1. This matter under Section 145, Code of CriminalProcedure, relates to nearly 10,000 bighas of chur land in the district ofFaridpore. The parties are zemindars; and the question at issue is the right toreceive rent from the cultivators. None of these ryots is a party to theseproceedings. It has been found by the Magistrate, after a long and carefulinvestigation, and in a well-considered judgment, that up to the end of theBengali year, March or April 1886, the ryots on this chur paid rents to theTeota Rajahs, party No. 1; that subsequently disputes arose, and the Rajahs,being unable to obtain enhancement of rent from the tenants, declared the landsto be their khas khamar, and unsuccessfully endeavoured to make settlementswith some other tenants for a portion, at least, of the lands. The tenants, onthe other hand, told the Rajahs that they would not pay them any rents. Thetenants probably finding themselves unable, unless supported by some person of influence,to resist the Teota Rajahs, put themselves into the hands of Sarbananda Basuand another, the second party to these proceedings, and attorned to them,executing kabuliats, which were registered in the course of August. Inconsequence of the threatening attitude of the parties indicating probabilityof a breach of the peace, proceedings under Section 145 were instituted inOctober 1886. It is unnecessary to refer to the cause of those proceedingsexcept to state that, on the 27th August 1887, the Sub-divisional Officer ofGoalundo found that the first party, the Teota Rajahs, were in possession byreceipt of rent from the tenants as against the second party.

2. The main objections taken before us as a Court ofRevision are that this dispute between zemindars with respect to land occupiedor held by tenants is not properly cognizable under Section 145, and that, ifcognizable, on the findings of the Magistrate, the second party was entitled tobe declared to be in possession.

3. The first contention is founded upon a construction ofthe section in the present Code similar to that adopted at one time by Phear,J., with respect to Section 530 of the old Code-that is, that the section isapplicable only to cases of actual or manual possession, such as that of ryots.

4. That was not, however, the construction of the words ofthe section, which finally prevailed in this Court. under Section 530 it was,as Jackson, J., said in Harak Narain Singh v. Luchmi Bux Roy 5 C.L.R. 287 ,"settled law that the section contemplates disputes between owners as wellas occupiers of land," following in this respect Sutherland v. Crowdy 18W.R. 11, and he pointed out in that case that this construction of the sectionis in conformity with the policy of the law as shown in previous legislation onthis subject.

5. It is argued that the introduction into the presentSection 145 of the word "tangible" before the words "immovableproperty" indicates that actual possession is alone contemplated by it. Asto this, we can but adopt and follow the language of Field, J., in PramathaBhusana Deb Roy v. Doorga Churn Bhuttcharji 11 C. 413 We think that a disputeas to the right to collect rents is a dispute concerning tangible Immovableproperty under Section 145. There can be no question that disputes regardingthe exercise of this right are most fruitful causes of disturbance, speciallyin newly formed alluvial lands, such as are the subject of the proceedings nowbefore us. We have no doubt that it is the policy of the law that Magistratesshould have summary jurisdiction to pass temporary orders in such matters so asto prevent the occurrence of serious breaches of the peace. We are so stronglyimpressed with this view that, had the decision of another Division Bench beento the contrary, we should have felt it our duty to refer the matter to a FullBench.

6. As to the second objection, it is contended that, in asmuch as the tenants had attorned to the second party, the first party hadceased to be in possession, and that consequently the order of the Magistratein their favour should be set aside; that the previous existing tenancy hadbeen determined by the action of the Teota Rajahs in declaring the lands to betheir khas khamar; and next that, even if this were not sufficient to determinethe tenancy, the conduct of the tenants in attorning to the second party wouldbe an assertion of possession adverse to the Teota Rajahs, such as to put anend to any previously existing relations between them and the Rajahs, and, withthem, to the existence of such a right to collect the rents as is within thesection. We do not think so. No doubt a zemindar and his tenants might, byagreement, determine any relation of landlord and tenant existing between them.But the acts of the two parties, the Rajahs and the tenants in the matterbefore us certainly cannot be construed as constituting such an agreementbetween them. The attornment by the tenants to the second party is not shown tohave been even known to the Rajahs until after the proceedings under Section145 were instituted. We regard the acts done by the Teota Rajahs and thetenants in this way: The Rajahs endeavoured to terminate the tenancy in amanner which was wholly unlawful, and in this they were opposed by the tenants,and were unsuccessful in obtaining from them a surrender of their lands. Undersuch circumstances, the original tenancy still subsisted, and the tenants inpossession of the lands remained liable to pay rent as heretofore. Thesubsequent acts of the tenants in repudiating as their landlords the TeotaRajahs, and in attorning to the second party to these proceedings, could not bythemselves alone operate so as to determine their tenancy. As has already beenstated, no notice was given to the Rajahs that the tenants had put an end totheir tenancy under them. We need not consider what the effect of such notice,if any, might have been.

7. It was argued that the decision of the Magistrate waswrong, as involving the acceptance of this proposition ; that the right of azemindar to come in under this section must exist, even though the payment ofrent has been withheld from him for years, so long as his right to recover itby proceedings-at-law can be shown; and that such a proposition cannot beaccepted, as it cannot be supposed that questions of title were intended tocome before a Magistrate for decision under this section. There may be greatforce in that argument, and the Magistrate, so far as he adopted this view, mayhave been wrong. The point need not be decided by us in this case, and we donot decide it. Here the rent was paid down to just before the dispute betweenthe Rajahs and the ryots which led to the proceeding under Section 145, Code ofCriminal Procedure ; and upon the dispute taking place, they attorned by real orpretended payments of rent to a stranger. The question on the second branch ofthe case is, whether such a proceeding by the tenants of a zemindar can deprivehim of recourse to this section in case of danger to the peace, to have hispossession of the right to collect rents maintained, pending civil proceedings;and we must determine that question in the negative.

8. Having regard to the length and character of theproceedings before the Magistrate, we are of opinion that his order regardingcosts should stand.

9. The rule must, therefore, be discharged.

.

Sarbananda Basu Mozumdar and Ors. vs. Pran Sankar RoyChowdhuri and Ors. (20.02.1888 - CALHC)