B.N. Jha, J.

1. The petitioner filed Title Suit No. 3 of 1963 on January 2, 1963 in the Court of Munsif, Hazaribagh, for a declaration that the deed of gift dated October 29, 1948 by the father of the petitioner in favour of the defendant opposite party in respect of the house bearing holding No. 349, ward No. VIII of the Hazaribagh Municipality was inoperative, ineffective and void and that it was not acted upon and for joint possession with the defendant over the same.

2. There is no dispute that the house in question belonged to the father of the plaintiff and the defendant. The parties are governed by the Dayabhag School of Hindu Law. Their father Rai Saheb Narendra Kumar Motilal died on or about January 1, 1951 leaving behind two sons, namely the plaintiff and the defendant besides three married daughters. He was a registered medical practitioner at Hazaribagh and was residing in the house in question which he gifted away to the defendant by a registered deed of gift dated October 29, 1948 which is being challenged as void and invalid conveying no title to the defendant on various grounds. In the deed of gift the valuation of the property was given at Rupees 2000/-. Hence the petitioner valued his title suit at Rs. 2000/- and paid a declaratory court-fee only. On the report of the Sharistadar, however, ad valorem court-fee on the valuation of Rs. 2000/- was demanded and the petitioner paid the same. In paragraph 14 of the written statement the defendant opposite party raised a plea that the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court as the valuation of the property in suit is not less than Rs. 50,000/- and that the suit could not proceed without payment of ad valorem court-fee thereon.

3. The petitioner filed an application on January 6, 1967 for appointment of a receiver in respect of the property in suit alleging therein that the monthly rental of the house in question was Rs. 595/- per month. The receivership matter was put up for hearing on January 31, 1967 and in course of the hearing of the matter learned counsel for the defendant raised a point that in view of the clear admitted position in the case that the monthly rental of the house was Rs. 595/-, the value of the house would exceed the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. Hence the matter of jurisdiction was heard before the receivership matter. It was urged on behalf of the plaintiff petitioner that the valuation of the house in suit was given at Rs. 2000/- and as the petitioner was challenging the validity of the gift, the suit was rightly valued. On the other hand it was contended that the suit was for a declaration of title and for joint possession in respect of the house, even the annual income of which exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. The learned Munsif accepted the plea of the defendant and ordered the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation before a proper Court. The petitioner unsuccessfully filed an appeal before the District Judge, Hazaribagh, and hence, has come up in revision before this Court.

4. There is no dispute in this case that the suit is for a declaration of title and for joint possession over the house in question and as such, it is governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. In fact, ad valorem court-fee was demanded under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act on the valuation of Rs. 2000/- given in the plaint and the petitioner accepted the position and complied with the orders. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that when the plaintiff has brought the suit to avoid the effect of the deed of gift and as the deed of gift was valued at Rs. 2000/- the plaintiff has rightly valued It accordingly under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act. It was further contended that when the suit is brought for declaration and consequential relief, it is for the plaintiff to put his own valuation, and the suit was valued on the basis as given in the deed of gift itself. He further contended for the purposes of jurisdiction in a suit governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, the valuation given by the plaintiff will be the valuation for jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Munsif had accepted the valuation of Rs. 2000/- as given in the plaint as the valuation of the suit and this valuation under Section 12 of the Court-fees Act became final and cannot be challenged by the defendant So long this valuation for payment of court-fees stands, the Munsif has jurisdiction to try this suit. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in Burjor Pestonji Sethna v. Nariman Minoo Todiwalla, : AIR 1953 Bom 382 [LQ/BomHC/1952/169] .

5. Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act provides as follows:--

"Where in suits other than those referred to in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs (v), (vi) and (ix) and paragraph (x), Clause (d), court-fees are payable ad valorem under the Court-fees Act, 1870, the value as determinable for the computation of court-fees and the value for purposes of jurisdiction shall be the same."

As ad valorem court-fee has got to be paid under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act in this case, the valuation for the purposes of both court-fees jurisdiction would be the same. This position is not disputed by learned counsel appearing for the parties. Section 3 of the Act gives the State Government powers to make rules for determining the value of the land for the purposes of jurisdiction in the suits mentioned in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraphs fv) and (vi) and paragraph (x) (d). Section 4 lays down as follows:--

"Where a suit mentioned in the Court-fees Act, 1870, Section 7, paragraph (iv) or Schedule II, Article 17, relates to land or an interest in "land of which the value has been determined by rules under the last foregoing section, the amount at which for purposes of jurisdiction the relief sought in the suit is valued shall not exceed the value of the land or interest as determined by those rules."

