Banerji, J.

(1) This appeal is on behalf of the defendants against whom a suit for money was partly decreed and the decree was affirmed by the. Court of appeal below.

(2) Shortly, the plaintiffs case was that one Babu Banwari Lal Arora was the Manager of the Khadga Vilas Press, Patna, owned by the defendants, on a salary of Rs. 100/- per month. His salary from March 1941 to the 13th of September, 1941, was not paid by the defendants who were also liable to pay Rs. 100/- to the said Manager for the fines that were realised from him on account of alleged violation of cases under the Factories Act and under the Payment of Wages Act. The Manager died after making a will in favour of the plaintiff who was also entitled to recover a sum of Rs. 28A, being his own salary for the month of August 1941. The probate of the will was taken in due course, and the plaintiff sued for a sum of Rs. 1013/3/- on 10-8-1944.

(3) The defendants, proprietors of the Khadga Vilas Press resisted the action on the grounds that the suit was not maintainable as the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was ousted by the provisions of Section 22, Payment of Wages Act (Act 4 of 1936); that it was barred by limitation; that they were not liable for the fines paid by the Manager as it was due to his negligence that the cases were brought, and that the, defendants had suffered loss on account of negligence, misappropriation and mismanagement of the Press by the Manager, and, on that account, the Manager was liable to pay a sum of Rs. 898/11/- and the plaintiff was liable to pay Rs. 87/9/6 to them. Five different statements were set out at the foot of the written statement showing the liability of the deceased Manager and the plaintiff.

(4) The learned Munsif decreed the suit, partly, holding that the salary of the deceased Manager was due from March 1941 to 21-8-1941, and the salary of the plaintiff was due from 1st of August to 21st of August, 1941, at the rates claimed. He disallowed the salary of the deceased Manager from 22-8-1941, to 13-9-1941, as he had absented himself from the Press without any valid excuse. He further held that the defendants were liable to pay for the fines realised from the deceased Manager as he was-convicted for acts done in his official capacity. The other pleas raised by the defendants were-negatived by him.

(5) As already stated, the Court of appeal below upheld this decree without any modification.

(6) The first point raised by Mr. A. B. Saran it this appeal is that the suit was barred under Section 22, Payment of Wages Act, 193

6. Section 22, Payment of Wages Act, which will be hereinafter referred to-as the Act, lays down that no Court shall entertairt any suit for the recovery of wages or of any deduction from wages in so far as the sum so claimed could have been recovered by an application under Section 15 of the Act. Section 15, sub-s. (2) provides as follows:

"Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector under this Act, or any other person acting with the pennission of the authority appointed under sub-s. (1), may apply to such authority for a direction under sub-s. (3)."

Sub-section (1), Section 15 confers jurisdiction on an Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area, and sub-s. (3) lays down the procedure of the enquiry after an application under sub-s, (2) has been entertained and empowers the Authority to direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the Authority may think fit. The amount of compensation is limited, but with this we are not concerned. In order to ascertain the nature of deductions from the wages and delay in payment of the wages, reference has to be made to Ss. 5 and 7 of the Act. S. 5 relates to time of payment of wages, and Section 7 relates to deductions which may be made from the wages. Section 15- has to be read in the light of the provisions given in these two sections for determining whether the claim of the plaintiff arises out of delay in payment of the wages or out -of deductions from the wages. It is not controverted that the Factories Act (Act 25 of 1934), applies to the Press in question and that the salaries of the deceased Manager and the plaintiff come within, the meaning of wages as defined in Section 2 of Act 4 of 1936.

(7) It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the arrears of salary claimed by the plaintiff are actually wages and, as the defendants delayed in making payment of the same or deduced them from the sum which was found due from the deceased Manager, the plaintiff should have applied to the Authority which was appointed under Section 15, Sub-section (1) of the Act. This contention is met by the learned Counsel for the respondent who has argued that the Authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Section 15 had no jurisdiction to entertain an application based on the facts mentioned in the pleadings and that in no case, whatsoever, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was ousted. Learned Counsel" for the appellants relies on three decisions, namely, the -- Modern Mills Ltd. v. R. Mangalvedhekar, AIR 1950 Bom 342 [LQ/BomHC/1950/26] (A); -- A. R. Saran v. B. C. Patil, AIR 1951 Bom 423 [LQ/BomHC/1951/63] (B); and -- Bhagwat Rai v. Union of India AIR 1953 Nag 136 (C). Counsel for the respondent depends on a single Judge decision of the Lahore High Court -- Simpalax Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. AHaud-D-in, AIR 1945 Lah 195 (D). I shall take up the cases one by one.

