K.J. VAIDYA, J.

(1) (I) whether the Court is empowered to permit composition of the offences under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 by invoking the inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, more particularly when there is no such express corresponding provision in these two special Acts like the one under Sec. 320 of the Criminal procedure Code, 1973 AND if yes, (ii) whether in cases where the statute provides for the minimum sentence, the Court would still be justified in granting composition of the offence These, in short, are the two important questions that arise for consideration in this appeal.

(2) TO state few relevant facts briefly, as far as they are necessary to decide the two questions raised above, the incident in question wherein ramanbhai Moghabhai and Arvindbhai Dalabhai came to be given kicks and fist-blows and abuses in terms of bhangi. sala-dheda, neech, and down-caste, harijans, etc. , etc. , and thereafter illegally detained in one room by two Bharwads namely - Rupabhai Bhalabhai and Bhagabhai darabhai took place on 27-5-1991 at 5-00 p. m. at Palanpur. On the basis of these allegations, Ramanbhai Moghabhai filed a complaint on 28-5-1991 against the said two accused before P. S. I. , Modasa Town police Station for the offences punishable under Secs. 323 and 324 of the indian Penal Code, Secs. 3 and 7 of the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (for short civil Rights Act) and Sec. 3 (xiv) of the Scheduled Castes and scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short the Atrocities act). After the investigation was over, the respondent-Bharwad Rupabhai Bhalabhai and Bhagabhai Darabhai came to be charge-sheeted to stand trial for the aforesaid alleged offences before the Special Court at himatnagar.

(3) THE trial Court after duly appreciating the prosecution evidence brought on the record, acquitted Bharwad Bhagabhai Darabhai, while convicted and sentenced the appellant-Bharwad Rupabhai Bhalabhai for the offences punishable (i) under Sees. 323 and 342 of the I. P. C. ; (ii) under sees. 3 and 7 of the Civil Rights Act; and (iii) under Sec. 3 (xiv)of the Atrocities Act, and sentenced him to undergo : (a) S. I. for one month and pay fine of Rs. 2000. 00, in default, to undergo S. I. for 7 days; (b) S. I. for six months and pay fine of Rs. 200. 00; in default, to undergo S. I. for 10 days; and (c) S. I. for six months and fine of rs. 200/-; in default, to undergo S. I. for 10 days, respectively. It is this order of conviction and sentence which is challenged by the appellant in this appeal.

(4) WHEN this appeal was called out today, Mr. K. B. Anandjiwala, the learned Advocate for the appellant submittedt that he matter has been amicably settled between the parties outside the Court as a result of intervention of some of the respectable persons of the village, and that the normal, peaceful and cordial relations have been restored between the parties. In support of this, Mr. Anandjiwala has also produced before this Court a compromise purshis dated 24-12-1991, duly signed by the original complainant-Ramanbhai Moghabhai, Arvindbhai Dalabhai (Prosecution witness) and the appellant-Bharwad Rupabhai Bhalabhai, all of which have been duly identified before this Court by Mr. Anandjiwala and Mr. B. J. Bharwad, the learned Advocate practising in Modasa Court. Over and above this, complainant-Ramanbhai has also filed a separate affidavit admitting therein that the matter has been amicably settled between the parties. Now, before accepting this compromise purshis, this Court has inquired from the complainant as to whether he has been pressurised to enter into such a compromise or so, to which, he said no. Rather, he said that the said compromise is arrived at quite voluntarily and that, he was very much interested in maintaining the harmony and peaceful atmosphere in the village, and the cordial relations with the accused. The appellant-Rupabhai who is also present before the Court has also expressed his deep sorrow and repentence for whatever wrong happened in the past and assured this Court that no such unfortunate incident will ever take place in future. Both the complainant and the appellant have admitted their signatures in the compromise purshis as well as the affidavit filed by the respective parties The office is directed to keep all these documents on record.

