G.P. Singh, J.

1. This order shall also dispose of Miscellaneous petition No. 696 of 1971 General Manager, Bhilai Steel Plant v. Presiding Officer, State Industrial Court and 2 others).

2. Shri R.K. Nair, who is petitioner in M.P. No. 557 of 1971 and respondent No. 3 in M. P. No. 696 of 1971, was an operator in the Gas Facilities Department of Bhilai Steel Plant. On 5th August 1967, the Manager of this Department was gheraoed by some workmen. On the same date, the petitioner was suspended by an order passed by the Chief Power Engineer. On 10th August 1967, a charge-sheet signed by the Manager, Gas Facilities Department, was handed over to the petitioner. The charges that were levelled against the petitioner are as follows:

Charge No, 1: Shri R.K. Nair, Operator, Gas Facilities Department, had gathered a number of workers in the room of the Manager, Gas Facilities at 8.30 A.M. on 5-8-67. He was responsible for Gheraoing the Manager, Gas Facilities, in his office and not allowing the Manager to go out or other officials to come in to him to transact normal official business. Inspite of the orders of the Manager, Gas Facilities, he refused to vacate the room and go to work and continued agitating in his office. Shri R.K. Nair, therefore, wilfully disobeyed the lawful and reasonable order of superior in combination with others.

Charge No. 2: Shri R.K. Nair, Operator (210-365) on the aforesaid day did not do his work from 8.00 A.M. to 12.30 P.M. and has thus neglected the discharge of his duties.

Charge No. 3: Shri R.K. Nail, Operation (210-365) on the aforesaid day struck work himself as well as incited others to strike work. He was on duty from 8.00 A.M. to 4.30 P.M. but uptill 4.30 P.M. (till he was suspended) he was striking work and agitating in the office of the Manager, Gas Facilities, despite instructions to go to work and carry on his normal duties. He persisted in this wrongful course despite repeated appeals made by C. P. E. Manager, Gas Facilities, C. I. R., A. P. M. and other officials and despite the consequences of such an action having been repeatedly explained to him, Shri R.K. Nair Operator has thus committed an act of misconduct under Standing Order No. 29, Clauses 1, 6 and 16.

A Departmental Enquiry Committee of two officers was constituted by the General Manager by order dated 23rd August 1967 to enquire into the charges. The Committee after an enquiry submitted its report. The report of the Committee along with the record of the enquiry was examined by the Additional General Superintendent who by his order, dated 17th October 1967, removed Nair from service. Nair then moved the Labour Court under section 31 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1960 to challenge the order of removal from service and for reinstatement. It was submitted by Nair that there was no proper enquiry and that the Additional General Superintendent not being his appointing authority was not competent to pass the order of removal from service. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the enquiry was proper and that the power to remove workmen of the rank of Nair was delegated to the Additional General Superintendent by the General Manager and, therefore, the order of removal from service was valid. Nair then preferred a revision before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court agreed with the Labour Court that there was no defect in the enquiry. It was, however, held that Nairs appointing authority was the General Manager and in view of Standing Order 31 (f) of the Standing Orders approved under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, Nair could not be removed from service by any authority lower in rank to the appointing authority and that as the Additional General Superintendent was lower in rank to the General Manager, the order of removal passed by him was illegal. The Industrial Court further held that in view of the order of removal being illegal, the consequence was that the enquiry was also illegal. The Industrial Court allowed the revision and remanded the case to the Labour Court to give its findings on the merits of the charges after permitting the parties to lead evidence. Aggrieved by this order of the Industrial Court, Nair has filed M. P. No. 557 of 1971 and the General Manager, Bhilai Steel Plant, has filed M. P. No. 686 of 1971.

3. The first question that arises in these petitions is whether the Industrial Court was right in holding that the Additional General Superintendent was not competent to remove Nair from service. To appreciate the argument of the learned counsel on this point, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant Standing Orders:

2 (c). Management means the Head of the works under the Company, or any other officer authorised to act in his place or to whom any of his powers is delegated.

30. Penalties for Misconduct:

The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed for misconduct:--

(i)......

(ii) The following shall constitute major penalties:

......

(c) Removal from service which does not disqualify for future employment.

......

