S.K. Mahajan, J.

1. This order will dispose of the revision petition filed by the petitioner against the order dated 13th March, 2001 passed by learned Additional District Judge dismissing the appeal of the petitioner against the order of the Civil Judge dated 17th February, 2000. The facts in brief relevant for deciding this petition are:

2. The petitioner was granted the licence by the respondents for running a tourist camp at Qudsia Garden, Opposite Kashmere Gate, Delhi. An agreement was entered into between the parties on 8th November, 1976 and the same was valid for a period of five years from the date of the agreement. Though the licence was initially for a fixed period of five years but the same was extended by the respondents regularly from time to time and the last extension was for the period ending 8th November, 1996. When the camp site was initially allotted to the petitioner in November, 1976 rent/licence fee of Rs. 8,551/- was fixed. With the licence being extended from time to time, the petitioner came to pay lastly a sum of Rs. 50,000/- per month as the licence fee. The respondent, it appears refused to renew the licence after November, 1996 and by letter dated 8th April, 1997 it informed the petitioner that the licence had expired on 8th November, 1996 and the petitioner, therefore, should remove himself from the site and hand over possession of the same to the respondents. This action of the respondents threatening to take possession of the site resulted in the petitioner filing suit for perpetual injunction for restraining the defendants/respondents from taking forcible possession of any portion of the land allotted to the plaintiff/petitioner for running the tourist camp at Qudsia Garden, opposite I.S.B.T., Kashmere Gate, Delhi except by the due process of law.

3. The case set up by the petitioner was that though initially the licence was for a period of five years but the same had been extended by the defendants regularly as per routine and with the due permission and consent of the defendants/respondents, the petitioner had made additions and alterations of permanent nature at the site and licence fee @ Rs. 50,000/- p.m. had been paid upto March, 1997. It was stated in the suit that the petitioners had in no way violated or committed breach of any of the terms of the agreement between the parties and the business was being run by the petitioners without any complaint from any quarter. It was stated that the petitioners had not been issued any show cause notice nor reasonable opportunity had been provided to them before calling upon them to hand over possession and in terms of the agreement, before the petitioner could be asked to hand over possession of the site, the respondents were required to offer compensation to the petitioner for the additions and alterations done by the petitioner at site with the approval of the respondents. It has also contended that though the agreement had been described as licence deed but the same in fact was a lease as the control of the entire area was exclusively with the petitioners and the respondents had no control over the same. It was stated that with the long user of the premises since 1976, a valuable right had accrued to the petitioner and they could not be dispossessed from the site without due process of law.

4. The defendants/respondents filed written statement and took the plea that the licence of the petitioner having been revoked, the petitioners had become trespassers and had no right to maintain the present suit. It was also stated in the written statement that after the expiry of the licence granted to the petitioners, the petitioners did not have any right to continue to occupy the site. It was submitted that legal possession all along remained with the respondents and the petitioner was only enjoying the site with the consent and permission of the respondents. It is submitted in the written statement that there was no necessity of issuing any show cause notice or granting any reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners before action was taken against them terminating the licence and getting the site evicted.

5. Alongwith the suit, the petitioner filed an application for the grant of an ad-interim injunction for restraining the respondents from dispossessing the petitioners from the site otherwise than by due process of law till the decision of the suit. This application of the petitioners for the grant of an injunction was dismissed by the Trial Court by order dated 17th February, 2000. Order of the Trial Court was challenged by way of appeal before the Additional District Judge. The Additional District Judge by the impugned order dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner holding that there was no infirmity in the order of the Trial Court. By way of the present revision petition, the petitioners have challenged the order passed by learned Additional District Judge on 13th March, 2001.

