M.F. SALDANHA, J.

( 1 ) ASPECTS of some significance touching proceedings instituted for dissolution of marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 have arisen in these appeals, in which we have heard learned counsel extensively, which issues are summarized below : (A) Whether in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage while granting a relief under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the trial Court would be justified in the grant of ancillary orders in relation to items of property, such as the ornaments, furniture, fixtures etc. , or whether on a strict construction of S. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, a Court would be required to direct the parties to adopt separate proceedings only in respect of these reliefs (b) Where the is silent and it appears both reasonable and desirable that the reliefs in respect of property not covered by S. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act be granted, whether the inherent powers under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure ought to be used (c) Whether in a case of grant of permanent maintenance/alimony at the stage of final disposal of the petition the order can date back to the point of time of the institution of parallel matrimonial proceedings earlier instituted in the face of an interim order refusing the grant of maintenance in that case (d) Whether the Court would be justified in refusing a litigant, who is alleged to have frustrated the resumption of cohabitation, the relief of divorce on the ground that the party is taking advantage of its own wrong

( 2 ) THESE are some of the main facets of the dispute that has fallen for adjudication before us. We shall, to the extent necessary, summarise the history of this proceeding, which is rather unusual and which, in fact, encompasses three different matrimonial proceedings. The appellant-wife had instituted M. J. Petition No. 383 of 1986 before the City Civil Court at Bombay on 4-4-1986 praying for a decree for judicial separation as also for a direction that she be awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 1,050. 00 per month for her three children. The appellant-wife was gainfully employed at that time and did not pray for any maintenance for herself. This petition was preceded by an earlier petition, being M. J. Petition No. 662 of 1982, filed by the respondent-husband. He had sought a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. The parties are Hindus and were married at Bombay on 11-5-1969 according to the vedic rites and ceremonies. The couple had three children, the first of them being a son by the name Rajesh, the second being a daughter by the name Unnati and the third a son by the name of Suprasad. We are not immediately concerned with the lengthy pleadings that are on record wherein the parties have traded a number of charges against each other. The reason for this is that the petition filed by the husband, wherein he alleged instances of cruelty which were denied by the appellant-wife was contested and the City Civil Court dismissed the petition with costs. It is relevant to point out that by virtue of a direction from the High Court, M. J. Petition No. 383 of 1986, which had been filed by the wife wherein she had prayed for a decree of judicial separation, was heard along with the husbands M. J. Petition No. 662 of 1982 and the petitions were disposed of by a common judgment dated 21-4-1987. This aspect is of some relevance because Mr. Angal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-wife, has sought to advance a submission on the issue of maintenance, which will have some bearing on the fact that the two petitions came to be heard and disposed of through a common judgment. The City Civil Court at Bombay, while dismissing the husbands petition, decreed the wifes petition and she was granted a decree of judicial separation. The only relevant aspect of the matter that is of some consequence as far as the present proceeding is concerned is that, admittedly, after a short cohabitation lasting about three years, the wife left the matrimonial home on 16-8-1972. There are references to some resumption of cohabitation in the course of the subsequent years on each of which occasion a situation arose whereby the parties again separated. At the time of the filing of the petition, admittedly, they were living apart. The City Civil Court at Bombay, while disposing of the two petitions on 21-4-1987, granted an ancillary relief whereby the appellant-wife was awarded maintenance in the sum of Rs. 600. 00 per month from the date of the decree as maintenance for the three children.

( 3 ) THE present appellant filed First Appeal No. 15 of 1989 impugning the validity of the judgment and decree in question. This First Appeal came to be disposed of by judgment and order dated 11-6-1991 by our brother Patankar, J. The appeal was partly allowed and the respondent-husband was directed to pay maintenance from the date of the presentation of M. J. Petition No. 383 of 1986, i. e., from 4-4-1986 and not from the date of the decree. It was clarified that the maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per month in respect of each of the children was to be paid till each of them attained majority, i. e. , in the case of Rajesh till 21-4-1988, in the case of Unnati till 6-12-1997 and in the case of Suprabhat till 5-7-1999. It is against this judgment and order that the present Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred.

( 4 ) THE appellant-wife had canvassed before the learned single Judge two aspects of the matter which came to be turned down and it is her case that the learned single Judge was in error on both counts and that, consequently, she is entitled to corrective action. The first head that was canvassed on her behalf related to the date from which she was eligible for maintenance. It is her case that by virtue of the fact that the two proceedings were disposed of through a common judgment and by virtue of the fact that she had applied to the City Civil Court for the grant of maintenance in the earlier proceedings, namely, M. J. Petition No. 662 of 1982, that she ought to have been awarded maintenance on and from the date of the filing of that petition. In sum and substance, she contended that the learned single Judge, when he directed that the effective date from which she was eligible for maintenance ought to be the date of the presentation of her petition, namely 4-4-1986, had erred, and that he ought to have granted the maintenance from the date of the filing of the earlier petition, namely, 5-5-1982. The second contention or rather the main contention that was agitated by the appellant-wife concerned the rejection of the appellant-wifes prayer for the grant of an incidental relief or ancillary relief relating to her ornaments and certain items of property. Briefly stated, the appellant-wife contended that the respondent-husband had taken charge of those items of jewellery which were referred to by her both in her written statement in reply to M. J. Petition No. 662 of 1982 as also by way of annexure to her own petition No. 383 of 1986. The trial Court had rejected this prayer and the learned single Judge also upheld this view, principally, on the ground that S. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act did not invest the Court with the requisite jurisdiction to make an order in respect of these items of jewellery and other items of property because they did not come within the restrictive scope of Sec. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The grievance of the appellant-wife is that the learned single Judge had misconstrued the provisions of S. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act and that on the present record it was permissible for the Court to have directed the return of these items of property. This submission bases itself on the fact that the appellant-wife contends that there is overwhelming evidence on record to establish that this property belongs to her, that it has been wrongly taken charge of by the respondent-husband and that, consequently, the Court ought to pass a decree in her favour for the restoration of this property. We shall deal with the various arguments as also the propositions of law that were canvassed on either side presently.

