Gopala Krishna Tamada, J.

(1) THIS writ appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge dated 17th December, 2007 in Writ Petition No. 23212 of 2007, whereby the learned single Judge dismissed the said writ petition.

(2) BRIEF facts are that the appellant is a licensee for running a retail liquor vend at Saripalli village in Visakhapatnam District and he was granted necessary licence in form A-4 on 1-7-2006. However, as Saripalli is a sparsely populated village, the appellant sought for shifting of the said retail liquor vend from the said village to Jarripothulapalem village and the same was considered by the commissioner, Prohibition and Excise (the first respondent herein) and accordingly he was permitted to shift the retail liquor vend to Jarripothulapalem village by order dated 23-8-2006. The third respondent, who was an existing licensee of a retail liquor vend at narva village, approached this Court and filed writ Petition No. 22493 of 2006 questioning the said shifting, but the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 6-11-2006. Thereafter, he filed another petition being Writ Petition no. 23576 of 2006 questioning the validity of rule 29 (3) of the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Lease of Right of Selling by Shop and conditions of Licence) Rules, 2005 (for short, the Rules). It appears, during the pendency of the said writ petition, the Commissioner, prohibition and Excise reconsidered the entire issue and passed an order on 28-11-2006 cancelling the shifting of the appellants retail liquor vend from Saripalli village to jarripothulapalem village. Questioning the said order dated 28-11-2006, the appellant approached this Court and filed Writ Petition no. 25429 of 2006. A learned single Judge of this Court clubbed both the matters i. e. , Writ petition No. 23576 of 2006 filed by the third respondent and Writ Petition No. 25429 of 2006 filed by the appellant, and disposed them of by a common order dated 1-10-2007 with a direction to the Commissioner, prohibition and Excise to provide necessary hearing to both the parties on 12-10-2007 in the afternoon. The learned single Judge further directed the appellant as well as the third respondent to be present themselves before the Commissioner and put-forth their respective pleas and thereafter, the commissioner shall decide the issue on merits by passing a speaking order within a period of fifteen days thereafter.

(3) PURSUANT to the said order passed by the learned single Judge, the Commissioner passed an order on 26-10-2007 upholding the cancellation of the shifting order passed by him on 28-11-2006. Questioning the said order, the appellant approached this Court and filed writ Petition No. 23212 of 2007 and as stated supra, the same was dismissed by the learned single Judge and hence this writ appeal.

(4) HEARD learned counsel for the appellant, Sri Bodduluri Srinivasa Rao, learned government Pleader appearing for respondent nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Vedula Venkataramana, learned counsel for the third respondent.

(5) ONE of the contentions, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, is that despite the fact that this Court, while disposing of the writ petitions by order dated 1-10-2007, specifically directed the Commissioner to pass a speaking order, the Commissioner did not adhere to the said direction and passed an order without assigning any reason. In this context, the learned counsel has drawn our attention to the orders impugned in the writ petition as well as this writ appeal. The second contention, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, is that as per the proviso to Rule 29 (3) of the Rules, only for valid reasons, any shifting can be effected, but in the instant case, the authority i.e., the commissioner, without assigning any reason, has simply cancelled the said shifting.

(6) LEARNED Government Pleader as well as the counsel for the third respondent have drawn our attention to the order passed by the learned single Judge and submitted that the learned single Judge has gone deep into the matter and arrived at such a conclusion and as such it needs no interference by this court.

(7) PRIMA facie, we are of the view that the order passed by the Commissioner on 28-11-2006 is not a speaking order. The specific direction given by this Court while disposing of Writ Petition Nos. 23576 and 25429 of 2006 is for passing of a speaking order by the Commissioner. If that is so, we are of the view that this appeal has to be allowed. But, having gone through the order passed by the learned single Judge and the proviso to Rule 29 (3) of the Rules, we are of the view that this writ appeal needs no interference for the following reasons.

(8) IT is not as though the learned single judge is not aware of the earlier order passed by him on 1-10-2007. In fact, the learned single Judge has extracted the said order in the order impugned in this writ appeal. The learned single Judge has followed the judgment of the apex Court in Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar, gathered information from the record and came to the conclusion that the cancellation of the shifting is justified. Though the said exercise ought to have been done by the Commissioner, the learned single judge has taken pains in doing so and came to the conclusion as to whether the said cancellation is justified or not. In the above ruling, the Supreme Court was of the view that in certain circumstances, reasons can be gathered from the record to see whether the conclusion arrived at by the authority concerned was based on some evidence. Following the ratio of the said judgment, the learned singe Judge looked into the record and came to the conclusion that the cancellation of shifting is proper. When such an exercise has been done by the learned single Judge, it would not be proper for the division Bench again to remit the matter to the Commissioner only for the purpose of passing a speaking order.

(9) IN the light of the above discussion, the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is rejected. Insofar as the second contention is concerned, it is relevant to notice Rule 29 of the Rules, which deals with "sale permitted at the licensed premises only", and the same reads as under:

"29. Sale permitted at the licensed premises only:- (1) The leaseholder shall sell the liquor only at the premises specified in the licence. (2) No change or alteration of the licensed premises shall be made not the licensed premises shifted elsewhere. (3) Shifting of the licensed premises may be permitted for valid reasons within the notified area and subject to conditions as may be specified by the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise subject to payment of 1% of the lease amount or rs. 25,000/- whichever is higher. Provided that the Commissioner may consider and permit for valid reasons shifting of the licensed premises notwithstanding the notified area of the licensed premises, within the same mandal or Municipality or Municipal corporation without affecting the total number of notified shops in the said mandal or Municipality or Municipal corporation subject to the conditions as specified by the Commissioner and subject to payment of 1% of lease amount or Rs.25,000/- whichever is higher. "

(10) IN our considered view, as per the proviso, it is clear that it is only for valid reasons, the Commissioner may consider and permit shifting of the licensed premises, but not in case of cancellation of the shifting. Here is a case where the appellant was initially permitted to shift his retail vend from Saripalli village to Jarripothulapalem village and subsequently, on a consideration of the entire material, the Commissioner, Prohibition and excise cancelled the said shifting. Even if the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Commissioner has to assign valid reasons for cancellation of shifting of the licensed premises is accepted, the prospects of the appellant not being in a position to carry on higher quantum of business at Saripalli village cannot be said to be a valid reason for ordering shift of the premises therefrom.

(11) IN the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the learned single judge is justified in passing the impugned order. The writ appeal is, therefore, dismissed.