6. Mr. Amarjit Singh Chandhiok, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioners contend that since the petitioners were in settled possession of the premises, they could not be dispossessed therefrom without following the principles of natural justice and without due process of law. It was also his contention that the petitioners were in possession of the premises as lessees and not licensees. It is submitted that the petitioners were monthly tenant of the premises and the tenancy having not been terminated in accordance with law, they were entitled to continue to be in possession of the premises. It is further submitted that the respondents even after alleged expiry of the licence deed on 8th November, 1996 had been accepting the rent/licence fee till March, 1997 and the lease/licence, therefore, would be deemed to have been renewed for a further period of five years from 8th November, 1996. It was further argued by Mr. Chandhiok that in the year 1983 the respondents had taken back almost 50% of the property which was leased on 1976 and on such surrender a new demise was created in favour of the plaintiffs. It is also argued that by erecting structure of permanent nature, an irrevocable licence was created in favour of the petitioners and they thus could not be evicted from the premises. Reliance has been placed upon certain clauses of the lease deed to contend that it was not a licence but a lease and that the petitioners had been permitted to carry out additions and alterations at their own expense and with this clause existing in the agreement even assuming a licence was created in favour of the petitioners, such licence was of a permanent nature and the same could not be revoked. It is submitted that unless there was breach by the petitioners of the terms of the agreement, the respondents had no alternative but to renew the licence/lease for a further period of five years. It is also submitted that the reason for revocation given by the respondent was that the land was required for the Metro Rail Project, however, subsequently the respondents made it known to the petitioners that the land was not required for the Metro Rail Project. It was submitted that the ground on which the licence/lease was allegedly revoked being not available now, the licence/lease could not be revoked. It is submitted that the issues in this case had already been framed and it was, therefore, all the more necessary that the matter should be tried on merits and the petitioners should not be disturbed from the premises till such time the suit is decided by the Trial Court. Mr. Chandhiok has placed reliance upon the judgments reported as Krishna Ram Mahale v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, JT 1989 (3) SC 489 [LQ/SC/1989/394] ; R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (1995) 5 SCC 698 [LQ/SC/1995/780] ; Annamalai Club v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others, (1997) 3 SCC 169 [LQ/SC/1996/1747] ; Karthiyayani Amma v. Govindan, AIR 1980 Kerala 224; Sarladevi v. Shailesh, AIR 1996 Bombay 98; and Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Lal Singh, 1972 Rajdhani Law Reporter (N) 151.

7. Appearing on behalf of the respondents, Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Additional Solicitor General, has contended that there was no error of jurisdiction by any of the two Courts below in disposing of the interim application and the appeal and this petition was, therefore, not maintainable. It is also the contention of learned Additional Solicitor General that licence having expired by efflux of time, there was no right in the plaintiff to continue to be in possession of the premises. It was submitted that none of the three principles of Order XXXIX, namely, a prima-facie case; balance of convenience; and irreparable loss or injury, were in favour of the petitioners so as to entitle them for the grant of injunction in their favour. It was submitted that the petitioners at no time during the last about 25 years had asserted that their possession in the premises was that of a lessee and not a licensee. It is submitted that by the grant of licence, only a privilege was granted to the petitioners to come at the site and use it and legal possession always remained with the respondents. It is submitted that merely because the petitioners had been permitted to carry out certain construction with the consent of the respondents will not change the nature of the licence so as to make the same irrevocable. Mr. Rohtagi has placed reliance upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Chandu Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 15 (1979) DLT 168 (DB) =AIR 1978 Delhi 174; East India Hotels Limited v. Syndicate Bank, 1992 Suppl. (2) Supreme Court Cases 29; and Connoisseur Catering Services Private Limited v. Sports Authority of India, 88 (2000) Delhi Law Times 385 (DB).

8. In Chandu Lal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), the Court was concerned with the grant of temporary injunction in the case of a Kiosk which was given on licence by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi to the petitioner in that case. Dealing with the case, the Court held that although a person who is let into exclusive possession is prima facie to be considered a tenant, nevertheless if the circumstances negative such a conclusion and show that no tenancy was created, the person in possession would not be held to be a tenant. According to the Court, the intention of the parties is the real test for ascertaining the character of a document. Where under the agreement the licence was only for a period of 11 months in the first instance and thereafter for such term of renewal as may be mutually agreed from time to time, that the benefit of licence was neither transferable nor heritable, that licence was liable to be cancelled without assigning reasons that the Corporation was entitle to resume possession after revocation of the licence, it was held that the various clauses of the deed indicated that the intention of the parties was apparent that what was going to be auctioned was licensee rights and not tenancy rights. The Court in the facts of that case had held as under:

Although a person who is let into exclusive possession is prima facie to be considered a tenant, nevertheless if the circumstances negative such a conclusion and show that no tenancy was created, the person in possession would to be held to be a tenant. The intention of the parties is the real test for ascertaining the character of a document. If a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way but its possession and control remains with the owner thereof, it will be a licence. In such a case the legal possession remains with the owner of the property, the licensee being permitted to make use of the property for a particular purpose. It would, therefore, be seen that but for the permission the licensees possession would be unlawful. Exclusive possession does not militate against the concept of a licence, if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy. It is so also if the circumstances and the conduct of the parties show that what was intended was that the occupier should be granted a personal privilege with no interest in the land, he would be held to be a licensee.