(8) In the case AIR 194$ Lah 15 (D), Beckett J., held that delayed "wages could only mean wages which are admittedly due, but the payment of which has been postponed on some excuse or another. He further held that, if there was any bona fide dispute relating to the amount payable, that dispute was to be tried by the Civil Courts, as, otherwise, there would be no authority capable of making an order for payment when the amount was in fact due. The learned Judge referred to the proviso to sub-s. (3) of Section 15 which runs as follows: "Provided that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to (a) a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person, or This proviso certainly relates to payment of compensation which was not to be allowed if the Authority was satisfied that the delay was due to a bona fide error or a bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person. The proviso did not oust the jurisdiction of the Authority to determine the amount payable if, according to the Act, the person employed was entitled to his wages which had either been delayed or been deducted by his employer. This was rightly pointed out in the Nagpur case (AIR 1953 Nag 136 (C)): where their Lordships dissented from the view taken by Beckett J., in the Lahore case. Learned Counsel for the respondent can, therefore, hardly depend on the Lahore case to the extent of the interpretation of the proviso to sub-s. (3) of Section 15.

(9) In the case of AIR 1950 Bom 342 [LQ/BomHC/1950/26] (A), an award was made in an Industrial Court in respect of certain disputes between some mills and their employees, giving relief to the latter provided they claimed to the Manager in writing before a particular date. The employee in question sent his claim before that date, but it appears that it reached the Manager subsequent to it. The Manager refused to recognise the claim which was in the nature of a bonus as having been submitted after the date given in the award, and the person employed thereupon applied to the Authority under the Act stating that he was entitled to the bonus declared under the award. The Authority held that the person employed was entitled to the bonus as declared by the award, and this finding was challenged by an application for a writ of certiorari before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. It was argued on behalf of the employers that the Authority under the Act was not entitled to construe the award and, in so construing it, it acted beyond its jurisdiction. Their Lordships, however, held that it was open to the Authority under the Act to construe the award in order to determine under Section 15 whether the refusal was an authorised deduction or not. This case did not go beyond holding that the Authority empowered under Section 15, CL. (1), could lawfully construe an awandd in order to determine if a refusal to pay a bonus, which comes under the definition of wages, was an authorised deduction or not. This decision is, therefore, of little assistance for the purposes of the present case. It cannot be denied that the Authority appointed under Section 15 (1) is competent to determine whether any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person contrary to the provisions of the Act and, in so doing, it can take into account and interpret an award on which the claim of the person employed is based.

(10) In the next case, reported in AIR 1951 Bom 423 [LQ/BomHC/1951/63] (B), the person employed was suspended from a particular date and was subsequently dismissed. On the ground that, he, being a Government servant, his tenure in office" was protected and he could not be dismissed in the way his employer had done, he filed an application in the Court of the Authority under the Act for a direction to pay a particular sum as delayed wages for the period from the date of his suspension." An objection was taken on behalf of his employers that the Authority had no jurisdiction to decide the application of the employed person as there was no subsisting contractor service between him and the employers after the date of his dismissal because he had- ceased to be a servant of the employers and the relationship of master and servant between them had come to an end. It was contended on behalf of the Authority, which had allowed the application of the person employed, and also on behalf of the latter that it was competent to decide under Section 15 whether a contract of service was terminated or not and, in coming to that conclusion, it was open to it to hold the validity of the termination of the service and the continuity of it for the purpose of directing the employer to pay the wages to the employed person if the same had been delayed. This contention did not find favour with their Lordships who held that the Authority was competent to determine the terms of a contract in so far as they related to the payment of wages and in so far as it had to decide the liability of the employer to pay wages, under the terms of the contract, but it had no jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether the contract had terminated, as alleged by the employer or that the contract was still subsisting; as alleged by the servant. Their Lordships further decided that delay in payment of wages could only mean delay in payment of wages which were admitted, as held by Beckett J., in the Lahore case. This decision, therefore, partly supports the Lahore one with respect to the meaning of delayed wages and goes further to hold that, whereas the Authority can construe the terms of a contract in order to determine what wages are to be paid and also to determine whether a person has been employed or not it cannot decide a question relating to the existence of the status of master and servant between the parties. The Authority can decide whether a servant was employed by his employer if the fact is denied or disputed, after which the question would arise as to what were the terms of the contract and what was the liability of the master under the terms with regard to wages, but that far only. In other words, according to this decision, it was not open to the Authority to decide whether a contract of service had been properly and validly terminated or that the dismissal of a servant by his master was wrong. I respectfully agree to the interpretation given by the learned Judges in this case as the Preamble of the Act shows that it is an Act merely to regulate the payment of wages to certain classes of persons employed in industry. It would be too much to hold that the Authority appointed under Section 15, Sub-section (1) is empowered with the jurisdiction of enquiring into matters where the liability of the employer is denied on the ground that there was no subsisting relationship of master and servant or on other similar grounds affecting such liability. In this view of the matter, the decision in this Bombay case would rather go against the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants.

