Meredith, J.The petitioner in this application instituted a suit in the Court of the Munsif, first Court, Bhagalpur, against the opposite party, Bhuthu Earn and his two minor sons, for recovery of Rs. 924 on the basis of a hand-note said to have been executed by Bhuthu Ram for Rs. 600, bearing interest at the rate of 18 per cent, per annum. The allegations in the plaint, briefly, were that Bhuthu Earn, the opposite party No. 1, was the karta of the joint family and was impleaded in the suit both in his personal capacity and as the karta and representative of the said joint family.

2. On 30th June 1935, Bhuthu Earn as karta and representative of his joint family borrowed Rs. 600 in cash from the petitioner for cultivation and household expenses), promising to pay on demand the same with interest at 18 per cent, per annum, and in proof executed a handnote payable on demand in favour of the plaintiff on the same date and made it over to him. The opposite party as defendants alleged that the handnote in suit had been executed not for cash but on account of balance found due to the plaintiff after adjustment of accounts from 1336 Fasli Sambat in which simple and compound interest at high rates had been charged and after payment of Rs. 1500 in cash.

3. Therefore, u/s 8, Bihar Money-lenders Act (7 of 1939), the accounts were liable to be re-opened; and they contended that on the re-opening of the accounts and on reducing the interest to the rate admissible under the law nothing would be found due to the plaintiff. The pleader guardian of the minor defendants in addition urged that there was no legal necessity for the loan.

4. The trial Court believed the defence case about the handnote having been executed in satisfaction of previous dues, but held that the appellants were not entitled to have the accounts re-opened, nor to an order for payment by instalments, and that no question of legal necessity arose in the case. It accordingly decreed the suit in full. On appeal before the learned subordinate Judge, the findings of the Munsif about the handnote in suit having been executed in payment of previous dues, about the question of legal necessity not arising in the case, and about the defendants not being entitled to instalments were not disputed, but it was contended that the defendants were entitled to have the accounts re-opened u/s 8, Bihar Money-lenders Act. The learned subordinate Judge accepted this contention, and remanded the case to the Munsif for ascertaining the liability of the defendants, if any, after re-opening the accounts on reference to the account papers produced by the plaintiff. He directed that the decree, if any, would be against all the defendants, and there would be no instalments. The point taken in the present application is that the learned subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to order the re-opening of the transaction, because Section 8, Bihar Money-lenders Act, or so far as it affects promissory notes is ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature and so null and void.

5. Section 8, Bihar Moneylenders Act, runs as follows:

In any suit brought by a money lender before or after the commencement of this Act in respect of a loan advanced before the commencement of this Act or in any appeal or proceedings in revision arising out of such suit, the Court may exercise all or any of the following powers:

(a) re-open the transaction, take an account between the parties, and relieve the debtor of all liability in respect of any interest in excess of nine per centum simple per annum in the case of a secured loan and twelve per centum simple per annum in the case of an unsecured loan ;

(b) notwithstanding any agreement purporting to close previous dealings and to create a new obligation, re-open any account already taken between them and relieve the debtor of all liability in respect of any interest in excess of nine per centum simple per annum in the case of a secured loan and twelve per centum simple per annum in the case of an unsecured loan, (c) set aside either wholly or in part or revise or alter any security given or agreement made in respect of any loan, and, if the money lender has parted with the security, order him to indemnify the debtor in such manner and to such extent as it may deem just;

Provided that in the exercise of these powers the Court shall not

(i) re-open any agreement purporting to close previous dealings and to create a new obligation which has been entered into by the parties or any persons from whom they claim at a date more than twelve years before the institution of such suit;

(ii) do anything which affects any decree of a Court.

provided further that if anything has been paid or allowed in respect of any liability for interest in excess of nine per centum simple per annum in the case of a secured loan and twelve per centum simple per annum in the case of an unsecured loan, nothing in Clauses (a) or (b) shall be deemed to require the creditor to repay any amount so paid or allowed in excess or to reduce the amount of the principal of the loan.

The contention that this is ultra vires is based upon the terms of Section 100, Government of India Act, 1935. That section is in these words:

(1) Notwithstanding anything in the two next succeeding Sub-sections, the Federal Legislature has, and a Provincial Legislature has not, power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 1 in the Seventh Schedule to this Act (hereinafter called the Federal Legislative List).