Where the Delhi Municipal Corporation published that auction for the grant of licence of Kiosk is to be held and invited bids therefore and the terms of auction inter alia provided that the licence shall be for 11 months in the first instance and thereafter for such term of renewal as may be mutually agreed from time to time, that the benefit of licence was neither transferable nor heritable, that licence was liable to be cancelled without assigning reasons, that the Corporation was entitled to resume possession after revocation of the licence, held that the various clauses of the deed indicated that the intention of the parties was apparent that what was going to be auctioned was licensee rights and not tenancy rights.

A lease is not a mere contract but envisages and transfers an interest in the demised property creating a right in favour of the lessee in rem. A licence only makes an action lawful which without it would be unlawful but does not transfer any interest in favour of the licensee in respect of the property.

In the case of a licence there is something less than a right to enjoy the property in the licensee; it cannot be exercised by servants and agents and is the case of a lease, there is a transfer for a right to enjoy the property or in other words the lessee is entitled to enjoy the property. A bare licensee having no interest in the property cannot maintain an action for its possession. A mere licensee has only a right to use the property. Such a right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property but is only a personal privilege to the licensee. After the termination of the licence, the licensor is entitled to deal with the property as he likes. This right he gets as an owner in possession of his property. He need not secure a decree of the Court to obtain this right. He is entitled to resist in defence of his property the attempts of a trespasser to come upon his property by exerting the necessary and reasonable force to expel a trespasser. If, however, the licensor uses excessive force, he may make himself liable to be punished under a prosecution, but he will infringe no right of the licensee. No doubt a person in exclusive possession of the property is prima facie to be considered to be a tenant, nevertheless he would not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy.

9. After holding as above, the Full Bench of this Court was, therefore, of the opinion that temporary injunction can be granted if the case was covered by the three principles, namely, (i) on making out a prima facie case; (ii) on showing balance of convenience in petitioners favour, in that the refusal of the injunction would cause greater inconvenience to them; and (iii) whether on refusal of the injunction they would suffer irreparable loss. Granting an injunction is a matter of discretion and in its exercise the Court has to satisfy itself whether the petitioners have a triable case. Before invoking the jurisdiction of the Court to seek temporary injunction the petitioners are bound to show that they have a legal right and that there was an invasion of that right. It was held that where a licence is validly revoked the licensee has no right to retain possession and therefore would not be entitled to temporary injunction against his eviction. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Rohtagi upon this judgment to contend that the facts in the present case being exactly similar to in Chandu Lals case, the judgment was fully applicable and the petitioners were, therefore, not entitled to any injunction by the Court.

10. Reliance has also been placed by Mr. Rohtagi upon a judgment in East India Hotels Limited v. Syndicate Bank (supra). The facts in this case were that:

By an agreement dated December 27, 1974 the amount of Rs. 30 lakhs was advanced to the company on interest at the rate of 12.5 per cent per annum and the amount was repayable in ten years. The Syndicate Bank executed a leave and licence agreement in favour of the company in respect of 15,000 sq.ft. on the mezzanine to the ground floor of the Hotel Oberoi Towers situated at Nariman Point, Bombay on a monthly compensation of Rs. 60,000/- per month, belonging to the company, for a period of 12 years. The leave and licence agreement inter alia provided that at the end of the said period of 12 years, the company shall, on the application of the licensee in writing, renew the licence for another period of 12 years if the company so deems fit on the terms and conditions to be mutually agreed upon. Admittedly the company repaid the entire loan and interest within the scheduled period. The company by a letter dated September 17, 1984 reminded the bank that the agreement was going to expire on December 31, 1986. The company also stated that as they were cramped for space, the bank should vacate the premises at the end of the terms. The company by another letter dated April 18, 1986 again requested the bank to vacate the premises by the end of December, 1986. The bank by its letter dated July 8, 1986 requested the company that the period of license may be renewed for a further period of 12 years. The company by its letter dated August 9, 1986 informed the bank that the request for renewal of licence was not acceptable and again requested the bank to hand over vacant possession on the expiry of the terms. The bank did not hand over vacant possession of the premises even after December, 1986 and sent the monthly compensation to the bank (sic company). The company did not accept the amount nor acquiesced in the continuance of possession of the bank after the expiry of the period of licence which came to an end on December 31, 1986. Some correspondence went on between the parties but the company did not agree for the extension of the period of licence. The company ultimately served a legal notice through their Advocate on January 22, 1990 calling upon the bank to hand over vacant possession.