31. (a) where an employee is charged with an offence which may lead to the imposition of a major penalty, he shall be informed in writing of the allegations against him and shall be given an opportunity to make representation within a period of not less than seven days. On receipt of the employees explanation, where the allegations are denied by him, an enquiry shall be held by an officer or officers nominated by the Management. Such enquiry will be conducted by an officer other than the officer who has either reported the alleged misconduct or has issued the charge-sheet or who is directly subordinate to them. At the enquiry, the employee concerned shall be afforded reasonable opportunity of explaining and defending his action with the assistance of a fellow employee. Where such enquiry relates to the alleged misconduct of several employees, the enquiry may be held for all the employees together.

......

(f) No order of removal of dismissal from service shall be made by an authority lower than the appointing authority of the employee. In awarding the punishment, the management shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record of the workman and any other extenuating or aggravating circumstances that may exist. A copy each of the orders passed by the Management shall be supplied to the workman concerned.

34. Appeal: The authorities competent to impose various penalties mentioned in Standing Older No. 30 as well as the appellate authorities shall be notified by the Management from time to time. An employee on whom any of the penalties is imposed shall have the right of appeal to the authority notified in this behalf. The appeal shall be submitted within 30 days of receipt of the order of the punishing authority and the appellate authority shall dispose of the appeal within 30 days of receipt of the appeal.

4. Nair was first appointed as a skilled worker by order, dated 21st January 1959 (Annexure H in M. P. No. 696). This order states that the General Manager was pleased to appoint the persons as per list enclosed as skilled workers. Nairs name is included in the list referred to in the order. The order is signed by the Assistant Administrative Officer "for General Manager". From the recitals in the order as also from the fact that the order was signed by the Assistant Administrative Officer "for General Manager", it is clear that the order appointing Nair as skilled worker was passed by the General Manager. Nair was appointed as Operator by order, dated 13th October 1960 (Annexure R-1 in M. P. No. 696). This order is signed by the General Manager. From these orders, it is clear that the appointing authority of Nair was the General Manager. The Additional General Superintendent, who passed the order dated 17th October 1967 removing Nair from service is admittedly an authority lower than the General Manager. It is for this reason that the Industrial Court held that the order removing Nair from service contravened Standing Order 31 (f) which provides that "no order of removal or dismissal from service shall be made by an authority lower than the appointing authority of the employee",

5. It is pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the Management that the definition of Management given in Standing Order 2 (c) includes any officer authorised to act in place of the Head of the works and Standing Order 34 provides that the authorities competent to impose various penalties shall be notified by the Management from time to time. It is further pointed out that the authority to impose penalties on employees of the rank of Nair was delegated under these provisions to the Additional General Superintendent. It is argued on this basis that the Additional General Superintendent was competent to impose the punishment of removal from service. It is true, as pointed out by the learned counsel, that Management not only includes the Head of the works, i.e., General Manager, but also any other officer to whom authority to act on behalf of the General Manager is delegated. It is also true that under Standing Order 34, it is for the Management to notify the authorities competent to impose the punishments. It may further be assumed that the Additional General Superintendent was authorised under Standing Order 34 read with Standing Order 2 (c) to impose the punishment of removal in respect of employees of the rank of Nair. Even so, the Additional General Superintendent was not competent to pass the order of removal against Nair, the reason being that he was an authority lower than the General Manager who was the appointing authority of Nair. The provision in the Standing Order 31 (f) that no order of removal or dismissal from service shall be made by an authority lower than the appointing authority of the employee is similar to the provision contained in Article 311(1) of the Constitution. Even though an authority may be empowered by delegation under Standing Order 34 read with Standing Order 2 (c) to impose the punishment of removal in respect of certain class of employees, he would be incompetent to do so in respect of those employees of this class who were appointed by a higher authority. The delegation of powers under Standing Orders 34 and 2 (c) can only be given effect to subject to the protection conferred on the employees by Standing Order 31 (f). If a delegation of power to an authority lower in rank to the appointing authority to impose the punishment of removal or dismissal is held to be valid, that would make Standing Order 31 (f) wholly negatory. In interpreting section 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919, which contained a similar protection as contained in Article 311(1) of the Constitution that no person in the civil service may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, the Privy Council held in R.T. Rangachari v. Secretary of State : A I R 1937 P C 27, that no delegation of power could be made by framing rules or otherwise to destroy this protection. This principle laid down in Rangacharis case was applied by the Supreme Court in the Management of D T.U. v. B. B. L. Hajelay A I R 1972 S C 2452 while dealing with a similar statutory provision contained in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. In Hajelays case, the employee concerned was appointed by the General Manager (Transport) and it was held that he could not be dismissed by an authority below the rank of the General Manager and that neither delegation of his function by the General Manager nor a Regulation framed by the Corporation effecting such delegation could nullify the statutory protection. Hajeiays case was followed in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Rampratap Singh A I R 1976 S C 2301. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the Industrial Court was right in holding that the order passed by the Additional General Superintendent removing Nair from service contravened Standing Order 31 (f) and was invalid.

6. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Nair that the charge-sheet and the enquiry into the charges were all invalid and void because the charges were not approved by the General Manager and the enquiry was not ordered by him. It is argued by the learned counsel that the protection contained in Standing Order 31 (f) that no order of removal or dismissal from service shall be made by an authority lower than the appointing authority implies that the charge-sheet must have the approval of the appointing authority and the enquiry into the charges must also be ordered by the appointing authority of the employee. In our opinion, there is no merit in this argument. The protection under Standing Order 31 (f) is limited to this that the order of removal or dismissal from service shall not be made any authority lower than the appointing authority. The Standing Order does neither expressly nor impliedly provide that the charges and the enquiry on the basis of which the employee is ultimately punished should have also been framed and conducted by or with the approval of the appointing authority or an authority not lower in rank than the appointing authority. In State of M. P. v. Shardul Singh 1971 M P L J 363, while dealing with Article 311(1) of the Constitution the Supreme Court observed that there was no farther guarantee under the Article that the disciplinary proceedings resulting in dismissal or removal of a civil servant should also be initiated and conducted by the authority mentioned in that Article. We are of opinion that the enquiry against Nair was not defective even if the charges were not framed or approved by the General Manager and the enquiry into them was not ordered by the General Manager who was the appointing authority of Nair. We may, however, mention that it was the General Manager who constituted the Departmental Enquiry Committee of two officers by order, dated 23rd August 1967, to enquire into the charges against Nair. The very fact that the General Manager constituted the Departmental Enquiry Committee to enquire into the charges implies that the charges were approved by him and the enquiry into them was conducted under his authority,

7. The learned counsel appearing for Nair next contends that the Industrial Court was wrong in remanding the case to the Labour Court for holding an enquiry into the charges of misconduct because no request for enquiring into the charges was made by the General Manager during the pendency of the proceedings in the Labour Court. Reliance for this contention is placed on propositions Nos. 5 and 6 in Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. L. B. Singh : A I R 1972 S C 1031. The said propositions read as follows:

(5) The Management has got a right to attempt to sustain its order by adducing independent evidence before the Tribunal, But the management should avail itself of the said opportunity by making a suitable request to the Tribunal before the proceedings ace closed. If no such opportunity has been availed of, or asked for by the management, before the proceedings are closed, the employer can make no grievance that the Tribunal did not provide such an opportunity. The Tribunal will have before it only the enquiry proceedings and it has to decide whether the proceedings have been held properly and the findings recorded there in are also proper.

(6) If the employer relies only on the domestic enquiry and does not simultaneously lead additional evidence or ask for an opportunity during the pendency of the proceedings to adduce such evidence, the duty of the Tribunal is only to consider the validity of the domestic enquiry as well as the finding recorded therein and decide the matter. If the Tribunal decides that the domestic enquiry has not been held properly it is not its function to invite suo motu the employer to adduce evidence before it to justify the action taken by it.