(2) Notwithstanding anything in the next succeeding Sub-section, the Federal Legislature, and, subject to the preceding Sub-section, a Provincial Legislature also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 3 in the said schedule (hereinafter called the Concurrent Legislative List).

(3) Subject to the two preceding Sub-sections, the Provincial Legislature has, and the Federal Legislature has not, power to make laws for a Province or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List 2 in the said schedule (hereinafter called the Provincial Legislative List).

(4) The Federal Legislature has power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List except for a Province or any part thereof.

6. Item 27, Provincial Legislative List, is "trade and commerce within the Province; markets and fairs; money lending and money lenders." It will thus be seen that the Provincial Legislature is given the exclusive right to legislate for the Province with regard to money-lending and money-lenders. On the other hand, however, item 28, Federal Legislative List is "cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other like instruments." The Federal Legislature is, therefore, given the exclusive right to legislate with regard to promissory notes. A handnote is a promissory note, for, in Section 4, Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881) promissory note is defined as

an instrument in writing (not being a bank note or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument.

7. It is argued for the petitioner that Section 8, Money-lenders Act, indirectly legislates with regard to promissory notes, because in certain respects it modifies or alters the existing law on the subject, which is contained in the Negotiable Instruments Act. For example, Section 32, Negotiable Instruments Act, provides that:

In the absence of a contract to the contrary the maker of a promissory note is bound to pay the amount thereof at maturity according to the apparent tenor of the note and in default of such payment as aforesaid, such maker is bound to compensate any party to the note for any loss or damages sustained by him and caused by such default.

8. Again, in Section 79 of the Act it is provided that:

When interest at a specified rate is expressly made payable on a promissory note., it shall be calculated at the rate specified, on the amount of the principal money due thereon, from the date of the instrument, until tender or realization of such amount, or until such date after the institution of a suit to recover such amount as the Court directs.

9. Thus, under the existing law with regard to promissory notes, when a suit is brought upon a handnote the maker of the hand-note is bound to pay the amount in full together with the interest stipulated in the handnote. Section 8, Money-lenders Act, detracts from that right of the payee of a promissory note, since it provides that in any suit brought by a money lender in respect of a loan (and no exception is made in the case of a suit on a handnote), the Court may inter alia re-open the transaction, take an account between the parties and relieve the debtor of all liability in respect of any interest in excess of nine per cent, simple per annum in the case of a secured loan and twelve per cent, simple per annum in the case of an unsecured, loan; and notwithstanding any agreement purporting to close previous dealings and to create a new obligation, may re-open any account already taken between the parties and relieve the debtor of all liabilities in respect of any interest in excess of nine per cent, simple per annum in the case of a secured loan and twelve per cent, simple per annum in the case of an unsecured loan. It may further set aside either wholly or in part or revise or alter any security given or agreement made in respect of any loan (and here again no exception is made with regard to collateral security given in the shape of a promissory note).

10. In the present case, the petitioner upon the existing law relating to promissory notes has the right to recover his principal of Rs. 600 and his interest at the rate of 18 per cent, per annum, yet by utilizing the provisions of Section 8, Money-lenders Act, the Court has passed an order, which may deprive him of the whole of his principal, if it is found on re-opening the account that nothing was due at the time of the handnote after reducing the previous rate of interest upon which the liabilities were calculated, and must certainly deprive him of all interest in excess of 12 per cent. If Section 8, Moneylenders Act, entitles the Court to modify the rights of the petitioner upon his promissory note in this manner, it unquestionably alters, so it is argued, the existing law relating to promissory notes as set out in Sections 32 and 79, Negotiable Instruments Act. It is therefore legislation with regard to promissory notes, which is a subject exclusively reserved to the Federal Legislature u/s 100, Government of India Act.

