T.Ch. Surya Rao, J.Inasmuch as common questions of law and fact are involved, although the landlords and the tenants are different, all these six Civil Revision Petitions can be disposed of together.

CRP Nos. 2312, 2313, 3332 and 3520 of 2001:

2. The above revision petitions arise out of R.C. Nos. 192/1996 and 196/1996 on the file of the Additional Rent Controller, Secunderabad. The landlord filed the said petitions u/s 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 ( the for brevity) seeking fixation of fair rent against two of his tenants in respect of his non-residential premises bearing No. 1-8-91/19/1 and No. 1-8-91/19/2 respectively situate at Prenderghast Road, Secunderabad. At the culmination of enquiry, on an appreciation of evidence available on record, the learned Rent Controller allowed those two petitions fixing the fair rent at Rs. 4,000/- per month exclusive of the electricity consumption charges and property taxes payable on the premises with effect from 1.8.1996 by two separate orders both dated 28.11.1998.

3. In the appeals filed in R.A. Nos. 361/1998 and 362/1998 by the tenants against those orders the learned Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad under the two impugned judgments both dated 3.4.2001, while dismissing the appeals, reduced the quantum of rent from Rs. 4,000/- to Rs. 3,000/- per month. Assailing the said judgments of the appellate authority, both the tenants filed CRP Nos. 2312/2001 and 2313/2001 respectively and the landlord filed CRP Nos. 3332/2001 and 3520/2001.

4. The case of the landlord was that he purchased the non-residential building consisting of ground floor, first floor and second floor bearing No. 1-8-91/19/1 and 1-8-91/19/2, under a registered sale deed dated 20.7.1979. Immediately after the purchase, after having obtained the necessary permission from the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad (MCH) he made new constructions by raising RCC pillars and beams. One of the mulgies situate in the ground floor bearing No. 1-8-91/19/1 was leased out to M/s. Sai Krishna General Stores, the respondent-tenant in R.C. No. 192 of 1996 under a rental agreement dated 22.7.1985 on a monthly rent of Rs. 450/-exclusive of electricity consumption charges. Another mulgi situate in the ground floor bearing No. 1-8-91/19/2 was leased out to M/s. Mukkawar General Stores, the respondent-tenant in R.C. No. 196 of 1996 under a rental agreement dated 1.11.1979 on a monthly rent of Rs. 300/-exclusive of electricity consumption charges. Both the tenants have been doing business in general stores in the respective demised premises. It was his further case that he had provided more suitable, necessary required comforts and space to enable the tenants to run their general stores business in the demised premises. The rent was later enhanced from Rs. 450/- to Rs. 950/- per month in respect of the premises bearing No. 1-8-91/19/1 and it was enhanced from Rs. 300/- to Rs. 910/-per month in respect of the premises bearing No. 1-8-91/19/2 some time thereafter. The measurements of both the premises in question are 12 feet x 20 feet with 3 feet wide pial fitted with rolling shutters and in fact the mulgies fetch a monthly rent of Rs. 4,700/- exclusive of electricity consumption charges and property taxes. Subsequently when he requested the tenants to enhance the rent on several occasions on the basis of the prevailing market rental value without reference to usual tentative enhancements made time to time, the tenants refused to enhance the rents. The landlord, therefore, approached the learned Rent Controller for fixation of fair rent for the mulgies in question.

5. Both the tenants claim that the landlord did not make any improvements to the demised premises after they had been inducted as tenants therein and the claim of the landlord for fair rent of Rs. 4,700/- per month is totally misconceived.

CRP Nos. 871 and 881 of 2002:

6. The above revision petitions arise out of R.C. Nos. 802/1997 and 803/1997 on the file Principal Rent Controller, Hyderabad, u/s 4 of the seeking fixation of fair rent. The learned Additional Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, under the impugned judgments in RA Nos. 132/2000 and 131/200 allowed the appeals while modifying the quantum of rent fixed by the Rent Controller. The landlord in both these petitions is the same although the tenants are different. The premises in question are non-residential mulgies. Both the petitions were filed by the landlord seeking the fixation of fair rent u/s 4 of the. The demised premises in both the petitions were let out each on a monthly rent of Rs. 135/-. The case of the landlord was that the plinth area of each premises is 300 square feet and they are situate on the main road in a commercial area; and that the present market rate in that locality is Rs. 10/- square feet per month which comes to Rs. 3,000/- per month per mulgi; and that it is very difficult to find out a vacant shop in the said area on the main road; and that if any premises is sought on rent, a person has to pay a good will which is ranging from Rs. 2 lakhs to Rs. 2.5 lakhs; and that the cost of the site of each mulgi is Rs. 3 lakhs and the landlord spent Rs. 1.2 lakhs for the construction of each mulgi and thus the total market value of each mulgi was more than Rs. 4 lakhs. The rent for the demises premises could easily be ascertained each at Rs. 3,000/- per month. Therefore, the landlord claims the fixation of fair rent for both the mulgies.