8. It is true that the propositions extracted above from the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. L.B. Singh (supra) lay down that the Management if it wants to avail the opportunity of adducing evidence to prove the charges of misconduct should make a suitable request before the proceedings are closed, but these propositions must now be read subject to the ruling of a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Mundhe : A I R 1975 S C 1900. In this case, the Supreme Court after referring to the cases of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. v. L. B. Singh (supra) and Workmen of F. T. & R. Co. v. The Management A I R 1973 S C 1237, pp. 1238, 1239, laid down that the Labour Court must first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry was defective and it is only when that decision is pronounced that the Management is to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the Labour Court in respect of the charges and it is when at that stage it chooses not to adduce any evidence that it would not thereafter be allowed to raise that issue. The following two passages from the decision in Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Mundhe are relevant on this point:

Is it, however, fair and in accordance with the principles of natural justice for the Labour Court to withhold its decision on a jurisdictional point at the appropriate stage and visit a party with evil consequences of a default on its part in not asking the Court to give an opportunity to adduce additional evidence at the commencement of the proceedings or, at any rate, in advance of the pronouncement of the order in that behalf In our considered opinion it will be most unnatural and unpractical to expect a party to take a definite stand when a decision of a jurisdictional fact has first to be reached by the Labour Court prior to embarking upon an enquiry to decide the dispute on its merits. The reference involves determination of the larger issue of discharge or dismissal and not merely whether a correct procedure had been followed by the management before passing the order of dismissal. Besides, even if the order of dismissal is set aside on the ground of defect of enquiry, a second enquiry after reinstatement is not ruled out nor in all probability a second reference. Where will this lead to This is neither going to achieve the paramount object of the Act, namely, industrial peace, since the award in that case will not lead to a settlement of the dispute. The dispute being eclipsed, protempore, as a result of such an award will be revived and industrial peace will again be ruptured. Again another object of expeditious dispose of an industrial dispute (see section 15) will be clearly defeated resulting in duplication of proceedings. This position has to be avoided in the interest of labour as well as of the employer and in furtherance of the ultimate aim of the Act to foster industrial peace.

We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication, the Labour Court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the Labour Court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication.

9. It logically follows from the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P. P. Mundhe (supra) that if the Labour Court does not decide the issue whether the domestic enquiry was defective as a preliminary issue and in the final order comes to the conclusion that the enquiry was defective, the management can complain before the revisional authority that it was not afforded opportunity to lead evidence on the charges of misconduct. Similarly, it also follows that if the issue relating to the validity of the domestic enquiry is decided in favour of the management by the Labour Court and if the revisional authority comes to a contrary conclusion, it should give opportunity to the management, either by remanding the case or otherwise, to lead evidence for proving the charges of misconduct. The point to be noted is that the stage at which the management is required to state that it will exercise its right of adducing evidence to prove the charges is the point of time when the issue relating to the validity of the domestic enquiry is decided against the management. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has emphasised in Cooper Engineering Ltd.s case that when there is a dispute between the parties regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry, this issue must be. decided as a preliminary issue. In the instant case, the issue relating to the validity of the domestic enquiry and also the issue whether the order of removal from service was passed by a competent authority were not decided as preliminary issues by the Labour Court. Both these issues were decided by the Labour Court by its final order. Moreover, both these issues were decided in favour of the Management. It was, therefore, open to the Management to urge before the Industrial Court that in case it is held that the domestic enquiry was defective, the Management should be given opportunity to lead evidence to prove the misconduct. The Industrial Court came to the conclusion that the domestic enquiry was illegal because the order removing Nair from service was not passed by a competent authority. If the Industrial Court was right in its conclusion that the domestic enquiry was illegal, it had jurisdiction to remand the case to the Labour Court for giving opportunity to the management to adduce evidence for proving the charges of misconduct and, for the reasons already indicated, this order of remand cannot be challenged on the ground that the Management had not claimed the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove the charges during the pendency of the proceedings before the Labour Court.