( 5 ) IT is essential at this stage for us to advert to another aspect of the matter which is intrinsically connected with the main dispute. As indicated by us earlier, the City Civil Court passed a decree for judicial separation in favour of the respondent-wife on 21-4-1987. Thereafter, since two years had elapsed since the passing of that decree, the husband filed M. J. Petition No 909 of 1988 before the Family Court at Bombay praying for a decree of divorce under S. 13 (1a) (i) of the Hindu Marriage Act. No grounds were necessary for the grant of a decree in these proceedings in so far as it was the case of the petitioner-husband in that M. J. Petition that the period of two years having elapsed since the passing of the decree for judicial separation and since, admittedly, there was no resumption of cohabitation during this period, that he was entitled by law to a decree of divorce. This order was contested by the respondent-wife in that petition and we shall deal at a later part of this judgment with those aspects of the proceedings which are also of some interest, apart from being of considerable importance. The wife in her written statement raised the plea that the husband was disqualified from the grant of any relief because he was taking advantage of his own wrong. The wife pointed out that it was her case that the husband was living in adultery with another woman and that as a result of this fact it had become impossible for the wife to resume cohabitation with him. She, therefore, contended that by preventing the resumption of matrimonial relationship and the continuance of her marriage with the husband, which had been ensured through the presence of a mistress in the house, the husband had committed a matrimonial wrong which disqualified him from any relief in the eye of the law. It is a subsidiary plea that the parties were not represented by Lawyers in that proceeding as a result of which even though the wife desired to lead evidence before the Court in support of this contention of hers, that she was not afforded an opportunity of doing so and that, therefore, her defence was prejudiced. The Family Court, however, after hearing parties, granted the husband a decree of divorce and it is against this judgment and order dated 27-2-1991 that the wife preferred. Family Court Appeal No. 27 of 1992. In so far as that proceeding is interconnected with the main Letters Patent Appeal, we have heard the two appeals together and propose to dispose of them through a common judgment.

( 6 ) WE shall, first deal with the initial submission advanced by Mr. Angal, learned counsel representing the appellant-wife which concerns the maintenance issue. Undoubtedly, the learned single Judge was satisfied from the record that since the three minor children were with the appellant-wife, who admittedly was looking after them and since the respondent-husband had not paid anything for their support during the entire period, that the City Civil Court was in error in having awarded the maintenance only from the date of the passing of the decree, namely, from 21-4-1987. The order was, therefore, corrected and the maintenance was awarded with effect from the date of the filing of that petition, namely, from 4-4-1986, obviously because in the petition itself, the wife had prayed for the award of maintenance to her. It is Mr. Angals contention that in the written statement filed by the wife to the earlier proceedings, namely M. J. Petition No. 662 of 1982, the wife had prayed for the grant of maintenance to her which fact is borne out by the record. Mr. Angal further pointed out that as far as the interim maintenance was concerned, the wife had taken out Notice of Motion No. 34 of 1984, which as heard by the City Civil Court and dismissed on 13-7-1983. Briefly stated, the husband had contended that he was a man of very modest means, that even while the parties were living together, according to him, it was the wife who was earning very well and that it was she who was effectively taking care of the household because the amount he was earning was relatively small. The learned Judge at the interim stage took the view that the earning capacity of the wife was sufficient to take care of herself and the three minor children, whom she had kept with her, and that, consequently, there was no warrant for the grant of interim maintenance from the husband. The wife challenged the correctness of this decision before the High Court and we are informed at the Bar that the High Court dismissed the appeal summarily. Under these circumstances, the interim order rejecting the wifes plea for maintenance became final. It is Mr. Angals contention that an interim order for maintenance is really a transitory proceeding and that the Court at that stage is only required to do a summary evaluation of the material placed before it for ascertaining the limited issue as to whether during the intervening period the wife would be entitled to an order for maintenance. He stated that at the hearing of a notice of motion, apart from the affidavits or documents which the parties produced, that evidence is not led and that there is no in depth consideration of the disputed questions. When the final decree comes to be passed in the proceedings, the court is completely seized of the entire matter and if at that stage the court takes the view that the wife is, in fact, entitled to maintenance, then according to Mr. Angal that order must necessarily date back to the date of the filing of the petition because the Court has satisfied itself that the wife is eligible for the grant of maintenance. It is his submission that this order ought not to be prospective and that even if it is passed at a later point of time, it has to become effective from the date of the filing of the petition. Since the City Civil Court has, on 21-4-1987 when the proceeding was disposed of, upheld the wifes claim for maintenance and since the two proceedings had been merged and heard together, Mr. Angal submitted that the only correct order would be to make the effective date for payment of maintenance as 5-5-1982, namely the date of the filing of the earlier petition. This, undoubtedly, presupposes that the circumstances were such that the children had been all through the period with the wife.