11. Once it is held that this legislation is legislation with regard to promissory notes, then the fact that "money lending and money-lenders" is an item reserved for the Provincial Legislature cannot render the legislation intra vires because u/s 100(3) the power given to the Provincial Legislature to legislate on the matters enumerated in the Provincial List is expressly made subject to the power of the Federal Legislature, and the deprivation of the power of the Provincial Legislature, to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the Federal List. Moreover, the power of the Federal Legislature to legislate in respect of its own list, and the provision depriving the Provincial Legislature of all power to make laws with respect to that list, is expressly made notwithstanding the powers given to the Provincial Legislature under Sub-section (3) of Section 100. That is to say, Section 100, Sub-section (1) in effect lays down that the Provincial Legislature has no power to make laws with respect to promissory notes notwithstanding the fact that Sub-section (3) of Section 100, gives the Provincial Legislature power to legislate with regard to money-lenders and money-lending; and, secondly (making the position plainer still), though in Sub-section (3) the Provincial Legislature has been given the power to legislate with respect to money-lenders and money-lending, that power is expressly made subject to the prohibition in Sub-section (1), depriving the Provincial Legislature of all power to legislate with respect to promissory notes.

12. When reduced to its fundamental terms in this manner, the argument for the petitioner appears to me to have great cogency. Section 100 when read in conjunction with the list in Schedule 7 if it gives the Provincial Government power to legislate generally with respect to money-lending, also deprives it of all power with regard to that particular portion of the general subject of money-lending, which consists of the law in respect to promissory notes. To quote the Federal Court:

A general Power ought not to be so construed as to make a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field, a nullity, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be given to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning and thus the overlapping between them can be avoided : AIR 1939 1 (Federal Court)

13. It will be observed that the argument in this case rests entirely on the doctrine of ultra vires. It does not depend in any way on the question of repugnancy. The case of repugnancy is dealt with in Section 107, and on a careful reading of Section 107, it is clear that the question of repugnancy to the existing law does not arise in the present case, and Section 107 has no application, for, both the Sub-sections of Section 107 in regard to existing Indian law provide only for the case of repugnancy to existing Indian laws with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List.

14. In the present case we have nothing to do with List III. The argument is based entirely on Lists I and II. If a subject falls exclusively within List II, so then the Provincial Legislature had full power, and the Federal Legislature has none, and the fact that a law passed by the Provincial Legislature upon that subject may conflict with the existing Indian law in regard to that subject will not render the legislation ultra vires or invalid. The new law will override the old, even though the old may be Central Legislation. Section 107, relating only to subjects in the Concurrent List, has no application. Nothing in Section 100 can render the law ultra vires. On the other hand, if it is found that Provincial Legislature while purporting to legislate upon a subject in List II has trespassed upon a field defined in List I and reserved u/s 100(1) for the Federal Legislature, then nothing can make that legislation valid, for again Section 107 has no application. The second Sub-section of that section cannot be employed, and the assent of the Governor General or of His Majesty cannot make the provincial law prevail even within the area of the province.

15. It is true that stress has been laid on the fact that Section 8 is repugnant to the existing law in the Negotiable Instruments Act; but that is not for the purpose of relying directly upon the repugnancy but only for the purposes of showing indirectly that this legislation does trespass upon the subject of promissory notes, since it modifies and alters the existing law which has been expressly enacted upon that very subject.

16. Before I go further, I want to deal with two subsidiary questions, which have been raised: (1) the question of the Usurious Loans Act and (2) the argument that the suit is based upon the loan, and not on the handnote. The argument with regard to the Usurious Loans Act, 1918, is that even if the learned subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to pass the order which he did by virtue of Section 8, Bihar Money-lenders Act, nevertheless the order can be treated as an order u/s 3, Usurious Loans Act, which is an Act of the Central Legislature, and so may be regarded as valid. This contention cannot be accepted, however, in view of the fact that Section 3 gives the Court jurisdiction to re-open a transaction, take an account between the parties and relieve the debtor, only where it has reason to believe that the interest is excessive, and the transaction was as between the parties thereto substantially unfair. The power of the Court under this section is, therefore, expressly limited to cases where there is a finding that the interest is excessive, and that the transaction was unfair.

17. In the present case there is neither of these necessary findings. In the absence of these findings, there is no jurisdiction to apply Section 3. The point raised with regard to the nature of the suit is that since it is a suit against the entire joint family, and not only against the maker of the promissory note, it is essentially a suit based on the loan, and not one on the handnote for enforcement of the security. Even, therefore, if Section 8, Bihar Money-lenders Act, cannot affect the law regarding handnotes, it is fully valid in relation to the present case, since it is not contended that the legislation is ultra vires as affecting suits upon loans.

