1. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and arises out of the following circumstances. Opposite party 1, Kishori Lal Sharma, was in the service of the petitioner-company as a permanent cotton clerk. The company had made a claim against the railways in respect of freight of 360 Californian cotton bales on the ground that it had been overcharged. According to the petitioner the bales were full-pressed while the company had been charged on the basis of the bales being half-pressed. This contention was accepted by the station-master, Rampur, who issued a certificate to the petitioner on 8 April, 1961. On 29 April, 1961 an inspector of the Northern Railway came to Rampur for verification of the claim and inspection of the bales in the mills of the company. The inspector met Sri C. S. Misra, the scrutinizing officer and incharge of the cotton section of the mills. Sri Misra directed Kishori Lal Sharma to show the bales in question to the inspector and also to allow him to measure the bales. While a confidential document, opposite party 1 gave to the inspector the weight list of the bales maintained by the company. According to the petitioner the weight list was a confidential document and opposite party 1 was not authorized to give it to the inspector without the previous permission of Sri C. S. Misra or other superior officers. Kishori Lal Sharma did not inform Sri C. S. Misra that he had handed the weight list to the inspector until the morning of 1 May, 1961. On the morning of 1 May, 1961 the general superintendent of the company called Sri C. S. Misra and told him that he had come to learn that the railway inspector had obtained a copy of the weight list and wanted to know whether the information was correct and whether Sri C. S. Misra had given the weight list to the inspector. Sri C. S. Misra replied in the negative and said that he would make necessary enquired in the matter. Sri C. S. Misra, then, asked Kishori Lal Sharma and it was, then, that opposite party 1, at 11 a.m., on 1 May, 1961 told Sri C. S. Misra that he had handed over a copy of the weight list to the railway inspector. On the matter being referred to the General Superintendent, an enquiry into the matter was ordered by him. Thereafter on 3 May, 1961 a chargesheet was served on opposite party 1 under standing order 23(n) for clerks. Kishori Lal Sharma was asked to appear before the enquiry officer on 5 May, 1961 and to furnish an explanation why he should not be punished under the provisions of the standing order. Standing order 23 (n) for clerks is as follows: "The following acts of omissions shall be treated as misconduct: (n) Disclosure or divulgence of any confidential information or business, or other secrets of the company." Kishori Lal Sharma furnished his explanation on 10 May, 1961. According to the explanation the inspector had asked Kishori Lal Sharma about the weight of the bales. To this Kishori Lal Sharma replied that weight can be ascertained from the weight list. Then the inspector asked to him to give him a copy of the weight list to which opposite party 1 was not prepared and asked the inspector to take the permission of Sri C. S. Misra. Sri C. S. Misra was not on the spot at the time and hence the inspector asked Kishori Lal to give him the weight list and told him that he will inform Sri Misra about it. Again Kishori Lal hesitated but ultimately he handed over the weight list to the inspector. He further said in the explanation that when he came to know that his action had displeased the authorities he instantly want to the railway inspector to get back the weight list. In his explanation Kishori Lal made no allegations of mala fide motives against the management, nor did he allege any case of victimization because of his trade union activities. Subsequently a domestic enquiry was initiated against Kishori Lal. Kishori Lal appeared before the enquiry officer and examined himself and three witnesses. On behalf the management also three witnesses were examined. In his statement before the enquiry officer Kishori Lal stated that he was not a member of any trade union and was not interested in the labour cases pending at the time. Sri C. S. Misra, in his statement, stated that the weight list was a confidential document and that Kishori Lal was not authorized to give the weight list to the inspector. The action of Kishori Lal had led the management to lose its confidence in his integrity. The enquiry officer submitted his report on 24 May, 1961 and held that the weight list was of a confidential nature. The report further stated that this fact was admitted by Kishori Lal when he stated that he was extremely hesitant in disclosing the information to the railway inspector. The enquiry officer, therefore, recommended that Kishori Lal should be dismissed from service forthwith. The report of the enquiry officer was placed before the general superintendent of the mills who was convinced that Kishori Lal was guilty of the offence with which he was charged and it was not in the interests of the company that his services should be retained and, therefore, ordered that his services should be terminated under standing order 20 for clerks. Standing order 20 for clerks runs as follows: "The employment of any permanent clerk may be terminated by one months pay in lieu of notice unless otherwise provided in specific agreement. The reasons for the termination of service shall be recorded in writing and shall be communicated to the clerk, if he so desires, at the time of the discharge unless such communication, in the opinion of the manager, may, directly or indirectly, lay the company and