AHMADI, J. (dissenting)
1. I regret my inability to agree with the order pronounced by the learned Chief Justice and brother Venkatachaliah as in my view this petition must fail. The facts which need to be noticed are that the petitioner who was appointed Draftsman Grade II in the pay scale of Rs. 205-208 in 1964 was reduced in rank to Draftsman Grade III by an order dated January 28, 1970 in the pay scale of Rs. 150-240. This order was challenged by a writ petition in the Delhi High Court (Civil Writ Petition No. 194 of 1970) but the same was dismissed on August 16, 1970 and a letters patent appeal against the said Judgment was also dismissed on December 3, 1974. Special leave petition filed in this Court also failed. Review of the said order was sought twice but without success. Then came a Writ Petition No. 32 of 1977 under Article 32 of the Constitution. That was withdrawn. Not satisfied, the petitioner filed another Writ Petition No. 4462 of 1978 in this Court which was dismissed on merits on November 20, 1986, 1987 (1) SCC 48 [LQ/SC/1986/475] . While dismissing the said writ petition, this Court took notice of the observations made by this Court while dismissing the petitioners special leave petition directed against his conviction and sentence for attempting to shoot his wife. This is evident from the following : (SCC p. 50, para 1)
"A special leave petition filed by this Court was also dismissed but some observations were made, which according to the petitioner have absolved him from any moral turpitude in the matter."
This clearly has reference to the observations made by the three-Judge Bench in the order of July 27, 1979. It is, therefore, obvious that the observations made by the three-Judge Bench in its order of July 27, 1979 were noticed by this Court when it dismissed the Writ Petition No. 4462 of 1978 on merits by its order dated November 20, 1986. After taking note of the observations as noted above, this Court proceeded to state : (SCC p. 50, para 2)
"We do not think that any interference is called for by us at the instance of the petitioner. As mentioned by us the order reducing him in rank was questioned by him repeatedly before the present writ petition was filed and on every occasion he lost. We do not see any justification for permitting him to challenge the order once again in the present writ petition. In view of the dismissal of the earlier writ petitions we cannot also entertain his claims for arrears of salary and other benefits."
Proceedings further, this Court observed : (SCC p. 50, para 2)
"The petitioner relied upon the observations of this Court at the time of the disposal of the special leave petition in the criminal case and urged that he was absolved of moral turpitude in that case. It is not possible for us to accept this contention. All that the court said was that it may be that there was no moral turpitude and that may be taken into account for other purposes but so far as the criminal case was concerned the conviction and sentence were correct. We are not prepared to read the observations of the Court as absolving the petitioner of all moral turpitude. We are unable to hold that the order dismissing the petitioner from service was illegal or improper."
This Court after taking note of innumerable petitions filed by the petitioner refused to interfere with the order of his dismissal nor did it see any reason or justification for grant of any monetary benefits. Yet the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. It deserves to be dismissed on the above-stated facts. To grant any relief would only encourage multiplicity of proceedings by such litigants. I would, therefore, dismiss the petition. Since the petitioner is a dismissed employee I would not direct him to pay costs
2. When the draft judgment prepared by the learned Chief Justice was circulated for consideration I had expressed my reservation and had later circulated this judgment to which the final response has been received from Venkatachaliah, J. on April 26, 1991. I, therefore, now pronounce my view as above.