Meredith, J.This is an application by one Sardar Dalip Singh under Sections 491(1) (a) and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is at present in force against the petitioner an order of the Governor of Bihar, dated the 17th August 1944, (No. 4827C-100 (1)/44) in the following terms:

Whereas the Governor of Bihar is satisfied with respect to the person known as Dalip, Singh, son of Sunder Singh of village Kodheal, P. S. Adampur, District Jullunder, and at present of Thakurbari Road, P. S. Sakchi, Jamshedpur, that with a view to preventing him from acting in a manner pre-judicial to the public safety and the maintenance of public order, it is necessary that he should be directed not to be in any place within the districts of Singhbhum and Manbhum.

Now, therefore, the Governor of Bihar in exercise of the powers conferred upon him by Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 3, Restriction and Detention Ordinance, 1944, hereby directs that the said Dalip Singh shall not at any time after the expiry of seven days from the service on him of this order be in any place in the districts of Singhbhum and Manbhum.

2. By an order of the 17th November 1944, Memo No. 5821C-100 (1)/44, the Government upon a representation by Sardar Dalip Singh have directed that order No. 4827C-100 (1)/44 will continue to be in force.

3. Section 3 (1) of ordinance 3 of 1944, so far as is material, is in the following terms :

The Central Government or the Provincial Government, if satisfied, with respect to any particular person that with a view to preventing him from aoting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order, His Majestys relations with foreign powers or Indian States, the maintenance of peaceful conditions in Tribal Areas or the efficient prosecution of the war it is necessary so to do, may make an order.... (c) directing that, except in so far as he may be permitted by the provisions of the order, or by such authority or person as may be specified herein, he shall not be in any such area or place in British India as may be specified in the order.

4. The order passed upon the petitioner is, therefore, clearly within the terms of Section 3(1) (c), and that is not disputed. The point urged is that ordinance 3 of 1944 is ultra vires so far as Section 3 (1) (c) is concerned, because restriction of the movements of persons does not fall within the Legislative Lists appended tb the Government of India Act, 1935. It is conceded that the ordinance making power extends to all the lists, but it is argued that the provision in question can-not be brought within any of the items in any of the Legislative Lists.

5. It has been argued as a preliminary objection by the learned Advocate General that the present application does not lie, as it does not fall within the terms either of Section 491 or of Section 661A, Criminal P. C. Mr. B. C. De for the petitioner, on the other hand, contends that Section 491(1)(a), which is in the following terms:

Any High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, direct (a) that a person within the limits of its appellate criminal jurisdiction be brought up before the Court to be dealt with according to law

will cover the case. It is unnecessary to come to any decision upon this contention, because, as will presently appear even if the Court could interfere u/s 491(1)(a), there is, in my opinion, no substance in the contention put forward upon the merits. It seems to me that a provision of the type in question quite clearly falls within item 1 of List II, the Provincial Legislative List, and also within item 2 of List III, the Concurrent Legislative List. Item 1 of List II is :

Public order (but not including the use of His Majestys naval, military or air foroes in aid of the civil power); the administration of justioe; constitution and organization of all Courts, except the Federal Court, and fees taken therein ; preventive dentention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order; persons subjected to such detention.

6. Prima facie, it would appear that this is a matter coming under "Public order," but Mr. De contends that we must read "public order" with reference to the latter part of the provision "preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order" and so while a provision could be made for detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order, a provision could not be made providing for restriction of move ments for that purpose. It seems to me there is no warrant in the wording of the provision for the adoption of this narrow construction. The words "preventive detention for reasons connected with the maintenance of public order" have been added, I think, not to restrict the expression "Public order," but merely because a specific reference was deemed desirable to that particular aspect of public order. The first item is "Public order," and the expression is used generally. It has been laid down by the Federal Court in AIR 1941 16 (Federal Court) that

none of the items in the lists is to be read in a narrow or restricted sense, and each general word should be held to extend to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which oan fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in it.

7. If the words "Public order" be construed in this manner, they will certainly include provisions restricting movements where necessary for the maintenance of public order.

8. Item 2 of List III is

criminal procedure including all matters included in the Code of Criminal Procedure at the date of the passing of this Act.

9. When the Government of India Act was passed, Section 144, Crimimal P. C, was in force. Section 144 provides inter alia, that orders may be passed directing any person to abstain from a certain act. This provision has been repeatedly construed as enabling a Magistrate to make an order preventing a person from entering a particular place, and the legality of such orders when passed upon proper grounds is not contested. Such orders are quite common u/s 144. It would follow that such orders will come within the provisions of item 2 of the Concurrent List, land consequently within the ordinance making jpower of the Governor-General.

10. It must, in my judgment, be held that there is no force in the contention put forward by Mr. B. C. De, and as the order has not been attacked upon any other ground, the application must fail. I would accordingly reject it.

Imam, J.

11. I agree.