B. SUBHASHAN REDDY, J.

( 1 ) THIS writ petition raises the constitutional vires of statutory provisions contained under Section 106 of Transfer of property Act (hereinafter referred as "the act" ). The complaint is that the petitioner being an educational society had been running the schools and Junior College to impart education to the students and that the petitioner is a junior college at Himayatnagar in a rented premises and that the said lease is governed by the Act and after termination of the lease, the landlord had instituted a suit for eviction in O. S. No. 873/1992 on the file of the v Additional Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad, and that the said suit was instituted after issuing 15 days notice as contemplated under Section 106 of the Act, and that as the petitioners college runs on the basis of an academic year it is highly improbable and impossible to disrupt its activities and in such cases, the period of notice terminating the lease should be six months on par with the agricultural leases and the leases in respect of premises in which manufacturing process is carried on.

( 2 ) THOUGH the Act is preconstitutional one, it is saved under the constitution. It is a valid piece of legislation. The learned counsel for the petitioner stresses the point of discrimination on the touch stone of Article 14 of Indian constitution on the ground that when the leases of immovable properties for agricultural and manufacturing process require six months termination notice, on the basis of the nature of the said operations, either agricultural or manufacturing process, being longer in duration, and when similar circumstances exist for leases like the one relating to the petitioner where there cannot be interruption during the academic year, the petitioner also should be given the same benefit and as he is not similarly treated as that of agricultural and manufacturing leases, section 106 of the Act should be declared as unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. At the outset, I do not find any relevance of Articles 19 and 21 of Indian Constitution to the instant case.

( 3 ) THE argument relating only to article 14 can be considered. The question of striking down Section 106 of the Act cannot arises at all and the prayer in that regard is mis-conceived. Merely because a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing process can be terminated by six months notice, and as the lease like the petitioners can be terminated by 15 days notice, the provision contained under section 106 of the Act cannot be declared as unconstitutional as being violative of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. The legislature has treated the agricultural and manufacturing leases as a separate class from that of the rest of the leases. That apart, as the petitioner seeks similar treatment as that of agricultural and manufacturing leases requiring six months notice, the question of striking down the provision which deals with agricultural and manufacturing leases distinctly cannot arise. Further, Section 106 of the Act is applicable only in the absence of the contract to the contrary. If the contract operates then Section 106 of the Act cannot be pressed into the service at all. If there is no contract to the contrary, the agricultural and manufacturing leases are treated from year to year, while other leases are treated as month to month. Section 106 of the Act does not prohibit a contract to the effect that even agricultural or manufacturing leases can be less than an year. Further, it also does not prohibit, if there is a contract, terminating the agricultural and manufacturing leases of ore or more years, by just a notice without specifying anytime. If Section 106 of the Act is struck down, it will lead to anomalies and also takes out the protection to the tenants, as in that event, without any notice the tenant can be evicted. If at all the argument of the petitioner is to be considered, it is only on the ground that when agricultural or manufacturing leases are terminable by six months notice because of the operations carried on, on the said lands relating to the said leases, why a school which runs on academic year basis, cannot also be extended the same benefit under Section 106 of the Act.

( 4 ) ARTICLE 14 guarantees equality before law and equal protection of laws. The transfer of Property Act was enacted in the year 1882 and came into force from 1 st Jujv. . . . 1882. It is pertinent to mention that when"! legislation is made, it is made generally having regard to the circumstances existed as on that date and the legislative body will not take particular aspects into consideration. It is for the courts, more so, for courts of records, to interpret the provisions of law so enacted and apply the same in specific cases. But while doing so, the courts can interpret and stretch the meaning of the statutory provisions to the extent possible having regard to the object and intendment of the Act, but not to traverse beyond the Act. While it is true that changing times need change in views and the courts have to place interpretation accordingly, but that cannot be beyond the clear provisions of the enactment. If a general word is employed under a statute, the said general word can be stretched and interpreted according to the changed situations and social conditions. But, If the statute enumerates and specifies, as is done under Section 106 of the Act, that, for leases relating to agricultural and manufacturing purposes six months notice is necessary for termination of lease and for other types of leases, the requirement is only 15 days notice, that is the mandate of the legislature and we cannot pick out a case like the petitioner, even though the court may feel that in cases of lease like the one relating to the petitioner, hardship is caused if the notice of termination is 15 days and that it will be appropriate that such a notice should be of six months. Educational Institutions running in rental premises is of the recent origin. But the courts are not enjoined to legislate the matter and it is for the legislative bodies to consider the said aspect. The courts must be on guard against encroaching beyond its proper bounds and not the less, so, since the only restraint upon it is self-restraint. The court is precluded from giving effect to its own notion of what is wise or politic. The constitution has not authorized the Judges to sit in judgments on the wisdom of what the legislature do. That is only a function of legislative body and not of this court.

( 5 ) IN the result, this writ petition is devoid of merits and the same is dismissed accordingly, but without any order as to costs.