(Prayer: This writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to the order of rejection passed in Na.Ka.No.241/SDOG/Mike/2012, dated 07.05.2012 on the file of the first respondent, quash the same and to direct the respondents to permit the petition to hold agitation (Kandana Aarpattam) for the cause mentioned in the application of the petitioner dated 04.05.2012 to be held on 19.05.2012 or any other subsequent dates.)

1. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the first respondent is justified in refusing to give permission to the petitioner to conduct protest demonstration against the closure of Beef stall run by the Aruntathiyinar during weekly market at Kavundappadi

2. The petitioner claims to be the Convener of the joint committee for Caste Abolition. He had applied for the conduct of protest demonstration on 09.05.2012 at 03.00 p.m. vide his requisition letter dated 4.5.2012 to the second respondent. They had also printed handbills in furtherance of their decision holding protest demonstration. In their handbill published, they had stated that in the weekly market, the Arunthathiyinars of the village were conducting Beef stall for over 40 years. The panchayat had cancelled permission to conduct the beef stall. To condemn the decision of the panchayat, a massive protest demonstration was organized on 09.05.2012 near Four Road junction in Kavundappadi. The first respondent by the impugned order dated 07.05.2012 had stated that taking into account the law and order situation and in view of the promulgation of section 30(2) of the Police Act, permission was refused. Hence the writ petition was filed challenging the same.

3. When the writ petition came up on 16.5.2012, this court directed the learned Additional Government pleader to take notice and to get necessary instructions from the respondents. Accordingly, the learned Additional Government Pleader produced a written instruction from the first respondent stating that permission to conduct protest demonstration at four road junction against the action of the panchayat cannot be granted. It was stated that certain local persons were selling beef in the open places at the market area at Kavandappadi twice in a week. As it was in the open place and was not healthy for human consumption, the panchayat had issued an order prohibiting the sale of beef at the open place in terms of Section 157 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act, 1994. The panchayat had also allotted a new area adjacent to the existing area. The new area is covered with compound wall and clean. The beef sellers have also installed the beef stall at the new place allotted by the panchayat. But the three persons belonging to the village did not accept the decision ad they have already filed a writ petition before this court being W.P.No.4051 of 2012 against the show cause notice dated 6.2.2012. That writ petitin was disposed of with a direction to the panchayat to consider the replies sent by the petitioners and till such time, the panchayat was directed not to interfere with their business.

4. Thereafter, curiously the first respondent in the written instruction had stated as follows :

"In the wall posters, the printed matters were in the nature of developing the communal disharmony between the different communities of Hindu Religion. Also, names of the President and others had been mentioned in the wall poster and they had been shown as communally fanatics, If the petitioner Veerakumar had been permitted to conduct agitation at Kavandapadi 4 road junction, it would have been created communal tension.

.........

In the interest of justice, maintaining Law and Order and safe guarding the communal harmony between the different communities and to avert untoward incident I had not granted permission to conduct agitations (Dharna) as requested by the petitioner Veerakumar."

5. A copy of the panchayat resolution dated 26.3.2012 banning the conduct of beef stall in the weekly market under Section 157 of the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act, was also produced. It was stated that if the aggrieved person applies for a shop in the newly allotted place, it will be considered.

6. However, the question is not whether the panchayat decision is legally valid or not. The question is related to the petitioners right to demonstrate even assuming that the decision of the panchayat was legally valid or not. Therefore what is involved is the petitioners right to protest against the decision of the local panchayat and their fundamental right to conduct such a protest.

7. As to the preference of persons eating beef and trying to get it from the local market, the Supreme Court had an occasion to say in the matter vide its judgment in Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat reported in (2008) 5 SCC 33 [LQ/SC/2008/709] and in paragraph 31, it was observed as follows:

"We have to take a practical review of the matter. Most people do not have the money to purchase meat from other cities or other States and bring it to Ahmedabad. Almost all meat-eaters get their meat from the local butcher shop in the city, usually from a shop which is close to their residence. Hence, closure of the slaughter house, in substance, means compelling the non-vegetarians to become vegetarians for 9 days".

8. The present question is concerned only with the ban on conducting demonstration against the panchayats decision. It is the right of every section of public or any individual to lodge their protest as enshrined under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Unless restriction provided under Article 19(2) is pressed into service, such demonstration cannot be curtailed by the respondents. The respondents had stated that if demonstration is allowed, it will cause communal disharmony among different communities of Hindu Religion.

