(1) In this application the order of the Subdivisional Officer, Sasaram, exercising powers under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, declining to dispose of the application of the workmen on a preliminary issue as requested by the petitioner employer is under challenge. The workman alleged that there was unauthorised deduction from his wages and sought relief before the said officer. The employer entered appearance and wanted the question of maintainability of such an application including the jurisdiction of the officer to hear it (issues 1 and 3) to be decided in the first instance as preliminary issues. The Sub-divisional Officer, however, rejected this prayer saying that these issues will be decided along with the other issues which deal with the merits of the case.

(2) There were two previous Bench decisions of this Court dealing with the same subject matter and Mr. Lalnarain Sinha quite property invited our attention to both of them. In one, which is M. J. C. No. 891 of 1962 (Pat) disposed of on 29-6-1965. It was held that the issue about jurisdiction should have been decided as a preliminary issue as it goes to the very root of the jurisdiction. Hence that Bench directed the Sub-divisional Officer to decide as a preliminary issue the question about the maintainability of the application under the said Act. The other Bench decision is in M. J. C No. 890 of 1962 (Pat) disposed of on the 4-8-1965, where a decision of a litigation on a preliminary issue was deprecated relying on several decisions including (1863-66) 10 Moo Ind App 476 (PC), 50 Ind App 247: (AIR 1922 PC 405) and AIR 1954 SC 202 [LQ/SC/1954/17] at p. 204 and it was held that on the facts of this case the Sub-divisional Officer was justified in declining to try the preliminary issue in the first instance and in directing that it should be heard along with all the issues in the usual manner. Mr. Lal Narain Sinha urged that the later Division, Bench should not have differed from the earlier Division Bench and that, if it thought that the earlier decision was wrong, it should have referred the case to a larger Bench. The law on the subject is laid down in Halsburys Laws of England. 3rd edition. Volume 22, at page 799, as follows :--

"The decisions of the Court of Appeal upon questions of law must be followed by Courts of first instance, and are, as a general rule, considered by the Court of Appeal to be binding on itself, until a contrary determination has been arrived at by the House of Lords. There are, however, three exceptions to this rule, namely, that (1) the Court is entitled and bound to decide which of two conflicting decisions of its own it will follow; (2) the Court is bound to refuse to follow a decision of its own which, though not expressly overruled, cannot, in its opinion, stand with a decision of the House of Lords; (3) the Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. A decision is given per incuriam when the Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords"

This aforesaid passage from Halsburys has been cited with approval in Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, AIR 1962 SC 83 [LQ/SC/1961/231 ;] at p. 88. See also Suresh Chandra v. The Bank of Calcutta Ltd. (1950) 54 Cal WN 832 at pp. 834 and 835

(3) Thus it may be taken as well settled that if an earlier Division Bench completely ignores previous decisions of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court dealing with a question of law. Its decision will not be binding on the succeeding Division Bench. The position would doubtless have differed if the earlier Division Bench had noticed the decision of the Privy Council or Supreme Court and distinguished it, either expressly or impliedly. This point is specially noticed in the note at (k) al p 799 of Halsburys as follows.

"A prior decision of the House of Lords inconsistent with a later decision of the Court of Appeal, but which was not cited to the Court of Appeal, will make the later decision of the Court of Appeal of no value as Riven per incuriam, but, if the prior decision has been cited to the Court of Appeal and expressly or impliedly distinguished by that Court, a problem of some difficulty arises; see the observations of Lord Wright in Noble v. Southern Rly., Co. 1940 AC 583. HL., at p. 598, where he inclined to the view that the law laid down by the House of Lords should be follow ed.".

(4) The Division Bench which heard M. J. C. No. 891 of 1962 (Pat) did not refer to any decision either of the Privy Council or of the Supreme Court, or even of the other High Courts, on the question about the impropriety of a piecemeal hearing of a case, especially on a preliminary question of jurisdiction On the other hand, the later Division Bench which heard M. J. C. No. 890 of 1962 (Pat) has discussed the entire case law on the subject, including the judgments of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, as already pointed out. I may quote the following observation of the Privy Council in 50 Ind App. 247 at p. 254: (AIR 1922 PC 405 at p. 408) :

"The Courts below, in appealable cases, by forbearing from deciding on all the issues joined, not infrequently oblige this Committee to recommend that a case be remanded which might otherwise be finally decided on appeal. This is certainly a serious evil to the parties litigant, as it may involve the expenses of a second appeal as well as that of another hearing below. It is much to be desired, therefore, that in appealable cases the Courts below should, as far as may be practicable, pronounce their opinions on all the important points".

Here, the order of the Sub-divisional Officer made under Section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act is appealable under Section 17. Hence the aforesaid principle laid down by the Privy Council applies with full force. The Sub-divisional Officer has further pointed out in his order under challenge that issue No. 3 was hardly a preliminary issue as it required investigation of facts also. Following the principle laid down above, therefore, I must hold that the later Bench was not bound to follow the earlier Bench decision, nor was it necessary to refer this case to a larger Bench.

(5) For these reasons, following the later Division Bench decision in M. J. C. No. 890 of 1962 (Pat), we maintain the order of the Sub- divisional Officer and direct him to dispose of the application as soon as possible. The matter has already been delayed for nearly three years. The application is dismissed with these observations with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 50 payable to opposite party No. 1.