18. In my view, having regard to the terms of the plaint in this case, the argument is fallacious. It is true that the suit was against both the maker of the promissory note and the other members of the joint family. It was nevertheless a suit on the basis of the handnote. There is an express allegation in the plaint that defendant 1 acted as the karta and representative of his joint family. That amounts to saying that he executed the handnote as an agent of the joint family, making his sons also liable on the handnote.

19. Moreover, it is expressly stated that defendant 1 is impleaded in his personal capacity as well as in his capacity as representative of the joint family. It can never be said that the plaintiff in this plaint has abandoned his rights upon the collateral security. If the suit is at all on the loan, it is a suit both on the loan and on the handnote; that is to say, the plaintiff is standing on both his legal rights, and if one of those rights be taken away by the Legislature, he can nevertheless succeed fully upon his enforcement of the other. If it be once conceded that Section 8 cannot affect rights and liabilities upon a promissory note, then the plaintiff cannot be defeated in his claim by anything derogating from any independent right to sue upon the loan.

20 The suit is clearly to enforce all the rights in respect of this transaction, and as long as he remains entitled to succeed in full upon any of those rights, an order refusing him the enforcement of his claim cannot be valid. Indeed it is to be noted that his case as regards the loan has not been accepted, and it is only upon the basis of the hand-note that he can secure a decree if he succeeds at all. Having disposed of these subsidiary points, I now return to the question of ultra vires. Is there any road of escape from the position that no Provincial Legislation can affect rights and liabilities relating to promissory notes as specified in the Negotiable Instruments Act

21. A very similar question arose in a Madras case, Nagaratnam v. Seshayya AIR 1939 Mad. 361 , where it was held by a Full Bench that the provisions of the Madras Agriculturists Belief Act, 1938, relating to scaling down of debts and interest are within the powers of the provincial legislation. There also the very contention which has been made in the present case was put forward. The argument was that the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act makes no difference between a simple contract and a debt due on a promissory note or other negotiable instrument.

22. Therefore, debts arising on negotiable instruments were within the purview of the Act. If debts on promissory notes were excluded the Act would to a very large extent be rendered nugatory, the practice of lending money on promissory notes being so widespread. It was said that, as the Negotiable Instruments Act contemplates the payment of the full amount due on a negotiable instrument, the Provincial Legislature had no power to enact a measure cutting down the amount payable on the negotiable instrument, and the attention of the Court was drawn to the provisions of Sections 32, 78, 79 and 80, Negotiable Instruments Act. The Full Bench did not accept that argument, and adopted two roads of escape from it. The first was what is generally called the "pith and substance" argument.

23. According to this doctrine, the act that an Act of a Provincial Legislature may in some respect trench upon a Federal subject is not the deciding factor. In deciding whether a particular Act is ultra vires of the Legislature the Court has to have regard to "the true nature and character of the legislation in the particular instance in order to ascertain the class of subject to which it really belongs": Russell v. Reg (1882) 7 A.C. 829. This argument is very clearly stated in a passage from the decision of the House of Lords in Gallagher v. Lynn (1937) A.C. 863. The passage, which is quoted in the Madras case, Nagaratnam v. Seshayya AIR 1939 Mad. 361 runs as follows:

It is well established that you are to look at the true nature and character or the legislation, Russell v. Reg (1882) 7 A.C. 829, the pith and substance or the legislation. If, on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorized field. The legislation must not under the guise of dealing with one matter in fact encroach upon the forbidden field. Nor are you to look only at the object of the legislator. An Act may have a perfectly lawful object, e.g., to promote the health of the inhabitants, but may seek to achieve that object by invalid methods, e.g., a direct prohibition of any trade with a foreign country. In other words, you may certainly consider the clauses of an Act to see whether they are passed in respect of the forbidden subject. In the present case any suggestion of an indirect attack upon trade is disclaimed by the appellant. There could be no foundation for it. The true nature and character of the Act, its pith and substance, is that it is an Act to protect the health of the inhabitants of Northern Ireland, and in those circumstances, though it may incidentally affect trade with County Donegal, it is not passed in respect of trade, and is therefore not subject to attack on that ground.