9. Now, it has to be seen whether the stand taken by the respondents is justified No doubt, the persons who were running beef stall belonged to Arunthathiyinar community. Traditionally they were doing such business as alleged by the petitioner for over four decades. Merely because they happen to be Arunthathiyinars and they wanted to conduct protest demonstration against the decision of the panchayat which will automatically lead to communal fight is only a futile imagination by the first respondent. In fact, Dr.Ambedkar, who was a Champion for the right of downtrodden had an occasion to consider the protest by the scheduled caste people against the Hindu religion following Chathurvarna (four castes) and also treating the scheduled caste as Avarna (no caste). It was stated that mere conduct of peaceful protest is not suffice and it is fair to participate in such event. It is necessary to refer to the quoting of Dr.Ambedkar, which reads as follows:

"Now the Oppressed Classes must not spend money and manpower fruitlessly and must stop the fight on Satyagraha front. They must now consider their society separate from the Hindu society and organised the former to obtain for it an independent and respectable place in the country. Henceforth, all Depressed Classes must not take part in any Hindu religious festivals, Ratha, worships and other similar occasions."

[Rev.Dr.K.David Pandyan: Dr.B.R.Ambedkar and the Dynamics of Neo-Buddhism, New Delhi, 1996, p.80].

10. He also referred to the continuous struggle between the Hindus and the Untouchables as a permanent phenomenon and stated as follows :

"To put it straight, it can be said that the struggle between Hindus and the Untouchables is a permanent phenomenon. It is eternal, because of the religion which has placed you at the lowest level of the society is itself eternal, according to times and circumstances, is possible. You are at the lowest rung of the ladder today. You shall remain lowest forever. This means the struggle between Hindus and Untouchables shall continue forever. "

[-Dr.B.R.Ambedkar: Why Conversion in B.R.Ambedkar: Political Thinkers of Modern India, edited by Verinder Grover, New Delhi: 1993, p.4.]

11. As to the nature of fight by the scheduled caste people against the religious fanatics in the Hindu religion, he had described the fight is for changing the mind of the Hindus. Further, he had stated that it is not a mere question of temple entry, but it is a struggle to change the Hindu mind set and had stated as follows :

"Your problems will not be solved by temple entry. Politics, economics, education, religionall are part of the problem. Todays satyagraha is a challenge to the Hindu mind. Are the Hindus ready to consider us men or not; we will discover this today . . . We know that the god in the temple is of stone. Darsan and puja will not solve our problems. But we will start out, and try to make a change in the minds of the Hindus."

[E.Zelliot, From Untouchable to Dalit. Essays on the Ambedkar Movement, Delhi: Manohar, 1992, p.114.]

12. Therefore, in the light of these if it is seen, the reasons set out by the first respondent cannot be accepted as a valid reason. This court do not think that there will be any communal division much more religious division between Dalits and rest of Hindu followers in the said village. On the other hand, the need of agitation is only on the ban by the panchayat in running the beef stall, thereby jeopardizing the interest of persons who are traditionally carrying on the said trade.

13. In this context, it is necessary to refer the judgment of the Supreme Court in Himat Lal K.Shah V. Police Commissioner, Ahmedabad reported in AIR 1973 SC 87 [LQ/SC/1972/443] = 1973 (1) SCC 227 [LQ/SC/1972/443] rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, wherein, the Court struck down Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the Bombay Police Act on the ground that Rule, which empowered the Commissioner of Police to refuse permission to hold meetings without giving any guidance under the Rule and thereby conferring an arbitrary discretion, was an unreasonable restriction on the freedom of assembly guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Court also held that the work regulating in Section 33(1)(o) of the Bombay Police Act would include the power to prohibit and impose the condition that permission should be taken a few days before the holding of the meeting on a public street. Mathew, J., dissented from the view of the majority and held that the power to regulate did not include the right to prohibit and the permission sought for holding a meeting ought not be refused. The majority opinion was that regulation is necessary to enable citizens to enjoy the various rights in crowded public streets, and that the State can make regulation in aid of the right of the assemble of each citizen and can impose reasonable restrictions in the interest of Public order.

