Authored By : Das, Mookerjee, S.C. Lahiri
Das, J.
1. In all the above matters, the Court of origin was aCourt, which, as from the appointed date (August 15, 1947), was situate in EastBengal. The appeals to this Court were disposed of, the applications for leaveto appeal to the Privy Council were filed and orders for final admission of theappeals were made before the said date. The paper-books were in course ofpreparation on the said date and are now ready.
2. In Privy Council Appeal No. 19 of 1944 the amount due onaccount of paper-book costs was not deposited in time; an office note, datedNovember 26, 1947, was put up before the Division Court taking Privy Councilmatters.
3. The Division Court, when the matter was put up before it,felt some doubt as to whether this Court had jurisdiction to make any order.The Court then heard the learned advocates for the parties on November 28, 1947and December 1, 1947.
4. Meanwhile, an application for the appointment of aguardian-ad-litem of a minor Respondent in Privy Council Appeal No. 8 of 1945had been directed to be put up before the Division Court taking Privy Councilmatters and had stood adjourned. This matter was also put up before the Courton November 28, 1947. The self-same question as to the power of this Court topass orders in this matter was also heard along with the said Privy CouncilAppeal No. 19 of 1944.
5. Both the cases were disposed of by a judgment reported asBrojendra Kishore Ray Chaudhuri v. Mohini Mohan Chaudhuri I.L.R. (1948) Cal.381. In Privy Council Appeal No. 19 of 1944, this Court, by a separate order,extended the rime for making the required deposit.
6. In Privy Council Appeal No. 8 of 1945, by Order No. 40,dated December 12, 1947, the case was directed to be put up on January 16,1948, for orders. By Order No. 41, dated January 16, 1948, this Courtdischarged the Deputy Registrar from the guardianship of the minor RespondentsNos. 1-7, 9-24 and 26-63 and appointed Mr. Serajuddin Ahmed, an advocate ofthis Court, as the guardian-ad-litem of the said minors.
7. Thereafter, in another case, Privy Council Appeal No. 48of 1946, the printed record had been transmitted to the Federal Court inaccordance with the provisions of Section 4 of the Federal Court (Enlargementof Jurisdiction) Act, 1947, which had meanwhile come into force on February 1,1948.
8. After the record was received, the Registrar of theFederal Court drew the attention of this Court to the fact that prima facie aquestion as to the jurisdiction of this Court to deal with the Privy Councilmatter was involved and directed that the matter be judicially determined bythis Court.
9. On receipt of the letter, the above matter and similarother matters including Privy Council Appeals Nos. 19 of 1944 and 8 of 1945,where, as already stated, the question of jurisdiction of this Court had beendecided by a Division Court, were put up before the learned Chief Justice andChakravartti J for orders.
10. These matters were then heard in the presence of thelearned advocates of all the parties in these cases.
11. The learned Chief Justice and Chakravartti J were ofopinion that the cases reported in I.L.R. [1948] Cal. 381 were wrongly decidedand that the following questions should be decided by a Full Bench:
(i) Whether this Court had, on or after August 15, 1947,jurisdiction over Privy Council matters, in which leave to appeal had beengranted and the appeal admitted before August 15, 1947, where the Court oforigin is now situate in Pakistan and the subject-matter of the dispute fellwithin the territories of East Bengal
(ii) Whether the orders, dated December 22, 1947, made inPrivy Council Appeals Nos. 19 of 1944 and 8 of 1945 were correctly made
12. Their Lordships, accordingly, directed that the abovesix Privy Council matters be referred to a Full Bench for decision.
13. They have now been argued before us by the learnedadvocates for the parties.
14. A preliminary objection was taken by Dr. Sen Gupta thatthe References are all incompetent as the rules of this Court do not providefor a Reference to a Full Bench in Privy Council matters. It was submitted thatChap. VII, Rule (2) to (5) are exhaustive of cases where such a Reference canbe made and these rules do not refer to Privy Council matters. In our opinion,Chap. VII, Rule (1) is wide enough to cover the present cases. Rules (2) to (5)merely define the course to be pursued by the Full Bench in certain specifiedcases.