( 7 ) AS against this, Mr. Thorat, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-husband, has contended that the disposal of the two proceedings through a common judgment was only a matter of convenience as far as the Court is concerned. He submitted that the two proceedings were, admittedly, independent matrimonial suits instituted at different points of time and that the two proceedings had not merged. Under these circumstances, he maintained that the order passed by the learned single Judge (Patankar, J.) is absolutely correct and that there is no warrant nor for that matter would this Court have the jurisdiction to order the grant of maintenance for any period other than the one that has been sanctioned. The argument proceeds on a technicality, namely, that it would lead to a dangerous precedent if the Courts were to pass an order in one proceeding that dates back into another proceeding. Mr. Thorat is not completely justified on facts in this submission because the fact of the matter before us is that by a direction of the High Court, the hearing of the two suits had been taken up together. Furthermore, the evidence is common and the parties are also the same. Under these circumstances, in the light of the findings of the City Civil Court and on the facts of this case where admittedly the husband had contributed nothing towards the maintenance of the minor children, who were admittedly supported by the wife right through this period, we would have had no hesitation whatsoever in directing the award of maintenance from the date of the filing of the first petition, namely, 5-5-1982. Unfortunately, there is a legal hurdle and an insurmountable one in the way of the appellant-wife. Admittedly, she had filed an application for interim maintenance and the Court at that point of time adjudicated that she was not entitled to any such maintenance for the relevant period. The period contemplated by the prayer clause in the notice of motion was from the date of filing of that petition up to the date on which the petition came to be finally disposed of. The order of the City Civil Court was carried in appeal to this Court and the High Court confirmed the order of the City Civil Court and dismissed the appeal. Once that order had become final, it would not be permissible to go behind the order in question and to direct that maintenance be payable in respect of that very period. Under these circumstances, as far as the first ground of appeal that has been canvassed before us is concerned, we are unable to accept the submissions canvassed on behalf of the appellant-wife and accordingly reject the same.

( 8 ) THE second ground and the more substantial ground of appeal that was canvassed in these proceedings relates to the dispute concerning the ornaments belonging to the appellant-wife. In her written statement filed before the trial Court, the appellant-wife had contended that she had not taken her jewellery with her when she left the matrimonial home. Briefly stated, it is her case that these items of jewellery had been kept in safe custody in a bank locker and that according to her the locker was last operated by the respondent-husband and all the items of jewellery have been taken charge of by him. She has annexed to her written statement a list (Exhibit "a"), which is at page 376 of the paper-book. She has contended that the 16 items of jewellery, most of which consisted of gold ornaments, had been left in the locker and that the husband, having taken charge of these items, was liable to return them to her. She had also mentioned in this list two items of silver ornaments. Under the head (C), she had listed certain items of furniture which according to her had been purchased out of her earnings and installed in the matrimonial home. Under the head (D), she had listed 9 items, such as a T. V. , a transistor, a refrigerator, etc. as being ones purchased by her out of her own earnings for the matrimonial home, all of which she contended were her personal property and were liable to be returned to her. as far as this entire set of claims is concerned, as indicated by us earlier, both the Courts have refused to pass any orders, principally, on the ground that Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act would not permit it. Mr. Angal has vehemently contended, in the first instance, that Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act is wide enough to permit an order for the restoration of such property. He contended that there is overwhelming evidence on record from which the Court could hold on facts that all the property in question was retained by the respondent-husband and that in the light of this position the Court would be fully justified in directing the return. As we shall presently point out, having regard to the position in law, wherein the Courts have consistently taken the view that the unambiguous wording of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act would not permit a Court to make an order for return of the property other than that presented "at or about the time of the marriage", Mr. Angal contended that the matter should be remanded to the Family Court on the ground that it was open to him to agitate these issues before the Family Court by virtue of the provisions of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

( 9 ) MR. Angal did advance another submission which appeared to be ingenious, namely, that at the present point of time since this Court is considering all the three proceedings, namely, the two petitions that were filed before the City Civil Court as also the proceedings that emanated from the Family Court that there is no reason why we should confine our orders to the ambit and scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act if Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 permits a far wider jurisdiction. This last argument is fallacious because it is just a matter of coincidence that the two appeals are being heard together for the convenience of the Court and the parties but one cannot brush aside the fact that they arise from two different forums, namely, the City Civil Court and the Family Court, that the evidence was recorded by the City Civil Court in the M. J. proceeding pending before it, that no evidence whatsoever relating to the property was recorded by the Family Court and that, consequently, it would be impermissible as a matter of procedure to read the evidence recorded by one Court in relation to the proceeding that has emanated from the other one. Such a faulty procedure would have disastrous consequences in this and other proceedings and it is for this reason that we have declined to accede to this request.

( 10 ) WE shall, briefly, examine the first limb of the arguments canvassed by Mr. Angal, namely that Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act is wide enough to permit the Court to make an order in respect of all property that is the subject matter of the matrimonial jurisdiction regardless of whether it was presented at or about the time of the marriage. Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act reads as follows: -"27. In any proceeding under this Act, the Court may make such provisions in the decree as it deems just and proper with respect to any property presented, at or about the time of marriage, which may belong jointly to both the husband and the wife. "Mr. Angal supports his argument by drawing our attention to the marginal note that appears next to the Section under the head "disposal of property". He contends that regardless of the wording of the Section, it only stands to reason that the Court, while dissolving a marriage, must adjudicate in the matter of disposal of property which pre-supposes that it is all or any property belonging to the spouses that is the subject-matter of rival claims.