10. The question that arises for consideration then is whether the Industrial Court was right in holding that the domestic enquiry was illegal simply because the final order of removal from service was not passed by a competent authority. The procedure for conducting the domestic enquiry into the charges which may lead to the imposition of a major penalty is contained in Standing Order 31 (a). The Labour Court and the Industrial Court have both found that the enquiry on the charges levelled against Nair did not contravene the Standing Order or the principles of natural justice. The only defect found by the Industrial Court was that the order of removal from service passed by the Additional General Superintendent contravened Standing Order 31 (f) as it was made by an authority lower than the appointing authority of Nair and was, therefore, invalid. But from this alone, it cannot be said that the entire enquiry held against Nair became defective. There was no defect in the enquiry before the stage of passing of the final order removing Nair from service. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Pratap Singh (supra), the respondent was appointed as a Sewer Inspector by the Commissioner of the Corporation. There was a departmental disciplinary enquiry against the respondent which resulted in his dismissal by the Deputy Commissioner. It was held that the dismissal was invalid being in contravention of the guarantee contained in section 15(1) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act which is to the effect that no employee shall be removed or dismissed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. It was, however, held that this did not make the domestic enquiry defective and it was not necessary for the Commissioner to hold a fresh enquiry and that the Commissioner could reach his own conclusion on the basis of the report and the record of the enquiry already held. The following observations of the Supreme Court are relevant on this point:

After all an enquiry had been conducted in accordance with the rules and the canons of natural justice and an enquiry report had been submitted. The illegality crept in when the Deputy Commissioner decided. From then on, what was done was also illegal. We think it correct in law and in. accordance with justice to hold that the Commissioner will be en titled to consider the enquiry report with an open mind and reach his own conclusion as to the culpability or otherwise of the respondent. It is no longer necessary to hold a fresh enquiry regarding the alleged misconduct since the record is complete up to that stage.

Having regard to the principle applied by the Supreme Court in Ram Pratap Singhs case, it is clear that the Industrial Court was not right in holding that the domestic enquiry was illegal simply because the order of removal was passed by an authority lower than the appointing authority. No defect has beer found in the enquiry up to the stage of submission of the report by the Departmental Enquiry Committee.

11. The next question is whether, when the domestic enquiry was legal and proper but the final order was passed by an authority which was not competent to do so, it was open to the Industrial Court to order a fresh enquiry-by the Labour Court into the charges of misconduct by directing the parties to adduce evidence on those charges. The learned counsel appearing for Nair contends before us that when the order of removal from service was bad on the ground that it was passed by an officer who had no authority to do so, the order of removal was clearly void and the Labour Court could not hold an enquiry into the charges. On the other hand, it is contended by the learned counsel for the Management that as there was no flaw in the domestic enquiry and the flaw was only in the final order, the Labour Court need not enquire into the charges of misconduct afresh and may itself decide on the basis of the material collected in the domestic enquiry whether the charges were proved against Nair and whether his removal from service was justified.