7. The case of the tenants, on the other hand, was that both the demises premises in question are situate away from the main commercial market; and that they are situate in front of Hindi Arts allege and Andhra Mahila Sabha Hospitals where there are no much commercial activities; and that the rent being paid is very reasonable; and that the tenants of the adjacent shops where one day electric dry cleaners are there are paying Rs. 275/- per month for both the mulgies at the rate of Rs. 137.50 ps. per mulgi and, therefore, the claim of fair rent at Rs. 3,000/-per month is unfounded and without any basis. It is their further case that the construction of both the demised premises were made about 35 years back and the entire cost of the construction of both the demised premises has already been realised by way of rents more than 20 years back and no improvements have been made to the suit mulgies nor any repairs have been undertaken warranting increase of the rents being paid.

8. Sri K. Somakonda Reddy and Sri P.R. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for the landlords, would contend that the facts do not warrant any interference with the findings of the learned Rent Controller.

9. Sri P. Venugopal and Sri R. Veerender Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the tenants, on the other hand, would contend that the evidence available on record do not warrant such a huge raise of the rent, and would further contend that at any rate the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction to enhance the rent beyond Rs. 1,000/- inasmuch as the provisions of the would apply to the buildings whose monthly rent is not more than Rs. 1,000/-.

10. Having regard to the respective contentions, the points that arise for my determination are:

(1) Whether the learned Rent Controller has the necessary jurisdiction to fix the fair rent beyond the sum of Rs. 1,000/-per month

(2) What would be the fair rent of the demised mulgies having regard to the facts and circumstances the case

Point No. 1:

11. Apropos the first point it is apt nay expedient to make a brief reconnaissance of the history, object and scheme of the rent legislation for an effective adjudication, particularly when the controversy pertains to the jurisdictional question. The war brought in its train in the year 1941 the increased demand for accommodation and consequent exploitation of the situation by the house owners by demanding excessive rents and resorting to unreasonable eviction of tenants. With a view to curb the situation, the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1941 was passed in exercise of the powers delegated under the Defence of India Rules regulating the tenancies and the order was made applicable initially to the hill stations only, but subsequently extended to the entire Madras Province. The order, which was confined, to the residential houses only in the beginning was extended to the buildings for storage accommodation by the Madras Godown Rent Control Act, 1942 and later to all non-residential buildings. Subsequently, the Madras House Rent Control Order, 1945 and the Madras Non-Residential Buildings Rent Control Order, 1945 were passed. After the expiry of the Defence of India Rules, the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1946 was introduced and it came into force with effect from 1st October, 1946. The Rent Control legislations followed the pattern evolved in Rent Restriction Acts of England, which were primarily aimed at the protection of small tenants in regard to the continued tenancy and against the threat of enhancing the rent. The Rent Control legislations though have been conceived as a transitory measure to rescue the tenants from sudden spurt of threatened evictions and enhancement of rent as a result of war have become a permanent feature due to acute shortage of housing accommodation in urban areas. The Rent Control legislations throughout the country are aimed at curbing unreasonable evictions and regulating the tenancies. The eviction of tenant is circumscribed by the conditions enumerated in the striking a departure from the unfettered right of the landlord to seek eviction at his whim under the Transfer of Property Act.

12. After formation of the State of Andhra Pradesh, a consolidated Act, namely, the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 was passed repealing the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent) Control Act, 1949 which was adopted by the State of Andhra and Hyderabad Act XX of 1954. As can be seen from the preamble of the, it intended to consolidate the law relating to the regulation of lease of buildings, control of rent thereof and prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Andhra Pradesh. In order to implement the same, the envisages the appointment of a Controller conferring jurisdiction on him to determine the fair rent, to increase the fair rent, to order eviction of the tenants, to direct the landlords to restore the amenities which are cut off or withheld by the landlord, and to execute the orders passed by the Controller. The Controller has also the power to permit the conversion of a residential building into a non-residential building.