On April 12, 1990 a fire broke out in Oberoi Towers and as a result of which not only the bank but all the other shop owners had to vacate the premises. Thereafter, again some correspondence took place between the parties but the only circumstance necessary to be mentioned is that the bank started functioning its business at another place but its papers, furniture, fixtures, etc. continued to remain in the premises. Initially the company permitted the staff of the bank to visit the premises on three days in a week but subsequently with effect from July, 1990 the company did not permit them to enter the premises at all. In the above circumstances the bank filed a suit under Section 6 of theon August 29, 1990 on the original side of the Bombay High Court. The company filed a written statement and contested the suit.

The High Court after considering the various authorities held that the plaintiff bank was no doubt a licensee but even after the expiry of the licence period it cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law and the plaintiff being in settled possession for a long time, was entitled to file a suit under Section 6 of the.

11. The Bombay High Court in that case held that since Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act provided that a person having title in the land could file suit for the possession based on his title, the only course open to the company was to file a suit against the bank. The High Court was, therefore, of the view that relief under Section 6 could not be denied to the plaintiff bank and the decree was, accordingly, passed in favour of the petitioner directing the hotel to hand over possession to the bank. The matter was taken up in appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that admittedly the bank was a licensee in the premises and the period of licence though had come to an end on December 31, 1986 but company never took law into its own hands to dispossess the bank from the premises. A fire had broken out in the premises on 12th April, 1990 without any fault of any party which compelled the bank to close the business and vacate the premises and start the business elsewhere. It was as a result of fire in hotel on 12th April, 1990 that the premises was vacated by the bank and the bank was not doing any business in the premises on or after the date of fire. The officials of the bank were not thereafter permitted to enter the premises. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that they had no hesitation in holding that the purpose behind Section 6 of thewas to restrain a person from using force and to dispossess a person without his consent otherwise than by due process of law but in that case since the bank had not been dispossessed by use of force and on account of fire which had broken out on 12th April, 1990, the bank had to stop its business and in fact had started its business at some other place. The Supreme Court Bench was comprised of Honble Justice N.M. Kasliwal and Honble Justice K. Ramaswamy. Justice Kasliwal was, therefore, of the view that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the bank was not entitled to any decree under Section 6 of the. Allowing the appeal, suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. Justice K. Ramaswamy, however, did not agree with the view expressed by Justice Kasliwal and dismissed the appeal of the hotel. The matter was then placed before Honble the Chief Justice of India for constituting Larger Bench for resolving the conflict. Though there was a difference of opinion amongst the Judges in East India Hotels case, however, the view expressed by Justice Ramaswamy in the aforesaid case was approved by the Supreme Court in another judgment in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (supra). It was held by the Court that so long as the licensee has not been evicted in execution of the decree lawfully obtained, his possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act as a licensee is protected. Section 6 can be availed of to recover possession until he is lawfully dispossessed in due course of law. The Full Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Chandu Lals case was not approved by Justice K. Ramaswamy in his judgment in East India Hotels case. It was held by Justice Ramaswamy in the aforesaid case that it was difficult to approve the ratio in Chandu Lals case. In my opinion, since in both the cases, namely, East India Hotels case and R.V. Bhupal Prasads case, the Court was concerned with the interpretation of Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, they may not be strictly applicable to the facts of the present case.