15. In two of the cases, viz., Privy Council Appeal No. 19of 1944 and Privy Council Appeal No. 8 of 1945, a further objection was taken. Itwas submitted that in these cases the jurisdiction of this Court to pass orderswas decided by the Division Court as a preliminary point and that decisionoperated as res judicata and precludes the referring Judges from deciding theidentical point at a later stage and that, as such, the Reference in these twocases was incompetent.
16. The argument is plausible, but does not bearexamination.
17. Admittedly, Section 11 of the Code of Civil Proceduredoes not in terms apply. The question is whether the principles of finality inlitigation as enunciated by the Privy Council in Ram Kirpals case I.L.R.(1883) All. 269 : L. Rule 11 I.A. 37 apply.
18. Mr. Gupta, however, submitted that what is res judicatais the point directly decided or the order passed and not the reason thereof.
19. In the above two cases, the question before the Courtwas whether time should be extended for making a deposit or whether an orderappointing a guardian-ad-litem for a minor Respondent should be made. The pointwhether the Court had power to pass any order in cases like the present wasgone into for a limited purpose. The question which has now arisen, viz.,whether the printed record should go to the East Bengal High Court or to thePrivy Council or to the Federal Court did not then arise. In fact, the FederalCourt (Enlargement of Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 (I of 1948), had not then comeinto force. The ambit of the enquiry before us is much wider. The order whichwas passed did not conclusively determine the matter which is now before us. Inthe case of Tarini Charan Bhattacharya v. Kedar Nath Haldar I.L.R. (1928) Cal.723, 737 Rankin C.J. said:
What is made conclusive between the parties is the decisionof the Court and that the reasoning of the Court is not necessarily the samething as its decision. The object of the doctrine of res judicata is not tofasten upon parties special principles of law as applicable to them inter se,but to ascertain their rights and the facts upon which these rights directlyand substantially depend and to prevent this ascertainment from becomingnugatory by precluding the parties from re-opening or recontesting that whichhas been finally decided.
20. An abstract question of law, dissociated from andunconnected with the rights claimed or denied as between the parties to thelitigation, is of no importance or value to them or to the decision of the caseitself and cannot be said to be substantially in issue and is not eadem questioand the principles of res judicata cannot apply: Broken Hill ProprietaryCompany Limited v. Municipal Council of Broken Hill (1926) A.C. 94.
21. It is not every decision of a question of law betweenthe parties which is binding, but only that decision on such a question whichaffects the subject-matter or creates a legal relation between the parties ordefines the status of either of them, which is binding.
22. The specific matters then before the Court are bindingbetween the parties, but the general question on which this Reference has beenmade, was not directly and substantially in issue and is not so binding. In ouropinion, it was open to the referring Judges to go into the matter and to makean order of Reference to a Full Bench. The point now raised does not appear tohave been raised at the time when the order for Reference was made.
23. The References are, therefore, competent. Thepreliminary objection is overruled.
24. We now proceed to consider the questions referred to us.
25. Article 3 of the High Court (Calcutta) Order, 1947,provides:
The High Court in Calcutta shall continue to exist on andafter the appointed day and shall, save as expressly provided by the High Court(Bengal) Order, 1947, have all such original, appellate and other jurisdictionas it had immediately before that day.
26. This Court, therefore, retains all its original,appellate and other jurisdictions, except where such jurisdiction has beentaken away by the High Court (Bengal) Order 1947.
27. Article 3 of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, set upa High Court of Judicature for East Bengal from August 15, 1947, to be calledthe High Court of East Bengal.
28. Article 5 of the High Court (Bengal) Order vested in theEast Bengal High Court, in respect of the territories in the province of EastBengal, all such original, appellate and other jurisdictions which wereexercised by the High Court at Calcutta in respect of the said territoriesbefore August 15, 1947.
29. Article 13(1) of the High Court (Bengal) Order runs asfollows:
Subject as hereinafter provided, the High Court in Calcuttashall have no jurisdiction in respect of the territories for the time beingincluded in the province of East Bangal.
30. The effect of Articles 5 and 13 is thus to give the HighCourt of East Bengal exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the territories inthe province of East Bengal and to take away all such jurisdiction from theHigh Court in Calcutta, subject to Article 13, paras. (2) (a), (b), (c) and(3).
