1. We are invited in this case to set aside an order made u/s 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code restraining the petitioners Rashbehari Singh and others from entering upon land of which they were formerly lessees under the Collector. This land has now been settled by the Collector with another party. On the 26th February 19l7 a similar order was made against these same petitioners. That order came before this Court in review and by the decision of Mr. Justice Mullick, dated the 24th April 1917, it was held that there had not been any illegal assumption of jurisdiction nor an excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Deputy Magistrate in issuing the order. The application was, therefore, rejected. That order, being dated 28th February 1917, expired on the 28th April last; the order now complained of was issued on the 6th of June and expired to-day. We are asked to set it aside on the ground that it was in fact a continuation of the first order and that under the terms of Section 144 itself any continuation of an order beyond a period of two months requires the sanction of the Local Government. The ground upon which this fresh order was issued was that the second party insisted upon going and ploughing the land in question in spite of their having been previously restrained u/s 144. The reason for which they insisted upon ploughing the land is that they were accused in a criminal case of rioting with regard to crops out from the. land on the 25th February and have been acquitted upon that charge on the ground that they grew those crops and were entitled to take them away. It is much to be regretted that this case did not come before us earlier. We view with disapproval the use of Section 144 for anything of the nature of a permanent expedient. It is idle to suggest that the Legislature intended that a man may be restrained once u/s 144, and that then if he states his intention of again doing the same thing a further order may be made against him. The logical conclusion to such a suggestion would be that if a Magistrate chooses to allow one day to elapse between the expiry of one order and the issue of another he is at liberty to continue ad libitum to extend an injunction u/s 144 without the sanction of the Local Government.

2. In the case before us there does not seem to have been any deliberate intention to usurp jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the order has this day expired, we do not think it necessary to set it aside or to say more than we have done. We would ask the District Magistrate himself to give his attention to this matter and to look into the real rights of the parties. If the applicants are likely to commit a breach of the peace and are clearly in the wrong, the proper course is to take proceedings u/s 107. This has been so frequently said in the Calcutta Court that we should have thought it was not necessary to repeat it. It does seem necessary, however, and we wish it to be understood that if this order is again repeated, the Court will have no hesitation in setting it aside.