(11) In the Nagpur case, reported in AIR 1953 Nag 136 (C)V the case of the employed person was that he had not been paid his wages for certain months and that he was illegally suspended for which he was further entitled to his wages during the period of suspension. The suit was brought in one of the Civil Courts and a plea was raised on behalf of the defendants that S. 15 was a bar, Their Lordships, while dissenting from the view taken by the single Judge of the Lahore High Court, relied upon the two Bombay decisions and held that the sums claimed by the employed person -could have been recovered by an application under Section 15 of the Act and, accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was ousted. In relying on the case of AIR 1951 Bom 423 [LQ/BomHC/1951/63] (B), their Lordships of the Nagpur High Court set down in extenso some important observations of that decision, of which the following are apposite:

"The question as to whether X amount or Y amount is due under the terms of the contract is a case where wages may not be admitted. The employer may say that X amount is due and the servant might say that Y amount is- due and the Authority would have to decide on a true construction of the terms of the contract as to, what is the amount due. Therefore the jurisdiction of the Authority really is to determine the terms of the contract in so far as they relate to the payment of wages and in so far as he has to decide the liability of the employer to pay wages under the terms of the contract".

Turning now to the facts of the present case, I find that the existence of contractual relationship between master and servant is not denied and the arrears of wages, in a way, do not appear to be seriously challenged; but there was neither deduction nor delay according to the scope of the Act, It was pure and simple case of refusal on the part of the proprietors to pay the wages on the grounds of negligence, mis-appropriation and mismanagement. They specifically set up a right to go into accounts to prove liability of the deceased Manager, and, in my opinion, this accounting between the parties, involving liability could not be done nor any objection determined by the Authority. The appellants cannot invoke the aid of Section 7(2)(c) of the Act as they never pleaded that they had so deducted the wages. There were simply some allegations in the written statement, and there is nothing to prove that the deceased Manager was required to account and a loss was sustained by the proprietors due1 to neglect or default directly attributable to him. In construing the sections of the Act, the utmost strictness is necessary especially when the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is tried to be ousted. According to Section 9, Civil P. C,, the Courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which- cognisance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Courts should not be inferred without a very close scrutiny. It has been laid down in a number of cases that it is for the Civil Court to determine in the last resort the limits of the powers of a Court of special jurisdiction, and -it is for the party seeking to oust the jurisdiction of the ordinary Civil Court to establish his right to do so. In AIR 1951 Bom 423 [LQ/BomHC/1951/63] (B), their Lordships, of the Bombay High Court reiterated the principle that the jurisdiction of a special tribunal cannot be inferred by implications; it must be expressly given, and it is from the language of the statute that one has to infer whether there has been express ouster of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts by conferring such jurisdiction upon a special tribunal. Therefore, one is reluctant to take into consideration the remote effect of an act or acts resulting in delay or deduction, and I have failed to find any word or expression within the Act from which ian inference can be drawn that the Authority appointed under Section 15, Sub-section (1) has jurisdiction to I go into accounts between the parties.

(12) Again, there is another stumbling block in the way of the appellants success on the subject. Section 15, Sub-section (2), confers right to apply under that section on the person employed, any legal practitioner or any official of a registered trade union authorised to act in writing on his behalf or any Inspector under this Act or any other person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under Sub-section (1). In this case, the Manager, himself, was not in a position to apply because he was dead. The plaintiff, who took out probate of the will of the deceased Manager and was thus entitled to his unpaid salary, could not himself apply under this section without the permission of the Authority. The amount relating to the payment of the fine by the deceased Manager was certainly beyond the scope of the Act. The- plaintiffs own pay was limited to a bare sum of Rs. 28/- with interest amounting to Rs. 9/10/- and the appellants can hardly be expected to be very serious to set aside the decree to the extent of this paltry amount. The contention of the appellants on the point of absence of jurisdiction fails.