the manager or the person signing the communication, open to criminal or civil proceedings at the instance of the clerk." Thereafter, the Raza Textiles Mazdoor Sangh, opposite party 3 to the petition, raised an industrial dispute with regard to the termination of the services of Kishori Lal Sharma and referred the matter for conciliation. No amicable settlement could be arrived at and, therefore, the State Government referred the following dispute to the labour court by its order dated 31 October, 1961: "Matter of dispute Whether the employers terminated the services of their workman, Kishori Lal, son of Sri Shyam Lal, clerk, with effect from 29 May, 1961 legally and/or justifiably If not, to what relief is the workman concerned entitled" The above dispute was registered as Adjudication Case No. 106 of 1961 before the labour court, Bareilly. The parties to the dispute filed written statements and rejoinder statements. In the written statement filed on behalf of the workman it was alleged that the services of Kishori Lal had been terminated because of his trade union activities and it was a case if victimization and unfair labour practice. This allegation was denied by the petition. It is stated in Para. 13 of the petition that during the course of proceedings before the labour court, the Commercial Inspector, Northern Railway, and Brij Mohan Swarup, secretary, Raza Textiles Labour Union, were examined on behalf of Kishori Lal and none of the deposed that Kishori Lal had been victimized because of trade union activities and no evidence was led to show that the order of termination of his services was passed because Kishori Lal was connected with any trade union. No mala fide on the part of the petitioner-company was alleged in the evidence led by Kishori Lal. The case was, later on, taken up by the presiding officer, labour court, Lucknow. The trial before the presiding officer, labour court, Lucknow, commenced from the stage at which the labour court, Bareilly, had left it off. Oral and documentary evidence was led by the parties. The labour court, Lucknow, gave its award on 10 April, 1962. This award was published in the Uttar Pradesh Gazette of 19 May, 1962. The award ordered the reinstatement of Kishori Lal with continuity of service and payment of back-wages from the date termination to the date of his reinstatement. In the award the labour court held that the charge against Kishori Lal was a wholly misconceived one and that the weight list is not a confidential document and "that realizing the weakness of the stand taken by the management, the general superintendent, Sri M. P. Srivastava, adopted the short-cut of terminating the services of the workmen, not on the basis of the misconduct for which he had been charged, but under the general power of termination of services conferred on the management under standing order 20." The labour court further held that the conduct of the employers in terminating the services of Kishori Lal was not bona fide and he was clearly victimized for his trade union activities. According to the labour court the order terminating the services of Kishori Lal was illegal. The petitioner, therefore, challenges the award dated 10 April, 1962 and prays that the same be quashed. The petitioner also prays that the State Government be directed not to enforce the award. A counter-affidavit has been filed by Kishori Lal. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder-affidavit. I have hear Sri T. N. Sapru, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner company and Sri J. N. Tewari, learned counsel appearing for Kishori Lal Sharma. Sri T. N. Sapru submitted that there was evidence on record to prove that there was any mala fide on the part of the petitioner in terminating the services of Kishori Lal, nor was there evidence to prove that he was victimized on account of his trade union activities and the labour court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to record its findings regarding and mala fides and victimization. He further submitted that the labour chartered in completely ignoring the findings of the domestic enquiry and the evidence led before it and in arriving at an independent finding regarding confidential nature of the weight list which it had no jurisdiction to do as it was not a Court of appeal. According to Sri Sapru the domestic enquiry was fair and followed the principles of natural justice and, therefore, the labour court had no jurisdiction to record a contrary finding without holding that the enquiry was either vitiated by fraud or malice or that the findings of the enquiry officer were capricious or perverse. Sri Sapru contends that the award dated 10 April, 1962 is speculative and conjectural. Sri Sapru relied upon the following cases: (1) Dunlop Rubber Company (India), Ltd. v. Their Workmen [1965 - I L.L.J. 426]. Their lordships of the Supreme Court in the above case at p. 432 held as follows: "We are satisfied that in this case the tribunal was not justified in interfering. It has acted as a Court of appeal in scrutinizing the evidence and in reaching conclusions of its own.... No outside agency should impose its will unless the action of the company is lacking in bona fides or is manifestly perverse of unfair." (2) Tata Oil Mills Company, Ltd. v. Their Workmen [1964 - II L.L.J. 113]. At p. 117 their lordships observed as follows: "The legal position in this matter is not in doubt. If it appears that the domestic enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice and a reasonable opportunity was not, for instance, given to Raghavan to lead evidence, in support of his defence, that would