Paragraph (2) (a) preserves the jurisdiction of this Courtin respect of all matters pending before it on the Original Side on August 15,1947, even though these may concern the territories in the province of EastBengal. Appeals from decrees and orders made in such proceedings are to bedecided by this Court by virtue of para. (2) (b).
Paragraph (2) (c) continues in this Court the power ofreview of orders made by this Court.
Paragraph (3) deals with matters pending on the AppellateSide and reads as follows:
Subject to the preceding provisions of this Article, allproceedings pending on the Appellate Side of the High Court in Calcuttaimmediately before the appointed day, shall, where the Court of origin is, asfrom that day, situated in the province of East Bengal stand transferred byvirtue of this Order to the High Court of East Bengal.
Paragraph (4) then provides:
Subject to the following provisions of this Article withrespect to appeals, any order made by the High Court in Calcutta either--
(a) before the appointed day; or
(b) in any proceedings with respect to which the said HighCourt retains jurisdiction by virtue of para. (5), (2) and (3) of this Article:
shall for all purposes have effect not only as an order ofthe High Court in Calcutta but also as an order made by the High Court of EastBengal.
This paragraph is, therefore, intended to giveextra-territorial effect to orders passed by this Court after August 15, 1947,in respect of matters dealt with in Article 13, paras. (2) (a), (b), (c) and(3).
Paragraph (7) states as follows:
And for the purposes of this Article, proceedings shall bedeemed to be pending in a particular Court until that Court has disposed of allissues between the parties including any issues with respect to the taxation ofthe costs of the proceedings.
31. In Pyari Mohan Kundu v. Bejoy Singh Chopra I.L.R. (1949)Cal. 271 a Special Bench of this Court had to construe Article 13(1) of theHigh Court (Bengal) Order, 1947. In that case, a suit had been filed in a Courtin the District of Faridpur, which has, on and from August 15, 1947, beenassigned to East Bengal, for levy of tolls in a market. The suit was decided bythis Court on Second Appeal before August 15, 1947. An application for leave toAppeal to His Majesty in Council was filed in this Court after August 15, 1947.A question arose whether the appeal could be entertained by this Court.
32. It was held that under Article 13(1) of the High Court(Bengal) Order, 1947, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction in respect ofany suit instituted in any Court situated within the territory of East Bengaland the exclusion of jurisdiction was not confined only to suits in respect ofland or interest in land forming part of the territory of East Bengal.
33. Article 13 merely embodies the well-establishedprinciple of private international law enunciated by the House of Lords inBritish South Africa Company v. Companhia de Mocambique (1893) A.C. 602, wherethe Supreme Court of Judicature was held to have no jurisdiction to recoverdamages for trespass to land situate abroad.
34. The question which is now before us was expressly leftopen by the Special Bench (supra).
35. In the present order of Reference, the question isstated to be--
Whether the records should be despatched to the FederalCourt in Delhi or to the High Court at Dacca for transmission to the PrivyCouncil
36. In the view we have taken of these cases, the recordsshould be despatched to the High Court at Dacca. It is not necessary for us toexpress any opinion as to the ultimate destination of the records. That will bea matter for the consideration of the High Court of East Bengal.
37. Article 13 (2) and (3) of the High Court (Bengal) Order,1947, deal with the question of transfer of cases pending in this Court onAugust 15, 1947. This High Court is known to possess an Original Side and anAppellate Side. Different sets of rules have, accordingly, been framed by theCourt. It is significant that the expressions used are not "originaljurisdiction" or "appellate jurisdiction".
38. The Letters Patent vests this Court with original,appellate, revisional and other jurisdictions, e.g., Admiralty, Divorce,Probate, Matrimonial, etc.
39. Under Section 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure(hereinafter called the Code) appeals lie to His Majesty in Council--
(a) from any decree or final order passed on appeal by theHigh Court or by any other Court of final appellate jurisdiction;
(b) from any decree or final order passed by a High Court inthe exercise of original jurisdiction; and
(c) from any decree or order when the case is certified tobe a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council.
40. In the case of Harish Chandra Acharja v. Nawbab Bahadurof Murshidabad (1911) 15 C.W.N. 879, it was held that a final order passed in aCivil Revisional case is an order passed on appeal within Section 109(a).