(13) The next contention on behalf of the appellants is that the plaintiffs claim to wages up till 10-8-1941. is barred by limitation under Art. 102, Limitation Act as the suit was filed on 10-8-194

4. The reply to this contention is that the defendants acknowledged their liability with respect to the wages by their letter (exhibit I/C), dated 13-9-1941, and, therefore, the period of limitation started afresh from that date under Section 19, Limitation Act. This, section lays down that, if before the expiration of die period prescribed for a suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of such property right has been made in writing signed by the party against whom such property or right is claimed, or by some person through whom he derives title or liability, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgment was so signed. The letter was signed by defendant No. 1, one of the proprietors, and the fact of sending this letter to the plaintiff was specifically admitted .in paragraph 8 of the written statement. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that this letter (Exhibit 1/C) should not be treated as an acknowledgment saving limitation as it is not an absolutely unconditional admission of liability on the part of the defendants. Reliance is placed on a case -- Jogeshwar Roy v. Raj Narain Mitter, 31 Cal 195 [LQ/CalHC/1903/145] (E), in which their Lordships refused to treat as an absolute unconditional acknowledgment a statement made in writing by the defendant that he would see what was due after examining the estimates and after deducting what had to be deducted. I do not think this case is an authority on the facts of the one that rest for our decision. A question of an acknowledgment saving limitation must be treated on its own merits, and the language expressed has to be examined in every case to decide whether the acknowledgment was a conditional or an unconditional one. An acknowledgment of liability need not be express; it may be by implication although that implication must in all cases be a necessary implication from which an acknowledgment, clear and unequivocal, can be inferred. In the Calcutta case 31 Cal 195 [LQ/CalHC/1903/145] (E), their Lordships, paraphrasing the letter supposed to be an acknowledgment, found it to mean as follows: "I have received your bill. I do not think it is correct. I will look into the matter and see if anything is due". On the facts of that case, therefore their Lordships held that the letter was not an acknowledgment of liability that anything was due. In the present case, in paragraph 8 of the written statement, the defendants made certain allegations against the deceased Manager and then stated:

"The aforesaid manager was further informed by this letter that unless he satisfactorily explained the job order book, cash book, ledger, journal and records, etc., and the authenticity of the bills are checked and verified and final accounting making deduction of the press dues done, his responsibilities will not cease, If after his explanations and verifications and final accounting anything found is due, it will be paid to him".

Exhibit I/C which is in the same terms, in one place mentions that, if after accounting any balance is found due, that will be paid at once. I do not understand how the defendants can escape the implication of their own statement in exhibit 1/C. In Sitayya v. Rangareddi, 10 Mad 259 (P), the plaintiff instituted a suit as a commission agent and the account was disputed. The matter was referred to arbitration and the defendants in the "memorandum of items to he settled", denied that any balance would be found due to A, but, at the same time, admitted that accounts must be taken and that they would be liable if any balance were found due to the plaintiff. Their Lordships- construed this as a clear acknowledgment of liability. It was held that for the purpose of an acknowledgment of a right to bar limitation, the fact that the defendants in the acknowledgment contended that nothing would be due to the plaintiff on taking of accounts was immaterial. In laying down this rule of law their Lordships depended upon two English decir-sions, namely, -- Prance v. Sympson, 1854 Kay 678 (G); and -- River Steamer Co., In re, (1871) 6 Ch A 822 (H). In the present case before us, there is a clear acknowledgment of the plaintiffs right to have the accounts taken, and there is also the unequivocal admission of liability to pay any balance that might be found due to the plaintiff. I think, therefore, that any written admission by a debtor of the existence of an unsettled account with a promise to pay the balance, if any due,. is sufficient acknowledgment within the meaning of Section 19, Limitation Act. It is not necessary- to decide in this case whether such an admission, if not accompanied by a promise to pay the balance, would amount to an acknowledgment. A glance at Explanation I of Section 19, Limitation Act indicates how wide the Legislature intended to be the scope of Section 1

9. Explanation of Section 19, is in the following terms:

"For the purposes of this section an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come, or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver, perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to a set off, or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to the property or right."

The defendants did not deny the salary of the deceased Manager or the plaintiff, but averred that the payment could not be made until an account had been taken and the Manager had explained the irregularities alleged to have been committed by him. At the same time, it was specifically stated that, if, on accounting, any balance was found due it was to be paid to the Manager. I am inclined to hold, therefore, that this suit is not hit by Ait. 102, Limitation Act, and is within time.