13. The problem of shortage of housing accommodation in urban areas was becoming more and more acute. The policy of the Government appears to be to provide an incentive to private efforts to construct new buildings. While at one breath, the seeks to regulate the lease of buildings, control of rents thereof, and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom, in order to encourage the construction activity of buildings so as to surmount the problem of shortage of housing accommodation in urban areas, a provision was incorporated in the to exempt certain categories of buildings which in the wisdom of the legislature serves as an incentive for the construction activity. In that view of the matter, Section 32 was incorporated into the. The said Section exempts from the operation of the provisions of the of all buildings owned by the Government and the buildings constructed on and after 26.8.1957. Yet another provision has been incorporated in the in Section 26 empowering the Government to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the by means of a notification and subject to such conditions and terms to be fixed in the said notification inter alia. As aforesaid, with a view to provide incentive to the building construction activity, the exemption was granted. This was originally intended to operate for a particular period. It was under consideration of the State Government for some time to amend Section 32 of theso as to include later constructions. The proposal was to extend the provisions of the to all the buildings after the completion of 10 years of their construction. The Government having faced the difficulty of non-availability of the buildings constructed prior to 26.8.1957 to meet the growing needs of the Government, attempt was earlier made to amend Section 32 by substituting the date "26.8.1957" with "1.1.1968". That proposal fell through. Later it was thought of to exclude the buildings for a period of 10 years from the date on which their construction was completed from the purview of the to ensure that the incentive to embark upon the construction of new houses which is so necessary is not scuttled but encouraged since exclusion of buildings for a particular period reckoned from the date of completion of their construction is a better course than to provide exemption of the buildings constructed on and after particular date inasmuch as in the former case it was to obviate the need for periodical amendment of the provision of the.

14. While things stood thus the Apex Court in Motor General Traders v. State of A.P.AIR 1984 SC 121 , considered the vires of Clause (b) of Section 32 and it struck down the same.

15. As a sequel to the decision of the Supreme Court in Motor General Traders and Another case (referred to supra) and pursuant to the observations embodied therein, G.O. Ms. No. 636 GAD, dated 29.12.1983 was passed by the State Government. The said G.O. exempts all buildings from the purview of the for a period of ten years from the date of construction and also buildings whose monthly rent exceeds Rs. 1,000/-. When the said G.O. Ms. No. 636 was impugned as resulting in invidious discrimination offending Article 14 of the Constitution it was upheld by this Court in S. Shankara Rao v. Government of A.P., 1985 (1) ALT 260. Although the said G.O. was passed in the year 1983 there has been no change or revision in the two conditions incorporated therein so as to be in tune with the changed circumstances and to meet the present day demands.

16. Yet another revolutionary change brought about by the Courts in the is striking down of the vintage provisions in Section 4 of the. In Suresh Gir Vs. K. ahadev, , a Division Bench of this Court held in para 29 at page 447 thus:

"Viewed in the present day context and setting, the irresistible conclusion that follows is that Section 4(2) and its allied provisions, namely, Sub-sections (3) and (4) violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The differential treatment given to the buildings covered by the i.e., the buildings aged more than 10 years and fetching monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/- and less cannot be supported on the basis of reasonable classification. The irrationality or unreasonableness of the impugned provision providing for determination of fair rent of the buildings in the manner in which it is envisaged by Sub-sections (3) to (4) of Section 4 results in unjustifiable discrimination. It is trite to say that in order to pass the test of permissible classification, two conditions must be satisfied: (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that differentia must have rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute. As pointed out by the Apex Court in Motor General Traders case "while the classification may be founded on different bases, what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the under consideration". Judged from this standard, we are unable to say that Sub-sections (2) to (4) of the A.P. Buildings Act pass the tests of valid classification so as to save them from the infraction of Article 14. Pegging down the rates of rents to 1943 level subject to a slight increase as provided for by Sub-sections (3) and (4) can no longer be regarded as valid basis for classification though it was so at the initial stages of the operation of the. Far from achieving the desired objective, it runs counter to the whole idea of fixation of rent which can be said to be fair rent. It would be contradiction in terms to call the rent contemplated by Sub-sections (2) of Section 4 as fair rent. If the said provisions are allowed to operate, the resultant rent, which is bound to be an absurdly low figure will be shorn of the element of fairness and propriety. The element of discrimination stemming from irrationality and unreasonableness is writ large on the face of the impugned provisions."