41. The six Privy Council matters which have been referredto us do not come within Clause (b) or (c) of Section 109 of the Code of CivilProcedure. We do not express any opinion on the question as to the destinationof the records in such cases.
42. Ordinarily, the jurisdiction of a Court to deal with thesubject-matter before it ceases with the disposal of the case, except forpurposes of review under Section 114 or for correction of certain errors underSections 151 and 152 of the Code.
43. We shall now consider the provision of Order XLV of theCode and the Judicial Committee Rules.
44. Under Order XLV, this Court receives the application forleave to appeal to His Majesty in Council, exercises powers of consolidation ofappeals, grants a certificate, accepts the required deposit or the security.
45. Under Rule 8, the Court declares the appeal to beadmitted, gives notice to the Respondent, transmits a correct copy of therecord to the Privy Council.
46. Before the admission of the appeal, the Court may revokethe security and make further orders. After the admission of the appeal thisCourt may order further security or deposit in case of deficiency and in caseof failure, the consequences mentioned in Rule 11 follow. Rules 12, 13 and 14confer on this Court, even after the final admission, powers of stay ofexecution, refund of balance of deposit, appointment of receiver, increase ofsecurity in case of insufficiency, etc.
47. Rules 8 and 9 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1920,deal with the powers of this Court after the grant of the certificate. Rules11, 12 and 13 deal with such powers after final admission of the appeal andbefore despatch of records. Rule 14 deals with powers of this Court afterdespatch of records. Rule 51 deals with a certificate of the Registrar asregards the person to be substituted.
48. The broad distinction is that, after the despatch ofrecords, this Court merely makes a report to the Privy Council and final ordersare passed by the latter.
49. Rule 19 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1925, providesfor registry of the appeal in the Privy Council after the records are received.
50. Order XLV of the Code creates a special jurisdiction inthe Court, whose decree is appealed from to His Majesty in Council, toentertain an application for leave to appeal and to pass various orders asalready stated. The extent of the powers of this Court differs at the differentstages of the said proceedings in this Court.
51. Dr. Sen Gupta contends that the jurisdiction so createdis of a very special character and is exercisable only when occasion arises forsuch exercise. In support of his submission, he relies on the followingobservations of Rankin C.J. in Bir Bikram Kishore Manikya v. Ali Ahamad I.L.R.(1927) Cal. 758, 762 [LQ/CalHC/1927/172] :
Proceedings before this Court have terminated and the wholematter is before the Judicial Committee.
52. The observations have to be read with reference to thefacts before this Court. A Privy Council appeal had been finally admitted andwas proceeding ex parte before the Privy Council. An application was made onbehalf of the guardian-ad-litem to be put in funds for contesting the appeal. Aquestion of jurisdiction of this Court to make an order arose. The learnedChief Justice was of opinion that the powers of this Court were of a limitedcharacter depending on Order XLV of the Code and the Judicial Committee Rulesand this Court had no power to make the order which was not covered by OrderXLV of the Code or by the Judicial Committee Rules. The observations do notmean that no proceedings are pending in this Court after the final admission ofthe appeal.
53. Reference was also made to the following observations ofSulaiman J. in Lachmeswar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri I.L.R. (1927)Cal. 758, 762:
This obviously implies that after the admission of theappeal, it has passed out of the absolute control of the High Court.
54. The observations speak of cessation of absolute controlof the High Court and do not support the submission of the learned advocate.
55. Dr. Sen Gupta referred us to Rule 2 to 6 of the JudicialCommittee Rules, 1920 and Rule 11 to 18 of the Judicial Committee Rules, 1925and submitted that, under the said rules, the Registrar of this Court has toperform certain duties and the exercise of such functions would not be possibleif the records are transmitted to the High Court of East Bengal. Similarcomments were made in regard to Rule 11 to 14 of the Judicial Committee Rules,1920.
56. It was also submitted that Clause 42 of the LettersPatent would be affected if these cases are transferred to the High Court, EastBengal.
57. The above argument ignores the effect of the setting upof two dominions and the establishment of a High Court in East Bengal.
58. The Judicial Committee Rules, 1920 and 1925 Clause42 of the Letters Patent have to be read so as to make the same applicable tothe two High Courts.
59. Section 18 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, alsosupports this view and provides for contingencies like the present.