24. What this amounts to is this, that if the legislation is primarily and substantially in respect of a legitimate field, it does not become invalid merely because it happens to trespass incidentally or indirectly upon forbidden ground. At the same time the forbidden ground cannot be trespassed upon in the guise of legislation within the legitimate field; and if the Local Legislature is expressly forbidden from invading a particular field, it cannot avoid that prohibition by doing indirectly what it cannot directly achieve. In the words of Lord Haldane,

neither the Parliament nor the Provincial Legislature (this was a Canadian case) have authority under the Act to nullify by implication, any more than expressly, statutes which they could not enact, Great West Saddley Co. v. The King AIR 1921 P.C. 148.

25. The doctrine, therefore, is subject to very narrow limitations. Nevertheless, the Madras Full Bench held that the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act was in substance within the express powers of the Madras Legislature, and that the fact that in particular cases it might operate to reduce liability oh contracts evidenced by negotiable instruments could not affect its validity. If I may say so with the greatest respect, the application of this principle, derived by analogy from Canadian and Irish cases, to the case of the Government of India Act, 1935, seems to me to ignore the provisions of Section 100 of that Act, which make the powers of the Provincial Legislature expressly subject to the powers of the Federal Legislature and give exclusive powers to the Federal Legislature notwithstanding any powers given to the Provincial Legislature.

26. The argument from analogy is always dangerous and particularly so in a case like this. If I may quote the Federal Court:

There are few subjects on which the decision of other Courts require to be treated with greater caution than that of federal and provincial powers, for the decision must depend upon the words of the constitution which the Court is interpreting; and since no two constitutions are in identical terms, it is extremely unsafe to assume that a decision on one of them can be applied without qualification to another: AIR 1939 1 (Federal Court) .

And again:

In construing the provisions of the Act relating to legislative powers, if the text is explicit, the text is conclusive, alike for what it directs and what it forbids (idem).

27. There are peculiar provisions in Section 100, Government of India Act, and in my view, they bar the application of the "pith and substance" principle to that Act, wherein the Provincial Legislature is given its powers in regard to money lending only subject to an express prohibition with regard to that portion of the money lending field which is covered by the subject of promissory notes.

28. As between the Madras Full Bench view and the view of this Court as expressed by a Full Bench, the latter must in this Court prevail. A Full Bench of the Patna High Court, in Sadanand Jha v. Aman Khan AIR 1939 Pat. 55 , has negatived the pith and substance argument. In that case Manohar Lall J., observed:

It will be worse than useless, if not dangerous, to apply the principles, which have been enunciated by the Privy Council to govern the construction of the Canadian Act, as governing the construction of the Bihar Money-lenders Act, 1938, which is framed entirely on different lines and based upon wholly different schemes of policy. The two Acts are not in pari material... I, therefore, decline to be led away by the argument from analogy, based upon the reasonings adopted by their Lordships in deciding cases on the Canadian law.

29. My learned brother, Dhavle J., who was a member of the Full Bench in question, observed in that case that,

the exclusive powers given to the Provincial Legislature over money lenders and money lending cannot be enlarged so as to include an incidental invasion of the dominant law in the concurrent field, even if such invasion could be regarded as necessarily incidental to the effective exercise of the powers by such Legislature.

30. In short, the Patna Full Bench rejected the pith and substance argument, and held that what the Provincial Legislature could not directly do, it could not do incidentally or indirectly; and I would add, upon the unimpeachable authority of Lord Haldane, that the Provincial Legislature cannot nullify, by implication any more than expressly, a statute which it could not enact. The Negotiable Instruments Act, at least with regard to Sections 32 and 79, is such a statute.

31. The Patna Full Bench case Sadanand Jha v. Aman Khan AIR 1939 Pat. 55 went up in appeal to the Federal Court. In the-Federal Court, however, the question was not considered upon its merits, as the Court held that in view of the fact that the Bihar Money-lenders Act (3 of 1938) had been, superseded by the Act of 1939, the question did not arise: AIR 1939 74 (Federal Court) .