17. From the above it is to be noticed that the rent legislation being a special enactment confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Rent Controller to decide the issues arising under various provisions of the. The Act is a self-contained enactment providing reliefs and remedies before the hierarchy of authorities constituted under the and therefore it necessarily excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The Act authorises the Government to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the. Having regard to the scheme and intendment of the, the Government may review its policy decision time to time. Such policy may bring in more buildings within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller or on account of the proliferation in the construction activity the need of the Government to secure various private buildings might diminish, and therefore time to time it may exclude certain buildings which have already been within the jurisdictional limits of the Rent Controller. Therefore the criteria prescribed inter alia in the G.O. Ms. No. 636 are susceptible of review by the Government time to time. In the process the pecuniary limit fixed in G.O. No. 636 might get changed. Notwithstanding the same the Rent Controller continues to have the jurisdiction either to fix the fair rent or to decide as to whether the tenant shall be evicted from the demised premises.

18. Section 4 of theconfers jurisdiction upon the Controller to fix the fair rent of the building after holding of the enquiry. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) thereof contemplate the indicia for fixing the fair rent. However, Sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) have been struck down by this Court. Subsection (5) of Section 4 authorises the Controller to allow such increase in the fair rent to which the landlord is entitled to when the fair rent of the building has already been fixed before the commencement of the. Sub-sections (1) and (5) of Section 4 thus confer jurisdiction upon the Controller to fix the fair rent of a building on an application filed by the landlord or the tenant, after conducting the necessary enquiry; and to increase the fair rent on an application filed by the landlord in respect of a building for which the fair rent has already been fixed before the advent of the. Both these provisions specifically envisage the fixation of fair rent regardless of the quantum to be fixed.

19. Undoubtedly the jurisdiction to fix the fair rent is with the Controller. The Municipal Courts cannot fix the fair rent of a building coming within the ambit of the. The Act has not placed any restrictions upon the Controller for fixing the fair rent. The quantum to be fixed eventually at the culmination of enquiry appears to have not engrafted any limitations on the power of the Controller to fix the fair rent. It is equally obvious that the Controller has no jurisdiction over the buildings the rent of which exceeds Rs. 1,000/-. The buildings which are exempted under the are not within the jurisdiction of the Controller. A piquant question arises, as it does in the present case, when a building is initially within the jurisdiction of the Controller having regard to the rent agreed to be paid by the tenant in respect of that building when it stands exempted on account if the increase in the rent at a subsequent point of time. In other words whether the Controller who has the inherent jurisdiction to fix the fair rent of a building in the process of adjudication if for any reason comes to the conclusion that the fair rent is necessarily over and above Rs. 1,000/-would he cease to have the jurisdiction. Even in such cases, undoubtedly the initial jurisdiction to fix the fair rent is with the Controller. In exercise of this jurisdiction, the Controller conducts an enquiry for fixing the fair rent. Such a situation cannot be equated to the class of buildings the rent of which initially is more than Rs. 1,000/- and which are exempted from the operation of the provisions of the. Difficulty might also arise in such cases where having regard to the rate of rent prevalent at the time of the filing of the petition, the Civil Courts may refuse to entertain the petition for want of necessary jurisdiction. That may again lead to chaotic situation and the landlord who is seeking the fixation of fair rent can neither before the Rent Controller nor before the Civil Court. A situation may be visualised as in the present case where the landlord who was receiving the rent at Rs. 950/- approaches the Rent Controller seeking fixation of fair rent, and when it is a fair case to fix the fair rent the Rent Controller must invariably fix the fair rent at less than Rs. 1,000/- as otherwise the building would be exempted from the provisions of the in which event he would have no jurisdiction. In such an event, fixation of rent at Rs. 1,000/- so as to retain the jurisdiction by no stretch of the imagination be termed as fair rent. Therefore, in all such cases where the rent of the building is in between Rs. 950/- to Rs. 1000/-the Rent Controller cannot fix the fair rent on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to fix the rent more than Rs. 1,000/- and in such cases the landlord cannot approach the Municipal Courts as the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller is exclusive and to give necessary jurisdiction to the Civil Courts the rent of the building must invariably be above Rs. 1,000/-. Therefore the landlord in such cases can neither before the Rent Controller nor before the Civil Court. That cannot be the object of the. To avoid such a situation, is it not expedient in the interests of justice to allow the Rent Controller, who has initial jurisdiction to fix the fair rent out of sheer necessity to fix the fair rent beyond the limit of Rs. 1,000/- which is nothing but the pecuniary limit. In fixing the fair rent, if for any reason it exceeds Rs. 1,000/-, the Controller who has inherent jurisdiction to fix the fair rent which is exclusive and excludes the jurisdiction of the municipal Courts, will not be losing his jurisdiction to fix the fair rent at a sum more than Rs. 1,000/-. The contention that in the process of fixing the fair rent if the Controller is of the view that it shall be more than Rs. 1,000/- he shall ask the landlord to approach the municipal Courts or the appropriate forum cannot be countenanced as it would lead to a greater inconvenience and hardship to the parties besides putting the adjudicatory, process out of gear. In my considered view, for the exemption of the building the rent of which is more than Rs. 1,000/- operates at the initial stage. Similarly the operation of the provisions of the to the building on account of the decision in the process of adjudication that it invariably fetches more than Rs. 1,000/-will not make the provisions of the cease to operate in respect of that building during such process.