(5) MR. K. C. Shah, the learned A. P. P. for the respondent-State submitted that ordinarily the State is not against the compounding of the offences when the parties have amicably settled the matter outside the court for the ordinary offences under the Indian Penal Code, But having regard to the most important fact that in the present case, the alleged offences are quite serious offences, i. e. , under the Civil Rights Act as Well as the Atrocities Act, and that there is no express provision for compounding the same, he feels that neither the parties are entitled to pray for compounding of the offences nor the Courts are empowered to grant the same. The learned A. P. P. further submitted that both - the Civil Rights act and the Atrocities Act are the special Acts enacted with a view to specially protect the victimised, down-trodden Harijans who are from ages looked down as a down-caste with contempt and the atrocities are still perpetrated even after the Father of the Nation - Mahatma Gandhi championed the cause for such people. The learned A. P. P. making good his submission invited attention of this Court to Sec. 320 of the Code which pertains to compounding of the offences, wherein the offences can be compounded either by the aggrieved person or with the permission of the Court. So far as the offences under the Civil Rights Act and the atrocities Act are concerned, they are not covered under Sec. 320 of the code, nor there is any express latitude given by the Legislature in the said Acts itself. According to Mr. Shah, it is under these circumstances, when the accused person has already been convicted for the offences under the aforesaid Acts, to permit composition would be perhaps, against the public policy. According to the learned A. P. P. by permitting composition of the alleged offence, both the aforesaid Acts are likely to lose their sharpness and the deterrent effect on the fanatic casteists : The learned a. P. P. thereafter invited attention of this Court to Sec. 3 (1) of the Atrocities act wherein at the bottom, after enlisting 15 offences, it has been legislated that such offences shall be punishable with imprisonment of a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to five years and with fine [emphasis supplied]. The learned A P. P. thereafter invited attention of this Court to the relevant provisions of Sees. 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Rights Act, wherein it has been legislated that the concerned offences shall be punishable for a term of not less than one month and not more than six months and also with fine, which shall not be less than one hundred rupees, and not more than five hundred rupees [emphasis supplied]. On the basis of these submissions, the learned A. P. P. ultimately submitted that when the legislature with its utmost anxiety has provided for the statutory minimum sentence for the alleged offence, this Court should not permit the composition of offences in favour of the accused.

