Meredith, J.These appeals against convictions under the Defence of India Rules have been admitted for hearing. Bail has been asked for, but that is opposed by the Crown, relying upon the provisions of Rule 130A, Defence of India Rules.

2. Having regard to the provisions of Rule 130A, this Court upon the facts of these cases cannot possibly grant bail. But it is contended by Mr. Raj Kishore Prasad on behalf of the appellants that this Rule 130A is ultra vires and inoperative.

3. He argues, first, that it is not covered by Section 2, Defence of India Act, and consequently the rule-making power provided by the Act gives no power to make such a rule. It is enough to say that this point has been expressly considered by a Bench of the Madras High Court in In re Bhuvaraha Iyengar AIR 1942 Mad. 221 , and I find myself in clear agreement with the reasoning and conclusions of Sir Lionel Leach C. J. upon the point. There is a ruling of the Bombay High Court in In Re: Surajlal Harilal Majmudar, to a similar effect.

4. Mr. Raj Kishore Prasad, however, attempts to distinguish these cases on the ground that they related to applications for bail by under-trial prisoners, and not by convicted persons who had appealed. His point is that Section 2 (3)(i), Defence of India Act, refers only to the trial and can give no power to make rules governing the appellate stage of the proceedings. The answer is that the appeal is only a continuation of the trial and is a part of the trial. The accused is on his trial before the appellate Court just as much as before the Court of first instance, since the question of his guilt or innocence is in issue in the proceedings. If authority is needed for this every obvious proposition it is to be found in Queen-Empress v. Jammu (sic) (89) 12 Mini. 451, In the matter of Ramasamy Chetty (04) 27 Mad. 510 and In the matter of Madhub Ghunder Mazumdar (89)16 Cal. 121 . Therefore, I. L. R. (1942) Mad. 414 and In Re: Surajlal Harilal Majmudar, cannot be distinguished in the manner attempted.

5. Mr. Raj Kishore Prasad next, however, contends that if we cannot grant bail as a .Court of appeal we should do so by the exercise of our inherent powers, his point being that Rule 130A cannot touch those inherent powers. This contention is, in my judgment, also unsound. R. 130A is in very wide terms, and imposes a bar "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure". Even the inherent powers of the High Court are based upon the Code of Criminal Procedure. There can, therefore, be no doubt that! Rule 130A if it is intra vires will operate to exclude even the inherent powers. If, however,! orders relating to the accused made at the appellate or revisional stage are a part of the proceedings in the trial, and I have already held that such is the case, upon which vide in particular In the matter of Bamasamy Chetty 27 Mad. 510 , then it necessarily follows that Section 2 (3), Defence of India Act, does confer power to make a rule in the terms of Rule 130A covering even the revisional stages of the case.

6. Mr. Raj Kishore Prasad next, however, puts forward the proposition that a rule such as 130A which repeals by implication certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and divests the High Court of its powers is invalid, because this could be done only by the Legislature itself under Sections 292 and 223, Government of India Act, 1935, and not by rules framed under statutory authority. The answer is that statutory rules if validly made within the powers conferred by the Act must be regarded as part of the Act itself and made with the full authority of the Legislature. The statutory rules must be held to be a part of the parent Act, and can do anything it can do if within its scope. Having regard to Section 3, Defence of India Act, any provisions of the " Code of Criminal Procedure inconsistent with anything in the Act or Rules must, therefore, be regarded as repealed.

7. Lastly, Mr. Raj Kishore Prasad asserted that Rule 130A was quite unreasonable and repugnant to elementary principles of justice and, therefore, he says, we should refuse to consider ourselves bound by it. I am afraid that whatever we may think upon The point our powers do not extend so far. It is the business of the High Court to observe laws however unreasonable if validly made. I must not be assumed to have expressed the opinion that the provision is in fact unreasonable and unjust, because it must be remembered that many provisions which would appear very harsh and unreasonable in peace time may be justified by the necessities of war.

8. In my judgment bail must be refused in these cases.

Varma, J.

9. I agree and I have nothing to add.