20. When the Court is seized of the matter it does not lose the jurisdiction by precise ascertainment of amount at the time of final disposal of the petition. The jurisdiction is to be determined with reference to the claim made and not to the result of the matter or the amount for which ultimately the decree may be passed by the Court. This is because the jurisdiction must be ascertained at the commencement of the proceedings and the amount proved cannot be known at that stage. In such cases, therefore, there is no initial lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court in entertaining the petition and the eventual decree passed by the Court is not a nullity. That apart there is every difference between the existence of jurisdiction and exercise of jurisdiction. It is apt to consider what exactly is meant by jurisdiction and the distinction between the existence and exercise of jurisdiction.

21. In Official Trustee, West Bengal and Others Vs. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee and Another, , the Apex Court at page 828 held thus:

"This jurisdiction of the Court may be qualified or restricted by a variety of circumstances. Thus, the jurisdiction may have to be considered with reference to place, Value and nature of the subject-matter. The power of a Tribunal may be exercised within defined territorial limits. Its cognizance may be restricted to subject-matters of prescribed value. It may be competent to deal with controversies of a specified character, for instance, testamentary or matrimonial causes, acquisition of lands for public purposes, record of rights as between landlords and tenants. This classification into territorial jurisdiction, pecuniary jurisdiction and jurisdiction of the subject- matter is obviously of a fundamental character. Given such jurisdiction, we must be careful to distinguish exercise of jurisdiction from existence of jurisdiction: for fundamentally different are the consequences of failure to comply with statutory requirements in the assumption and in the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction: and when there is jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter, the decision of all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. The extent to which the conditions essential for creating and raising the jurisdiction of a Court or the restraints attaching to the mode of exercise of that jurisdiction, should be included in the conception of jurisdiction itself, is sometimes a question of great nicety.

[Emphasis is mine]

22. A clue can profitably be taken in this regard from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which confers the pecuniary jurisdiction upon the Municipal Courts. In Putta Kannayya v. Venkata Narasayya AIR 1918 Mad 998 (2) , a Full Bench of the Madras High Court was of the view thus:

"In every case where the Court is seized of jurisdiction, it cannot and does not lose it by any change in the value of the subject-matter of the suit after the institution of the suit or by the precise ascertainment of its value in cases which do not admit of such ascertainment at the time of institution, except when the plaint is allowed to be amended."

The said judgment was referred to in a later decision in C. Muthuvel Pillai Vs. Hazarath Syed Shah Mian Sakkab Sahib Kadhiri Thaikal, . It was held by the Madras High Court thus:

"Where a Court trying a suit has jurisdiction at its inception to try a suit for eviction it does not lose that jurisdiction merely because the price of the superstructure fixed by it is beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction especially when the relief of fixing the price is only consequential to the main relief."