(14) It has also been argued that in the written statement the defendants expressly set up a claim to set-off against the plaintiffs demand and the learned Munsif should have treated the same as a plaint in a corss-suit and then proceeded to pronounce a final judgment in respect of both the original claim and the set-off. It is not known whether this claim by the defendants was made at the first hearing of the suit and, if not, whether permission was obtained from the Court according to the provisions of Order 8, Rule 6, Civil P. C. The fact that no court-fee was paid on this written statement would suggest that the defendants never meant their statement to constitute a demand made against the plaintiff for the purpose of liquidating the whole or a part of his claim. , The Court was never under any obligation to call upon the defeni dants to pay the necessary court-fees. It is significant that, according to our High Court amendment to Rule 6, sub-rule (1) of Order 8, the provisions of Order 7, Rr. 14 to 18 shall, mutatis mutandis, apply to a defendant claiming set-off as if he were a plaintiff. The amendment, in all probability, purposely refrained from including Order 7, Rule 11 which relates to rejection of plaints in cases, amongst others, where the relief claimed is under-valued and ..... ....... ......... ....... ........ the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so. Moreover, it was not permissible of the defendants to derive any benefit out of this order when no court-fee, however nominal, was paid by them on their claim to the set-off. Therefore, the learned Munsif cannot be blamed if he did not embark on an investigation to find out if the defendants claim was true.

(15) The last point relating to freedom from liability for the fines paid by the deceased Manager can hardly detain us any longer on the finding of the Court of appeal below that there was no satisfactory evidence to prove the personal negligence of the deceased Manager in connection with, the offences for which he had been fined under the Factories Act and under the Payment of Wages Act.

(16) The appeal, accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. Das, C.J.

(17) I agree that the appeal should be dismissed, but would like to add a few words regarding the four points which have been argued before us. The points are (1) that the suit was barred under Section 22, Payment of Wages Act, (1936); (2) that part of the claim was barred by limitation; (3) that the appellants were not liable for the fines imposed on the Manager for violation of the provisions of Section 25, Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and Ss. 41 and 24 (4), Factories Act 1934, and (4) that the Courts below were wrong in not adjudicating on the set-off claimed by the appellants.

(18) The first point is not covered by any authority of this Court and that probably was the reason why the case was referred to a Division Bench by a Single Judge of this Court. I shall first deal with this point on the plain words of certain sections of the Payment of Wages Act, 193

6. Learned Counsel for the appellants has relied on Section 22 of the said Act. This section says, "inter alia, that no court shall entertain any suit for the recovery of wages or of any deduction from wages in so far as the sum so claimed could have been recovered by an application under Section 15. The expression "wages" is defined in Section 2 (vi) of the Act arid means all remuneration, capable of being expressed, in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behaviour of the person employed or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include certain items which are mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 2 (6) of the Act. We are not concerned with clauses (a) to (e) in the present case and I have, therefore, refrained from quoting them. It is not disputed that in the present case part of the claim relates to wages as defined above; that part of the claim which relates to the recovery of fines does not, however, come within the definition of wages. Now, I must read Section 15. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 says that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gagette appoint any Commissioner for Workmans Compensalion or other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deductions from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages of persons employed or paid in that area. It is not seriously disputed before us that an appointment has been made by the State Government under Sub-section (1) of Section 15," Payment of Wages Act, 193

6. Sub-section (2), excluding the two provisos of Section 15 is in these terms:

"Where contrary to the provisions of this Act any deduction has been made from the wages of an employed person, or any payment of wages has been delayed, such person himself, or any legal practitioner, or any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or arty Inspector, under this Act or any other person acting with the permission of the authority appointed under Sub-section (1), may apply to such, authority for a direction under Sub-section (3)".

Sub-section (3) lays down the procedure for hearing the application, and then states what direction the authority appointed under Sub-section (1) may give: it states that the authority may direct a refund to the employed person of the amount deducted, or the payment of the delayed wages, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding ten rupees in the latter; then there is a proviso to Sub-section (3), which says that no direction for the payment of compensation shall be made in the case of delayed wages if, amongst other grounds, the authority is satisfied that the delay was due to a bona fide error or bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person. We are not concerned with Sub-section (4) of Section 15, and I am, therefore, not reading it. Section 15, Payment of Wages Act, 1936, has to* be read with certain preceding sections in order to appreciate its meaning and scope. It will be notified that Section 1a5, Payment did Wages Act talks of two matters (a) deductions from wages, and (b) delay in payment of wages. It is in respect of these two matters that an application can be made to the authority appointed under Sub-section (1), where, contrary to the provisions of the Act, any deduction has been made or any payment of wages has been delayed. We are not concerned "in this case with any deduction from the wages, and I arn not, therefore, reading Sections 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 which deal with deductions from wages, though it is clear that the expression "deduction" in Section 15 has a reference to these earlier sections. Section 5lays down the time of payment of wages, and says, in effect, that in the case of some employees the wages shall be paid before the expiry of the seventh day and in the case of other employees before the expiry of the tenth day, after the last day of the wage period in respect of which the wages are payable. Sub-section (2) of Section 5 lays down that where the employment of any person is terminated by or on behalf of the employer, the wages earned by him shall be paid before the expiry of the second working day from the day on which his employment is terminated. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5 are not relevant for our purpose and need not be read. It is clear that the reference to delay in the payment of wages in Section 15 of the Act is based on Section 5. Now, the crucial question before us is if the present case is a case of delay in the payment of wages within the meaning of Section 15, Payment of Wages Act 193