(6) UNDOUBTEDLY, it is true that Sec. 320 of the Code is silent on the point of compromise so far as the offences under the Civil Rights act and the Atrocities Act are concerned, as there is no subsequent amendment made to that effect. It is further equally true that both the civil Rights Act and the Atrocities Act have not made any express provisions for compounding of the offences. It is under these circumstances that the question arise as to when the "law" is silent on the point of compromise, whether the "justice" is also required to maintain tight lips or something should be done by the Court which may ultimately bring about peace and harmony between the two classes of the Society which is fundamental pre-requisite for the maintenance of the "rule of Law", "justice" and the overall happy and peaceful society. One can quite understand that the grave and cold-blooded offences like murder, dacoity, rape, child lifting or any such type of grave offences are not rightly made cpmpoundable. One can as well also understand the cases where the Court feels that composition of the offences arrived at between the parties is not genuine and voluntary but has been brought about by some threats, inducements and coercions, the Court would be justified in refusing the same. But certainly, in cases wherein the offence takes place all-of-a-sudden, in a heat of the moment and comparatively of a mild nature, and ultimately when the wisdom prevails and the passion cools down, if the aggrieved party coming to the senses, on being persuaded by some respectable persons of the area, to compound the offence which they voluntarily agree to do the same, there indeed should not be any difficulty for the Court to grant composition of the alleged offence either prior or even after the order of conviction is recorded. When the aggrieved party approaches the Court praying for compounding of the offences and the Court is satisfied that the same was honest, genuine, true and voluntary, and that the same will bring about harmony and peace in the area, setting at naught the castehatred and conflicts arising therefrom, then there is indeed no harm in accepting such compromise purshis. Rather, not to accept the same would be indirectly perpetuating the class-hatred, the violance arising therefrom resulting into the disturbance of peace, law and order, etc. , etc. , and in this way, such refusals would be like adding fuel to the fire and salt to the injury. This Court can never be a party to such blind refusal of the compromise between the parties. The Courts of law aiming at justice is also supposed to prevent the situation where the things flare-up and the aggrieved person once again becoming victim of the alleged offence, approach the Court for redressal of his grievances. If the prevention is better than cure, such a compromise purshis is certainly more advisable and acceptable than to refuse the same on the technical ground that there is no express provision in the law for the same. When in the facts and circumstances of the case like the present one, it appears to the Court that the composition of the offences can turn out to be blessings in the area, it is indeed the duty of the Court to invoke the inherent power for bringing about the real and substantial justice whereby not only the caste-hatred would be burned to some extent but it may further open up an avenue for the diehard casteists to have a sense of togetherness and sympathetic understanding of each other. The climate of such compromise is required to be encouraged not only to solve the problems between the aggrieved complainant and the accused but also to improve the psychological pollution of caste-hatred in the Society. Before accepting the composition, this Court has consulted its judicial conscience whether the composition in question would serve the individual and social interest or not, and after deeply pondering over the same, it has reached the considered opinion that it will serve both the purposes. Ordinarily, before accepting such compromise purshis, this Court would have directed the learned A. P. P. to hand over a copy of the same to the Police Officer of the area concerned to find out as to whether the same was voluntary, genuine and truthful or not, as has been throughout advisable and done by this Court in a reported decision in case of the State of Gujarat v. Rajput Bhikaji Kaluji and Ors. , XXXIV (1) [1993 (1)] GLR 810. [LQ/GujHC/1992/104] But in the facts of the present case, this ordinary practice is not resorted to by this Court for the simple reason that not only the complainant but about 10 to 15 other persons of his community were also present before this Court when compromise purshis was submitted, which indicates beyond any manner of doubt that the same was not brought under any threat, inducement or coercion. Further in order to test the truthfulness and genuineness of the compromise purshis. this Court of its own has put certain questions to the respective sides and reached to the conclusion that the same was indeed voluntary, genuine and truthful, and there was no reason for this Court to doubt the same. It is under these circumstances that the Court is inclined to accept the compromise between the parties. However, by way of abundant caution and in order to rule out the possibility of the aggrieved S. C. and S. T, complainant is brow-beaten or coerced to enter into the compromise, it is desirable that such compromises should not be directly accepted without the previous permission of the Court which in turn before granting the same shall have to record satisfaction on the basis of directions given in the case of the State of Gujarat v. Rajput Bhikaji Kaluji and Ors. (supra) that the same was voluntary, true and genuine and not sham one. In fact, a similar question also did arise before the Madras High Court in case of Dhanraj v. State, reported in 1986 Cri. LJ 284. In the said case, the question was whether the offences under Sees. 6 and 7 of the Civil Rights Act were compoundable or not, wherein in para 4 it has been observed as under :

"4. A doubt was raised that the offence under the Protection of Civil rights Act is not strictly a compoundable one. I have carefully considered this contention and heard the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as the learned public Prosecutor. It is clear that the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 is a special Act and Sec. 16 of the same lays down that it overrides other laws. Now, the question is whether the conviction could be compounded in law. Having regard to the peculiar facts of this case and the circumstances set out supra, I am of the opinion that this is a fit case of this Court to interfere and record the settlement arrived at between the parties. My reasons are as follows - The preamble to the Protection of Civil Rights Act reads that the was intended to punish the breaching of and practice of untouchability and for the enhancement of any disability arising there from. When the parties themselves have voluntarily and willingly come forward to settle their differences, I do not think there can be any legal impediment in permitting the same, since it is not contrary to the spirit of the. When the affected parties under the Protection of Civil Rights Act themselves have come before this Court and are prepared to compound the offence, there is no reason why this Court should not accept the same. since, in my opinion, the itself will be better implemented if compounding of such offences is permitted. I have also taken into consideration the further fact that both the parties involved, namely, Krishnaveni and Indirani ate Staff Nuraes enployed in the Government Hospital, holding responsible post, and both of them agree that further proceedings, against each other may be dropped. The alleged Acts constituting the offence took place in August, 1980 and it would appear that both parties have forgotten the incident totally as is clear from the endorsement made by the parties in person before this Court. In these circumstances it will be but just and expedient to up hold the compromise and record the same"