32. As for the other road of escape taken in the Madras case, Nagaratnam v. Seshayya AIR 1939 Mad. 361 that was a finding that the Agriculturists Relief Act was not to be regarded as really affecting the principles embodied in the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the present case we have nothing to do with the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, and I do not want nor would I be entitled, to express any opinion with regard to that finding. I may, however, perhaps say that I am unable to follow the argument in support of this view. The only reason given for it is that:

Negotiation of a promissory note is not prohibited, nor it is said that a maker or an endorser will not be liable; the only effect of the Madras-Agriculturists Relief Act, so far as negotiable instruments are concerned, is to reduce liability where the maker or endorser is an agriculturist.

33. To point out that certain provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not affected affords no ground for drawing an inference with regard to other provisions found elsewhere in the Act.

34. In my view there is no escape from the position that if the provisions of Section 8 are to be applied to suits upon promissory notes, then they undoubtedly modify the existing rights and liabilities upon promissory notes as specified in the Negotiable Instruments Act, and they thereby affect the law with regard to promissory notes, and so, while directly dealing with money lending, trespass indirectly upon the forbidden field, and. nullify rights which exist in that field.

35. There is one other argument with which I must deal, namely that as this legislation is legislation within the field of contract, a wide field which embraces both the subject of money lending and the narrower subject of promissory notes, it is, therefore, legislation in respect of a subject in the Concurrent List and so is validated u/s 107(2), as the assent of the Governor-General has been obtained to the Act of 1939. There are, I conceive, two answers to this argument. The first is that Section 107 relates only to the Concurrent List and has no application to subjects reserved exclusively to List I.

36. The part of the law of contract which is covered by the subject of promissory notes is not covered by Section 107, as the power given u/s 100(3) is subject to the provisions of Section 100(1). The second is that Section 107 deals with repugnancy, but not ultra vires. Its effect is that when the Provincial Legislature enacts a law which it is otherwise competent to enact, but which conflicts with an existing Indian law, then the assent of the Governor-General will make it prevail. But no assent of the Governor-General can validate a law which is void apart from any question of repugnancy, and which it was never within the competence of the Provincial Legislature to enact: a law which is therefore void ab initio. Section 107 (2) provides means for overcoming a repugnancy; it provides no means of validating a law which is completely ultra vires--ultra vires ab initio, and not merely on account of repugnancy, and which therefore has no intrinsic force in it which can be validated.

37. I have endeavoured to consider the question in all its aspects, and after doing so I am decidedly of opinion that nothing in Section 8, Bihar Money-lenders Act, could give the learned subordinate Judge jurisdiction to pass the order which he has done in this case. I am not holding that Section 8 is ultra vires. It may be that the Provincial Legislature never contemplated that it should apply to suits upon handnotes (though the terms of Section 8(c) render that view difficult). However that may be, the question in its broad aspect is one that it is unnecessary in this case to decide.

38. I do, however, consider that nothing in Section 8 can debar the holder or the holder in due course of a promissory note, who sues upon that note, from recovering the full amount of principal and interest due according to the apparent tenor of the note. That is enough for the purposes of the present application.

39. In this view I would allow the application with costs, set aside the order of the learned subordinate Judge and restore the order of the learned Munsif.

40. I consider this is a case where the certificate u/s 205(1), Government of India Act, should be given.

Dhavle J.

41. I agree. The existing Indian law regarding promissory notes (a matter coming within Item 28 of the Federal Legislature List) that we find in the Negotiable Instruments Act is not directly or indirectly referred to in Section 107, Government of India Act, for the section assumes the competency of legislation with, reference to the three Legislative Lists in Schedule 7 and provides for repugnancies between competent legislation by Provincial Legislatures on one hand and competent legislation by the Federal Legislature on the other, besides existing Indian Legislation with respect to the matters enumerated in the Concurrent Legislative List. Section 100, however, altogether excludes the Provincial Legislatures from the matters enumerated in List I, and therefore the law relating to promissory notes must be given effect to notwithstanding any enactments-by the Provincial Legislature operating in the two fields open to it, namely Lists II and III. This makes it unnecessary to determine how far the Provincial Legislature intended Section 8, Money-lenders Act, to apply to suits upon handnotes, for that section cannot be taken to override the Negotiable Instruments Act.