C.H. Hill, J.

1. This is an action for the recovery of Rs. 2,500, theamount of a hundi together with interest and protesting charges, by theendorsees against the drawers of the hundi.

2. The defendants have pleaded several matters in answer tothe action, some of which relate to the performance on the plaintiffs part offormal acts, such as the presentation of the hundi for acceptance and payment,and notice of dishonour. It was also pleaded that the plaintiffs were merelythe agents of their endorsers for the purpose of collecting the amount of thehundi, and were bound accordingly by an arrangement between their endorsers andthe defendants by which the former were precluded from recovering on the hundi.In addition to these pleas, it was also objected that this Court had nojurisdiction to entertain the suit.

3. The contention with respect to this last point, which itis necessary to dispose of before dealing with the merits of the case, was thatno part of the cause of action arose within the local jurisdiction of theCourt, and that, accordingly, and notwithstanding leave given under Clause 12of the Charter, the Court has no jurisdiction over the suit. What appears isthat the defendants firm drew the hundi at Benares, on a branch of their firmat Bombay, in favour of a firm of Bholanath Bissessur Pershad, which carried onbusiness at Mirzapore and Calcutta, and that the latter firm endorsed the hundito the plaintiffs at Calcutta. Mr. Dunnes argument for the defendants was thatno act, which cannot be attributed directly and immediately, that is, withoutthe intervention of any third person, to the defendant, can enter into thecause of action, and that, accordingly, the endorsement to the plaintiffs inthe present case, which alone was relied upon to give the Court jurisdiction,formed no part of the cause of action. He contended that his proposition wassupported, not only by the cases cited by the plaintiffs, but also by otherswhich he himself cited. Since in all of them the act upon which the Courtfounded its jurisdiction was either in reality or in effect the act of thedefendant, I cannot say I am prepared to go that length with Mr. Dunne. But atall events none of these cases seem to me to involve any principle, the effectof which would be to limit the scope of the cause of action in the mannercontended for. Indeed the tendency of some of them, such as Kellie v. FraserI.L.R. Cal. 445 and Doya Narain Tewary v. The Secretary of State for IndiaI.L.R. Cal. 256, which were relied upon by the plaintiffs, and by which, Ithink, I ought to be guided, seems to me to be quite to the contrary. In theformer of these cases, Mr. Justice Kennedy described the cause of action (inrelation to the 12th clause of the Charter of this Court) as "the entirebundle of facts which would of necessity be proved." Clearly theendorsement to the plaintiffs in an action on a hundi by endorser against draweris one of such facts. Again, in the latter case, Mr. Justice Mitter says:"It has been uniformly held here that the words the whole cause ofaction in Section 12 of the Letters Patent mean all things necessary to give aright of action," from which it would follow that anything necessary togive a right of action would constitute part of the cause of action. The rightof action of a plaintiff suing as endorser of a hundi is directly dependent onthe endorsement, which, accordingly, on the principle stated by Mitter, J.,must form part of the cause of action. Since, therefore, the endorsement to theplaintiffs in the present case took place in Calcutta, a part of the cause ofaction arose here, and, leave having been given, the Court has jurisdiction.

4. [A decree was entered in favour of the plaintiffs for theamount claimed with interest and costs]

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Roghoonath Misser vs.Gobindnarain (05.01.1895 - CALHC)