J .B. Goel, J .

1. By this order I.A. No. 6479/97 under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the Code) of the plaintiffs and I.A. No. 7831/ 97 under Order 39, Rule 4 of the Code, of the defendants for vacating the interim order passed on August 1, 1997 are being disposed of.

2. The plaintiffs have filed a suit seeking injunction against the defendants No. 1 and 2, mandatory injunction against defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and a declaration of tenancy against defendant No. 1.

3. Briefly, the averments made in the plaint are that plaintiff No. 1 is a tenant in property No. J-341, Sarita Vihar, New Delhi, having been inducted by defendant No. 1 w.e.f. 1.4.1996 at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,500. Plaintiff No. 2 is her hubsband living with her; at the time the premises were let out, father of plaintiff No. 1 late Shri Prem Nath Ghai had paid Rs. 33,000 by means of two cheques dated 26.3.1996 each of Rs. 16,500 towards security and out of which Rs. 7,500 were paid towards rent for the months of April to June, 1996. The plaintiffs further paid monthly rent by means of cheques of Rs. 2,500; the second week of May, 1997 the defendants No. 1 and 2 accompanied by bad elements tried to forcibly evict the plaintiffs for which a complaint was lodged and the local police had warned them not to dispossess the plaintiffs. Again on 28.7.1997, at about 8.45 a.m., defendants No. 1 and 2 along with some anti-social elements came to the suit premises to dispossess the plaintiffs and locked one bedroom having independent entry from outside; and in the morning on 30.7.1997, they again came, broke open the door of the said room, removed the goods of the plaintiffs, placed their own goods in that room and locked from outside. Some of the goods of the plaintiffs are still lying in that room. A complaint about it was lodged with the local police on 30.7.1997 but it appears that the local police is in collusion with the defendants No. 1 and 2 and have shown lack of concern.

4. Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed the aforesaid application under Order 39, Rules. 1 and 2 (IA No. 6479/97) and on that application an ex parte interim injunction was passed on 1st August, 1997 against defendants and restraining them from disturbing the possession of the plaintiffs from the suit premises which has been extended from time to time.

5. Defendants No. 1 and 2 have filed a written statement along with a reply to the plaintiffs application and an application under Order 39, Rule 4 (IA No. 7831/97) for vacating the above injunction raising various legal pleas about the maintainability of the suit and have also alleged that the suit is an abuse of the process of the Court. It is alleged that the plaintiffs had got possession of the premises by misrepresentation and fraud because late Shri P.N. Ghai, father of plaintiff No. 1 had approached defendant No. 1 requiring the premises for the residence of the employee of Indian Hospital Association; the premises were agreed to be let out at a monthly rent of Rs. 5,500 and two cheques of Rs. 16,500 dated 26.3.1996 were given by him, comprising of Rs. 16,500 as three months advance rent for the months of April, May and June, 1996 and the other amount of Rs. 16,500 as security deposit. A rent agreement (Annexure-A) was executed by him. However, the plaintiff No. 1 occupied the premises and after sometime desired to vacate on 31.12.1996 and wanted adjustment of Rs. 16,500 the amount of security deposit; she gave six cheques of Rs. 2,500 each on account of part of rent and balance amount of Rs. 3,000 was to be adjusted out of the security deposit amount. Thus, besides three months advance rent, the plaintiffs paid Rs. 15,000 by means of six cheques and on adjusting the security amount of Rs. 16,500, a balance of Rs. 1,500 remains due as on 31.12.1996. The plaintiffs have not paid any other amount there after. It is thus alleged that the monthly rent is Rs. 5,500 and not Rs. 2,500. The plaintiffs, however, could not pay the monthly rent of Rs. 5,500 and of their own surrendered one room (marked X in the sketch filed by the plaintiff) on 28.7.1997 and agreeing to pay monthly rent at the rate of Rs. 4,000 from August, 1997 for the remaining portion and promised to clear the arrears ofrent due since January, 1997 by December 1997 for which a writing (Annexure B) written in the hand of the plaintiff No. 1 and signed by both the plaintiffs was also given. The plaintiffs had agreed to pay rent ofRs 4,000 after surrendering one room, however, the amount of Rs. 3,500 was wrongfully mentioned in the writing given by the plaintiffs which was not accepted by defendant No. 1.