( 11 ) AS against this position, Mr. Thorat has vehemently supported the view expounded in the earlier decisions before us wherein it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Court was limited and that it was confined to such property as was presented at or about the time of the marriage. Reliance was placed on earlier decisions of this Court, the first of them being in the case of Nandini v. Sanjiv, AIR 1988 Bom 239 [LQ/BomHC/1988/174] , and a later decision of this Court in the case of Shakuntala v. Mahesh, AIR 1989 Bom 353 [LQ/BomHC/1989/106] . These decisions have considered the ambit and scope of S. 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act and have, though for different reasons, upheld the position in law that an order under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act can only relate to that limited class of property that is owned jointly by the spouses and which has been presented at our about the time of marriage. Mr. Thorat was at pains to point out that in the present case, apart from a few items of jewellery which, it is contended by the parties, were presented by other persons, that a majority of the items that are claimed, be they jewellery, or furniture, or household gadgets, constitute the separate property acquired by the wife out of her own earnings. Mr. Thorat, therefore, contends that the evidence itself indicates that even assuming the appellant-wife is justified in her claim that the Court would have no jurisdiction to pass any orders in respect thereof having regard to the crystallised position in law, she is precluded from praying for any relief under Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Learned Counsel on both sides have drawn our attention to some other decisions in support of their respective contentions, but we do not propose to refer to them because, on a clear reading of the Section, we are of the view that the findings recorded by the City Civil Court and by the learned single Judge of this Court that the scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot be expanded will have to be upheld. Whichever way one construes the Section, it is not permissible to graft on to it anything other than what the Legislature has stated therein and, consequently, it would not be possible to uphold the first submission of Mr. Angal that the property in question would still came within the ambit and scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. By this, all that we are holding is that the claim of the appellant-wife in its entirety would be outside the scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act. What the City Civil Court and the learned single Judge of this Court seem to have overlooked, however, is that the appellant-wife is a normal Indian Hindu wife and that she has produced before the Court evidence which the Court could, under no circumstances, have rejected, namely, that at the time of the marriage a certain amount of jewellery was, in fact, presented to her. The learned single Judge has brushed aside this aspect of the matter on the ground that from the photographs it would not be possible to identify the items of jewellery. The learned single Judge is right as far as the identification is concerned, but the learned single Judge could not have overlooked the deeper aspect, namely, that having regard to normal circumstances, of which the Court has to take cognizance, that at the time of an Indian wedding, the bride would be wearing such of the jewellery as she would be possessing or that which was presented to her. To that extent, Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act would apply to that restricted amount of jewellery. Furthermore, in the present proceedings, we do not need to exhaustively set out the specific passages, but there is direct evidence and even admissions from the respondent-husband that certain items of gold jewellery were presented to his wife even by the members of his family at the time of the marriage. Under these circumstances, even though, as indicated by us, it would not be possible to expand the scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act to cover all the property that has been claimed, at least some of it would certainly be covered by Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

( 12 ) WHILE considering the scope of Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act in the decision in the case of Nandini v. Sanjiv, AIR 1988 Bom 239 [LQ/BomHC/1988/174] (supra) Patel, J. has made a very relevant observation which is briefly to the effect that it must be presumed that when a court is passing final orders in relation to the dissolution of a marriage that it is, as of necessity, invested with the jurisdiction to decide all ancillary issues in that behalf, such as the question of custody, apportionment of the property, maintenance, etc. by a process of legis, Patel, J. has observed that there is much to be said in favour of the argument that Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act should not be afforded a restricted interpretation. However, the decision steps there. We have heard learned counsel on both sides in great detail with regard to this aspect of the matter because we consider it an issue of paramount public interest that this particular vexed question be set at rest. As far as the city of Bombay and some of the metropolitan areas are concerned, it would, perhaps, not provide much of a difficulty to the course of the proceedings under the Hindu Marriage Act because of the wording of Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, which empowers the Court to pass appropriate orders in respect of items of property that are the subject-matter of dispute. However, the problem still persists in relation to the greater number of subordinate Courts that are required to deal with adjudication of the property aspect while disposing of matrimonial proceedings and it is for this reason that we have gone into the subsidiary question. It is equally important for the decision of the present proceedings because, as indicated by us earlier, the evidence relating to the property and the claim of the property was made in relation to the proceedings emanating from the City Civil Court in a proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act prior to the inception of the Family Court. The point will, therefore, require to be set at rest.

( 13 ) TO start with, we do not support the view as was canvassed by Mr. Thorat that if Section 27 of the Hindu Marriage Act, which is the only Section under the dealing with the disposal of property is given the restrictive application, then by a process of default, the parties must be directed to institute separate proceedings in relation to the property only. Where, as in the present case, the property belongs to one of the spouses or to the two of them jointly, where it is inextricably woven into a matrimonial dispute and virtually inseparable from it, we do not see any justification behind driving the litigant to another separate proceeding which will only result in proliferation of litigation, increase of the cases and the attendant trauma to the parties. It stands to reason, therefore, that the Court must proceed on the basis that it is invested with the powers to grant all such ancillary reliefs that are dependant on the main reliefs and that are connected to it. The difficulty arises because the Hindu Marriage Act is silent in this regard. It is precisely for this reason, to our mind, that resort will have to be had to the provisions of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. A statute cannot make provision for each and every eventuality and often times a Court is faced with a situation whereby the interests of justice, equity and fair play require that a particular order be passed but there is no specific provision of law empowering a Court to do so. It is under these circumstances that the Code of Civil Procedure exhorts a Court to have recourse to the inherent powers. That the Code of Civil Procedure applies to these proceedings and that the Code governed the procedure applicable to them when petitions were heard and disposed of by the City Civil Court can never be disputed. Under these circumstances, the subordinate Civil Court trying a matrimonial proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act would be justified in passing appropriate orders by having resort to the powers vested in them under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this regard, Mr. Thorat did draw our attention to a reported decision of this court in the case of Shantaram v. Dagubai, AIR 1987 Bom 182 [LQ/BomHC/1987/14] . The Division Bench had observed that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be had resort to for purpose of creating rights in favour of the parties. The Division Bench had further observed that it was not open to a Court to almost enter the province of the Legislature as an aid to arm itself with powers and then grant reliefs which could normally not have been done. We have no quarrel with the proposition that has been enunciated by the Division Bench, though on a different set of facts and in a different proceedings. It is equally true that Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be used as a handle to pass orders in a proceeding if there is a specific bar to the passing of such orders by virtue of any other statutory provision. We are faced with a situation, however, where the Legislature made specific provisions for the disposal of only one small restrictive class of property. Undoubtedly, there is no provision in the Hindu Marriage Act which imposes a bar on the courts in relation to the disposal of other forms of property. Consequently, by virtue of the vacuum that is created, the Courts have been hitherto directing the parties to institute normal civil suits in relation to the remaining property. We have already observed that this is hardly fair to the parties and, having regard to the volume of litigation that is pending, neither is it fair to the Courts when such a litigation would be unnecessary and. to our mind, superfluous. As already observed, it is precisely in these circumstances that the Court must exercise the powers vested in it under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and pass orders in relation to the remaining items that are the subject-matter of the dispute.

