1. This Rule was granted upon the application of the highpriest of the Temple of Baidyanath, who was elected to the office in executionof a decree of this Court, made in affirmance of the decree of the Court belowin a suit instituted under Section 539 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882.[Shailajananda Dut Jha v. Umeshanunda Dut Jh 20 L.J. 460]. A scheme for themanagement of the temple was drawn up pursuant to that decree and from time totime the scheme has been amended by order of this Court. [Umeshananda Dut Jhav. Ravaneswar Provad Singh 17 Ind. Cas. 969 [LQ/CalHC/1912/524] : 16 C.L.J. 431 : 17 C.W.N. 841 andUmeshananda Jha v. Maharaja Sir Ravaneswar Prosad Singh R.A. No. 111 of 1916].Under the decree of this Court the high priest was appointed the trustee, and aCommittee of management was appointed to supervise the work of the temple. Onthe present occasion, the application is made by the high priest for insertionof a clause in the scheme to the effect that the Maharaja of Gidhour who is amember of the Committee, may be removed from his office on an application tothe District Judge and without the institution of a fresh suit. The applicationhas been opposed on behalf of the Maharaja. We are of opinion that theapplication has not been properly framed and that an order cannot possibly bemade in its terms. The whole matter, however, has been placed before the Court,and it is plain that there is considerable difference between the high prieston the one hand and at least one member of the Committee on the other hand. Onthe last occasion, a clause was inserted in the scheme by an order of thisCourt to the effect that on good cause established, the high priest may beremoved on an application to the District Judge without the institution of afresh suit for administration of the trust. The question arises, whether asimilar provision should or should not be inserted in the scheme for theremoval of a member of the Committee. We find on an examination of the judgmentdelivered on the 4th July 1901 by Mr. Joges Chandra Mitter who tried theoriginal suit, that he intended the insertion of a clause to the followingeffect in the scheme: "The members of the Committee shall hold the officefor life, but it will be competent to the said Deputy Commissioner, or on hisrefusal, the District Judge, on his own motion or on the application of anyperson interested in the temple," to remove from the Committee any memberwho may be found to be unfit or incompetent to continue, a member of theCommittee. Pursuant to this judgment, a decree was drawn up, and it was signedby Mr. G.K. Deb on the 15th July 1901. The decree contained a provision to thefollowing effect: "The aforesaid supervisors, that is, the members of theCommittee, will be appointed for life, but the aforesaid Deputy Commissioner,and, on his declining, the aforesaid Judge, may, in his discretion, or on theapplication of any person interested in the temple, dismiss any of the aforesaidpersons, if they happen to be unfit or disqualified for the work."Subsequently the decree was amended after an appeal had been preferred to thisCourt on the 5th August 1901. The amended decree was signed by Mr. H.D. Corey,the then District Judge, on the 18th January 1902. For some unexplained reason,the clause mentioned does not appear in the decree as signed by Mr. Corey. Froman examination of the records in this Court, it appears that the appeal to thisCourt was originally preferred against the decree as signed by Mr. G.K. Deb. Onthe 21st April 1902, an application was made to this Court to attach to thememorandum of appeal a copy of the decree as amended by Mr. Corey: theapplication was granted, and from that moment, the appeal then pending in thisCourt became an appeal against the amended decree. We must hold accordinglythat the decree as amended by Mr. Corey is the final decree operative inrespect of the trust properties; for the judgment of this Court shows that noquestion as to the propriety of the details of the scheme was raised here andthe appeal was dismissed, with the necessary consequence that the decree asamended by Mr. Corey stood confirmed. We cannot hold after the lapse of fifteenyears that the decree as amended by Mr. Corey is of no effect between theparties to the litigation or their successors. In this view it is difficult toresist the conclusion that a clause should be inserted in the scheme to theeffect that a member of the Committee may on good grounds established be removed,by way of an application to the District Judge without the institution of afresh suit.

2. This was, in fact, the course adopted in the case ofDamodarbhat v. Bhogilal Karsondas 24 B. 45 : 1 Bom. L.R. 509 : 12 Ind. Dec.(N.S.) 567. There, in the scheme originally framed, a Committee of managementwas appointed, without provision made for the removal of a member of theCommittee. In execution of the decree, an attempt was made to remove one of themembers on the ground that he had rendered himself unfit, by conductsubsequent, to hold the office. The Court held that this could not be done inexecution of the decree, and that the proper course was, not to institute afresh suit under Section 539, but to adopt the more convenient and obviousprocedure of amendment of the scheme by the inclusion of a provision for theremoval of the trustees, if necessary.

3. The authority of the Court to amend the scheme from timeto time has not been and cannot possibly be questioned. As was pointed out byMr. Justice Subrahmania Ayyar in the case of Prayag Dossji Varu Mahant v.Tirumala Srirangacharla Varu 28 M. 319pc : 15 M.L.J. 133, which wassubsequently affirmed by the Judicial Committee in Prayag Dossji Varu v.Tirumala Srirangacharla Varu 30 M. 138 : 11 C.W.N. 442: 2 M.L.T. 119 : 17M.L.J. 236 : 9 Bom. L.R. 588 (P.C.), there is ample authority for theproposition that a Court, which has sanctioned a scheme for the administrationof a charitable trust, is competent from time to time to vary the scheme as theexigencies of the case may require. Reference need only be made to thedecisions in Attorney General v. Bovill (1840) 1 Phi 762 : 4 Jur. 548 : 41 E.R. 822 : 65 R.R. 506, Attorney-General v. Bishop of Worcester (1851) 9 Hare 328: 21 L.J. Ch. 25 : 16 Jur. 3 : 18 L.T. (O.S.) 86 : 68 E.R 530 : 89 R.R. 47,Mayor of Lyons v. Advocate-General of Bengal (1876) 1 A.C. 9 : 45 L.J.P.C. 17 :34 L.T. 77 : 34 W.R. L.T. 77 : 24 W.R. 679 and Re Brownes Hospital Stamford(1889) 60 L.T. 288. We direct accordingly that the decree of this Court, whichconfirmed the decree as finally amended by Mr. Corey, be further amended by theinsertion of a clause to the following effect; The members of the Committeeshall hold office for life but it shall be competent to the District Judge, onhis own motion or upon the application of any person interested in the temple,to remove, for good cause, from the Committee, any member, on the ground ofunfitness or incompetence or for any like reason. The District Judge may, whenan application is made to him in this behalf, consult the Deputy Commissioner.

4. We desire to add that we make this order because we areof opinion that it is in the best interests of the temple, and not because weare satisfied that the allegations made by the petitioner against the Maharajaof Gidhour are well-founded; on the other hand, there is, we think, good groundfor suspicion that the application has been prompted by personal motives ratherthan by a genuine regard for the welfare of the trust.

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Sadupadhya Umeshanand Oja vs. Ravaneswar Prosad SinghBahadur of Gidhour (20.08.1917 - CALHC)