6. Similar averments have been made in the reply to the application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and also in the application under Order 39, Rule 4.

7. Separate written statement has been filed on behalf of defendants No. 3 and 4. They have pleaded that the complaint of plaintiff made on 30.7.1997 was found false.

8. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for the parties : have placed reliance on their respective pleadings, plaintiffs supporting the interim injunction whereas defendants opposing it. Reliance on behalf ofdefendants has been placed on S.P. Chengalwaraya Naiduv. Gagan Nath, 1994 (1) SCC 21: AIR 1994 SC 853 [LQ/SC/1993/933] .

9. The principles for the grant of temporary injunction are well established. The grant of an interlocutory injunction is discretionary. The object of the interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury by violation of his right for which he could not be adequately compensated in damages recoverable in the action if he ultimately succeeds after trial. The plaintiffs need for such protection has to be weighed against the corresponding need of the defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal right for which he could not be adequately compensated. The material available to the Court at the hearing ofan interlocutory application should disclose that the plaintiff has real prospect of succeeding in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial. And the Court has to be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious and there is a serious question to be tried and the claim is bona fide. Though the Court is not justified in embarking upon anything resembling a trial of the action upon conflicting affidavits in order to evaluate the strength of either partys case however, it may not be improper to take into account the relative strength of each partys case as revealed by the affidavit evidence and the material adduced on the hearing of the application. The burden is on the plaintiff by evidence aliuende by affidavit or otherwise, to show that there is a prima facie case in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infringement ofthe enjoyment ofhis property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. The Court has to be circumspect before granting the injunction and look to the conduct ofthe party and the probable injury to either party. The Supreme Court in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. M.C.D. & Ors.,(1993) 3 SCC 161 [LQ/SC/1993/444] , while reiterating the well established principles oflaw governing grant ofinterim injunction has sounded a note ofadvice as also a warning for the Courts while considering the application for grant of interlocutory application for temporary injunction. This is so because it is notorious fact that great delay is caused in the administration ofjustice with so many cases pending in Courts and once an interim order of injunction is passed in many cases the interim order continues for months and even in many cases for years. While the Court should be always willing to extend its hand to protect a citizen who is being wronged or is being deprived of a property without any authority in law or without following the procedure which are fundamental and vital in nature but at the same time the judicial proceedings cannot be used to protect or to perpetuate a wrong committed by a person who approaches the Court. Power to grant injunction is an extraordinary power vested in the Court to be exercised taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

10. Coming to the facts of the case, case of the plaintiff as pleaded is that plaintiff No. 1 was inducted as a tenant in the property in question by defendant No. 1 on 1.4.1996 at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,500; her father late Shri P.N. Ghai had given two cheques of Rs. 16,500 each both dated 26.3.1996, partly towards security and partly towards rent; Rs. 7,500 was given as rent for the months of April to June, 1996 and thereafter she paid rent for the months of July to December, 1996 @ Rs. 2,500 per month; it is also alleged that defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had attempted to illegally evict them first in May, 1997 and on 28.7.1997, defendant No. 1 put his lock on the outer room of the premises; and on 30.7.1997 removed the goods of plaintiffs and placed his own goods and occupied it with the help of bad elements, for this a complaint was lodged with the local police on 30.7.1997.

11. It is not specifically pleaded how much amount was given by way of security and how two separate cheques of Rs. 16,500 were given if rent of 3 months of April to June, 1996 paid was Rs. 7,500 only. The case pleaded by the defendant No. 1 is that the premises were agreed to be let out to Indian Hospital Association through the father of plaintiff No. 1 at a monthly rent of Rs. 5,500 for which an agreement of lease dated 26.3.1996 (Annexure A) was entered into with Shri Ghai and he had given two cheques of Rs. 16,500 each both dated 26.3.1996 one of Rs. 16,500 as security deposit and other as rent for the months of April to June, 1996; the plaintiff No. 1 however occupied the premises and afterwards agreed to vacate the premises by 31 st December, 1996 and wanted adjustment of security amount of Rs. 16,500; rent was agreed to be paid partly by cheque of Rs. 2,500 and the balance amount of Rs. 3,000 was to be adjusted out of the security deposit and after thus adjusting these payments a balance amount of Rs. 1,500 remains due on account of rent up to December, 1996. And except these payments no other payments have been made. Lease agreement dated 26.3.1996 annexed with the written statement purports to have been signed on behalf of M/s. Indian Hospital Association by Shri P.N.Ghai. By this agreement defendant No. 1 had agreed to let J-341, Sarita Vihar comprising of two bedrooms, drawing 1 dining room and kitchen at a monthly rent of Rs. 5,500 exclusive of electricity and water charges. Payment of Rs. 16,500 as security money; and another Rs. 16,500 as advance rent is acknowledged in it. This agreement with correctness of Mr. Ghai as not been denied in the replication or in the affidavit filed by the plaintiffs.