( 14 ) HAVING held that it would be permissible for the Court to adjudicate on matters relating to property other than that which is presented at or about the time of the marriage, all that remains for us to do is to cull out from the record the material on the basis of which it needs to be ascertained as to whether or not the appellant-wife has made out a case for the grant of the relief claimed by her. We do not propose to reproduce the relevant extracts from the record because two Courts have already done so. To our mind that process is unnecessary because we have heard this appeal at very great length and. the two learned Counsel, both of whom are extremely competent lawyers, have taken us more than once through the relevant parts of the record and we have virtually scrutinised it threadbare to find out the truth purely out of sense of responsibility. We, therefore, propose to briefly record our conclusions as a result of this investigation and the reasons therefor.

( 15 ) ONE needs to start with the premise that the appellant-wife is, as indicated by us earlier, an ordinary, normal Indian Hindu wife. The fact that she was possessed of certain items of jewellery has already been dealt with by us. In addition to this, the admitted position is that she was gainfully employed and that she still continues to be so. All through the years, she was working as a comptist with Philips India Ltd. (Now known as PEICO Electronics Ltd.). She has produced from time to time a lot of evidence in relation to her earnings which include her salary and other benefits that she was entitled to which were reasonably substantial. She has also correlated her ornaments with the claim made by her and having scrutinised her evidence, we are of the considered opinion that there can be no question of her credibility being assailed. We do not accept the repeated criticism that she was subjected to, namely, that she has exaggerated or for that matter that she has fabricated. Having regard to the period of time and having regard to her earning capacity and also having scrutinised the oral and documentary evidence, we accept the position that the items indicated by her in the list Exhibit "a" to her written statement must have been, in fact, possessed by her. This is supported by the evidence of the husband who has all through been projecting a picture of poverty and has unabashedly cast the entire burden of looking after the minor children on his wife, on the excuse that he did not possess the required financial capacity. Under these circumstances, it would be absurd to suggest that any item of the property was financed by him or that it belonged to him. In the light of this evidence, therefore, we unhesitatingly accept the position that the appellant-wife has been truthful in her claims to the Court as regards the items of property. We do not see any reason why a respectable lady like her should under any circumstances produce a false inventory in respect of a single item of jewellery which is the bulk of the valuable property. As and by way of cross-checking, we have verified this list with an inventory of the jewellery that has been produced by none other than the husband himself and which appears at page 450 of the paper-book. This is a joint inventory wherein the appellant-wife has, in her handwriting, indicated the items of jewellery which she brought from Vikhroli and the rest of the inventory was in the handwriting of the respondent-husband himself. When we compared it with the list exhibit a we found that the two substantially tallied. One needs to take into account the fact that the appellant-wife was earning and that, as is common with the Indian housewife, she must have been acquiring little items of jewellery from time to time whenever she was able to do so and that, therefore, the few additions in the list Exhibit a are fully explained. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the list Exhibit a substantially represents the property that belonged to the appellant-wife. We need to mention, in passing, that there are few items, such as the furniture and fixtures, in the matrimonial home as also some gadgets, utensils, etc. In his anxiety, however, to dispute the claims of the appellant-wife and in his anxiety to avoid liability to pay any maintenance for the children, the respondent-husband has been very eloquent, both in his oral as well as documentary evidence, in convincing the Court that he was virtually living from hand to mouth. He has also made out a case that it was virtually the appellant-wife who ran the household, paid for everything, including the needs of the children. Accepting his own evidence, we have no hesitation in holding that among the two spouses, it was obviously the appellant-wife who bought all the remaining items that appeared in the list exhibit a.

( 16 ) HAVING recorded the aforesaid findings, we need to address ourselves to the all important question, namely, as to whether the appellant-wife is entitled to the relief which, Mr. Angal submits, should be awarded to her. It is true that Mr. Thorat has repeatedly drawn our attention to the oral depositions as also to the averments contained in the pleadings on the basis of which he contends that there is no unanimity with regard to the case made out by the present appellant-wife. What Mr. Thorat, in fact, submits is that there ought to be total and absolute consistency with regard to the case made out by the appellant-wife in relation to her property. For this purpose, we would prefer to divide the items into two broad categories. We would prefer to deal with the second category first, namely, the furniture and other items that, admittedly, were in the matrimonial home. The evidence of the appellant-wife is to the effect that she was virtually driven out from the matrimonial home; whereas the respondent-husband contends that it was she who left the premises. It is obvious that on the earlier occasion when the appellant-wife left the matrimonial home that she did not take any of the items with her as the respondent-husband would have otherwise referred to them in his evidence. As far as the last occasion is concerned, the same is the position because we have carefully scrutinised the record and we find that neither in the notice nor in the pleadings is there reference to the fact that the appellant-wife had removed any of the property from the matrimonial home to the place where she was residing with her children. In this view of the matter, by a process of elimination, we have no hesitation in concluding that as far as the remaining items of property were concerned that they remained in the matrimonial home which continues to be occupied by the respondent-husband. It has been pointed out to us at the Bar that the respondent-husband has, not in the very distant past, disposed of the flat in question and it is, therefore, presumed that either these items have been removed or that they must have been disposed of along with the flat. In either case, as far as the liability is concerned, the respondent-husband would be responsible to make good to the appellant-wife the items that are listed in respect of which she would be entitled to a decree or recovery of the value thereof. There are some references in the course of the evidence and the pleadings to the purchase of the flat in question and the appellant-wife contends that it was purchased out of the funds procured by her; whereas the respondent-husband has vehemently denied this. In any event, that issue is not the subject-matter of the appeal before us, even though an attempt was made on behalf of the appellant-wife to contend that it should be included in the order, We, however, decline to mix up that issue with what is being decided in the present appeal.