12. It is now well settled that when an employee is punished by the Management without holding an enquiry or after holding a defective enquiry, the Labour Court has jurisdiction to give an opportunity to the Management to lead evidence in support of the charges of misconduct and to uphold the punishment if on the basis of evidence produced before it, the Labour Court comes to the conclusion that the charges are proved. An order of removal or dismissal from service which is passed without holding an enquiry or which is passed on the basis of an enquiry which is defective makes the order of removal or dismissal invalid. Even so, the Labour Court goes into the charges of misconduct itself and it is only when it is found that the charges of misconduct are not established that relief is granted to the employee. There are two reasons why a Labour Court is required to adopt that course: first, that an enquiry by the Labour Court itself is more advantageous to the employee, for he gets the benefit of a verdict of the Court on merits and is not left to another domestic enquiry by the employer which if properly carried out is conclusive on merits; and, second, that the Labour Court by itself enquiring into the charges gets the opportunity of finally adjudicating the dispute and of doing justice between the parties thereby finally removing the cause of industrial strife [See Jagat Singh v. Electricity Board : 1969 M P L J 132=A I R 1969 M P 65 and Workmen of the Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd. v. Motipur Sugar Factory Private Ltd. : A I R 1965 S C 1803]. We have earlier extracted a passage from Cooper Engineering Ltd.s case where also it has been stressed that if the merits of misconduct are not gone into by the Labour Court and the order of punishment is set aside simply on the ground of defect of enquiry, a second enquiry by the Management is not ruled out and the paramount object of the Act, namely, industrial peace, by settling the dispute finally is not achieved A dispute which is eclipsed by such an award is likely to be revived again repturing industrial peace. It is further stressed in the sarnie passage that duplication of proceedings has to be avoided in the interest of labour as well as of the employer and the industrial dispute has to be expeditiously disposed of to foster industrial peace. These broad principles of industrial jurisprudence on which the Labour Court itself enquires into the charges of misconduct when the domestic enquiry is defective are also applicable to a case where the order of removal or dismissal is defective because it was passed by an authority not competent to pass it. If such an order is set aside simply on that ground, it does not put an end to the industrial dispute because the competent authority even thereafter can pass a fresh order of punishment and the industrial dispute, which is temporarily eclipsed, is likely to be revived. Further, if the Labour Court itself goes into the merits of the charges, the employee gets the benefit of a verdict of the Court on merits which naturally is more independent than the verdict of the management. In our opinion, therefore, it would be correct on principle for the Labour Court to go into the merits of the misconduct even when the final order of punishment is found to be defective on the ground that it was passed by an authority incompetent to impose the punishment. The distinction pointed out by the learned counsel for Nair that in such a case as the order itself is void, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to go into the merits is not a valid distinction. Even in those cases where the domestic enquiry is defective because there is violation of the principles of natural justice or breach of mandatory provisions of the Standing Orders laying down procedure of the enquiry, the order of punishment though passed by a competent authority is void. The same is the position when the order is passed by an authority not competent to pass it although there is no defect in the enquiry. In both cases, the order of punishment is void. It is well-known that an order of dismissal or removal passed against a civil servant is void when it contravenes Clause (1) or Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution. Clause (1) of Article 311 guarantees to a civil servant that he shall not be dismissed or removed by any authority subordinate to that by which he is appointed; Clause (2) of Article 311 guarantees to a civil servant that the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank shall not be awarded except after holding an enquiry in which the civil servant is given a reasonable opportunity of being heard and meeting the charges. A contravention of Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 stands on the same footing. An order of punishment contravening either of them is invalid and void [See Punjab Province v. Tara Chand A I R 1947 F C 23, High Commissioner for India v. I. M. Lall : A I R 1948 P C 121; Union of India v. P. v. Jagannath Rao : 1968 M P L J 328 = A I R 1968 M P 204]. On the same analogy an order of dismissal or removal made against an employee by the Management will be void when it contravenes the safeguards of enquiry contained in the Standing Order 31 (a) and also when it is passed in contravention of Standing Order 31 (f) by an authority not competent to pass it. We, therefore, do not find any valid reason why the Labour Court should not have jurisdiction to go into the question of merits of the misconduct in a ease where the order of punishment is passed by are authority not competent to pass it.

13. The last question is whether the Labour Court should hold a fresh enquiry on the charges of misconduct or whether it should give its findings on the charges on the basis of the enquiry conducted by the Management when there is no defect in the enquiry. It is well settled that when an enquiry is not defective and when a competent authority has passed an order of punishment, the Labour Court can see whether the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry although it has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the Management as an appellate body [See Proposition No. 3 in the case of Workmen of F. T. & R. Co. v. The Management.] In our opinion, when there is no defect in the domestic enquiry, it would be duplication of proceedings for the Labour Court to hold a fresh enquiry into the charges and it would be fair to both sides if the Labour Court gives its own finding on the charges on the basis of the domestic enquiry conducted by the Management. The Labour Court in such cases would put out of consideration the finding reached by the authority which was not competent to pass the order of punishment and will itself consider whether the charges are proved on the basis of the material collected in the domestic enquiry. The difference would be this: that when the order of punishment is passed by a competent authority, the Labour Court would only see whether the finding on the charges is plausible conclusion, but when the order is passed not by a competent authority, the Labour Court would see whether the charges can be said to be properly proved against the employee. The Labour Court would also see whether the punishment awarded is reasonable on the basis of the charges if they are found to be proved. By adopting the above course, the Labour Court can put an end to the Labour dispute by deciding the same finally between the parties.

14. As a result of the above discussion, M. P. No. 557 of 1971 fails and is dismissed and M. P. No. 696 of 1971 is allowed to this extent that the Labour Court shall not hold a fresh enquiry and shall decide whether the charges of misconduct are proved on the basis of the material collected in the domestic enquiry. It shall also decide whether the punishment of removal from service is justified on the basis of its finding on the charges and what relief, if any, can be granted to the employee. There shall be no order as to costs in both the petitions. The security amount shall be refunded in each case to the petitioner.