6. If it is, then the suit was barred under S, 22 of the Payment of Wages Act, 193

6. If it is not, then Section 22 was no bar to the maintainability of the suit. It is now necessary to understand the nature of the dispute which led to a refusal or non-payment of the wages by the appellants. The appellants apparently admitted their liability to pay the wages of their Manager and of the other employee, namely, the plaintiff, at least for a part of the period of .the claim; but they said that the Manager was himself liable to account to the appellants for certain acts of mismanagement and on an adjustment of accounts, the Manager owed the appellants a sum of Rs. 1463/6/- which, if debited towards his salary acr count, would show that the Manager owed to the appellants a sum of Rs. 898/11/-. This was the nature of the dispute on account of which the appellants did not pay the wages of the Manager and the plaintiff. The question is if such non-payment is "delay in payment of wages contrary to tho provisions of the Act", within the meaning of Section 15. On a careful consideration of the relevant provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, I am of the opinion that it would be stretching the language of Section 15 too much to say that the nonpayment, of wages in the circumstances mentioned above is delay in the payment of wages. The expression "delay" is not a term of art; It should be taken in the ordinary dictionary sense; there is, I think, a well understood difference in meaning between delay in payment of "money and refusal to make such payment, and I find it somewhat difficult to understand how the question of accounts or liability on the grounds of mismanagement etc., can be considered by an authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Act, Under that subsection the authority is only entitled to hear and decide claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of the wages; no other matter is really within the cognizance of the authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Section 15. Therefore, on a plain, reading of the. various sections of the Payment of Wages Act, I have come to the conclusion that the present case is not one in which the recovery could have been made by an application under Section 15, Payment of Wages Act, 1936.

(19) I now proceed to consider such case law on the subject as has been placed before us. The earliest decision is that in AIR 1945 Lah 195 (D)V That decision, in my opinion, took a much too narrow view of the expression "delay" in Section 15.

(20) His Lordship Beckett J. : said:

"It seems to me clear that delayed wages can only mean wages which are admittedly due, but the payment of which has been postponed on some excuse or another. This view seems to be confirmed by the proviso to such Sub-section (3) of Section 15 in which it is said that a direction should not be made when the delay in the payment of wages is due to a bona fide dispute as to the amount payable to the employed person. This seems to suggest that any bona fide disputes as to the amount payable are to be tried by the Civil Courts, for otherwise there would be no authority capable of making an order for payment when the amount is in fact due."