12. In Krishna Ram Mahalev. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly held that where a person was in settled possession of the property even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. The Supreme Court in that case held that if any authority were needed for that proposition, they could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and Others, (1968) 2 SCR 203. [LQ/SC/1967/355] It was held by the Supreme Court that in India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court. Quoting the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Rattan and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977) 2 SCR 232 [LQ/SC/1976/460] , the Court held that a true owner had every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he was in the act or process of trespassing but that right was not available to the true owner if the trespasser had been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law required that the true owner, should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law.

13. The view taken by Justice Ramaswamy in East India Hotels Limited v. Syndicate Bank (supra), was again followed by the Supreme Court in Annamalai Club v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others (supra). The facts in this case were that the Annamalai Club was granted licence in respect of certain Government land. On 22nd May, 1992 notice under Section 3 of the Government Grants Act was issued terminating the licence of the club. The land was resumed and the possession thereof was taken with the assistance of police personnel. The Division Bench of the Madras High Court upheld the termination of the licence and recorded a finding that there was no legal impediment at all for resumption of possession of the lands by the Government without seeking any aid of the provisions of the PPE Act after the determination of the grant in the manner provided in the grant itself. This order of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court was challenged in the Supreme Court. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the resumption of possession unilaterally after determination of the grant in the manner provided in the grant itself was valid in law as held by the Madras High Court. The Supreme Court in this case held that the view taken by the Madras High Court was not correct in law. Quoting with approval a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1570, it was held that it was open to the State to take appropriate legal action for evicting a person after the determination of the lands, however, the State could not remove them from possession except under the authority of law. The following view of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh, 1989 (2) Supreme Court Cases 505, [LQ/SC/1989/26] was quoted with approval:

A lessor, with the best of title, has no right to resume possession extra-judicially by use of force, from a lessee, even after the expiry of earlier termination of the lease by forfeiture or otherwise. The use of the expression `re-entry in the lease deed does not authorise extra-judicial methods to resume possession. Under law, the possession of a lessee, even after the expiry or its earlier termination is juridical possession and forcible dispossession is prohibited; a lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law. In the present case, the fact that the lessor is the State does not place it in any higher or better position. On the contrary, it is under an additional inhibition stemming from the requirement that all actions of Government and governmental authorities should have a `legal pedigree. In Bishan Das v. State of Punjab, this Court said:

We must, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order......

Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic principle of the rule of law.

Therefore, there is no question in the present case of the Government thinking of appropriating to itself an extra-judicial right of re-entry. Possession can be resumed by Government only in a manner known to or recognised by law. It canot resume possession otherwise than in accordance with law. Government is, accordingly, prohibited from taking possession otherwise than in due course of law.

14. The Supreme Court also approved the following view of Justice Ramaswamy in East India Hotels Limited v. Syndicate Bank (supra) :

They must obtain such possession as they are entitled to by proper course. In our jurisprudence governed by rule of law even an unauthorised occupant can be ejected only in the manner provided by law. The remedy under Section 6 is summary and its object is to prevent self-help and to discourage people to adopt any means fair or foul to dispossess a person unless dispossession was in due course of law or with consent.

What is meant by due course of law Due course of law in each particular case means such an exercise of the powers by duly constituted Tribunal or Court in accordance with the procedure established by law under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights. A course of legal proceedings according to the rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the enforcement and protection of private rights. To give such proceedings any validity, there must thus be a Tribunal competent by its constitution, that is by law of its creation to pass upon the subject matter of the suit or proceeding; and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant, it must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance. Due course of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present before the Tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty or property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise, and to have the right determination of the controversy by proof, every material fact which bears on the question of fact of liability be conclusively proved or presumed against him. This is the meaning of due course of law in a comprehensive sense.

It is thus clear that the Courts have viewed with askance any process other than strict compliance of law as valid in dispossessing a person in occupation of immovable property against his consent. The reason is obvious that it aims to preserve the efficacy of law and peace and order in the society relegating the jurisprudential perspectives to a suit under Section 5 of theand restitute possession to the person dispossessed, irrespective of the fact whether he has any title to possession or not.

15. Supreme Court has in the aforesaid judgments clearly held that after the termination of the licence the Government is entitled to resume possession but resumption of possession does not mean unilaterally taking possession without recourse to law. The Eviction Act contemplates such a procedure. Premises defined under the means any land or any building or a part of a building or hut or any enclosure appurtenant thereto. Section 4 prescribes procedure of issuance of a notice of show cause and thereafter taking action under Section 5 of the. It was held that after determination of the grant though a person in whose favour the grant was made had no right to remain in possession, the State cannot unilaterally take possession without taking recourse to procedure provided under the.