Section 4 puts the maximum limit to the valuation of a suit for the purpose of jurisdiction in which the relief sought relates to land or an interest in the land, So far Bihar is concerned, the State Government has not framed any rule under Section 3 of the Act. Learned counsel for the opposite party, therefore, contended that the market value of the property in suit will be the value for the purposes of jurisdiction. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision of this Court in Jadunandan Gope v. Syed Najmuzzaman, : AIR 1957 Pat 560 [LQ/PatHC/1956/160] wherein it was pointed out that "suits relating to lands coming under the scope of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act are governed by Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act, and, if no rules have been made under Sections 3 and 4 of the Suits Valuation Act in the State of Bihar for the valuation of an interest in land which is the subject-matter of suit under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act, the market value of the subject-matter has always been taken for the purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction." Therefore, learned counsel submitted that the learned Munsif has rightly held that the value of the house in question exceeded the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on Section 12(i) of the Court-fees Act which runs as follows:--

"12(i) Every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this chapter on a plaint or memorandum of appeal shall be decided by the Court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed, and such decision shall be final as between the parties, to the suit:"

The contention of learned counsel, therefore, was that the valuation of Rs. 2000/-given in the plaint has been accepted by the Court and, therefore, this decision has become final and the defendant cannot be allowed to challenge this valuation. It is difficult for me to accept this contention. The Court had not previously decided the question of valuation in the suit. When the Court demanded ad valorem court-fee, it only decided the category to which the suit fell and demanded ad valorem court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act on the valuation of Rs. 2000/- as given in the plaint overruling the contention of the petitioner that the suit was only a declaratory suit. The Court proceeded on the valuation given in the plaint and there was no judicial decision by Court regarding the quantum of valuation. Moreover, the order passed by the learn ed Munsif was ex parte in absence of the defendant who had every right to object to the order passed by the Court before he appeared in the suit. Therefore, Section 12 of the Court-fees Act has no application to the facts of this case.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the plaintiff in a suit under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act is entitled to put his own valuation and, therefore, so long the valuation stands, that valuation will be the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction under Section 8 of the Act. In support of his contention he relied on a decision of the Bombay High Court in : AIR 1953 Bom 382 [LQ/BomHC/1952/169] wherein it was held that "a plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation upon the relief which he seeks in the suit if the suit falls under Section 7(iv) of the Court-fees Act, and if he has put a valuation, then that valuation is conclusive for the purpose of Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act and the jurisdiction of the Court must be determined according to the valuation so put by the plaintiff. It is not open to the Court to go behind that valuation and to consider whether the valuation is a proper valuation or not." The decision proceeds on the view that the valuation put by the plaintiff in a suit under Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court-fees Act cannot be questioned whether it is proper valuation or not. This is not the viexv so far this Court is concerned. No doubt it is true that the plaintiff is entitled to put his own valuation in a suit for declaration and consequential relief but where the valuation given by the plaintiff is not reasonable or arbitrary, the Court has power to revise that valuation and to find out the real value of the property (: ILR 11 Pat 161 :AIR 1932 Pat 9 [LQ/PatHC/1931/69] ); (FB); 1953 BLJR 100; 1954 BLJR 360 and : AIR 1957 Pat 560 [LQ/PatHC/1956/160] ). Therefore, it is not possible for me to accept the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the valuation given by the petitioner in the suit is final and cannot be altered by the Court below and that valuation will be the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction on the basis of the view taken by the Bombay High Court in the case referred to above. It is true that the Court has not determined the valuation for the purposes of court-fee under Section 7(iv)(c) which valuation would have been the basis for the purposes of jurisdiction, but apparently on the basis of the monthly income the learned Munsif has rightly held that the valuation of the suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court without determining the exact valuation of the suit property. The defendant has raised a plea in the written statement that the valuation of the property in suit is more than Rs. 50,000/- and, as such, it is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court and unless court-fee is paid on that amount, the suit cannot proceed. As was held in Jadunandan Gopes case, referred to above, market value of the property will be the valuation both for the purposes of jurisdiction and court-fee in this case which the Court has to determine as the valuation given is too low. No useful purpose in such circumstances would have been served by determining the actual valuation of the suit property for the purposes of court-fee which would be the valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction also when on the face of the admitted monthly income of the property, the valuation was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, in my opinion, the learned Munsif has not committed any error of law or procedure and hence his order does not call for any interference by this Court.

8. For the reasons stated above, the application fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.