I agree with their Lordships of the Nagpur High Court in AIR 1953 Nag 136 (C)7, when they point out that the proviso to Sub-section (3), Section 15 prohibits only the making of a direction for the payment of compensation in the case of delayed wages and does not prohibit the making of a direction regarding the refund of the amount deducted or the payment of the delayed wages laid down in Sub-section (3) of Section 15; therefore, the proviso does not sugest that all bona fide disputes as to the amount payable are to be tried by the civil courts. The reason given .for the decision in AIR 1945 Lah 195 (D), is, if I may say so with great respect, not quite correct. A dispute as to the amount payable may, in certain circumstances, be dealt with by the authority apppinted under Sub-section (1) of Section 15. An example of such a dispute being considered by the authority appointed under Sub-section (1) of Section 15 will be found in the Nagpur decision AIR 1953 Nag 136 (C), in which case the employee claimed wages even during the period of suspension, and the defence was that part of the wages had been paid and for the remaining period the employee was absent from duties without permission and, therefore, was not entitled to wages for that period. Such a dispute,, it was held, amounted to a delay in the payment of wages within the meaning of Section 15 of the Act. In the case before us, however, the dispute was not of that nature, and the payment of wages was not postponed on account of such dispute. In the present case the appellants, while admitting their liability to pay wages, said that the employee was liable to account, and on such adjustment of accounts being made, nothing was due at all to the employee; on the contrary, employee had to pay something more to the employer. In these circumstances, I do not think that the principle laid down in the Nagpur decision can be of help to the appellants. Whether a particular case of refusal or nonpayment of wages comes within the expression "delay in the payment of wages" must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, In AIR 1950 Bom 342 [LQ/BomHC/1950/26] (A), the facts were like these. An employee made an application for bonus on the basis of an award made by the industrial Court under the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946; condition. 6 of the award provided that claims in writing were to be submitted to the Manager before 21-5-1948. The question was whether the claim had been made within the time allowed. The employer took the view that the claim had been submitted after 21-5-1948, and, therefore, the employee was not entitled to any "bonus. It was a case of a deduction of the bonus from the wages, and their Lordships held that it was open to the authority under the Payment of Wages Act to construe the award in order to determine whether the deduction made by the employer was an authorised deduction or not. .That case, in my opinion, is no authority for holding that in the circumstances of the present case, the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act could go into the question of accounts and determine the liability of. the employee on rendition of accounts. The last decision which has been cited before us is the decision in AIR 1951 Bom 423 [LQ/BomHC/1951/63] (B). That was a case in which the principal question - for determination was whether the contract of employment had been terminated or not and whether it was open to the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act to determine the question as to whether the contract of employment had been terminated or not. Their Lordships held that the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages-Act had no jurisdiction to determine the question as to whether the contract was terminated as alleged by the employer, or the contract was still- subsisting as alleged by the employee. In giving his decision Chagla, C. J., made certain observations with regard to the scheme of the Payment of Wages Act. His Lordship observed:

"Delay in payment of wages can only mean delay in payment of wages which are admitted. Wages are due, but for some reason or other those wages have not been paid at "the time when they should have been paid under the law. Mr, Seervai wants us to read delay in payment of wages as if it meant the same thing as refusal to pay wages. In this case there is no delay on-the pait of the petitioner to pay wages. He has. refused to pay wages, rightly or wrongly, contending that respondent 2 is not his employee, he has dismissed him and therefore nothing is due to him. Therefore, the issue which really arises and which the authority has assumed jurisdiction to decide is whether the refusal of the petitioner to pay wages is justified or is valid iit law. If the Legislature wanted to confer such, a jurisdiction upon the authority, it would certainly have done so by appropriate language. Really Mr. Seervai goes to the utmost length by suggesting that all questions arising out of a contract of personal service and all questions arising out of the relationship of master and servant, have all been transferred from the civil courts to this special tribunal.........As I have said before, one would have expected very-different language, much more appropriate language, to oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts and to confer that jurisdiction upon the special tribunal".

If I may say so with great respect, I entirely agree with the aforesaid observations, and whether: refusal to pay wages, rightly or wrongly within the time allowed by law comes within the ex- j pression "delay in payment of wages", must dependj on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is certainly open to the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act to construe the terms of the contract of employment in order to determine what wages are to be paid; and even if the contract of employment has been terminated, it is open to him to construe its terms in order to determine whether any sums are payable by reason of the termination; this is clear from the last part of the definition of the expression "wages". I have already said that I consider that the Lahore view is much too narrow, and it is not possible to lay down a general-and inflexible rule that the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act should try only cases of admitted wages. 1 agree that the jurisdiction of the authority is to determine the terms of the contract in so far as they relate to the payment of wages and in so far as it has to decide the liability of the employer to, pay wages under the terms of die contract. But the jurisdiction does not extend to a determination of the liability for accounting on account of acts of mismanagement etc. Such a liability can only be determined in the civil courts; and if an employer refuses to make a payment of wages on account of such liability, the aggrieved person has the right to come to the civil court to claim his wages. This, in my opinion, is the correct view of Section 15, Payment of Wages Act, both on the basis of the plain words used therein and the case law on the subject.

(21) I proceed now to a consideration of the question of limitation. The only question is if the letter (Ext. 1 (c), dated 13-9-1941, is an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19, Limitation Act. If it is, then no part of the claim is barred by time. On a perusal of the document and paragraph 8 of the written statement, it is clear to me that the letter dated 13-9-1941, is clearly an acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19, Limitation- Act. Explanation I to Section 19 makes the position quite clear. It says;

"For the purposes of this section an acknowledgment may be sufficient though it omits to specify the exact nature of the property or right, or avers that the time for payment, delivery, performance or enjoyment has not yet come, or is accompanied by a refusal to pay, deliver perform or permit to enjoy, or is coupled with a claim to a set-off, or is addressed to a person other than the person entitled to tile property or right."