12. The defendant No. 1 has supported this plea by his two affidavits also. If the premises were agreed to be let to Indian Hospital Association at a monthly rent of Rs. 5,500 on 26.3.1996, there would be no reason for the defendant No. 1 having let out the same premises to plaintiff No. 1 at a monthly rent of Rs. 2,500. Plaintiff has obviously got benefit of this deposit made by his father.

REGARDING DISPOSSESSION OF PLAINTIFF FROM ONE ROOM (MARK X):

13. The plaintiffs have pleaded in para 11 of the plaint that on 28.7.1997 at about 8.45 a.m. defendants No. 1 and 2 with some bad elements attempted to physically dispossess the plaintiffs and. defendant No. 1 even locked one bedroom mark X from outside and on 30.7.1997 in the early hours defendants No. 1 and 2 again came along with goondas and broke open the door of the said bedroom, gained access to it, removed the goods of the plaintiffs, and placed their own goods there and locked it from the outside. It is not her case that any complaint was lodged on 28.7.1997 when the defendant had put his lock on one room and taken possession of one room.

14. The defendant No. 1 on the other hand has pleaded that the plaintiffs could not pay the rent of Rs. 5,500 per month and agreed to surrender one room mark X on 28.7.1997 in the morning and plaintiff No. 1 herself had suggested that she will pay Rs. 4,000 from August 1997 which was agreed. One room was surrendered and the same has been occupied by defendant No. 1 since 28.7.1997. This fact is supported by the writing Annexure B given in her hand and signed by both the plaintiffs. Though the amount of reduced rent is mentioned as Rs. 3,500 in it but the defendant has alleged that the agreed rent was Rs. 4,000 per month. Annexure B reads as under:

Shrimanji Jagdish C. Mehta,

I am keeping part of your flat on rent. Rest rent since December, 1996 will be paid in installments maximum by December, 1997 @ Rs. 5,500 per month upto July, 1997.

Present rent will be Rs. 3500 p.m. Electricity for outside room will be paid by the landlord.

Sd/-

(Sapna Singh) (Rajesh Singh)

Dtd : 28.7.97"

15. These facts have not been specifically denied by the plaintiffs in the replication or in reply to defendants application under Order 39, Rule 4. Under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code a party is expected to expressly deny the facts which are within its knowledge. Denial should be definite and unambiguous. The scope of this provision has been considered by the Supreme Court in Badat & Company v. East India Trading Co.,AIR 1964 SC 538 [LQ/SC/1963/170] where after referring to Rules 3, 4 and 5 of Order 8 of the Code his Lordship Subba Rao, J. observed as under:

These three rules form an integrated Code dealing with the manner in which allegations of fact in the plaint should be traversed and the legal consequences flowing from its non-compliance. The written-statement must deal specifically with each allegation of fact in the plaint and when a defendant denies any such fact he must not do so evasively, but answer, the point of substance. If his denial of fact is not specific but evasive, the said fact shall be taken to be admitted. In such an event, the admission itself being proof, no other proof is necessary

The present suit has been filed on the Original Side of this Court. The pleadings in this Court are drafted by trained lawyers; both the plaintiffs are admittedly Advocates. The pleadings had obviously been drafted with due deliberations.

16. In the light of the circumstances, the material facts alleged by the defendants having not been specifically denied amount to admission. The writing mark B has been written and signed by the plaintiffs and it has not been denied. Even at the time of arguments this writing was not disputed or denied. Agreement Annexure A entered into by defendant No. 1 with the father of plaintiff is also not denied. These two writings belie the stand taken by plaintiffs and supports the case of defendant No. 1.