( 17 ) AS regards the items of jewellery, we have already held that from the record, which is rather voluminous and which we have scrutinised more than once in the course of the detailed arguments advanced by learned Counsel, that the items claimed by the appellant-wife listed out in Exhibit a on page 376 of the paper-book under the heading of jewellery which are covered by sub-heads a and b were, in fact, purchased by her or presented to her, in both of which cases they constitute her personal property. We are also satisfied from the evidence that has come on record that these items of jewellery were kept in a bank locker. The evidence indicates that the last person to operate this bank locker was the respondent-husband. We have gone through the material that has been produced on record and the respondent-husband himself, in his evidence, states that when he opened the bank locker on the last occasion that the items of jewellery were not there and that he only found a one rupee coin in the locker. Mr. Thorat has vehemently contended that at the very highest, the Court would have to held that the evidence in this regard is inconclusive. He submits that even if the Courts were to accept in its entirety the evidence of the appellant-wife that she has stated on oath that all the jewellery was kept in the bank locker, that admittedly the access to that locker was available to both the parties. Mr. Thorat contends that when the appellant-wife left in an atmosphere of hostility, she was obviously aware of the fact that the jewellery is her most valuable possession and according to him since the key of the locker was in her possession that she would have most certainly removed the jewellery from the locker to some other place. It is his submission that it is out of a sense of vendetta that the appellant-wife has foisted this false claim on the respondent-husband and she is trying to take advantage of the fact that the respondent-husband was the last person to operate the locker in question.

( 18 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, the evidence of the two parties is diametrically opposed to each other in so far as the appellant-wife contends that the jewellery was in the locker and that it was taken charge of by the respondent-husband which is borne out by the correspondence on her behalf. On the other hand, the respondent-husband has taken the offensive by contending that the appellant-wife had taken away the items of jewellery not only belonging to herself but also including that of several of his other family members to which she had no right and that she was liable to return those items to ham. It is essential in these circumstances for us to resolve the position as to whether, in the first instance, the evidence conclusively establishes that the jewellery was, in fact, left in the locker, and secondly, as to whether on the state of the record it can be safely and correctly concluded that it was the respondent-husband who thereafter removed it from the locker. As far as the first aspect of the matter is concerned, we have on record the inventory of the jewellery in the handwriting of the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband wherein there are detailed references to the various items and it is common ground of both the spouses that this inventory was prepared at the time when the jewellery was placed in the locker. The fact that the respondent-husband produced this inventory and the further fact that he also admits that the jewellery was being kept in the locker leads to the conclusion that there can be ho dispute about the place where the jewellery was, in fact, kept by the parties.

( 19 ) IT is quite reasonable to expect that the jewellery which was valuable would, normally, have been kept in the locker and not at any other place because both the parties were working and, furthermore, in the background of the case that they would have probably found that this was the safest method of storing it. We do not require to elaborate on this aspect of the matter because we have on record one tell-tale circumstance to which the respondent-husband has no satisfactory answer. As indicated by us, the respondent-husband was the last person to open the bank locker for which there is documentary evidence on record. At the stage of opening the bank locker, the respondent-husband possessed the key to that locker and it is his explanation that when he had questioned the appellant-wife shortly before this about the key of the locker that she is alleged to have flung the key on the ground in a temper and that was when he took charge of it. Having regard to the background of this case and the dealings between the parties, it is virtually impossible on the state of the present record for us to accept that the key of the locker at that point of time would have at all been with the appellant-wife. Obviously, the respondent-husband had to explain about the disappearance of the jewellery and he, therefore, desired to make a weak attempt before the court to establish that even though he was in custody of the key and had operated the locker that there was a possibility at some earlier or prior point of time for the appellant-wife to have opened the locker and it is for this reason that the story of the appellant-wife having been in possession of the key and having flung the same at him has been set up.

( 20 ) WE have tested this part of the evidence on the basis of the correspondence that has been entered into between the parties and the conduct of the respondent-husband. To our mind, since it was the respondent-husbands case that some portion of the jewellery did not belong to the appellant-wife; when he opened the locker and found it empty, if as he states the jewellery which ought to have been there was missing, the consequences would have been different. The respondent-husband would have immediately swung into action because the question arising would be as to who has removed the jewellery and at what point of time. One would not rule out the possibility of a police complaint in respect of its removal because at that point of time the respondent-husband would not have kept quiet even if just a small part of his property had been taken away. The correspondence between the learned advocates at that stage accounts for a good portion of the paper-book and the manner in which this correspondence was carried out leaves no doubt in our mind that had the appellant-wife stealthily or fraudulently removed the jewellery without the knowledge or consent of the respondent-husband, he would not have missed out from making an issue in the correspondence and that he would most certainly have taken appropriate steps in the matter. The omission to do this lends complete support to our view that the appellant-wife is justified when she contends that the jewellery was, in fact, last deposited by her in the locker and that it was the respondent-husband who has taken charge of it.

( 21 ) BEFORE parting with the consideration of the evidence on this aspect of the matter; we need to point out that apart from the pleadings in the oral evidence before the Court where the appellant-wife has examined herself on oath and has been grilled in the process of cross-examination very elaborately, that she has withstood the onslaught successfully, for the obvious reason that the statements made by her could stand the test of such scrutiny. Furthermore, since we have had occasion to go through the depositions of the parties in some detail, it is necessary for us to record that, as the learned Judge of the City Civil Court had done, we are inclined to hold that the credibility of the appellant-wife is high and is such as finds acceptability with this Court. One needs to take special note of the fact that in matrimonial matters relating to items of personal property, the Court will invariably have to first satisfy itself as to whether the person making the claims satisfies the tests of reliability and credibility and when that is done the Court would have to act on the basis of that evidence. Undoubtedly, it is easy to contend, in the course of the arguments, that the documents such as the receipts or supportive evidence must be forthcoming, but, to our mind, in matters such as this, there could not be either of the two. Between a husband and a wife when it comes to an issue of personal property and a question as to when exactly property was deposited, when it was procured, who has removed it, etc. , nobody other than the parties would be in a position to depose to these facts. To insist on documents would be an absurdity and asking for the impossible. If the evidence of any of the spouses inspires the confidence of the Court, in our considered view, that evidence being trustworthy, requires to be accepted.