be a valid ground on which the tribunal can discard the finding of the domestic enquiry and consider the matter on the merits uninfluenced by the said finding." (3) Bengal Bhatdee Coal Company v. Ram Pradesh Singh and others [1963 - I L.L.J. 291]. In this case their lordships observed thus: "Hence the inference of victimization made by the industrial tribunal from the mere fact that the management chose to inflict the punishment of dismissal instead of suspension or fine would be arbitrary. Further the fact that the relations between an employer and the union were not happy and the workmen concerned were office-bearers or active workers of the union would by itself be no evidence to prove vitimization, for if that were so, it would mean that the office-bearers and active workers of a union with which the employer is not on good terms would have a carte blanche to commit any misconduct and get away with it on the ground the relations between the employer and the union were not happy. Such finding of the industrial tribunal must be characterized as one based merely on conjectures and surmises." (4) G. Mackenzie and Co., Ltd. v. Its Workmen and others [1959 - I L.L.J. 285]. It was held in this case at p. 289 that: "It is for the management to determine what constitutes major misconduct within its standing orders sufficient to merit dismissal of a workman, but in determining such misconduct it must have facts upon which to base its conclusions and it must act in good faith without motive of vindictiveness, intimidation or resorting to unfair labour practice and there must be no infraction of the accepted rules of natural justice. When the management does have facts from which it can conclude misconduct, its judgment cannot be questioned provided the abovementioned principles are not violated. But in the absence of these facts or in case of violation of the principles set out above its position is untenable." (5) Ritz Theatre (Private), Ltd., Delhi v. Its Workmen [1962 - II L.L.J. 498]. It was observed in this case at p. 501 that: "It is well-settled that if an employer serves the relevant charge or charges on his employee and holds a proper and fair enquiry, it would be open to him to act upon the report submitted to him by the enquiry officer and to dismiss the employee concerned. If the enquiry has been properly held, the order of dismissal passed against the employee as a result of such an enquiry can be challenged if it is shown that the conclusions reached at the departmental enquiry were perverse or the impugned dismissal is vindictive or mala fide, and amounts to an unfair labour practice. In such an enquiry before the tribunal, it is not open to the tribunal to sit in appeal over the finding recorded at the domestic enquiry. This Court has held that when a proper enquiry has been held, it would be open to the enquiry officer holding the domestic enquiry to deal with the matter on the merits bona fide and come to his own conclusion." (6) Assam Oil Company, Ltd., New Delhi v. Its Workmen [1960 - I L.L.J. 587]. In this case their lordships observed at p. 590 as follows: "If the discharge has been ordered by the employer in bona fide exercise of his power, then the industrial tribunal may not interfere with it; but the words used in the order of discharge and the form which it may have taken are not conclusive in the matter and the industrial tribunal would be entitled to go behind the words and the form and decide whether the discharge is a discharge simpliciter or not." (7) Anand Bazar Patrika (Private), Ltd. v. Their Employees [1963 - II L.L.J. 429]. It was held in this case at p. 432 that: "The extent of the jurisdiction which a labour court or an industrial tribunal can exercise in dealing with such disputes is well-settled. If the termination of an industrial employees services has been preceded by a proper domestic enquiry which has been held in accordance with the rules of natural justice and the conclusions reached at the said enquiry are not perverse, the tribunal is not entitled to consider the propriety or the correctness of the said conclusions. If, on the other hand, in terminating the services of the employee, the management has acted maliciously or vindictively or has been actuated by a desire to punish the employee for his trade union activities, the tribunal would be entitled to give adequate protection to the employee by ordering his reinstatement, or directing in his favour the payment of compensation; but if the enquiry has been proper and the conduct of the management in dismissing the employee is not mala fide, then the tribunal cannot interfere with the conclusions of the enquiry officer, or with the orders passed by the management after accepting the said conclusions." There can be no doubt with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the above cases. What has to be seen in the instant case is whether the above principles apply. Sri J. N. Tewari concedes that the domestic enquiry held by the management was a fair enquiry but submits that since the management exonerated Kishori Lal Sharma and has not punished him, the labour court was bound to find whether the termination of Kishori Lal Sharmas services was termination simpliciter or was by way of punishment. Annexure L to the petition is the written statement filed before the labour court by the petitioner. In para. 8 of that written statement it was stated: "That the management did not proceed against Kishori Lal with regard to his misconduct and so punishment was awarded to him under standing order 24 for clerks." Victimization is a question of fact which needs to be proved. When, on