17. The plaint in paras 1 to 17 contains statement of facts relied by the plaintiffs and which are within the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The verification of the plaint is as under:

"We, Mrs. Sapna Singh Pathania, Advocate and Mr. Rajesh Singh Pathania, Advocate, the plaintiffs No. 1 and 2, do hereby solemnly affirm and verify that the contents of paras 1 to 17 of the plaint are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and belief."

18. To the similar effect is the verification in the replication. Sub-rules (1) and (2) of Rule 15 of Order 6 of the Code read as under:

"15. Verification of pleadings(1)Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force, every pleading shall be verified at the foot by the party or by one of the parties pleading or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.

(2) The person verifying shall specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs of the pleading, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true."

19. The object of this Rule is to fix responsibility for allegations made in the plaint on the persons who verify and this is to ensure that false allegations are not made freely and recklessly. The verification in plaint and replication is not proper and according to law. Facts which were within the knowledge of the plaintiff have not been verified in accordance with the statutory requirement giving rise to an adverse inference against the plaintiff that they have deliberately not made correct and truthful statements. These pleadings thus lack bona fides on the part of the plaintiffs.

20. Same is the position with the verification of the two affidavits one filed in support of application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 and the other in support of the defendants application under Order 39, Rule 4.

The verifications of the two affidavits read as under:

I, Smt. Sapna Singh Pathania, the deponent named hereinabove do hereby solemnly affirm and verify that the contents of the above affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. No part of it is false and nothing material has been concealed therefrom.

Order 19, Rule 2(1) of the Code provides that upon any application evidence may be given by affidavit. Evidently these affidavits filed in support of interlocutory applications is intended to contain the evidence of the deponent.

21. Rule 3 of Order 19 of the Code reads as under:

3(1). Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except an interlocutory application on which statements on his belief may be admitted, provided that the grounds thereof are stated.

22. An affidavit must contain the evidence of the deponent as to such facts of which he is in a position to speak of to his knowledge and such fact must be verified on personal knowledge. It is only in respect of those facts which are not within his knowledge which can be verified on information or belief. The source of information or the grounds of belief must be clearly stated so that the opposite party gets an opportunity to verify the averments and make an effective answer. The facts must be given with sufficient particularity to enable the Court to judge whether it would be safe to act on the deponents belief.

23. Verification of an affidavit is required by law, (a) to satisfy the Court about the authenticity of the allegations made in the affidavit and (b) to make the deponent accept responsibility for the same. False verification is an offence under Sections 191 and 193 of the IPC.

24. An affidavit not complying these requirements of Order 19 is no affidavit in the eyes of law and it is not safe to rely on it. It is liable to be rejected. (A.K.K.Nambiarv. Union of India & Anr.,AIR 1970 SC 652 [LQ/SC/1969/445] ).

25. The affidavit evidence filed by the plaintiffs thus is not proper and legal evidence on which reliance could be placed safely.

26. On the other hand, there is no reason to disbelieve the averments made by the defendants which are supported by affidavit and two documents, agreement of lease Annexure A" and the writing given by the plaintiffs Annexure B".Thus, from the pleadings of the plaintiff and affidavit evidence filed by them and other material on record, it cannot be said that the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case. Prima facie, there is no reason to disbelieve that the premises were agreed to be let out at a rent of Rs. 5,500 per month. The plaintiffs had occupied the premises on the strength of this agreement dated 26.3.1996. The premises would not have been let out @ Rs. 2,500 per month to the plaintiffs at the same time as alleged by her. The first and foremost requirement of existence of prima facie case thus is not fulfilled in this case. In these circumstances, the other two conditions of balance of convenience and irreparable loss being caused to the plaintiff does not arise.

27. The result is that application of the plaintiff being I.A. No. 6479/97 has no merit and the same is dismissed and that of the defendants being I.A. 7831/97 is allowed.

28. The order granting interim injunction passed on August 1, 1997 on IA No. 6479/97 is hereby vacated.

29. Plaintiffs shall pay costs of these proceedings. Costs assessed at Rs. 2,500.

IAs. No. 7831/97 and 6479/97 are disposed of accordingly.