( 22 ) THE result of these conclusions is that in the first instance we confirm the order of the learned single Judge and hold that the respondent-husband is liable to pay to the appellant-wife maintenance at the rate awarded on and from the date of the filing of M. J. Petition No. 385 of 1986. As regards the second head of conclusions recorded by the learned single Judge, the present appeal will have to be allowed and accordingly succeeds. We set aside the order of the learned single Judge whereby he has held that the matrimonial Court would have no jurisdiction to pass an order in relation to the remaining items of the property. For the reasons recorded by us in this judgment, there shall be a decree in favour of the appellant-wife in terms of Exhibit "a" at page 376 of the paper-book. The office shall accordingly draw up a decree in these terms, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs as far as this appeal is concerned.

( 23 ) IT is essential for us to now deal with the connected appeal, namely, Family Court Appeal No. 27 of 1992. As far as this appeal is concerned, Mr. Angal has vehemently submitted that the respondent-husband has been guilty of taking advantage of his own wrong and that, consequently, the decree passed by the Family Court is liable to set aside. As briefly indicated by us earlier, Mr. Angal contends that the respondent-husband is residing with another lady and, according to him, the appellant-wife would have established this fact by leading evidence before the Family Court, which she was precluded from doing. We put a straight question to Mr. Angal that even though the parties were not represented by Counsel before the Family Court that since his client, who is a well-educated and well-experienced person and has conducted the matter with some degree of ability, though without legal assistance, but with the experience of an earlier long drawn-out litigation, whether she had made an issue of the fact that she was precluded from adducing the aforesaid evidence before the Family Court. Admittedly, the record does not indicate of any such grievance having been made. Apart from the grievance, we have checked up the record to find out as to whether any application was made to the Family Court for the leading of additional evidence by the appellant-wife and whether the Family Court had declined to assist her in this regard or precluded her. Even as regards this factor, we find that the record is silent. To thereafter at the appellate stage make a grievance of this fact, to our mind, would, therefore, be impermissible. We have, as of necessity, proceeded on the basis of the record and the record undisputedly indicates that the appellant-wife was not handicapped at any stage in these proceedings. Under the circumstances, on a strict construction of the record before us, what emerges is that the appellant-wife herself had obtained a decree for judicial separation from the trial Court on 21-4-1987. That decree has become final because the appeal directed by the present appellant-wife, though against such a decree, was restricted to the challenge on the other issues. We also have it on record that though the appellant-wife made an attempt before the Appeal Court at one stage to contend that she desired to withdraw the original petition filed before the City Civil Court, that permission was not granted.

( 24 ) IT is in this background that Mr. Thorat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-husband, has pointed out to us that he was entitled, as of right and by operation of law, to a decree of divorce on the expiry of a period of two years after the decree for judicial separation had been granted. On facts and on the state of the record, we are unable to take cognizance of the statement made at the Bar to the effect that there was somebody else residing in his (respondent-husbands) house and that this was the reason why the appellant-wife could not resume cohabitation. Apart from this, we need to take special note of another aspect of this litigation. Admittedly, for whatever reasons, the parties could not live together and did separate from each others company on more than one occasion. It was after the final breakdown that, admittedly, the appellant-wife left the matrimonial home. Even if she contends that the respondent-husband was responsible for her departure, it was she who ultimately moved the Court for the relief of judicial separation. Having applied for this relief, it was quite obvious that she desired the sanction of the Court to her residing separately because she considered that for her safety and welfare this course of action was necessary. It would be extremely far-fetched to ascribe, therefore, that having obtained a decree from the competent Court for judicial separation that the appellant-wife would have thereafter resumed cohabitation with the respondent-husband. There is nothing on record from which we can conclude that this was one of these unusual situations where, in the face of such a decree, the parties could still come together. On the other hand, they were furiously contesting the litigation before more than one Court. We, therefore, consider that there is ample justification for the arguments advanced by Mr. Thorat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-husband, that it is because of the background of hostility and purely out of a sense of vendetta that an attempt has been made to call into question the validity of the decree of divorce passed by the Family Court in favour of the husband. On facts, to our mind, the Family Court was fully justified in passing the decree in question. The period of 2 years had admittedly elapsed. Admittedly, there had been no cohabitation or resumption of cohabitation during that period and, therefore, as a matter of course, the decree of divorce had to follow. Under these circumstances, we see little substance in the appeal that has been preferred against that decree.