60. As already stated, by virtue of Order XLV of the Codeand the rules of the Judicial Committee, 1920 and 1925 the Rules of thisCourt, this Court exercises certain powers which, however, differ according tothe stage of the proceedings commencing with the filing of the application forleave to appeal to the Privy Council and ending with the taxation of costs ofthis Court after the disposal of the appeal.
61. These powers are exercised by this Court as ancillary tothe due prosecution of the appeal before the Judicial Committee and to thecarrying out of the orders of the Judicial Committee. The thread of continuitywhich runs through the different stages is that all such powers are exercisedby this Court in relation to one and the same matter, viz., the appeal beforethe Privy Council.
62. By reason of Article 13, para. (7), the proceedings,which are initiated in this Court by the filing of a petition to this Courtunder Order XLV, Rule 2, remains pending till all issues between the partiesincluding any issues with respect to the taxation of the costs of theproceedings, are disposed of.
63. Under Rule 45, Part II, Chap. VI of the Rules of thisCourt (Appellate Jurisdiction), the Deputy Registrar of this Court grants to thesuccessful party in appeal to His Majesty in Council a certificate of the costsincurred in the appeal in this Court and places it on the record of the PrivyCouncil Appeal. Dr. Sen Gupta suggests that the certificate granted by theDeputy Registrar is not taxation of costs. We do not agree. The amount of coststo be entered in the certificate may be a matter of doubt or dispute and theDeputy Registrar has to exercise his judgment in disposing of the matter. Tillthen, at any rate, the proceedings are pending. The mere fact that no activestep may be required to be taken by a party after the final admission of theappeal and before the despatch of records to the Privy Council does not makethe proceedings any the less a pending one. As Jessel M.R. observed in In reClagetts Estate. Fordham v. Clagett (1882) 20 Ch. D. 637, 653:
A cause is said to be pending in a Court of justice when anyproceeding can be taken in it. That is the test. If you can take any proceedingit is pending.
64. There is a distinction between the words"appeal" and "proceeding": Section 645, Rule 11. We areconcerned with the pendency of "proceedings" in this Court on August15, 1947.
65. Under Chap. VI, Rule (2) of the Rules of this Court(Appellate Jurisdiction) matters connected with appeals to His Majesty inCouncil, except those which the Registrar, Appellate Side, is authorised todeal, shall ordinarily be heard by a Division Court appointed by the ChiefJustice to deal with such matters.
66. The six matters before us are thus proceedings pendingon the Appellate Side on August 15, 1947.
67. The above discussion leads us to hold that these mattersare proceedings pending on the Appellate Side of the High Court at Calcuttaimmediately before the appointed date and as the Court of origin in all thesematters is, as from the appointed day, situated in the province of East Bengal,they stood transferred by virtue of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, to theHigh Court of East Bengal.
68. As these matters stood transferred to the High Court ofEast Bengal, on and from August 15, 1947, they were not in the eye of law,pending in this Court on February 1, 1948 and thee Federal Court (Enlargementof Jurisdiction) Act, 1947 (I of 1948) is not attracted to these cases.
69. A contrary view was taken by a Division Bench of thisCourt in Brojendra Kishore Ray Chaudhuri v. Mohini Mohan Chaudhuri (supra). Inthe order of Reference, the learned Chief Justice referring to this decisionsaid:
I might say that one of the learned Judges who decided thosetwo cases has himself expressed considerable doubt as to the correctness of thedecision.
70. We shall now proceed to examine the grounds on which thedecision is based.
71. The learned Judges rightly point out that under Art. 5of the High Court (Calcutta) Order, 1947, this Court retains all itsjurisdiction, original, appellate or otherwise, save as expressly provided bythe High Court (Bengal) Order. Article 13 of this Order, which was relied onbehalf of some of the parties in favour of the transfer of these cases to EastBengal, High Court, was held to be inapplicable on the following grounds:
(i) The opening words subject to the proceeding provisions"of this Article" mean that the proceedings pending on the AppellateSide should be such on which an adjudication on the merits could be given as inArticle 13(2)(a) to (c), i.e., appeals and revisions pending on the AppellateSide.
(ii) Article 13(7) defines the word "pending" thedefinition implies an adjudication on some material question of fact orproposition of law and does not include matters which may arise for disposalafter the certificate is granted and before the records are despatched.