23. In Shyam Nandan Sahay and Others Vs. Dhanpati Kuer and Others, , the Full Bench of the Patna High Court held thus:

"A distinction must be drawn between cases where there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction apparent on the face of the record and cases where it is doubtful, or at least not so apparent, whether the Court possesses jurisdiction or not. Where there is total lack of jurisdiction, nothing can confer the same on the Court, and an objection to jurisdiction cannot be waived. Therefore, even if such an objection is not raised by any party, the entire proceeding of the Court from the very initial stage is without jurisdiction and void.

Where, however, there is no total lack of jurisdiction, but on the contrary the averments in the plaint if not challenged, manifestly bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Court in which it is filed its proceedings are perfectly with in the jurisdiction and want of jurisdiction in such case can rightly be waived. In other words, this kind of defect in jurisdiction is not fundamental in character and does not amount to anything more than a mere irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction."

24. Sri P.R. Prasad, learned Counsel appearing for some of the respondents-landlords seeks to contend that the purposive interpretation shall have to be given to the provisions of the keeping the object and purpose with which the enactment was passed. In this context, he places reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, in the said judgment it was observed thus:

" The construction must not, of course, be strained to include cases plainly omitted from the natural meaning of the words." Crawford says that a liberal construction does not justify an extension of the statutes scope beyond the contemplation of the Legislature. The fundamental and elementary rule of construction is that the words and phrases used by the Legislature shall be given their ordinary meaning and shall be constructed according to the rules of grammar. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the speaks for itself. It is a well recognised rule of construction that the meaning must be collected from the expressed intention of the Legislature."

25. In R.S. Raghunath Vs. State of Karnataka and another, , the Apex Court held in para 12 thus:

"It is also well settled that the Court should examine every word of a statute in its context and to use context in its widest sense..........

Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act."

26. In Suresh Chand Vs. Gulam Chisti, , the Apex Court held at page 904 in para 11 thus:

"It is well settled that no man should suffer because of the fault of the Court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated the maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit" -an act of Court shall prejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the time normally consumed for adjudication, the ten years exemption or holiday from the application of the Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that unless a suit is instituted soon after the date of letting it would never be disposed of within ten years and even then within that time it may not be disposed of. That will make the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problem of shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation would thus be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else."

27. In Bharathidasan University and another v. All India Council for Technical Education and Ors. 2001 (7) Supreme 196, it was held thus:

"When the language is specific, unambiguous and positive, the same cannot be over-looked to give an expensive meaning under the pretext purposive construction to perpetuate ideological object and aim, which also having regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons for the AICTE Act, are not warranted or justified."

The question is one of jurisdiction. It does not depend upon the interpretation process. Whether the Rent Controller has jurisdiction or not shall have to be considered on a plain reading of the provisions of the and the pleading of the petitioner.

28. A learned single Judge of this Court in Kanda Lingaiah Vs. P. Nirmala Devi, , while placing reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Atma Ram Mittal Vs. Ishwar Singh Punia, , held in para 6 thus:

"It is well settled principle that the rights of the parties crystallizes on the date of the institution of the suit and even though the rent enhanced and the building becomes older than ten years the rights will continue to be available until the suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Once rights crystallize the adjudication must be in accordance with law. In the instant case, the rent was only Rs. 1,000/- as on the date of filing of the R.C. and the landlady enhanced the rent subsequent to the filing of the R.C. without prejudice to her rights with regard to the eviction petition and, therefore, it cannot be said that the Rent Controller has no jurisdiction."

The facts in the above judgment show that the monthly rent payable over the demised premises in that case was Rs. 1,000/-. The building was, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. By an agreement subsequently the parties enhanced the rent from Rs. 1,000/- to Rs. 1,325/-. The enhanced rent places the demised premises out of the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. But there has been a covenant mentioned inter alia in the agreement to the effect that the rental deed was executed without prejudice to the rights and contention of the landlady with regard to the eviction of the tenant. In view of the said covenant the subsequent enhancement of rent has no bearing in the eviction proceedings and the proceedings shall have to be continued notwithstanding the said enhancement.

29. From the above, it is obvious that the Rent Controller who has undoubtedly the inherent jurisdiction to fix the fair rent and has the initial jurisdiction to entertain the petition, while in the process of fixation of fair rent comes to the conclusion that the quantum might exceed the limit of Rs. 1000/-; which limit is prescribed under the statute for convenience sake and on account of the policy of the Government and is susceptible of change; will not cease to have jurisdiction and cannot at that stage direct the petitioner to approach the Municipal Courts.