( 25 ) WE shall, in passing, refer to some of the decisions that were cited by Mr. Angal, learned Counsel on behalf of the appellant-wife. He submitted that this Court, while hearing the two appeals together, will have to take cognizance of the evidence that has come on record and that since these appeals are being heard together, the evidence cannot be delinked from the subsequent proceedings before the Family Court. Mr. Angal submits that the appellant-wife has brought on record the fact that the respondent-husband had subsequently built up a relationship with another lady; that he is residing with her and that there are children born to her. He uses this material in support of his argument that the respondent-husband has been guilty of a matrimonial wrong during the intervening period. As indicated by us earlier, there was no material adduced before the Family Court. On a strict construction of law, it would not be permissible for us to import into that proceeding any of the material that may have come to our notice in the course of the companion appeal for the simple reason that we are only called upon to examine in this appeal the judgment of the Family Court, and one is required to be fair to that forum. The bulk of the evidence that has been examined by us pertains to the proceedings before the City Civil Court which admittedly was not produced before the Family Court, nor was it referred to there. In fairness to the learned Judge who has decided the matter before the family Court, we must observe that the submission of Mr. Angal in this regard cannot be upheld. He has placed strong reliance on certain decisions which we will refer to since learned counsel have argued the point of law, though that principle would hardly apply to the present case in the view that we have taken. The Family Court has held on facts that no material was placed before it in support of the fact that the respondent-husband is taking advantage of his own wrong. That conclusion is a correct one and is justified by the record before the Family Court. We see no infirmity with regard to the finding of the Family Court and the consequential passing of the decree in favour of the respondent-husband.

( 26 ) COMING now to the first of the authorities referred to by Mr. Angal in the case of Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar, AIR 1977 SC 2218 [LQ/SC/1977/255] , which, in fact, is the bone of contention between both learned Counsel. Whereas Mr. Angals submission was that the Supreme Court has clearly interpreted S. 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act and defined as to what constitutes a wrong and under what circumstances. Mr. Thorat has, on the other hand, submitted that this decision would equally support his argument in illustrating that his client is not disqualified from the grant of relief from the Family Court. The facts in that case were slightly different, but the real distinguishing factor was that there was a distinct refusal on the part of one of the parties to resume cohabitation and the refusal was demonstrated to the Court in the form of specific letters from the party. In the present case, we are inclined to uphold the argument of Mr. Thorat that there could have been no question of his client even attempting reconciliation because the appellant-wife had obtained a decree for judicial separation against him. As far as the appellant-wife was concerned, having obtained a decree on her own volition and not having taken any steps to resume cohabitation, she can hardly be permitted to raise the legal bar contemplated by S. 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is true that a weak attempt was made before the Family Court on the part of the appellant-wife to state that she did try to visit the residence of the respondent-husband and that the door of the house was closed. This, to our mind, is totally and thoroughly unsatisfactory, because in the background of the judicial separation if the appellant-wife was serious about the resumption of cohabitation, she would have taken steps through the Court because the appeal was pending at the relevant time or through the respective learned Counsel or would have made attempts in the form of letters; none of which has been done and a bald statement in the air that some attempt was made to visit the flat occupied by the respondent-husband, to our mind, would not be of any assistance to her.

( 27 ) MR. Angal has placed considerable reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Soundarammal v. Sundara Mahalinga Nadar, AIR 1980 Mad 294 [LQ/MadHC/1979/396] . It is true that the learned single Judge of the Madras High Court, relying on the ratio laid down in the case of Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar, AIR 1977 SC 2218 [LQ/SC/1977/255] referred to supra, did take the view in that particular proceeding that where the husband continues to live in adultery, he was certainly guilty of taking advantage of his own wrong and that, consequently, he was disqualified from obtaining a decree for divorce. Had there been conclusive evidence before the Family Court that the respondent-husband was, in fact, living in adultery and that he was using this circumstance in order to take advantage of the matrimonial wrong and secure a decree, we would have, perhaps, had occasion to reconsider the matter differently. The principle enunciated by this decision was, undoubtedly, correct on the limited facts of that case, but the same would not apply to the appeal that we are at present seized of.

( 28 ) ONCE again, both learned counsel sought to place reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Vatsala v. Niranjan Ramchandra, 1981 Mah LJ 917. Mr. Thorat relies on the observations of Mohta, J., who held that there is an unqualified right to divorce as soon as the conditions laid down in S. 13 (1-A) of the Hindu Marriage Act as amended by Act No. 44 of 1964 are fulfilled and that refusal to comply with the decree for restitution of conjugal rights and/or judicial separation cannot defeat the claim for dissolution of marriage, even if made at the instance of the party against whom the decree was made, Mr. Angal relied on the same observations of the learned Judge wherein he has cited illustrations indicating where a party can be so disqualified if it is taking advantage of its own wrong. We have analysed this and a few other decisions that were cited before us and we need to observe, in passing, that the statute contemplates a situation of breakdown of a marriage and it is virtually at the almost terminal stage that one of the spouses would apply either for divorce or for judicial separation. The legislature itself has taken cognizance of the fact that the marriage is virtually at the terminal stage and has only prescribed the period of 2 years in the fervent hope that if at all there is a total change of heart during this limited period that, the marriage could be revived or restored. In the absence of such a resurrection of the almost dead marriage, the Legislature contemplated that the Court shall without hesitation pass a decree as it would be unfair to keep the parties technically bound to the marriage thereafter. The general provision that is contained in S. 23 (1) (a) of the Hindu Marriage Act is a specific provision applicable to all proceedings specifically to matrimonial proceedings, and cannot be read in isolation as being applicable only to the cases of the present type and confined to the interim period of two years. It is necessary also that this factor will have to be fully and conclusively established before the Court because the onus of proving this ground or fact shifts entirely to the party who is making the charge. Viewed at from this angle, we find that there is no material before the Court in support of the argument. though this was the only defence taken up before the Family Court. Having regard to this situation, the appeal fails and stands dismissed. The decree passed in favour of the respondent-husband by the Family Court stands confirmed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

( 29 ) FOR the reasons indicated by us, Letters Patent Appeal No. 74 of 1991 is partly allowed with no order as to costs. Family Court Appeal No. 27 of 1992 stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

( 30 ) AT this stage, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-husband applies for stay of the operation of this judgment for a period of 12 (twelve) weeks. We direct that the stay shall be operative for a period of 8 (eight) weeks after the certified copy of the judgment is received by the respondent-husband, which presupposes that the necessary application in this behalf will be filed within the prescribed time. Office to issue certified copies to the parties expeditiously. Order accordingly.