existing facts, a labour court forms an opinion that there was victimization this court will not interfere with that finding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. In Bharat Bank, Ltd., Delhi Employees of the Bharat Bank, Ltd., Delhi, and the Bharat Bank Employees Union, Delhi [1950 L.L.J. 921 at 940] it was held by their lordships that: "The word victimization has not been defined in the statute and is not in any sense a term of law or a term of art. It is an ordinary English word which means that a certain person has become a victim, in other words, that he has been unjustly dealt with." Following are some of the issues which were framed by the labour court: "(2) Whether the management was justified in terminating the services of Kishori Lal (3) Whether Kishori Lal was victimized for his trade union activities *** (5) Whether the orders terminating the services of Kishori Lal are mala fide and illegal" In view of the specific issues regarding victimization and mala fides against which no protest was raised by the petitioner at the time when they were framed the labour court was justified in finding whether the workman had been victimized and whether the action of the management was mala fide. It was not necessary for the workman to plead that he was victimized. If there were circumstances present which showed that the workman had been victimized and if evidence to that effect was led before the labour court, that court did not err if it found that the workman had been victimized. In Kalyani (P.H.) v. Air France, Calcutta [1963 - I L.L.J. 679 at 683] the Supreme Court held that "a finding of victimization is generally a question of fact." A plea of victimization can never be taken before the domestic enquiry. Such a plea arises only after the action against the workman had been taken. It cannot be said that in the instant case there was no evidence before the labour court about the victimization of the workman. Kishori Lal Sharma appeared before the labour court and stated that he started his association with trade union activities within a year of his joining the petitioners mills and that he formed a union of clerks in 1948 of which he was the president and further that whenever there was any domestic enquiry against any clerk or any proceedings before the conciliation board he represented the workman. He further stated that when the wage boards recommendation was not implemented in the petitioner-firm a joint committee of the unions was formed and he was the chairman of the committee. Kishori Lal also stated that he played a prominent part throughout and even interviewed the Chief Minister as well as the Labour Minister of the State Government. There was, thus, sufficient evidence regarding his trade union activities and from that evidence the labour court was justified in inferring that the workman had been victimized on account of his trade union activities. This being the position and the finding of the labour court regarding victimization being a finding of fact, this Court will not interfere with that finding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. I do not find any force in the Constitution of Sri T. N. Sapru that the labour court was not justified in recording a finding regarding the confidential nature of the weight list. The case of the petitioner was that it had lost confidence in Kishori Lal Sharma as he had handed over a copy of the weight list to the railway inspector. Under these circumstances, the labour court was bound to decide whether the weight list was confidential or not. In Indian and Iron Steel Company v. Their Workmen [1958 - I L.L.J. 260 at 269-270] the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Undoubtedly, the management of a concern has power to direct its own internal administration and discipline; but the power is not unlimited and when a dispute arises, industrial tribunals have been given the power to see whether the termination of service of a workman is justified and to give appropriate relief. In cases of dismissal on misconduct, the tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (i) when there is a want of good faith, (ii) when there is victimization or unfair labour practice, (iii) when the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials, the finding is completely baseless or perverse." The case before me is fully covered by this case, and therefore, it must be held that, even if the domestic enquiry was a fair and proper enquiry, the labour court had the jurisdiction to go into the question of mala fides of the management. In fact, Sri T. N. Sapru conceded that the labour court could go into the question of mala fides of the management. In Express Newspapers (Private), Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madras, and another [1964 - I L.L.J. 9 at 11] it was held that: "When the labour court came to the conclusion on a consideration of the evidence that the managements action was not bona fide but amounted to victimization of the employee, it would not have been open to the High Court in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to disturb that finding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record or on the ground that there was no evidence at all to support it." In the instant case I find no error apparent on the face of the record in the award of the labour court and since there was evidence before the labour court to support the plea of victimization, this Court will not interfere with the findings of the labour court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. For the reasons mentioned above I dismiss this petition with costs.