This is a petition by the landlord against the order of the revenue Court condoning the delay in filing the application for restoration of possession under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants (Protection from Eviction) Act XXXVI of 1976.

2. The facts of the application are briefly these: The revision petitioner was the landlord and respondent herein was originally his tenant in respect of 156 acres of the land in Esaneikorari Village in Lalgudi Taluk. It is common ground that the landlord filed an application for eviction of the tenant on the ground of non-payment of arrears of rent and an order of eviction was passed after giving sufficient opportunity to the tenant. It would appear that the landlord executed the order of eviction and took delivery through Court. Later, the tenant seems to have meddled with the possession and the landlord field a suit in O. S. No. 645 of 1976 on the file of the District Munsifs Court, Thuchirapalli, for permanant injunction and obtained a decree restraining the tenant from interfering with the possession of the lardlord. Meanwhile, Act XXXVI of 1976 came into force under which the evicted tenants were given rights in the property enabling them to recover possession. Section 7 of theXXXVI of 1976 says that an application for restoration of possession must be made within three months. The tenant kept quiet and filed an application out of time with a petition to condone the delay. The landlord opposed the application, but the revenue Court condoned the delay and ordered further enquiry. The landlord is aggrieved with the order and has come on revision.

3. Normally, in a case of this kind, this Court will not interfere in revision especially when the lower Court has passed an order of condonation of delay in admitting an application. But in the instant case, the Revenue Court has taken very many things for granted and its conclusion is not supported by evidence. No doubt, there is provision in the XXXVI of 1976 under which the revenue Court is empowered to receive application even after the prescribed time, if sufficient cause is shown. This is a special enactment giving special rights to a certain class of persons and therefore the provisions must be strictly construed. According to the respondent/tenant, he was prevented from filing this application in time, since the landlord offered to settle the matter with him and therefore the tenant was involved into a state of inaction. The second ground urged on behalf of the tenant was that his lawyer was indisposed and therefore he could not file an application in time. Regarding the first ground that it was the landlord who was responsible for the inaction of the tenant, it is prima facie unacceptable. The revision petitioner who is the landlord had obtained an order of eviction and also taken possession through Court. There was no ostensible need for him to compromise the matter with the tenant after taking delivery. Therefore it is, tenant was obliged to put forward a plea that it was only a paper delivery and not actual delivery. This story of paper delivery should not be readily accepted without proper and rigid proof, since all official acts must be presumed to be done in the normal course and they assume regularity. This story of paper delivery is very freely introduced by the defeated parties as a last resort and therefore it should be scrutinised with care and caution. So far as this case is concerned, if the tenant continued to be in possession of the property even after the alleged delivery, there was no need for him for filing an application for restoration of possession which itself presupposes effective delivery. In the face of official records recording delivery the

plea that the landlord wasted to compromise with the tenant is not at all acceptable. I wonder what is there for compromise.

4. Again, the next ground that the lawyer of the tenant was indisposed has no factual foundation. The said lawyer was not examined nor has he filed an affidavit to that effect. In any event, this ground has not been satisfactorily proved at all. There is one other important factor which the revenue Court has lost sight of. The landlord has filed a suit in a civil Court and obtained a decree for injunction against the tenant restraining his from interfering with the possession of the landlord. The tenant remained ex parte and it was an ex parte decree. The very fact the landlord filed a suit and obtained a decree for injunction shows that there was no scope for compromise between the parties and that the alleged promise of compromise is only imaginary. Even when the decree was brought to the notice of the revenue Court, it ignored the decree of the civil Court and condoned the delay for the mere asking of it. Strictly speaking, the law is that the delay of each day should be explained, though the civil Courts take a rather liberal view of the matter depending on the circumstances of each case. In the instant case, no sufficient cause was shown for the long delay and the ground alleged is also hollow and puerile. As already stated, in matters where special rights are given to parties under Special enactments, judicial body or any quasi judicial authority should not be over-indulgent or lightly interfere with the rights of parties which deprive them of the valuable rights of limitation. For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the revenue Court has erred in condoning the delay without sufficient ground. In the result the revision petition is allowed and the order of the revenue Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.