Point No. 2:

30. During the course of enquiry, the landlord besides examining himself as P.W.1 and another witness as P.W.3, examined P.W.2 the Valuer and got valuation report dated 18.6.1996 marked as Ex.P.3. Ex.P.l is rough sketch of the demised premises. The tenants examined themselves as witnesses in their cases besides getting Exs.R.1 to R.3 marked separately which are the extracts from the assessment book of the Corporation pertaining to different mulgies including both the mulgies in question.

31. As per the evidence of P.W.2 coupled with Ex.P.2-report given by him, the value of each of the mulgies would be Rs. 4,18,000/- and, therefore, the rental value would be Rs. 4,700/- per month. P.W.3 is another tenant of the premises belonging to the landlord. According to his evidence, he has been paying Rs. 2,000/- per month towards rent. The consistent evidence on the side of the landlord is that both the premises in question are in commercial area. P.W.2 is a Civil Engineer and, therefore, he is competent to speak about the value of the building and he is also competent to assess the rental value of the building. Having regard to the fact that both the demised mulgies are situate in a commercial area and are non-residential premises and placing reliance upon the oral evidence of P.W.2-Civil Engineer buttressed by his report Ex.P.2 and other attendent circumstances, the learned Rent Controller was of the view that a fair rent could be fixed at Rs. 4,000/- per month exclusive of electricity consumption charges and property taxes. The appellate Court, however, on reappraisal of the evidence on record and having regard to the fact that the landlord has not made any improvements or additions to the demised mulgies since the date of induction of the tenants, was of the view that it would be reasonable to fix the fair rent at Rs. 3,000/- per month exclusive of electricity consumption charges and property taxes. Therefore, it reduced the fair rent of Rs. 4,000/- as fixed by the Rent Controller to Rs. 3,000/- per month.

32. In Suresh Girs case (referred to supra) a Division Bench of this Court held that fair rent to mean reasonable rent is based upon the factors as to prime location of the house, important amenities to the house like water supply, etc., and that the fair rent need not be determined taking factors as on the date of filing application only and the Court can go beyond the date of filing application also in fixing the fair rent.

33. Keeping the same in view, it is to be seen whether the impugned judgments in CRP Nos. 2312, 2313, 3332 and 3520 of 2001 are correct, legal and proper. On. an appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, more particularly, the evidence of P.W.2 coupled with Ex.P.2 report, the learned Rent Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs. 4,000/- per month per mulgi. The appellate Court, while concurring with the said finding, however on the premise that no improvements or additions had been made to the demised premises, modified the rent as fixed by the learned Rent Controller by reducing it to Rs. 3,000/- per month per mulgi. Such an approach on the part of the appellate Court cannot be said to be wrong. This Court cannot reappreciate the evidence on the point while exercising the revisional jurisdiction. The appellate Court concurred with the finding of the learned Rent Controller that the landlord was entitled to fixation of the fair rent. Therefore, the concurrent finding of both the Courts below was that the landlord was entitled to fixation of the fair rent. On the data available on record, the learned Rent Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs. 4,000/- per month per mugli but having regard to the fact that no improvements or additions to the buildings were in fact made subsequently, the appellate Court modified it to Rs. 3,000/- per month per mulgi.

34. Under these circumstances, I see no compelling circumstances to interfere with the said concurrent finding of fact. Therefore, CRP Nos. 2312, 2313, 3332 and 3520 of 2001 must fail.

35. Similarly, it is to be seen whether the impugned judgments in CRP Nos. 871 and 881 of 2002 are correct, legal and proper. Appreciating the evidence on the point, the learned Rent Controller fixed the fair rent at Rs. 3,000/- per month mulgi, particularly having regard to the fact that the rent was fixed in the year 1966 and there was no enhancement of rent since then. While concurring with the finding of the learned Rent Controller that the landlord is entitled to the fixation of fair rent, the learned appellant Court, however, on the ground that the demised premises have been constructed about 30 years back and no depreciation was given in that regard by the learned Rent Controller, reduced the fair rent as fixed by the learned Rent Controller to Rs. 2,500/- per month per mulgi. Such an approach of the appellate Court cannot be said to be wrong.

36. Therefore, there are no compelling circumstances to interfere with the impugned judgments in CRP Nos. 871 of 881 of 2002 and they must fail.

37. In the result, all these six civil revision petition are dismissed confirming the judgments impugned therein. Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.