16. Coming now to the facts of this case, it is clear that the petitioners are in settled possession of the premises since November, 1976. It is not denied that the petitioners had raised construction though with the permission of the respondent. At the time of deciding this application though this Court is not deciding the question as to whether the petitioner was in possession of the premises as a lessee or a licensee, however, it cannot be denied that for the last about 25 years the petitioner had been in possession of the premises without any interference by any person including the respondent. In Chandu Lals case it was held by the Full Bench of this Court that in the case of a licence there is something less than the right to enjoy the property in the licensee and a mere licensee has only a right to use the property, such a right does not amount to an easement of an interest in the property but is only a personal privilege to the licensee, the licensor is entitled to deal with the property as he likes. This right he gets as an owner in possession of his property and he need not secure a decree of the Court to obtain this right. It was held that the licensor is entitled to resist in defence of his property the attempts of a trespasser to come upon his property by exerting the necessary and reasonable force to expel a trespasser. It was held that no doubt a person in exclusive possession of the property is, prima facie, to be considered to be a tenant, nevertheless he would not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy. In the present case, as I have already held the Court is only taking a prima facie view of the matter and prima facie it appears to the Court that the petitioner is in exclusive possession of the property. Being in exclusive possession of the property, in my opinion, the petitioner has a right to resist any invasion of his right by the respondent threatening to dispossess the petitioner by use of force. The Full Bench judgment of this Court was in any case not approved by Justice K. Ramaswamy in East India Hotels Limited v. Syndicate Bank (supra), and view of Justice K. Ramaswamy taken in that judgment was approved by the Supreme Court in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others (supra); Annamalai Club v. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others (supra). It has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court that a person who continues to remain in possession even after the termination of the licence is not a mere trespasser in respect of the said property. Law makes a distinction between persons in juridical possession and rank trespassers. Law respects possession even if there is no valid title to support it. Law does not permit any person to take law into his hands and to dispossess a person in actual possession without having recourse to a Court. The object thereby is to encourage compliance of the rule of law and to deprive the person who wanted a person in lawful possession removed from possession according to proper form and to prevent him from going with a high band and eject such person. Undoubtedly, the true owner is entitled to retain possession even though he had obtained it by force or by other unlawful means but that would not be ground to permit the owner to take the law into his own hands and eject the person in juridical possession or settled possession without recourse to law. The fact that the licence was being extended from time to time after the expiry of every five years and even after the alleged expiry on 8th November, 1996 the respondent had been accepting the licence fee from the petitioner, in my prima facie opinion, prove that the petitioners were in possession of the premises which was given on licence to the petitioners by the respondent and their possession cannot be disturbed without due process of law. At this stage, it will not make any difference whether the possession of the petitioner was that of a licensee or a lessee. The petitioners were in juridical possession of the premises and were enjoying the same without any interference from any person. In my view, therefore, both the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court were not correct to hold that once the licence has come to an end, the petitioner had no right to retain possession thereof and would not be entitled to temporary injunction against its eviction. As already held above, even assuming that the petitioner after the alleged termination of the licence was required to hand over possession of the premises to the respondent but on his refusal to hand over such possession, the State, and for that matter the respondent, is not entitled to take law in its own hands by trying to take forcible possession of the premises. The respondent must obtain such possession, as they are entitled to, by due process of law.

17. In my opinion, the plaintiff was able to make out a prima facie case. The balance of convenience, in my opinion, is also in favour of the plaintiff and the plaintiff will also suffer irreparable loss in case he is evicted from the premises in a manner otherwise than by due process of law. Petitioner is running a tourist camp at the site which is the source of his livelihood and in case of dispossession by force, he will be deprived of such livelihood which, in my opinion, cannot be compensated in terms of money. Both the Courts below have acted with immaterial irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction by not granting injunction in favour of the petitioner.

18. I, accordingly, allow this petition, set aside the orders of the Courts below and grant an injunction in favour of the petitioner restraining the respondent from in any manner disturbing the possession of the petitioner in the premises otherwise than by due process of law. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties are left to bear their own costs.