Reasoning
Decision
Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Limited
v.
Mahabir Sugar Mills Private Limited
(Supreme Court Of India)
Civil Appeal No. 1750 Of 1981 [From Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 10760 Of 1979] | 20-07-1981
1. Special leave granted.
2. We have heard counsel for the parties. The only ground on which the High Court reversed the judgment of the Commissioner entertaining the appeal was that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable. The High Court itself found that so far as the Commissioner of the Division is concerned he was undoubtedly a revenue court but it held that as the matter arose out of U.P. Sugar-cane (Regulation of Supplies and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Commissioner was exercising appellant jurisdiction as an authority under the said Act and was therefore persona designata. There is no doubt that the Cane Commissioner is highest authority under the and if the intention of the legislature was that appeal should lie to special tribunal, then it would have clearly provided that the appeal should lie to the Cane Commissioner and not to the Division Commissioner. This fact which does not appear to have been noticed by the High Court clearly shows that the Division Commissioner was made an appellate court not as persona designate but was acting as a revenue court. If this is the position, it is obvious that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied and hence the Division Commissioner has ample power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remit the case to the Division Commissioner for hearing the appeal on merits.
3.The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
2. We have heard counsel for the parties. The only ground on which the High Court reversed the judgment of the Commissioner entertaining the appeal was that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable. The High Court itself found that so far as the Commissioner of the Division is concerned he was undoubtedly a revenue court but it held that as the matter arose out of U.P. Sugar-cane (Regulation of Supplies and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Commissioner was exercising appellant jurisdiction as an authority under the said Act and was therefore persona designata. There is no doubt that the Cane Commissioner is highest authority under the and if the intention of the legislature was that appeal should lie to special tribunal, then it would have clearly provided that the appeal should lie to the Cane Commissioner and not to the Division Commissioner. This fact which does not appear to have been noticed by the High Court clearly shows that the Division Commissioner was made an appellate court not as persona designate but was acting as a revenue court. If this is the position, it is obvious that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied and hence the Division Commissioner has ample power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and remit the case to the Division Commissioner for hearing the appeal on merits.
3.The appeal is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
Advocates List
For
For Petitioner
- Shekhar Naphade
- Mahesh Agrawal
- Tarun Dua
For Respondent
- S. Vani
- B. Sunita Rao
- Sushil Kumar Pathak
Bench List
HON'BLE JUSTICE SYED M. FAZAL ALI
HON'BLE JUSTICE A. P. SEN
Eq Citation
AIR 1982 SC 119
(1981) 4 SCC 158
LQ/SC/1981/286
HeadNote
A. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 43 R. 1, Ss. 9 & 11 and Or. 41 R. 32 — Applicability of Art. 226 of the Constitution to orders passed by revenue courts — Limitation Act, 1963, S. 5
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