(iii) The phrase "proceedings pending on the Appellate"Side" is ambiguous and a wide construction, which includes PrivyCouncil matters, should not be adopted, because: (a) such an interpretationwould affect Clause 42 of the Letters Patent and (b) Rules 11, 13, 51 of theJudicial Committee Rules, 1925 and would render the provision ultra vires.
72. We shall deal with, these reasons seriatim.
As regards ground No. (i), we think that the opening wordsmake para. (3) subject to paras. (1) and (2) and do not bear the meaning soughtto be put upon them, by the learned Judges. The opening words were insertedwith a view to impose a further limitation on Article 13(3) in cases which maycome within Article 13 (1), (2).
73. As regards No. (ii), this Court retains various powersafter the grant of a certificate and even after the final admission of theappeal, e.g., application for stay of execution, appointment of a receiver,substitution on death of party, taxation of costs of the High Court, etc. andadjudication may be necessary to decide any dispute which may arise at thatstage. We have already held that the pendency of proceedings would not end withthe grant of the certificate.
74. As regards ground No. (iii), neither Clause 42 of theLetters Patent nor the Judicial Committee Rules are affected by theinterpretation we have put on Article 13, para. (3) of the High Court (Bengal)Order, 1947. It is true that, under Art. 3 of the High Court (Calcutta) Order,this Court continues to exist as before; and retains all such original,appellate and other jurisdictions save as otherwise expressly provided. Article5 of the High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947, however, vested the abovejurisdictions of this Court in the High Court of East Bengal in respect of theterritories now in East Bengal. The Letters Patent and the Judicial CommitteeRules have to be read, in the changed circumstances, as referring to the HighCourt, East Bengal, in respect of the territories in East Bengal in cases likethe present.
75. But, even if the effect of our interpretation to beaffect Clause 42 of the Letters Patent and the Rules of the Judicial Committee,such power was vested in the Governor-General by the Indian Independence Act,1947. The Act was passed by the Houses of Parliament and approved by the KingsMost Exalted Majesty and came into force on July 18, 1947. Section 9 provides:
(1) The Governor-General shall by order make such provisionas appears to him to be necessary or expedient--
(a) for bringing the provisions of this Act into effectiveoperation;
* * * * * *
(d) for removing difficulties arising in connection with thetransition to the provisions of this Act;
* * * * * *
(i) sO far as it appears necessary or expedient inconnection with any of the matters aforesaid for varying the constitution,powers or jurisdiction of any legislature, Court or other authority in the newDominions and creating new legislatures, Courts, or other authorities therein
* * * * * *
76. The above-quoted provisions, in our opinion, conferredon the Governor-General plenary powers to provide for all matters consequentialon or connected with the setting up of two independent Dominions in India.
77. The High Court (Bengal) Order, 1947 and the High Court(Calcutta) Order, 1947, were promulgated by the Governor-General in exercise ofthe powers conferred by Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and ofall other powers enabling him in that behalf.
78. In our opinion, Art. (13) of the High Court (Bengal)Order, 1947, as construed by us, is not ultra vires and is not in excess of thepowers of the Governor-General by virtue of which the order was made.
79. The grounds on which the decision of this Court inBrojendra Kishore Ray Chaudhuri v. Mohini Mohan Chaudhuri I.L.R. (1948) Cal.381 is based are not tenable.
80. We, therefore, hold that the above case was wrongly decided.
81. Our answers to the two questions referred to us are asfollows:
(1) This Court has, on or after August 15, 1947, nojurisdiction over Privy Council matters, in which leave to appeal had beengranted and the appeal admitted before August 15, 1947, where the Court oforigin is now situate in East Bengal and the subject-matter of the dispute fellwithin the territories of East Bengal.
(2) The orders, dated December 22, 1947, in Privy CouncilAppeals Nos. 19 of 1944 and 8 of 1945 were not correctly made.
82. Certificate under Section 205(1) of the Government ofIndia Act, 1935, is granted.
Mookerjee, J.
83. I agree.
S.C. Lahiri, J.
84. I agree.
.
Santosh Kumar Das vs.Nripendra Kumar Ray Chaudhuri (07.04.1949 - CALHC)
