaint in the light of the statement made by the complainant before the Magistrate we must hold that the complaint itself discloses that the act purported to be done in execution of duty. We are not satisfied that this is so. On the language of paragraph (6) of the complaint set out supra there is no room for any suggestion of ambiguity as to the case alleged against the appellant.

7. The appeal fails and is dismissed.