14. Further, the Supreme Court also in S.Rangarajan V. P.Jagjivan Ram reported in 1989 (2) SCC 574 [LQ/SC/1989/198] held that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India means the right to express ones own opinion by word of mouth, printing, picture or is any one manner of ideas made through any and the communication of ideas made through any medium. Such right, however, was held to be subject to reasonable restrictions in the larger interest of the community and the country as set out in Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Those restrictions are intended to strike a proper balance between the liberty guaranteed, and the social interests specified under Article 19(2). The Court emphasised that the interest of freedom of expression and social interest cannot be regarded as of equal weight and the Courts commitment to freedom of expression demands that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom are pressing and community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger should not be remote, conjectural or far fetched, but should have proximate and direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically dangerous to the public interests. It should be inseparably locked up with the action contemplated like the equivalent of a spark in a powder keg.

15. Therefore, it is too late for the respondents to refuse permission to hold a demonstration. With respect to the respondents reliance upon Section 30(2) of the Police Act, 1861, it can only be said that it enables the respondents to direct the control and conduct of all assemblies and processions on public road or in the public streets or thoroughfares and to prescribe the Rules by which and the times by which the processions may pass and Section 30(2) and (3) on which reliance was placed, is extracted below:

Sec 30(2): He may also, on being satisfied that it is intended by any persons or class of persons to convene or collect an assembly in any such road, street or thoroughfare, or to form a procession which would, in the judgment of the Magistrate of the district, or of the sub-division of a district, if uncontrolled, be likely to cause a breach of the peace, require by general or special notice, that the persons convening or collecting such assembly or directing or promoting such procession shall apply for a licence.

(3) On such application being made, he may issue a licence, specifying the names of the licensees and defining the conditions on which alone such assembly or such procession is to be permitted to take place, and otherwise giving effect to this section.

16. Therefore, the said provision is only a regulatory power and not a blanket power to trifle any democratic dissent of the citizens by the Police.

17. While dealing with a similar situation on the powers conferred on the Commissioner of Police under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act, 1888, this Court (R. Jayasimha Babu, J.) vide judgment in P. Nedumaran v. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 1999 (1) L.W. (CRI) 73 defined the scope of the rights of citizen and the power of the State to impose reasonable restriction. The following passages found in paragraphs 15 to 18 may be usefully extracted:

Para 15: "The rights conferred on the citizens by Article 19 of the Constitution are precious rights and are not to be lightly breached or restricted by the State or any functionary of the State. Any regulation of exercise of those rights must be for the purposes specified in Article 19 of the Constitution itself, and that power must be so exercised as to subserve the larger public good. The power to impose restrictions is not the power which is available for exercise in an arbitrary manner or for the purpose of promoting the interest of those in power, or for suppressing dissent Democracy can be made dynamic an truly alive only when there is free market for ideas and discussion and debate is not only permitted but is encouraged. All expression of opposing view point cannot be regarded as dangerous to the safety or security of the country and all expressions which do not find the approval of those exercising the power of the State cannot be regarded as harmful to the State and to the public order.

Para 16: The power conferred on the Commissioner under Section 41 of the Madras City Police Act is sweeping, that power is meant to be exercised with great care and caution. The Madras City Police Act is a pre-Constitution enactment, and the powers conferred on the authorities at a time when the country was under the colonial regime, and during the period when suppression of dissent was considered to be a legitimate policy of the State, cannot be exercised after the enactment of the Constitution in the same manner, as it was exercised earlier. The Intelligence Report placed before the Court shows that the police still have the attitude which does not seem to recognise that the country is a democratic nation, where every citizen has a right to full and equal participation in the process of Government. No citizen can be regarded as an enemy of the State merely because he has voiced a view which is not the one favoured by those in authority.

Para17: The fact that the police are vested with power should not make them assume that, that power is available for exercise in any manner that they consider fit. That power is to be exercised strictly within the ambit of the provisions of the Constitution, more particularly, the requirement that any restriction placed on the exercise of fundamental rights should be a reasonable restriction, and the restrictions so placed should be shown to be essential, having regard to the permissible purpose for which restrictions may be imposed.

Para18: The fact that the petitioner-Association is voicing a view point which may not be popular cannot be a justification for preventing that point of view being projected."

This Court is in entire agreement with the views expressed therein.

18. In the light of the above, the impugned order stands set aside. The writ petition will stand allowed. Since the date fixed for the demonstration was already over, the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr.S.Doraisamy on instructions stated that his client wanted to conduct the demonstration on 27.07.2012. Hence, the respondents are hereby directed to permit the petitioner to conduct protest demonstration on 27.07.2012 at four roads junction at Kavundappadi. If necessary, he should give police protection to the demonstration. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.