It is clear that the letter acknowledged the liability for the payment of wages, but it was coupled with a claim to a set-off and a refusal to pay unless the Manager rendered accounts with regard to his acts of mismanagement etc. Under the explanation quoted above, such an acknowledgment is sufficient to extend time even though it is coupled with a claim to set off or is accompanied by a refusal to pay. The Indian law Is somewhat different from the English law in this matter. Under the English law, an acknowledgment of a debt implies a promise to pay. The English law makes no distinction between an acknowledgment or promise which is sufficient to extend the time in the case of a debt which is not barred, and an acknowledgment or promise which is sufficient to create a new contract where the debt has already become barred by lapse of time. But in India, an acknowledgment in which there is no express promise implying a new contract to pay, must be made before the debt is barred by time, and in this respect an acknowledgment under Sec. 19, Limitation Act, differs from a promise to pay a barred debt under Section 25(3), Contract Act. Under the Indian law, acknowledgment means a definite admission of liability; it is not necessary that there should be a promise to pay, and the simple admission of a debt is sufficient. I am, therefore, satisfied that the letter dated 13-9-194.1, was a sufficient acknowledgment of liability within the meaning of Section 19(1) of the Limitation Act, and no part of the claim is barred by time.

(22) I now take up the question of set off. Learned Counsel for the appellants has contended that what his clients claimed was an equitable set off for which no court-fees need have been paid. There has been some difference of opinion as to whether written statements, pleading an equitable set off are chargeable with court-fees, I do not .think that it is necessary to deal with that difference of opinion in the present case. I am quite satisfied that in the present case what the appellants preferred was a counter-claim and not an equitable set off. There can be an equitable set off in respect of an ascertained sum of money;, but the essence of such a claim is that there must, be some connection between the plaintiffs claim for a debt and the defendants claim to set off, which will make it inequitable to drive the defendant to! a separate suit, as, for instance, when they arise out of the same transaction or transactions which can be regarded as one transaction, or where there is know-ledge on both sides of an existing debt due to one party and a credit by the Other party founded on and trusting to such a debt as a means of discharg-ing it -- (Hari Ananda Shaba v. Mohurnmad Esahak Mia, "40 Cal. W. N. 751(1)). The nature of the claim made by the appellants in the present case will be clear from their written statement. The appellants appended to their written statement five separate statements marked A to E, and in these statements they mentioned various items which the appellants were claiming from their Manager. Those items do not arise out of nor do they relate to, the same transaction on which the claim of the respondent was based. On the contrary, they arise out of completely different transactions, and the claim which the appellants preferred was really a counter claim based on a different cause of action altogether. A counter-claim is substantially a cross-action and need not be an action of the same nature as the original action or even analogous thereto. Though there is no provision in the Code of making a counter-claim, a court has got the power to treat the counter-claim as a plaint in the cross-suit and hear them together, if the counter-claim is property stamped. Whether the claim of the appellants be considered to be a legal set off or a counter-claim, the appellants had to pay court-fees on their claim) This they did not do, and the courts below were right in not considering the appellants counter-claim, when they did not pay court-fees thereon. I agree with the courts..below that there was no obligation on the court to call upon the appellants to pay court-fees.

(23) The last point relates to the recovery of fines. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has dealt with this point in this manner:

"Babu B. L. Arora was fined Rs. 50/- for-violation of the provisions of section 25 of the Payment of Wages Act (Ext. 6) and also Rs. 50/- under Sections -433 and 24(4) of the Factories Act of 193

4. These-offences were practically offences committed by the Press and it was only according to the provisions of law that the Manager was held responsible and was fined. Really the fine was against the Press and the liability was that of the Press. The Manager, therefore, must be deemed to have paid the fine for the Press. There is no satisfactory evidence that the offences for which the Manager was fined were committed due to his personal negligence. Therefore, in my opinion, the Manager was entitled to recover the amounts paid by him on account of fine from the proprietor of the Press."

The learned trial Judge expressed himself as follows:

"Moreover, it has been admitted by D. W. 4, who is the Manager of the Press and who is the main witness for the defendants, that the cases under the Factories Act were with respect to the liability of the press."

(24) Learned Counsel for the appellants has not been able to show that the aforesaid views expressed by the trial Judge and the appellate court are in any way wrong.