The aforesaid observations of Madras High Court are required to be whole-heartedly endorsed and in that view of the matter, though there is no express provision in either of the aforesaid two Acts, viz. , the Civil rights Act and the Atrocities Act, regarding composition of the offences, still however, invoking inherent powers under Sec. 482 of the Code, this court declares that the Court is definitely empowered to compound the offence under the Civil Rights Act and the Atrocities Act, depending upon the facts and circumstances of that particular case. Not only that but merely because the minimum sentence is prescribed, that by itself cannot be permitted to come in the way to settle the matter, where the aggrieved party himself is ready and willing to settle the same. The apprehension of Mr. Shah that such a compromise would be against the public policy and it will perpetrate crimes one after another has no basis. In fact, the public policy warrants that such a compromise, if it is voluntary, true and genuine, it would accordingly be encouraged. Further, if such a compromise is accepted then it would subserve the very object of the, viz. , "the rehabilitation". Thus, once the cordial relations are resorted between the parties and they have already started living peacefully together, no better justice could ever be done then by seeing that compromise is accepted and things are rehabilitated in the said manner.

(7) INCIDENTALLY, it may be clarified that while accepting compromise, one additional factor shall have to be clearly borne-in-mind, viz Sec. 3 of the Atrocities Act which consists of two parts - the first part pertains to the minor offences, while the second one pertains to the major offences where the sentence provided is for ten years or life. Thus, the offence falling within the ambit of the second part being quite serious so far as the life imprisonment is concerned, the Court would not be justified in granting composition of the offences. But in cases where the sentence provided is for ten years or less than that, the Court may depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case, grant composition of the offence. It may further be clarified that the inherent powers vested under sec. 482 of the Code in the High Courts are not made available to the special Courts, however, if parties desire composition of the offence and approach it, then the concerned Court on the basis of observations made in the foregoing paragraphs may accept the same, as for the limited purpose of composition, it would not be just to ask the parties to incur expenses and undergo physical hardships to specially come to the High Court.

(8) WHILE parting, this Court would like to offer special compliments to the complainant-Ramanbhai who was though assaulted physically and demoralized psycholigically has whole-heartedly volunteered to compromise the alleged offence. Ordinarily, such persons would keep their wounds green and are not likely to settle the matter out of sheer revenge and spite, and yet, it is matter of major satisfaction for this Court that the complainant with open and broad mind has come forward showing grace towards assailants by entering into the compromise, but for which the class-hatred, vindictiveness and the resultant fire of discontent between the casteists and aggrieved Harijans would not have extinguished in the area. Thus, here is a case where the persons, who day-in and day-out commit such atrocities upon the members of the SCs and STs must take a lesson from this humane and gracious conduct shown by none other than the victim and member of the supressed class of the society. It is this spirit of compromise which has put the complainant at the top of the glory over the fanatic casteist. When this much has been said in favour of the aggrieved complainant, even the accused-Bharwad Rupabhai also deserves some compliments. He also seriously repenting submitted that not only he was sorry for whatever has happened but is also ready and willing to contribute some amount which may be utilised for the welfare of the community. Though this Court appreciates this noble and generous gesture of the accused, but at the same time, such financial transaction is not the concern of Court as it has nothing to do with this compromise. The compromise should not only be honest, truthful, voluntary and genuine but should also be unconditional.

(9) IN the result, the compromise purshis between the appellant and the aggrieved complainant is accepted, and accordingly, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence is quashed and set aside. The accused is acquitted of all the charges levelled against him. Fine, if paid, be refunded.